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Working time has been a central workforce issue since the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution, and a central issue of labour policy since at least the
adoption of the Factories Act of 1844 in the United Kingdom limiting the
working hours of women and children.  Working time was also the subject
of the very first international labour standard, the Hours of Work (Industry)
Convention, 1919 (No. 1). Over the years, working time has continued to 
be central to the work of the International Labour Organization (ILO),
which has adopted international standards on a variety of working time 
related subjects, including not only standards establishing limits on working
hours, but also those providing for minimum weekly rest periods, paid
annual leave, protections for night workers and equal treatment for part-
time workers.
The ILO has defined a concept of “decent work” that involves
“promot[ing] opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and
productive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human
dignity” (ILO, 1999, p. 6). This vision of decent work animates all the ILO’s
efforts across four broad strategic objectives: advancing fundamental
principles and rights at work; promoting employment; strengthening social
protection; and expanding social dialogue. During the past few years,
different programmes within the ILO have worked to apply the broad
concept of decent work to their specific fields of inquiry. Based upon 
both the existing international labour standards on working time and 
recent research on working time trends and developments focusing on
industrialized countries, five significant dimensions of “decent working
time” have recently been proposed: working time arrangements should be
healthy; “family-friendly”; promote gender equality; advance enterprise
v
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productivity; and facilitate worker choice and influence over their hours of
work (Messenger (ed.), 2004).1 These five dimensions of “decent working
time” provide a broad policy framework – grounded in long-standing ILO
principles such as equality of opportunity and treatment between women and
men in the world of work2 – that establishes a basis from which to consider
how the goal of decent work can be advanced in the area of working time.
In its programme of work on working time and work organization, the 
ILO is seeking to advance “decent working time” by two related means of action:
• building its knowledge base via information collection and research on
a range of issues, including national laws on working time, actual hours
of work, various types of “flexible” working time arrangements 
(e.g., part-time work, flexi-time), rest periods and paid annual leave,
etc.; and
• applying this expanded knowledge base to provide practical tools and
technical advisory services to assist ILO constituents (governments and
employers’ and workers’ organizations) to develop and implement
appropriate policies and practices regarding working time and work
organization – both at the national level and in the workplace.
In addition, the ILO is in the process of considering the implications of
the recent General Survey report on two of the most important inter-
national labour standards on working time, the Hours of Work (Industry)
Convention, 1919 (No. 1) and the Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices)
Convention, 1930 (No. 30) (ILO, 2005).3 This report, based on survey
questionnaires submitted by ILO member States regarding their working
time laws and practices, concluded that, while “it remains important and
relevant to provide for minimum standards of working hours . . . the changes
that have taken place since these two instruments were adopted warrant their
revision” (ibid., p. 105). While at the present time there is no consensus for
such a revision, having access to the best available information regarding
working time trends and developments will help to inform the decision 
of the ILO’s Governing Body regarding the appropriate course of action to
take with respect to these two standards. It will also inform any potential
future discussion of working time, such as at a Tripartite Meeting of 
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1 Each of these five dimensions of “decent working time” is discussed at length in the concluding chapter of this
volume.
2 This principle is enshrined in a number of international labour Conventions, most notably the Discrimination
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111).
3 This report was prepared by the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations.
Experts4 or at the International Labour Conference – the body that
ultimately makes the decisions on the adoption and revision of international
labour standards.
As the premier network of international researchers in the field of
working time, the International Symposium on Working Time – ISWT 
(Le Séminaire International sur le Temps de Travail – SITT) represents an
important source of knowledge regarding working time trends and develop-
ments, as well as an essential forum for the exchange of ideas. As such, the
ISWT/SITT network offers an important resource for assisting the ILO with
building its knowledge base regarding working time and informing any future
discussions and debates on this subject. The Symposium itself, which is held
every few years, brings together scholars in the field of working time to
address new trends and new issues in working hours and the organization of
working time from across the industrialized world. 
The Ninth International Symposium on Working Time, convened in
Paris on 26–28 February 2004 and co-sponsored by the ILO, focused on the
profound changes that have been occurring in the nature of working time,
and indeed in the nature of the employment relationship itself. The new
trends that have emerged over the past decade or two – such as the increasing
use of results-based employment relationships for managers and
professionals; an increasing fragmentation of time to more closely tailor
staffing needs to customer requirements (e.g., short-hours part-time work);
and the dramatic expansion of operating/opening hours with the move
towards a 24-hour and 7-day economy – have resulted in a growing diversi-
fication, decentralization and individualization of working hours, as well as
an increasing tension between enterprises’ business requirements and
workers’ needs and preferences regarding their hours. This new reality has
raised some new issues as well, such as those regarding increasing
employment insecurity and instability; time-related social inequalities,
particularly in relation to gender; workers’ ability to balance their paid work
with their personal lives; and even the synchronization of working hours
with social times, such as community activities.
The results of the Ninth International Symposium on Working Time
provide a better understanding of current developments in working time
across the industrialized world; how those developments vary across different
countries and under different sets of socio-economic circumstances; and the
public and enterprise policies that are the best suited to addressing these
Foreword
vii
4 A proposal to conduct a Tripartite meeting of Experts on Working Time will be considered by the ILO’s Governing
Body in March 2006.
developments. The carefully selected set of papers from the Paris Symposium
that is presented in this volume represents an important contribution to
building our knowledge base from some of the leading scholars in the field of
working time. As such, these papers provide a wealth of information for
policy-makers, the social partners and academics, and will also assist the ILO
in further developing and refining the proposed policy framework for
advancing “decent working time”.
Jon C. Messenger
Senior Research Officer
International Labour Office
Geneva
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The International Symposium on Working Time (ISWT) is an interdisciplinary
research network set up in the late 1980s. In the ensuing period there has been
no lack of policies and debates on this issue. These include the processes of
reducing working time and increasing the flexibility of working time; the
growth of part-time working; the consequences of these policies on
employment and working conditions; and the transformation of social
working time norms, brought about as much by the reductions of working
time as by the sizeable new types of flexibility introduced into schedules and
working patterns established in most industrialized countries. All these
matters have constituted the crux of the work carried out by the ISWT. In
particular, its research has aimed to examine, analyse and evaluate government
working time policies and the strategies of employers and trade unions in the
main countries of the industrialized world (Europe, North America, Japan and
Australia) from the perspective of international comparison. The effects of
these policies and strategies on employment, working and living conditions
have also been a focus for research. 
The work has highlighted the distinctive national industrial relations
characteristics, particularly in terms of the methods for organizing industrial
relations and family relations. It has shown how these distinctive features are
taken into account and reinforced by the choice of employment policies, and
how their effects intersect with those of the economic constraints impacting
on the policies and methods of the organization and reduction of working
time. The research has also stressed the effect of industry-specific differences
on the methods of organizing working time, by highlighting, for example, that
service-sector activities differ considerably from the industrial model on
which the economic literature has long been based. Lastly, this work has
Jean-Yves Boulin, Michel Lallement and François Michon
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heavily emphasized the social inequalities developing in the field of working
time, in particular gender-based ones.
This book is the second collection of ISWT research to be published by
the International Labour Organization (ILO).1 The first (Bosch et al., 1994)
marked the completion of the network’s initial phase of activity. The goal 
was thus to review and assess the policies, concerns and methods of regulating
working time in the industrialized countries. This phase was encapsulated 
in the building up of a research network in a period during which inter-
national comparison as a methodology ultimately became dominant within
academic concerns.
A good decade or so later, economic and social concerns and stakes are
greatly changed, especially in terms of working time. This second book uses
the “decent working time” perspective advocated by the ILO to evaluate the
recent transformations of working time and of the policies implemented in the
last few years: the use of instruments for increasing the flexibility of working
time, methods for reducing as well as extending working time; the
intensification and degradation of working conditions as well as changes in the
social organization of time (working time, time devoted to other activities,
time set aside for leisure and family) to ensure “lifelong learning” and greater
“work–life balance”; and the growth of new time-related social inequalities (in
particular issues specific to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) –
women, managerial staff, older workers, etc.). This evaluation framework is
obviously a fruitful one.
The various chapters in this book are taken from the highlights of the
work presented at the Ninth International Symposium on Working Time
(ISWT) conference. During this conference, a sizeable body of contributions
stressed the powerful relationships bringing together the various facets of the
change that working time is going through: the changes in working hours and,
as a result, in the organization of working time, and the time set aside for
family and leisure. The difficulties of harmonizing “supply side” and “demand
side” have been identified and studied using concepts such as “working time
gaps” and “decent-work deficits”. Many contributions have emphasized the
effects of such changes on the control that employees (and the organizations
representing them) might have over their working time, and the losses of
autonomy to which they are subject in terms of their working patterns. The
processes involved in the social construction of time, productive and social-
time periods, have been described using a range of methodologies (surveys,
data analysis, etc.). It was underlined at the conference that the social
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1 These two books do not make up the ISWT’s entire published output. To consult the findings of other research
undertaken in the network, see Michon and Taddei (1991); Bosch et al. (1994); Anxo et al. (1995); Bosch et al. (1997).
construction constituted by “working time” is indeed part and parcel of the
general process of transforming productive organizations and the employment
relationship, and also how much employees’ relationships with their own
personal time are heterogeneous or even individualized, and in any case vary
widely among different groups of workers. Naturally the gender issue is
crucial to this variation, and can be found virtually everywhere in the thread 
of this book’s arguments. Indeed, it is around such concerns that this book 
is structured.
In this collection, international comparative studies stand alongside
national case studies. In Part I, this book attempts to describe the “New
Stakes and Policies” in the industrialized countries and, using a range of
approaches, examines the transformations and adjustments between
productive and social organizations, preferred choices, and individual and
collective constraints.
This section of the book thus begins with a long-term review of 20 years
of the transformations of working time, economic and social stakes and
working time policy objectives implemented in the industrialized countries. 
In Chapter 1, Jean-Yves Boulin, Michel Lallement and François Michon explore
the point of the concept of “decent working time” in the design, drafting and
assessment of policy. The authors identify some limits and paradoxes, and even
a few apparent contradictions, which they suggest may be raised by the decent
working time approach, in particular with respect to the European Employment
Strategy. How can increasing working time be reconciled with the
implementation of work–life balance policies? How can the productive
flexibility demanded by business be reconciled with individual flexibility to take
the wishes and needs of employees into account? These two issues generate
another one: “Should working time policies therefore be reconfigured to more
effectively anchor them in the decent working time approach?”
In Chapter 2, Gerhard Bosch links the analysis of working time with an
overview of the changes in the standard employment relationship. In doing so,
he argues against a number of theories which form the conventional wisdom
about the breakdown and erosion of this employment norm and which some
attribute to the coming of the information society. Without denying the
existence of major changes, which he describes using empirical data, he suggests
paving the way for a new model of a flexible labour relationship that resonates
with the concerns inherent in decent working time – that is, the promotion of
internal flexibilities of labour organization within firms, the extension of
lifelong learning to all individuals, the growth of care structures, etc.
Sangheon Lee and Deirdre McCann clearly share Bosch’s concern, that is,
to contribute to thinking through the growing trend towards the individ-
ualization of the labour and employment relationship in the most beneficial
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possible industrial relations context (Chapter 3). Building on Sen’s theory of
“capabilities”, Lee and McCann stress the significance of industrial relations
infrastructure and more generally of institutions, in order to make working
time schemes viable enough for individuals to accept. The authors then discuss
practical legal steps that can bolster genuine decent working time: equal
treatment with regard to wages, benefits, promotions and so on for full- and
part-time workers; entitlement, if the employee so wishes, to withdraw from
the labour market to bring up children, and so on. What is at stake, the authors
add, is to place an entire legal infrastructure at an employee’s disposal: an
infrastructure whose actual utilization does not generate more inequalities
than already exist in the labour market.
Dominique Anxo, Jean-Yves Boulin and Colette Fagan (Chapter 4)
demonstrate how viewing working time from a life-course perspective leads to
imagining new forms of the organization of time, in order that individuals may
more effectively adjust their own time between paid work and other family-
oriented, social and leisure activities. Of course, life-course arrangements are
becoming more diverse, as the authors point out, but much remains to be
done. The writers emphasize how much, from this viewpoint, the embedding
of working time policies in a life-course perspective and the concept of decent
working time are intimately connected. The life-course perspective offers a
solid basis for advancing decent working time, while the latter suggests that
numerous criteria can be used for assessing the effectiveness of these life-
course policies.
Lastly, to end the first section of the book, Jill Rubery, Kevin Ward and
Damian Grimshaw’s Chapter 5 presents the findings of a survey on the
various reconfigurations of the employment relationship now under way in
the United Kingdom. They emphasize the degree to which working time lies
at the crux of these transformations. Their interpretative framework locates
companies’ management of working time at the intersection of: (i) employ-
ment relationships that develop between employees, employers and their
representatives; (ii) the organization of productive activities; and (iii) the
domestic sphere. Their findings describe two new working time arrangements
that have developed in British firms: on the one hand, a results-based
employment system, characterized by long hours, and, on the other hand, a
more fragmented time-based system. Their work confirms that a clear
deterioration in the job satisfaction of British employees in terms of their
working hours can now be witnessed.
Part II focuses on “Individual Choices and Collective Options”, and
examines the real nature of the individual preferences that are used to justify
systems of flexible working time organization. It introduces some assessments
(from the decent working time perspective) of the comparative merits of the
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regulations that either promote individual choices or introduce collective
amendments to working time.
The book’s second part begins with an essay by Didier Fouarge and
Christine Baaijens (Chapter 6) that puts forward an assessment of the 
effects of the Adjustment of Working Hours Act introduced by the Dutch
Government in July 2000. This policy’s goal was to oblige employers to allow
employees to seek longer or shorter individual working hours, in order to
obtain their preferred hours. The authors’ findings show the minimal impact
(over a very short period, however) of the measures comprising the Adjustment
of Working Hours Act. Only a small proportion of employees dissatisfied with
their working hours managed to adjust them to their needs; moreover, the
majority of the changes made were obtained through changing jobs, whereas
the Adjustment of Working Hours Act aimed to reach this goal without
employees having to change jobs. These findings show that upward
adjustments in working hours can be made more easily than downward
adjustments, and that men’s working time preferences are more stable than
women’s. All these findings imply that decent working time has a long way to
go even in the Netherlands – a country that, however, is exemplary in terms of
the large-scale presence of part-time workers who have supposedly actually
opted to work those hours. 
Pascal Charpentier, Michel Lallement, Florence Lefresne and Jocelyne
Loos-Baroin question to what extent the French 35-hour-week experiment has
contributed to the improvement of decent working time (Chapter 7) in that
country. Basing their work on four firm monographs, enabling an in-depth
longitudinal analysis of the implementation process and the effects of the
second Aubry Act to be carried out, they link various constituent criteria for
decent working time – most importantly the opportunities for employees’
choice and control over their working time, working and employment con-
ditions on the one hand, and companies’ economic performance requirements
on the other. Refusing to gloss over the potential for conflict within this range
of criteria, they aim to identify the types of combinations that can exist within
companies. First, the authors make no attempt to hide their surprise when
they find that a reduction in working time of this scope was desirable neither
for employers nor for employees. Yet both groups responded negatively to
later attempts to back-pedal over the 35-hour week. Second, they point out
that if the compromises made by the parties concerned have established
working time arrangements that are not entirely satisfactory, almost nobody
thinks of scrapping them. The authors here stress the degree to which the
stability of the organization of working time that results from a compromise
within a firm is a significant dimension that should be incorporated in the
concept of decent working time.
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Lonnie Golden devotes Chapter 8 to the issue of overemployment in the
United States: the fact that employees work longer hours than those they
would actually like, the exact opposite of what decent working time suggests.
Although the incidence of overemployment is actually relatively limited in the
United States (despite substantial variation among the available empirical
studies), the phenomenon is highly concentrated in particular industries,
occupations, and categories of workers, especially women and the parents of
young children. The author identifies that in the United States (as well as in
the United Kingdom), substantial overemployment coexists with an even
higher level of underemployment (i.e., people who have shorter working
hours than those to which they aspire). He makes the same observation as
Fouarge and Baaijens: to enable actual working hours and working time
preferences to coincide, employees usually have to change jobs. Yet, unlike
Fouarge and Baaijens, he makes a plea for the introduction of collective rules
allowing American workers to exercise a minimum of control over their
working schedules, so that they can alter their working time depending on the
various phases and events in their working and personal lives.
In Chapter 9, Mara Yerkes and Jelle Visser look at whether part-time
work, and specifically the one-and-one-half earner model developed in the
Netherlands, fits with the decent working time criteria. The authors compare
part-time working conditions in three countries in which part-time working is
particularly widespread – Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
In these countries, as elsewhere, part-time working is a form of employment
in which women predominate massively, and they nicely illustrate the
continuing prevalence of the male breadwinner model. Yet part-time working
does not really match the preferences of women except in the Netherlands –
where, indeed, it has been completely normalized, with an equivalent set of
rights established in law. However, part-time work is still very much marred
by discriminatory treatment in the other two countries. Yet, although part-
time working seems to match the criteria for decent working time in the
Netherlands, one question posed by Yerkes and Visser is why this form of
employment is still occupied overwhelmingly by women.
Part III – “Flexibilities and Conditions of Work” – addresses new forms
of flexibility in working time and their twin effects on working conditions and
non-working time. Nicole Gadrey, Florence Jany-Catrice and Martine
Pernod-Lemattre (Chapter 10) focus on the working conditions of unskilled
white-collar workers in the service industries in France. These researchers
show how the temporal availability required from unskilled clerical workers
brings into play the dimensions of timing, variability and predictability of
work schedules, and thus constitutes a crucial aspect of the hardships faced by
today’s service-sector workforce. This temporal availability criterion seems to
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raise questions about the concept of decent working time that are all the more
relevant, as it is indeed a central element of the changes currently impacting on
working conditions.
Oddly (but is it really that odd?), a similar examination based on
temporal availability is repeated in relation to the highly skilled work
accomplished by managers. Jouko Nätti, Timo Anttila and Mia Väisänen
(Chapter 11) attempt to delineate the features of the new working time regime
that is now emerging in Finland in the field of knowledge work, more
specifically among managers. They note the extension of what they refer to as
“the ambiguity of working time” – the impossibility of really setting temporal
limits, and the lengthening of working times well beyond the norms contained
in collective agreements. Although managers’ work is still characterized in
principle by a large degree of autonomy, this does not prevent negative
outcomes impinging on managers’ social and family lives, especially those who
show a marked preference for shorter hours – that is, this is a kind of lack of
decent working time.
In Chapter 12, Thomas Haipeter describes the new methods for injecting
flexibility into working time established in German companies – in particular
the working time accounts systems, which are decentralized, negotiated
systems exempt from the norms contained in sector-level collective
agreements, and which aim more effectively to meet employees’ individual
needs. He looks at the risk of the erosion of collective standards that the
growth of these company systems brings about, and the difficulties
encountered by the unions and works councils on this issue. Above all, he
observes that works councils are struggling to get flexible working time
systems implemented at company level. Obtaining negotiated rules at that
level which assumes a genuinely “normative power” is not possible without
serious difficulties because, in the face of market constraints, these rules carry
little weight. The criteria for achieving decent working time seem, therefore,
to be difficult to satisfy using this method, without a more centralized form of
regulation – although strong, proactive works councils can make a difference.
The fourth section of this book – “Quality, Efficiency and Inequalities”
– suggests linking the theme of decent working time to the issues of quality of
work, economic efficiency and social inequalities. In his study of Japan
(Chapter 13), Thierry Ribault offers an initial explanation by theorizing that
the structural transformations related to Japan’s shift to service-sector
activities have had determining impacts on time management. Using a
framework borrowed from the French “conventions school”, he shows in
more detail that three types of systems interact: income, family and temporal
availability. Analysing the interaction between these various components
sheds light on the determining role of the age and gender variables in the
Introduction
7
process of decommodification now under way in the Japanese economy. In 
the picture he draws, Ribault demonstrates that atypical work schedules are
becoming more widespread; this is the case among young workers, as well as
in the category of men occupying normal forms of employment. Women are
found more in part-time employment statuses (pâto), especially when they
reach an intermediate age, at which point, the issue of the compatibility
between occupational and domestic commitments arises. Finally, as in other
countries, the distribution of domestic tasks is changing slowly – proof that
although, with the help of flexible working, the distribution of time is
changing in the occupational sphere, such changes are much less obvious when
the focus is on the personal sphere.
The study by Paul Bouffartigue and Jacques Bouteiller (Chapter 14) reveals
concerns that converge with those structuring the argument of the preceding
chapter. Unlike that chapter, however, this one is comparative in two ways – it
analyses three different countries (Belgium, Spain and France), and two different
professions (nurses and bank managerial staff). One of the major findings of this
investigation is that dynamics specific to each occupational group seem to take
precedence over the social characteristics structuring the organization of work
and industrial relations in each country. From this perspective, also, gender
emerges as a determinant at all three levels studied here, that is, “formalized time”,
“represented time” and “experienced time”. There are, however, still some
irreducible societal effects (e.g., part-time working is much less widespread in
Spain) against a general backdrop of changes in working time which, in all three
countries, link the intensity of work, flexibility, and the growing diversity of
employment statuses and situations.
This trend towards the reconfiguration of time worked is also at the crux
of the analysis undertaken by Isik Zeytinoglu and Gordon Cooke (Chapter
15). More precisely, they investigate the determining factors of regular weekend
work in Canada, starting from the understanding that behind such a form of
working time organization a series of problems deserving attention can be
identified – such as its effects on health and social life; its real impacts on
productive efficiency; and the creation of new forms of inequality in which
weekday workers and weekend workers are on either side of a dividing line.
Without claiming to have answers to all the questions directly related to decent
working time, Zeytinoglu and Cooke contribute empirical evidence, thanks to
a statistical analysis of the factors that are associated with weekend working. In
any society that some people happily imagine is open 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week, in this case Canada, weekend workers are often people who have a
number of disadvantages: lower education and skill levels, temporary contracts
and part-time work (although here they are often covered by collective
agreements). Although a testimony to the power of the trend towards
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extending working time beyond the boundaries of the standard work-week,
weekend work is not the province of only a small minority of employees. 
To end the book, or rather not to end it, Jon Messenger offers an
interpretative synthesis of the various contributions to this volume
summarized above. Based on the findings that he highlights, as well as the
unanswered questions that he identifies (of which there are still many), he
outlines some prospective approaches that could build on and enrich the
decent working time policy framework. Finally, he sketches an agenda for
future research on working time that will, we hope, provide a structure for
much future work.
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PART I
NEW STAKES AND POLICIES

1.1 INTRODUCTION
Changes in working time and in the life course (its length, patterns and
timetables) as economic and social issues – and even the stated objectives of
working time policies – are, all things considered, very similar in the large
developed economies. Trends in working time, related concerns and policies
have knock-on effects upon one another, and explain these changes. Moreover,
in the contemporary context of international competition due to global-
ization, each country is seeking explanations for others’ success and trying 
to reproduce the “winning formula” at home. Although the issues in each
country seem more convergent than ever, on closer inspection there are still
considerable national differences, both in working time and in the ways of
understanding the main issues of the moment and translating them into
objectives and policy instruments. There is an interminable list of distinctive
regional and national characteristics, particularly distinguishing the North
American continent from Europe, the British Isles from continental Europe,
northern from southern Europe and so on. So it is this mixture of shared and
specific dynamics and concerns which at the same time marks the field of
working time.
This chapter attempts to analyse the ways in which the trends and
stakes of working time have changed during recent decades (section 1.2).
The utility of the concept of “decent working time” will then be examined
in the light of these changes, by emphasizing its heuristic contribution, and
the perspectives and implications that the term suggests in respect of
working time policy (section 1.3). The limits and even the paradoxes of such
a concept when applied to a heterogeneous world of national spaces can thus
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be stipulated. The paradoxes and contradictions of policies, in this case EU
ones, will then be stressed (section 1.4). Finally, we will show how the
notion of “decent working time” suggests some reconfigurations of these
policies (section 1.5).
1.2 WORKING TIME: ISSUES AND POLICIES OVER 
THE LAST DECADES
Let us first note that the reduction of working time is a long-standing
phenomenon. Estimates of annual working time put forward by Maddison
(2001) trace the path covered since the early twentieth century: from roughly
2,600 hours per person in the years before the Second World War to between
1,400 and 1,800 hours now, depending on the country. Naturally, these
estimates are approximate, especially those for the earliest period. The
comparability of national data is highly problematic, but in regard to current
levels, the long-term trend is incontestable (figure 1.1). 
Economic prosperity plus sustained growth, whose stability seems
assured, and full employment, characterize the 30 “glorious” years in industri-
alized countries between the immediate post-war period of reconstruction
and the first oil crisis. In the 1960s and 1970s, the threat hanging over the
economic future seemed to be that of labour shortages, entailing a growth
bottleneck and destabilizing inflation. To make up for these shortages, new
workforce seams were mined: immigration and the large-scale entry of women
into the labour market. Working patterns simultaneously intensified, and 
shift work became more widespread in order to make better use of heavy
equipment. On the other hand, a policy of improving working conditions
appeared to be indispensable.
The observation of the hardships involved in “timed and repetitive” tasks
imposed by assembly lines in the car-manufacturing industry in Europe and
the United States nicely encapsulates the concerns of that era in the
industrialized world, and the interest shown in the experiments in
reorganizing labour engaged in by some American and Scandinavian car
manufacturers to enrich work, increase the organizational autonomy of
assembly-line workers, and break the mandatory alignment of everybody’s
working patterns and timetables with the imperatives of a standardized form
of organization. Such experiments were also aimed at reducing and
reorganizing working time, but with a view to diminishing the hardship of the
labour force’s working conditions. The range of concerns then was far smaller
than that later attributed to working time policies. In particular, the objectives
of “flexibility” lay within much more restrictive parameters than those of
today. One such initiative was to implement individual flexi-time schemes – a
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system of time organization enabling each worker to obtain greater levels of
personal satisfaction with his/her constraints and wishes, etc. by satisfying the
time needs of individuals first – even though the restrictive parameters of
labour force requirements (i.e. attracting new groups into the workforce) were
always there (Rehn, 1972).
This “golden age” appears to have gone for good. The oil crises of the
mid-1970s ushered in a new era. Due to uncertain growth and rising
unemployment, the stakes had changed. The emblematic employment
relationship of the period, that is, a permanent full-time contract and a job
“for life”, at least in the large industrial firms, is now giving way to a large
number of forms of atypical and more “flexible” employment contracts. The
fight against unemployment and for job creation has dominated the political
and industrial relations agendas of many European countries. The reduction
of working time, followed by the organization and reduction of working
time (the goal of reducing working time thus combining with that of flexible
reorganization of work in order to improve productive efficiency) have 
been addressed in Europe as employment and work-sharing policies 
(Gauvin and Michon, 1989). It is hardly surprising that the economic and
social stakes related to the issues of working time have been largely
transformed as a result.
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Source: Maddison (2001).
The requisite conditions for the success of policies for reducing
collective working time standards have been talked about for a long time in
continental Europe, in France and Germany particularly. A vigorous revival in
job creation was initially expected, but this was slowed down by insufficient
economic growth. Next, solid productivity gains were expected to ensue,
despite the short-term contradictions between these objectives. It was hoped
that the competitiveness jeopardized by increased production costs following
the reduction of working time – which was nonetheless indispensable if the
job creation effects were to be fully realized in the long term – would thus be
restored. The debate in particular underlined the extent to which the pay-
related measures accompanying the reduction in working time and its impacts
on the organization and patterns of work are key elements in the effectiveness
of such policies. On the other hand, for increasing part-time working, the
objectives put forward were very different. These meant reducing the
contradictions between career and family duties, and fostering women’s
engagement with the labour market. 
Yet at the end of the twentieth century, the long-term trend toward the
reduction of working time slowed noticeably, especially in a few countries, the
most notable of which were Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
United States.1 Europe, on the one hand, and the North American continent
and the United Kingdom, on the other, are not really treading the same path.
Moreover, the spectrum of working times is broad – apparently broader now
than at the beginning of the century, if recent data are compared with
Maddison’s estimates (figure 1.2).
The very broad aggregate figures naturally hide a number of differences
between countries, operating in one way or another. The annual working times
per person employed quoted above, apart from the fact that they refer to all
employees and non-salaried workers, including those on leave schemes, differ
widely from one country to the next. These also include part-time workers.
We know there was a rapid growth in part-time work in the final quarter of the
last century. It grew at varying rates however, from one country to another.
Consequently, the levels reached are not particularly comparable. In Europe,
there is a world of difference between the levels observed in the Netherlands,
the country that is a byword for part-time working, and southern European
countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain and even France. This difference
accounts for a considerable proportion of the reduction of working time
witnessed over this period, using indicators for average annual working time
that incorporate part-time work in several countries that have expressly
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1 These long-term elements conceal several particular national distinctions. In Sweden, for example, the increase in annual
working time heading towards previous levels is basically explained by a lengthening of working time for part-timers. 
chosen to foster its growth. For some, the entire reduction in working time
recorded using such indicators can, in these countries, be explained by the
growth of part-time working. In the 1970s and 1980s, then, the reduction of
working time recorded is not always due to cutting collective working time.
Two genuine national strategies of reduction of working time have been
witnessed in Europe: fostering part-time employment (the Netherlands or the
United Kingdom); and reducing full-time working hours (Denmark, France
and Germany) (Bosch et al., 1994; 1997). Some countries accorded such high
priority to one of these two strategies that they appear to be almost exclusive
of one another (figure 1.3).
Now the strategic choices are definitely less clearcut. As early as 1998, the
European Commission stressed the limits of a policy of reducing working time,
and obviously preferred the expansion of part-time work and new forms of
employment. The growth of part-time working, however, is only one aspect of
the directions adopted, out of many. The crucial objective has indeed become
that of increasing employment rates and improving the quality of employment,
rather than reducing unemployment (Math, 2002). The priority previously
accorded to the reduction of collective working time in the countries that had
chosen this option are thus substituted by the priorities of more flexible and
more individualized regulations. The individualized regulations whose
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extension is sought have enabled more flexible and varied working times to be
devised, such that everyone can manage them at their own convenience. Yet
above all, these regulations are not focused solely on weekly working time, but
address the whole of working life. Lastly, although the basic idea has been to
relax collective regulations, and enable each individual to organize his/her own
working time and career, the issue is opening the option to extend working time
as much as it is to reduce it, even to the point of “working longer hours to earn
more money”, as the slogan goes in France. The extension of weekly flexi-time
schemes and annualized working time to enable greater levels of flexibility has
already been propounded, but so have the broadening of overtime options,
possible longer working hours, the availability of training time throughout
one’s career, the postponement of retirement and so on.
Is the point always to provide more choices for workers? While there is
growth in part-time employment, long working hours are actually making a
comeback. This therefore produces a growing dispersion of weekly working
times. Anxo and O’Reilly (2000) observe such a change over an 11-year period
in Germany and the United Kingdom. Lee (2004, pp. 41–43) notes the
sometimes astonishing frequency of working weeks lasting 50 hours and more,
amounting to, for example, 20 per cent of American and Australian employees
and 26 per cent of Japanese employees in 2000. Campbell (2004, p. 10) argues
that, in Australia, “the trend towards longer hours is the dominant one for
full-time employees. It is widespread and strong, spreading well beyond the
ranks of managers and based on patterns of not just extended but often very
extended and extremely extended hours.” If the growth of shift work and
atypical hours (evening, night, weekend work, etc.) is added to the picture, the
situation is obviously far from one in which a typical single model
predominates with few exceptions – i.e. the same hours every day, weekends
off, annual leave during the summer holidays, if, of course, we were to use a
caricature to summarize this model.
The OECD (2004) shows that the United States now enjoys a basic
competitive advantage over Europe: a far higher total number of hours worked
per capita. The resulting discrepancy is allegedly a major determining factor
affecting relative performance regarding economic growth. A total number of
hours worked per capita includes not only employment data but also reflects
demographic changes, and in some way measures the population’s productive
performance. The growth in employment rates due particularly to the large-scale
mobilization of women has had a positive impact on productive performance in
Europe. Yet the longer period of education prior to accessing the labour market,
the lowering of the retirement age, the increase in the amount of training received
during one’s working life, mass unemployment and, lastly, unfavourable
demographic changes have weighed in the opposite direction. 
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According to the OECD (2004), although time in paid work is associated
with major economic and social challenges to the governments of OECD
countries and working time policies still need to be activated, the current
challenges are completely different. The reduction of working time is clearly
no longer an instrument to be considered. On the contrary, increasing the
population’s productive performance is at the top of the agenda. Among the
available instruments, working time flexibility is still highly favoured, but is
this actually the type of flexibility that was envisaged by the OECD back in
the 1970s?
All these overhauls of the organization of working time and time set
aside for people’s private lives have contributed to the high degree of
organizational flexibility sought by companies, and are probably a more
effective response to the inevitable fluctuations and contingencies of a
workload now calculated down to the last detail. All of this simultaneously
enables the economically active (at least we hope it does), and especially
economically active wage earners, to achieve better trade-offs between their
working lives, their income requirements and their out-of-work activities on
one side, and their family and personal choices and constraints on the other.
However, the path between the two is narrow, and is strewn with pitfalls. This
is the path that the reforming zeal derived from the concept of “decent
working time” attempts to clear.
1.3 FROM DECENT WORK TO DECENT WORKING 
TIME
Because in all of the “developed” countries, the turning point represented by
the introduction of flexibility has had many pathological consequences for
working and employment conditions, it is easy to see that, by remaining true
to its mission, an institution such as the ILO might foster new research and
actions in order to have its own input into the world of work across the globe,
including the industrialized countries. The concept of “decent working time”
was designed with this purpose. It reworks the ILO’s concept of “decent
work”, applicable to all types of working environments, in order to address
the issue of working time first in industrialized countries. However, it is
hardly controversial to say that the same issues are raised in completely
different ways in the developing world. Understandably and fortunately,
pragmatism is holding its ground against reforming zeal on this point. Isn’t
this approach problematic, however, from the perspective of researchers
anxious to retain their axiomatic neutrality? If the concepts of “decent work”
and “decent working time” are used for heuristic purposes, therefore enabling
the two ideas to be examined, the answer is a resounding “no”.
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1.3.1 “Decent work”
The concept of “decent work” was formulated by the International Labour
Organization to refer to satisfactory working and employment conditions.2
The term first appeared in the Director-General’s Report during the 87th
Session of the International Labour Conference in 1999. The ILO’s stated goal
was the possibility for both men and women to obtain “productive work under
conditions of freedom, equity, security and dignity, in which rights are
protected and adequate remuneration and social coverage are provided” (ILO,
1999a, p. 15). A further requirement was added: a “tripartite approach and
social dialogue”. This means, as indicated in a later report (ILO, 1999b), that
there should be a genuine freedom for trade union action, and a collective
bargaining process without which a minimum level of regulation would be
impossible. An initial stake of this semantic formula is, according to the ILO,
to reveal a discrepancy between the reality of work and employment and
individuals’ “aspirations”. The ILO calls this a “decent work deficit”, which
may be attributable to “the absence of sufficient employment opportunities,
inadequate social protection, the denial of rights at work and shortcomings in
social dialogue” (ILO, 2001, p. 8). In other words, again, behind this “decent
work deficit” stand realities as variable as unemployment and under-
employment, precarious working conditions, various forms of mutually
compounding discrimination, and the absence of basic social rights. 
In distinguishing four pillars of “decent work”, the ILO was seeking
above all to try to “normalize” working and employment conditions in the
most varied workplaces, on a global scale: formal and informal economies,
wage earners and the self-employed, the most modernized and the most
traditional industries, men’s work as well as women’s, etc. The stated
objectives are thus ambitious, and address subjects with different statuses.
The first two sets of variables that inform “decent work”, that is, access to
employment (including pay levels) and social protection (including working
conditions), are the products of rules and practices that can be broken down
and compared, but whose norms vary dramatically from one country to the
next. This is precisely why the ILO acknowledges the premise that, in terms
of job security and income, the minimum that could be expected for workers
necessarily varies depending on the country’s level of and capacity for
development. Workers’ rights (freedom of association, no discrimination in
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2 The term “decent work” is difficult to translate. In English, “the word decent has quite a specific meaning. If you say,
I have a decent job, a decent income, it is a positive expression – the job or income is good, it meets your expectations
and those of your community, but it is not exaggerated – it falls within the reasonable aspirations of reasonable people”
(Rodgers, 2002, p. 15). By emphasizing four constitutive dimensions of work and employment relations (employment,
social protection, workers’ rights and bargaining), the ILO thus avoids the moral connotation that a clumsy translation
might evoke. 
employment, the rejection of all forms of forced labour, minimum age for
employment, etc.) constitute a different type of norm since they make claims
to virtually universal status, and the production of a range of differing rules
is made conditional on the set of variables previously referred to. From this
perspective, “social dialogue” is, in the opinion of the ILO, a prerequisite for
“decent work”. Social dialogue is not only the benchmark for freedom of
expression and the observance of rights, but it also facilitates the ways in
which disputes are dealt with; has an impact in procuring greater social
equity; and makes it easier to actually implement labour and job-related
policies, etc.3
As Ghai (2002) argues, this “decent work” approach is above all a way of
packing a concept with a set of longstanding ILO topics and concerns.
Moreover:
The notion of decent work not only forces us to view work along all its different
dimensions but also invites us to explore the relationships between these
dimensions. Hopefully this should help bring out the complementarities and
conflicts among the components of decent work more clearly than in the past
(Ghai, 2002, p. 2).
In classifying these components of “decent work”, the ILO is not simply
placing all the desirable objectives in the global workplace on the same level, but
also setting out the necessary conditions for improvement to take place
(material resources, law, social dialogue). Lastly, it is encouraging the establish-
ment of hierarchies among the objectives to be attained for the actual
implementation of “decent work”, based on the assumption that “the question
of priorities must depend upon societal values, socio-economic institutions and
levels of prosperity and wealth” (ibid., p. 3).
This is a crucial point. It implies, quite rightly, that for the promotion of
“decent work”, priorities are not necessarily similar in every country, and there
may even be an incompatibility of goals due to the specific characteristics of
institutional configurations:
For instance, an agrarian regime characterized by a relatively equal distribution of
land generally provides greater livelihood security and more even income
distribution than one featuring a few large landowners and widespread
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3 By late 2004, there were 76 contributions of various formats (reports, discussion papers, conference papers, web pages,
book chapters, etc.) listed in the ILO’s in-house publications. Altogether, one-third were programmatic statements,
dealing with general approaches to “decent work”, etc.; one-fifth included this issue in a national or comparative study,
with a clear focus on Africa and Latin America (in terms of “decent work” deficits), on the one hand, and a slight
inclination toward Scandinavian models on the other (which, in the case of Sweden, and the role of women in its labour
market, emerge as potentially useful normative configurations). The rest of the work was thematic, with priority
accorded to vocational training, poverty, the informal economy and gender. There were also more sporadic treatments
of “social welfare”, “equality”, “pay”, “migration”, “illness” and “labour rights”.
landlessness and tenancy. Similarly, the presence of communal and cooperative
institutions in some societies can provide an important cushion against insecurity
and risks before the development of insurance schemes and social security financed
by the state and employer (ibid.).
More generally, it is well understood that certain variables determine
others. This is true for legislation and rules that derive from collective
bargaining, as well as for available state funding and each country’s dominant
forms of socialization, which in turn are determining elements for the
construction of local, regional and national forms of social solidarity.
Based on the argument outlined above, Ghai (2002) puts forward 
the theory that among the determining institutional variables, the most
significant are: per capita income, sector-level structures, workforce
employment status, public expenditure on employment as a proportion of
national income and lastly, the public sector’s role in the national economy.
Based on this theory, he then constructs three models to which the concept
of decent work can be applied. The first, the “classical” model, relates to the
wealthiest nations (the United States, Western Europe and Scandinavia). Its
characteristics are well known: high GDP; wage earning as the predominant
form of employment; a poverty rate (i.e. the percentage of people with
income worth below 50 per cent of the median income) oscillating between
a little over 5 per cent (Finland) and more than 25 per cent (the United
States); acknowledgement of the role of trade unions and the existence of
collective agreements (with coverage rates of 25–90 per cent of employees),
etc. The second model is that of the former “socialist” countries. Despite the
diverse situations of the countries in this category, they share a level of
national income that puts them in the middle of the world hierarchy, with
their social security systems undergoing radical transformations and the
rebirth of industrial relations. Lastly, there is the “development” model, the
most heterogeneous in that it includes “the rest of the world”, or more
precisely the least wealthy nations. Here, the agricultural sector dominates
the economy (employing 60–80 per cent of the active population); the
informal economy is vigorous; the number of wage earners still very low and
trade unionism still in its infancy; public expenditure on social welfare is
much lower than in other countries; and poverty is a reality for a large
segment of the population. Although rather contrived, this schema enables
the conceptual “nail” to be hit on the head: like other general concepts such
as wealth, education, culture, etc., “decent work” is relevant only if it can be
adapted to a very broad spectrum of social contexts.
Only if this basic methodological imperative is kept in mind can the
genuine significance of the few available indicators for characterizing
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national spaces (and even classifying them, as Ghai suggests) be assessed
(table 1.1).4
One can easily get the feeling when reading this table that not all the
indicators enjoy the same status: the ones that particularly relate to the last
two components of “decent work” are thus difficult to compare with the other
indicators. It is therefore a genuine intellectual challenge to find a formula to
express decent work through these possible indicators of “decent work”.
However, in the comparison of the 22 developed countries he constructs, 
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Table 1.1 Breaking down “decent work”
Components of “decent work” Some possible indicators of “decent work”
Employment • Access to employment: activity rate, employment rate, 
unemployment rate.
• Pay: proportion of the population below a relative
income or absolute poverty line.
Social protection • Proportion of national income spent on social welfare.
• Percentage of employees covered by unemployment, 
sickness, old age, accident, and maternity insurance.
• Working conditions: working-time indicators, prevalence 
of night work, prevalence of weekend work, prevalence 
of work-related accidents and occupational mortality rate.
• Human development: mortality rate, malnutrition 
indicator, literacy rate, access to water, presence of 
secondary schools.
Rights at work • Presence and prevalence of child and forced labour. 
• Prevalence of gender and ethnic discrimination 
(identifiable in terms of pay, career, etc.).
• Freedom of association or lack of it (measurable by an 
index of civil liberties), unionization rate, coverage rate 
for employees by collective agreements.
Employees’ representation • Right to negotiate or lack of it, percentage of workers 
and social dialogue covered by basic rights enshrined in legislation and
collective agreements.
• Rules facilitating economic democracy or lack of them.
• Participation of social partners in national economic and 
social policy, or lack of it. 
4 For an even more exhaustive presentation and discussion of the issue of “decent work” indicators, see the special
edition of International Labour Review (ILO, 2003) devoted to that topic.
Ghai (2002) picks up the gauntlet. In order to accomplish this goal, he begins
by ranking the countries by each indicator used. He then adds up these
rankings to obtain an overall “decent work” league table in which the leading
positions are taken by the Scandinavian countries (Sweden 1st, Denmark 2nd,
Norway 3rd and Finland 4th), followed by Australia (5th), Germany (6th) and
Canada (7th). At the bottom of the league come France (20th), Ireland (21st)
and Spain (22nd). The United States and Japan take joint 15th place. After
having built up an overall economic performance indicator (growth of per
capita income, growth and average inflation rate) for the 1990–98 period, the
author juxtaposes the results with those for “decent work”. No significant
correlation then emerges between the economic performance and “decent
work” results.
From a researcher’s viewpoint, this typology is both useful and unsatis-
factory. It is useful in so far as it provides a documented table of “decent work”
performance by country, and in that it substantially validates the idea that
certain national spaces (those in Scandinavia first and foremost) are able to put
their particular ethical and social solidarity requirements into practice.
However, it is unsatisfactory (and Ghai is fully aware of this) in that indicators
and rankings can only squeeze the social breadth of the relevant countries and
conceal, among others, the fact that “decent work” performance is perhaps
above all the product of an interaction among institutions rather than the
expression of a sum of actions and indicators.
1.3.2 Time and “decent work”
From the perspective of the ILO, Messenger (ed.) (2004) has suggested
applying the concept of “decent work” to working time. The goal here is to
critically examine, using “decent working time”, five dimensions of working
time: its effects on health, the juggling of family life and work, gender equality,
productive efficiency, and workers’ capacity to influence their working hours.
By using this method, Messenger fully accepts the normative concern which
calls, through greater knowledge of the practices relating to working time, for
an improvement in the effects of working time on health and safety; the
prioritization of “family-friendly” policies (priority given to family life rather
than exclusively to childcare strategies); the use of working time as a lever for
promoting gender equality; a campaign for more effective work–life balance
that might allow the two birds of “decent working time” and “productive
working time” to be killed with one stone; and lastly, for workers’ margins of
autonomy regarding the control of their working time to be broadened.
As citizens, we can only approve and support this pragmatic concern.
From a researcher’s perspective, however, several comments immediately come
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to mind. The first is that the concept of “decent working time” grants an insight
whose major advantage is to help understand a multifaceted subject in a
synthetic form (the length, quality and distribution of working time, its
consequences for employment levels, etc., are merely some of the relevant
aspects). The question that arises, however, is that of the interaction between
these components: are they actually completely independent of each other?
Isn’t analysing and acting on one simply (directly or indirectly) the same as
analysing and acting on another? So, for example, it is difficult to observe and
study autonomy in the choice of working time without simultaneously raising
the issue of the relationships between working time and family life, as well as
gender equality. From this angle, the various components of “decent working
time” do comprise, at least pragmatically speaking, a useful set that provides 
a broad policy framework from which to consider how the goal of decent work 
can be advanced in the arena of working time (Messenger (ed.), 2004). On
another level, however, it is worth debating the way in which an apparently
similar subject can, in different countries, contain different meanings, and
consequently can be the foundation for policies with ultimately very different
(potentially positive or negative) impacts, even when the original intention
seems generous – e.g. increasing the numbers of men as well as women working
part time in order to heighten male involvement in the domestic arena.5
Let us return to the first of the two points. The issue here is to extend the
“decent working time” approach advocated by the ILO into a system, so that
we can more effectively capture the multiple dimensions of time-related
practices. To this end, we suggest submitting highly diverse national and
subnational realities to an empirical comparison. Two areas of reflection seem
to merit consideration. The first is the comparison of purely quantitative
approaches to working time (e.g., daily and weekly working time, the 
proportion of part-time workers, etc.) with more qualitative measurements
(e.g., working conditions, effects on health, etc.). The second calls for the
opposition between work and employment to be taken into account, based on
the understanding that, following Maruani (1994), we can define: (i) “work” as
any human activity directed at the production of goods and services considered
useful, as well as the set of conditions for performing this activity; and 
(ii) “employment” as the methods for accessing the labour market and the
translation of labour activity in terms of social status and role. The intersection
of these two areas suggests an avenue to explore, in the field of study opened
up particularly by Supiot (1999), whose book contains elements supporting this
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5 This raises the question of the relevance of “best practice”, which might be used to promote good employment
conditions, equality and rights, but would need to be applied differentially, as so many areas would be involved, and
also has some risks in that such practices may be viewed as a substitute for setting norms.
point (see also the contributions in this volume by Anxo, Boulin and Fagan
(Chapter 4) and Rubery, Ward and Grimshaw (Chapter 5)).
Our second point concerns the cross-cutting nature of the various
subjects that make up “decent working time”. We know that making inter-
national comparisons can by its very nature be a hazardous exercise. In terms
of working time, Michon (2003) uncovered many difficulties and traps that are
not easy to avoid whenever one is dealing with a large group of countries. It is,
however, important to adopt a critical stance towards what appears to be
obvious. Take the example of part-time work. The functions and implications
of this specific form of short-hours employment differ from one social
context to another. Using the same terminology now defined in Europe as a
job involving 30 hours per week or less, regardless of the full-time working
week, it covers “marginal” part-time jobs with very short hours (around 20
hours or less, virtually corresponding to a half-time job), which are by far the
most numerous in some countries, and long-hours part-time jobs (almost 30
hours, corresponding to four-fifths of a full-time job), which are the norm
elsewhere. What is there in common between France, where part-time
working is seen, in the case of women, as a form of labour market peripheral-
ization, and Germany and the Netherlands (and to a lesser extent the United
Kingdom), where the connotation of part-time work is much more positive?
In Germany and the Netherlands, part-time work is not viewed as an
economic crisis-management instrument at the expense of one section of the
active population, but as an instrument that, used as early as the 1950s and
1960s, enabled women to earn some independence by accessing the labour
market in this way. A comparative analysis of “decent working time” forces us,
it can be observed, to transcend the simple consideration of general indicators
to get straight to the crux of social variations (e.g., the relative weight of the
various institutions and the relationships between them; the weight of history;
dominant forms of solidarity, etc.) in which working and employment time
refer to highly idiosyncratic stakes, practices and policies.
A key component of decent work, the notion of “decent working time”,
whose ideal-type contours have just been set out, cannot cover the same
concrete realities and implementation conditions without reference to the
economic and social development of the world’s various geographical areas.
Moreover, its implementation cannot be extricated from the nature of the
industrial relations systems, methods and conditions for industrial relations
dialogue and even the values and representations attached to the various
amounts of working time and time set aside for people’s private lives. As
defined by the ILO, the concept of decent working time stands as a universal
in terms of its structuring principles, but it is clear that today its
implementation can only be achieved by taking into consideration the specific
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situations of the various large groups of countries. The prevalent situation
with regard to working time in what are now called the “emerging nations”
(e.g., 7-day working weeks; 10–12-hour working days; child labour; very few
paid holidays; pension provisions that are non-existent or not applied due to
very low life expectancy in those countries, etc.) involves stakes which are of
a different nature from those pertaining to developed economies.
1.4 PARADOX AND CONTRADICTIONS OF 
POLICIES TODAY
In the following argument, we shall confine ourselves to the analysis of the
policies of developed countries6 by examining the current trends in working
time, i.e. first, which political stakes structure contemporary change, and then
what questions these pose with respect to the concept of decent working time.
1.4.1 Working time policies in Europe: Paradoxical precepts 
The paradoxical nature of current working time policy enacted in the EU can
be seen in the objectives set by the European Commission for the revision of
the European directive on working time (Directive 93/104, box 1.1). For the
Commission (European Commission, 2004), a working time policy must:
• ensure a high level of protection of workers’ health and safety in terms of
working time;
• afford companies and Member States greater flexibility in the manage-
ment of working time;
• enable a better balance between working and family life to be achieved;
and 
• avoid imposing unreasonable constraints on companies, particularly on
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Although the goal of bringing all these criteria together can only be
welcomed, one element of the revision plan immediately raises doubts
regarding its feasibility. The Commission’s plan includes, among other
things, the option of making employees work up to 65 hours per week, since
the possibility of exemption from the maximum 48-hour week established in
the 1993 directive can be activated by collective agreement or even by
introducing it directly into an individual contract (the so-called “opt-out”
Decent working time
28
6 More precisely to the old EU-15, which is the subject of many of the contributions to this book.
provision). Yet virtually all the available studies on the subject show that
working long hours has negative implications for workers’ health; that it
compromises work-life balance; and lastly, since it is men who most often
work such long hours, that it does not facilitate gender equality. This type of
contradiction can be found in the three currently dominant trends regarding
working time in developed countries.
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Box 1.1 The revision of the 1993 European Working Time Directive 1
The European Union (EU) Working Time Directive sets the maximum weekly working
time at 48 hours, including overtime, with this 48 hours being calculated as an
average over a maximum 4-month period; a maximum of 8 hours’ night work on
average over a 24-hour period; a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours;
a minimum weekly one-day rest period; and 4 weeks of paid leave per year. All EU
Member States were to have incorporated these rules into their national statute books
by 23 November 1996. In April 2003, Italy completed this process, becoming the last
of the EU-15 members to have done so.
The directive allows two justifications for exemptions. The 4-month reference period
used for the calculation of weekly averages can be extended to 6 or even 12 months
by collective agreement. An “opt-out” clause grants employers exemption from the
weekly maximum if employees agree this threshold. This exemption is now so
widespread in the United Kingdom that almost one in five employees works more
than 48 hours per week. 
In January 2004, the European Commission planned to revise the directive with two
objectives. The first was to redefine working time in order to respond to the problems
generated by recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings concerning the nature
of “on-call” time. The second was to more effectively monitor the use of the two types
of exemptions applicable to the calculation of average and maximum working hours.
The proposals for revisions tabled by the Commission have been facing strong
opposition from the Member States, particularly the United Kingdom. In these
countries, it is now probably considered that the basic point is not to set boundaries,
but rather to offer the broadest possible choices that would allow the entire range of
economic and social needs to be met – i.e. short working hours (part-time work for
example), but also very long hours. In many countries with relatively low wages, and
more generally in areas of work that require low levels of skill and pay low wages, very
long hours of work enable workers to improve their total earnings.
1 Directive 93/104/EC, 23 November 1993. Cf. EIRO (2004), “Commission consults on review of working time
Directive”, EIRO on-line, http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2004/02/ feature/eu0402202f.html
The extension of working hours
EU membership for ten new Member States, in which norms governing
employment and pay are clearly worse than those in force in the 15 older
Member States, has led to a trend towards an extension of working time in
several countries, such as Germany, France (which is currently experiencing a
challenge to the 35-hour week), the Netherlands, Sweden, etc. Although this
trend is still confined to a few companies and industries that are facing the new
stakes of economic competition in a more immediate way than others, it
currently appears to be viewed by many developed countries as the most
appropriate response to economic globalization. It does not encounter, for
example, any legislative or collectively agreed obstacles any more than it runs
counter to the dominant representations of a country such as the United
States (Golden, Chapter 8, in this volume; Golden and Figart, 2000). This
development then is part of a logic of cost competitiveness that aims to cut
hourly labour costs, since very frequently the extension of working time is
implemented without any increase in pay. Such an approach (the economic
relevance of which this is not the place to discuss) heralds a break with the
trend towards shorter working hours that had held sway in several European
countries over the previous 20 years (see above). It also attests to a change in
the nature of the instruments used for fostering economic growth, which, as
far as the smooth running of the labour market was concerned, was assumed
to be derived from the extension of the flexibility of working time and the
development of a variety of forms of employment.
Work–life balance 
For more than a decade, the issue of work–life balance has been one of the
significant elements in European policy impacting on the length and
organization of working time through the adoption of directives and
recommendations, some of which have become the subjects of prior
agreements between the social partners (part-time work, parental leave). It has
already been emphasized that this dimension of work–life balance has been
grasped as basic to the EU policy guidelines adopted in Lisbon in 2000, then
reiterated in subsequent summits (in Barcelona, Stockholm and Laeken): the
development of a knowledge-based society and an increase in employment
rates, particularly for women, but also for younger and older people. The
inclusion of the latter two categories additionally allows the concept of social
time to be extended to all the time spent outside work – not only time spent
with one’s family. In practice, this institutional context has been a driver for the
implementation of legislative provisions on parental leave or granting
entitlements for changing to part-time hours (e.g., a Dutch law in July 2000
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establishing a reversible option for moving from full- to part-time working; a
2001 law in Germany granting an entitlement for changing to part-time work).
Collectively agreed provisions have also been negotiated in some sectors and
companies offering employees the option of taking longer parental leave than
the European basic norm (3 months); a temporary reduction in working time;
and various working time modifications for family reasons (Den Dulk, 2001).
In the United Kingdom, following several government initiatives aimed at
encouraging the social partners to come up with “family-friendly” working
time arrangements, the British Trade Union Confederation (TUC) launched a
campaign in the late 1990s called “Changing Times”, which aimed at spurring
unions to negotiate the establishment of working time options that would
enable a greater degree of work–life balance to be achieved. This prospect of a
better relationship between working and family life thus gave rise to a wide
variety of methods for reorganizing working time which has increased the
process of diversifying working time schemes: long paid leaves and possibilities
for career breaks; part-time work; variable working hours; a compressed
working week; job-sharing; teleworking; the annualization of working time;
and work schedules based on school hours (European Foundation, 2002).
Life-course working time policy
The European Employment Strategy begun in Luxembourg and endorsed
at the Lisbon and Barcelona summits has also contributed to the growing
number of working time provisions fostering the idea of older people
remaining in the workforce, and a proactive labour market policy (designed to
increase employment rates) through concepts such as lifelong learning. De
facto, a process is now under way in Europe of the “destandardization” of the
life courses of employees who are experiencing sometimes involuntary “career
breaks” (i.e. unemployment), but who can also take advantage of new working
time provisions enabling them to train throughout their lives and temporarily
get involved in other activities (care, voluntary work, leisure, etc.) via the
emergence of new working time provisions such as the Droit individuel à la
formation (“Individual Training Entitlement”) established in France in 2004
and the working time accounts in force in many companies in Germany,
France, the Netherlands and Scandinavia (Boulin and Hoffmann, 1999;
Naegele et al., 2003; Anxo and Boulin, 2005, 2006). 
1.4.2 Current trends in working time and decent working time
These current trends in working time policy supplement rather than replace
the policies in force over the last two decades that have contributed to the
development of forms of reorganizing working time designed with the aim of
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granting greater productive flexibility to businesses (see section 1.2). Even
firms themselves have spurred the emergence of initiatives in terms of
work–life balance, in so far as productive flexibility has resulted in the growth
of atypical working schedules and new forms of working time (especially the
annualization of working hours), which are generally imposed on employees.
This leads to a growing interference that blurs the boundaries between
working life and life outside work, and raises questions regarding the
relationship between working time and other forms of social time. 
From the point of view of decent working time, the current trends in
working time policies in developed countries contain contradictory elements.
Although the policies enacted to procure a balance between the various types
of social time, such as life-course policies, are, depending on the conditions in
which they are implemented, integral parts of a philosophy based on the
concept of decent working time, the potential extension of individual working
hours is on a collision course with this approach for at least four main and
mutually compounding reasons.
First, the possibility of detrimental outcomes from recent changes in
working time duration (i.e. longer hours), and even the reorganization of
working time – in terms of worker satisfaction certainly, but first and foremost
in terms of difficult working conditions and occupational health – is obviously
a decisive issue (Golden and Figart, 2000; Askenazy, 2004). A recent Austrian
survey has shown that levels of stress rise proportionately with increases in
working time (European Foundation, 2004).7 Van Echtelt (2004) demon-
strates that, for employees, overtime is a source of time-related pressure, and
difficulties arise from trying to reconcile occupational and domestic
constraints; that this may, however, be fully compensated for when
occupational tasks are such that they can procure personal satisfaction; and
finally that, on the other hand, the negative effects of overtime are not
compensated for by the financial benefits that overtime work provides. The
OECD (2004) has pointed out that around 20 per cent of men work long
hours in all of its member States, with some countries being particularly
affected by this phenomenon (Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico,
New Zealand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, etc.). Moreover, working time
flexibility – which often used to go hand in hand with a reduction in working
time – has also had negative impacts on workers’ health, due in particular to
the twin trends of the intensification and the “densification” of working time
(i.e. the elimination of unproductive time during the working day). The
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7 These findings come from the Austrian “work climate” survey (Arbeitsklima-index), which is based on a standardized
survey of 1,800 respondents questioned in two interviews carried out over a 6-month period. It was commissioned by
the Upper Austrian Chamber of Labour and carried out by the Institute for Empirical Social Research (IFES) and the
Institute for Social Research and Analysis.
compounding effect of these two trends that seems to emerge with the
development of extended working schedules may, from the perspective of
working conditions, have disastrous effects. Studies carried out by the
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions (Merllié and Paoli, 2001; Boisard et al., 2003) stress the clear
worsening of working conditions that occurred in Europe between 1990 and
2000, at the same time as the collective working week was being reduced and
part-time working was on the rise. These same studies also demonstrate the
diversification of working patterns; the growing importance of market
constraints; and the demands placed on working time patterns by rigorous
deadlines. It was argued for a time that contemporary forms of the
reorganization of work had increased the autonomy of the people performing
it and reduced the time pressures on them. However, no evidence of this can
be found in the above-mentioned aggregate statistics. The pressure of
deadlines and customer demands now seems to have replaced the pace of the
assembly line – the very symbol of Taylorism and its excesses that were
criticized during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Second, long hours are an obstacle to attaining a work–life balance (see,
e.g., Schor, 1991; Jacobs and Gerson, 2004). As the OECD (2004, p. 48)
underlines: “The greatest difficulty in finding a balance between work and
family life is very significantly linked to the presence of children in the
household, to being younger and working longer hours or in more demanding
jobs, or being self-employed.” The Austrian survey on long hours referred to
above demonstrates the negative impact of long hours on work–life balance: 62
per cent of respondents working 20 or fewer hours per week rate their own
ability to reconcile work with family life as “very good”, while only 39 per cent
of those working between 35 and 40 hours and 29 per cent of those working
more than 45 hours per week do so (European Foundation, 2004, p. 1). A
DARES8 study also shows that it is particularly the self-employed and
managerial staff – i.e. those who usually work long hours – who experience the
greatest difficulty in finding an adequate work–life balance (Garner et al., 2004).
The findings in the two pieces of work referred to above converge in their
indication that working atypical hours, most particularly at night, or having
irregular or unpredictable working schedules makes achieving a good work–life
balance more difficult. Clearly, here as well the compounding effect of the two
trends is not going to help resolve the issue of the relationship between work
and family life. The current trend in the context of a culture of long hours is to
use services that assist in finding a good work–life balance to help alleviate these
problems and to transfer the negative externalities of the organization of
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8 DARES is a section of the French Ministry of Labour that undertakes statistical surveys on employment conditions.
working time onto society as a whole, in the hope that time-related aspects of
public policies at a municipal council level, whose objectives greatly exceed
solely an adjustment function (see Boulin and Mückenberger, 2002), will enable
these problems to be tackled. 
Third, long working hours run counter to gender equality, and one might
say counter to equality in general. As witnessed above, it is mostly men who work
longer than 45-hour weeks, which also means that their contribution to edu-
cational and domestic tasks is still marginal in most developed countries
(Gershuny, 2000). Because of this, women in many countries where schemes
facilitating work–life balance are not very developed face a choice between en-
gaging in paid work or bringing up children – a dilemma dramatically expressed
in the decline in fertility rates in countries such as Spain and Italy. Unintended
discriminatory negative effects on social equality stem from the fact that services
assisting the search for a good work–life balance – for example, those that enable
both parents to stay in the labour market, even when they have small children –
are only accessible to those with higher incomes, which in turn consolidates the
traditional division of labour at the foot of the social ladder.
Finally, long hours militate against both encouraging older workers to
stay in the workforce and the prospects of developing life-course policies.
Indeed, we know that it is those who have experienced the hardest working
conditions, particularly in terms of hours or those who began to work at a
young age, who leave or wish to leave the labour market prematurely.
1.5 RECONFIGURING WORKING TIME POLICIES
BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF DECENT 
WORKING TIME
In respect of the current trends in working time, it should be stressed that
neither work–life balance policies nor life-course working time policies are
automatically rooted in the philosophy of decent working time. Many options
offered to employees lead to gender discrimination and social inequalities due
to the ways in which they are implemented and the systems of representation
still dominant with regard to “downshifting”. Those countries in which
parental leave and other career-break mechanisms are paid, and in which social
welfare regimes include them, are few and far between (Anxo and Boulin,
2005). Similarly, male entry rates into these schemes are still low, even where
there are accompanying incentive systems, such as in Sweden. The same
observation can be made regarding men’s movement into part-time
employment. As in the case with long-term leave, it is more the employers’
responses that are questionable, in that such a decision, when made by male
employees, is perceived by the former as a sign of the latter’s lack of interest
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in their jobs. The Act of July 2000 enabling Dutch employees to reduce or
increase their working time thus seems to have been little used so far (see
Fouarge and Baaijens, Chapter 6 in this volume). Similarly, studies show that the
take-up rate for working time accounts at the employee’s initiative is still rather
poor, especially for long-term working time accounts (Eberling et al., 2004). 
Should working time policies therefore be reconfigured to more
effectively anchor them in the decent working time approach? This is one of the
questions that this book attempts to answer. From reading what has already
been argued, it appears that a prerequisite is to break out of the trap of
paradoxical precepts – especially that of wanting to simultaneously increase
working time and institute work–life balance policies. Additionally, it should be
emphasized that the increase in per capita working time does not inevitably
entail the growth of a long-hours culture. Research shows that, although a
considerable proportion of full-time employees want to reduce their working
time, in particular those working overtime, another group – most clearly those
in “marginal” part-time work with very short hours – actually want to increase
their hours (see, e.g., Bielenski et al., 2002). Moreover, a rise in employment
rates (and thus in per capita hours) can also occur if individuals who are
currently outside of the labour market are able to enter employment with
working hours that are not minimal.9 Any solutions must take into consider-
ation the various situations prevalent in each country: where there is a high
employment rate for all age groups, among both men and women, and for the
various ethnic groups, the increase of working time for those working part time
seems a heuristic avenue (this is true of the Scandinavian countries and, to a
lesser extent, of the Netherlands). Alternatively, where employment rates are
generally low, or low for particular age, gender or ethnic groups, their inte-
gration into the labour market must be sought (this is true of France, Germany,
and generally among the European “Mediterranean-model” countries).
Obviously, however, things also depend on social contexts. In a study
cited by the OECD (2004, p. 55), for example, Golden shows that American
workers who want more freedom of choice regarding their working hours
often have to agree to long, atypical or unpredictable hours (Golden, 2001).
This finding seems paradoxical in terms of our observation that this type of
timetable is incompatible with family life.
A second avenue to explore is the compatibility between productive and
individual flexibility, which raises the twin issues effectively highlighted in the
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9 As the OECD rightly notes, policies aiming to increase employment rates do not take into account the generally low
number of hours worked by the members of under-represented groups when they are integrated into the active
population. On the contrary, choosing the one-dimensional perspective of increasing the number of hours worked per
member of the active population tends to neglect the determining significance of the extensive margin of labour supply
(OECD, 2004).
1993 European Directive on working time, which “sets out the principle of
adjusting work to mankind, which entails, on an individual level, that every
person is in control of his/her time, and collectively, that collective time away
from work be preserved” (Supiot, 1999, p. 127). These two issues are, first,
the matter of workers’ independence in the area of time and the influence they
can have on their working schedules and, second, the issue of finding out
whether non-working time is included in the regulation of working time and
at what level (e.g., national legislation, regional, sector, company, etc.).
If our starting point is the observation that workers who can exercise a
degree of control over the organization of their working time mention fewer
problems in finding a decent work–life balance (OECD, 2004),10 the findings
of the survey on working conditions carried out by the Dublin-based
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
(European Foundation, 2001) demonstrate how much remains to be done:
around one-third of all employees state that the number of hours they work
varies from day to day, and approximately one-quarter state that they work
different days from week to week; a little over one in four men and women say
that their hours change at least once a month, and only about half of this
group is given more than one day’s notice of such changes; and, while 50 per
cent to 60 per cent of all workers enjoy a degree of latitude in the choice of
when to take breaks and paid holiday, only one-third say they actually have
“control” over their working schedules. To respond to these power imbalances
in terms of determining work schedules – which means, in the final analysis,
reducing the employer’s authority and the employee’s subordination – we
must look at which lines of inquiry enable us to make “chosen schedules”
more widespread, and consider at which levels collective regulation of
individual working time choices can be carried out. From this perspective, the
law that came into force in the Netherlands as of July 2000 seems a fruitful
path to follow, on the condition that the way in which it is to be implemented
be specified at the sectoral level. Yet examples of companies in which genuine
regulation of individual choice has been implemented show that collective
bargaining can play its part in this area as well (Anxo and Boulin, 2006; Den
Dulk, 2001). One further condition for greater autonomy being granted to
employees in setting their work schedules and working patterns lies in the
reconfiguration of social welfare systems in order that they include paid
periods outside work as a part of the normal career path (as is true for parental
leave in Sweden and other Scandinavian countries), and in order to confer
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10 Yet this point is not corroborated by all the studies. Work carried out by Garner et al. (2004) suggests that “People
who set their own hours flag up more problems than those whose working time is set by a company, whether shift-
work or a timetable that may change on a daily basis” (p. 3).
practical content on the neologism “flexicurity”. From this point of view, the
thinking currently being done in the Netherlands about the reconfiguration of
the social welfare system from a life-course perspective deserves ongoing and
more detailed attention (Leijnse et al., 2002). 
If, as Alain Supiot emphasizes, “the personal needs and wishes of the
workers must be addressed in the organization of work schedules” (Supiot,
1999, p. 136), this assumes, for example, the implementation of “policies
aiming to reduce the opportunity cost devoted to work, via finer adjustment
of work schedules to other daily activities” (OECD, 2004, p. 52). Such an
approach means that working time and its regulation can be viewed from a
societal perspective, with working time thus becoming one form of social time
among others that has to be examined in terms of its relationship with other
periods of social time. Legally speaking, this results in “considering time no
longer solely as working time, like a measurement of the work/pay exchange,
but also as a subjective experience, i.e. as part of the worker’s life course”
(Supiot, 2001, p. 127). In terms of action, this shows the whole point of local
time policies (or time-related policies decided on a municipal council level), is
to demonstrate that regulation should no longer apply to every form of social
time taken individually, but rather to the relationship between the various
types of social time (Boulin and Mückenberger, 2002).
Lastly, the final question and an extreme ambition, but one for which we
must indeed provide some tentative theoretical and practical answers: in a
knowledge-based society, is time still a relevant indicator for measuring work?
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
When social scientists today debate the employment relationship of the
traditional full-time core worker, the so-called standard employment
relationship (SER), they speak almost exclusively of erosion and crisis rather
than of change. The predominant notion is that the SER of the past is
breaking up in favour of a diversity of non-standard atypical employment
relationships that are no longer held together by any common bond, so that
it no longer makes any sense to assume that there is any dominant form of
employment relationship. For example, in his monumental work on the
information society, Manuel Castells wrote that “the traditional form of
work, based on full-time employment, clear-cut occupational assignment,
and a career pattern over the lifecycle is being slowly but surely eroded away”
(Castells, 1996, p. 268). He notes, moreover, that this applies not only to
unskilled workers, but also, and particularly, to highly qualified knowledge
workers (ibid., p. 267). The reasons he and other authors advance this can
be summarized as follows:
• The new information and communications technologies (ICTs) are
leading to the spatial restructuring of established productive systems.
Corporate structures and forms of work organization geared to the long
term are being replaced by virtual networks and frequently shifting forms
of cooperation geared to the short term.
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• The “half-life” of workers’ skills and qualifications is declining because
of the increasing pace of technological change. As a result, specialist
knowledge that has tended hitherto to have a stabilizing effect over the
course of the working life is being more rapidly devalued, so that in the
future workers can expect to have to change jobs and occupations several
times in their lives.
Self-evidently, these arguments share a common basis. Because of the
disintegration of its spatial and social ties, labour is regarded as divisible and
combinable at will. For most theoreticians of the information society, the
current paradigm can be expressed as follows: “external structural change is
replacing internal structural change”. As is usually the case when such
paradigms are formulated, this is meant not only as an empirical observation
but also as a normative proposition. The new forms of employment are, it is
argued, superior to the allegedly sluggish and conservative employment model
of the past. The message is clear: “External structural change is more flexible
and thus more efficient than internal structural change, because it is not
hampered by so many rules. Only what is known can be regulated, not
innovations.” By virtue of its technological determinism, this paradigm is also
universal. Its paean of praise to external labour market mobility turns it,
perhaps unwittingly, into a propaganda vehicle for the so-called “Anglo-Saxon”
model of deregulated labour markets that encourages external mobility.
Only a few contributors to the debate (Beynon et al., 2002; Bosch, 2002,
2004; Wagner, 2000b) have examined the chances of the SER’s survival or
reconstruction; outlined some starting points for the political action that
needs to be taken; and developed some approaches to a new SER that would
be viable in future. These opportunities for shaping the future of the SER and
developing new norms for employment relationships are the subject of this
chapter. These opportunities are also important for achieving the goal of
decent work,1 which up to now has been defined by the ILO (1999) largely in
terms of good standards achieved in the traditional employment relationship.
In order to uncover these buried starting points for action, the various lines
of argument alluded to above need to be unpicked step by step. The fact that
they are so intertwined makes it very difficult to obtain a clear view of the
overall situation. It is not sufficient to check the numerous statements of fact
against the findings of empirical research. The world of work is in such a state
of upheaval that statistical surveys on the diffusion of particular forms of
employment relationships merely provide snapshots of a moving object. In
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1 The ILO (1999) defines decent work in the following way: “Decent work is the converging focus of all its (the ILO’s)
four strategic objectives: the promotion of rights at work; employment; social protection; and social dialogue. It must
guide its policies and define its international role in the near future.”
order to make a film out of these snapshots, not necessarily one with a happy
ending but at least with a comprehensible story, we have to get to grips with
the forces driving the change. Only then will we be in a position not only to
consider the future, but also to understand the causes of change, and hence
identify shifts in trends and points of intervention for political action. What
interventions are proposed is a normative decision – and not one that can be
inferred simply from the analysis. However, whether or not any opportunities
for action are revealed at all depends very much on the quality of the analysis.
The paradigm of work organization in the information society
formulated by Castells and others is empirically indefensible, normatively
questionable and, because of differences in societal configurations, not
universal in scope. This will be demonstrated in what follows. I begin by
outlining what the standard employment relationship actually is and why it
was regarded as “standard” during a long period of high economic growth.
Here, particular attention will be devoted to analysing the connection between
the standard employment relationship and standard working hours (section
2.2). In section 2.3, selected empirical findings on the development of employ-
ment relationships in various countries are presented. I then turn to an
examination of the various causes of the change in employment relationships
and their effects on the SER. What emerges from this examination is that
much of what is attributed to the computerization of society has quite
different causes. It will be shown that new technologies are only one of several
equally important causes of the changes that have occurred in the standard
employment relationship (section 2.4). Since paradigms can be combated only
with other paradigms and not with facts (Kuhn, 1967), I would like to propose
an alternative paradigm which, in contrast to that formulated by Castells, takes
as its starting point a balance between external and internal change on the one
hand and, on the other, more working time options for employees to choose
from (section 2.5). An alternative paradigm is necessary, because otherwise all
other options will be closed off. Castells will of course be proved absolutely
right if his view becomes so dominant that it pushes all other approaches and
possibilities into the background. 
2.2 THE DEFINITION AND FUNCTION OF THE SER
The traditional SER has been defined as a “stable, socially protected, dependent,
full-time job . . . the basic conditions of which (maximum working hours per
day and week, rest times, pay, social transfers etc.) are regulated to a minimum
level by collective agreement or by labour and/or social security law” (Bosch,
1986, p. 165). The full-time nature of the job, its stability and the social
standards linked with permanent full-time work are the key elements in this
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definition. Only full-time employment guarantees a family wage and an
adequate level of social protection, while a stable job places the relations
between employer and employee on a long-term footing. Nolan’s starting point
is the social function of the SER for employers. He argues that what
distinguishes this employment relationship from other forms of exchanges is
the “attempt by employers to reconcile . . . two problems – of securing workers’
cooperation and a surplus product” (Nolan, 1983, p. 303). Harvey (1999) and
Clarke (1991) identify the wage form as the key criterion in assessing the
approach to future time inherent in employment forms. In the SER, in contrast
to day labour, workers are paid not only for the days they work, but also for
times when they are not working or are investing in their capacity for work
(through learning on the job, initial and further training, health and safety at
work and so on). The object of the contract is not only today but also to-
morrow, with many mutual obligations enshrined therein. These obligations
may include, on the employee’s side, exclusivity of employment with one
organization and, on both sides, a commitment to a minimum period of
employment and rules for terminating the contract. Esping-Andersen (1990)
argues that workers are not commodities like other inputs to production
because they must survive and reproduce both themselves and the society 
they live in. As commodities they could easily be destroyed by even minor
contingencies such as illness, and by macro-events like the business cycle.
Decommodification is a precondition for a tolerable level of individual welfare
and security. The welfare state, including job protection and the entitlements
linked to the SER, reflects responses to pressure for decommodification
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 37). He differentiates between three types of
welfare systems: the social-democratic (example Sweden), the corporatist
(example Germany), and the neo-liberal (example United States). The purpose
of welfare state regulations in the social-democratic and corporatist models is
to protect that special commodity labour from the vagaries of the market. The
various social protection measures create buffers between the market and
employment relationships that guarantee workers an income, at least for a
transitional period when they are not working, or are working less, because of
illness, accident, unemployment, short-time working, etc. 
The various analytical perspectives on the SER can be summarized by
reviving the concept of decommodification – not, as Esping-Andersen sees it,
as relating only to the provision of social security by the welfare state – but
with its original wider meaning. The term, which was, to the best of my
knowledge, first coined by Briefs (1927), who spoke of decommercialization,
and Polyani (1957), covered all the social protection measures of a welfare
state that create buffers between the market and employment relationships.
These buffers are rooted, first, in the supra-enterprise welfare state and,
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second, in the employment contract itself, which is not concluded, as it is with
day labourers, for the here and now, but contains elements of future security.
For example, owing to protection against dismissal, enterprises are obliged to
conclude longer-term employment contracts, and under certain conditions,
such as holiday, illness, unemployment, accident or continuing training,
employees still receive money when they are not working, and, thanks to
compulsory insurance, part of the wage goes towards provision for retirement.
Third, there is also the issue of making use of the commodity labour once the
contract has been concluded. Time limits are set for this utilization.
Employees’ capacity for work is maintained over the long term by protecting
workers from excessive demands, for example by establishing maximum
working times and holiday entitlements (Bosch, 1999). Private life is made
easier to plan by establishing a standard working time and rules that have to be
adhered to when deviations from that norm are necessary (payment of
premiums, giving notice of changes to working time). The first two
dimensions can be described as external decommodification and the third as
internal decommodification of employment relationships. Working time
regulations play a part in all three dimensions. 
Thus the SER enables employees to plan for the long term. This applies
not only to the planning of everyday life, such as the use of leisure time, but also
to workers’ investment, and that of family members, in their own capacity for
work, for example through education and training. Social protection and the
constraining of corporate decision-making by rules (protection against
dismissal, for example) increase employees’ bargaining power in the labour
market, which they are able to deploy effectively in representing their interests.
Above all, they have been able to obtain for themselves a share of the increase
in economic productivity and compensation for their own willingness to be
flexible (e.g., through the payment of overtime premiums). In this way, the SER
has been a significant instrument for the reduction of social inequality. 
If only welfare state regimes are compared, there is a danger that the
function of the SER for firms and the economy as a whole will be overlooked,
a point underlined by Nolan (1983). Firms also benefited from the standards
laid down by the SER during the period of stable economic growth and mass
production. In the past, work organization in both the manufacturing industry
and the service sector was based on full-time employment and the 8-hour day
associated with it, and on the 48-hour and, later, the 40-hour week. This
traditional form of working time was the main pillar of work organization
systems and was generally taken for granted. Thus employees’ standard
working time was not simply an externally imposed regulation but found its
equivalence in firms’ work organization systems. This is the main reason why
traditional forms of work organization became second nature to both
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employees and firms. The standard working time laid down in the SER and the
dismissal protection it provided meant that ad hoc personnel decisions became
costly, leading firms to plan their personnel deployment very carefully. The
high-productivity increases achieved in the 1960s and 1970s showed that they
made intensive use of their freedom of action within the framework laid down
by the SER in order to reorganize and rationalize labour deployment.
This focus on decommodification has been criticized from a gender
perspective because “in order to enjoy rights to ‘de-commodification’ it is
essential to be a potential participant in the labour market. Some welfare states
act to restrict women’s role to the domestic or family sphere, while others
encourage and promote the participation of all citizens” (Rubery and Grimshaw,
2003, p. 87). In the corporatist model, as in the German model, the traditional
male breadwinner model is still further stabilized by a number of reinforcing
measures, such as morning-only school, the inadequate supply of childcare
facilities, the so-called splitting system for assessing married couples’ tax liability
and the system of deriving married women’s social security entitlements from
their husbands’ SER. On the basis of criticism of the traditional paternalistic
model, Orloff (1993) actually demanded the right for women “to be
commodified” (ibid., p. 318). However, this formulation is misleading. What
Orloff really means is a right to paid employment, and not the dismantling of all
the protective provisions of the SER. To recommodify the SER would only mean
replacing a woman’s dependence on her husband with dependence on the market.
This is an important distinction, since only some, but by no means all, of the
regulations involved in the traditional SER impede employment of women. Today
many working women, even in the corporatist welfare model, enjoy the
protection of many SER regulations, and the new, more flexible, SER in the social-
democratic model has developed not by deregulating the old model but through
reregulation. In the 1950s and 1960s the Scandinavian welfare states also
supported traditional household structures with a male breadwinner and were
gradually transformed into the social-democratic welfare states of today, which
is based on the assumption that all fit adults are in employment. We will see that
the switch from derived entitlements to individual rights in European welfare
states is one of the major drivers of change in the SER.
It is clear from the various definitions and attributions of function that
the SER is of value not only to employees but also to firms and society as a
whole. Employees are protected from the vagaries of the markets and can
make long-term plans for themselves and their families. Firms benefit from a
reliable framework within which to plan their work organization and are able
to rely on their employees’ willingness to cooperate in return for the security
they enjoy. In society as a whole, inequalities are reduced and families are
enabled to invest in their members’ human capital. With the traditional
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household division of labour, the SER could fulfil these functions only if the
single male breadwinner worked full time and earned a family wage. However,
examination of the various models of the welfare state has revealed that
alternatives very definitely exist. In order to develop our analysis, therefore, it
is important to make a distinction between the substance of the SER and its
form. The substance is determined by the functions set out above. However,
the forms (full-time employment, family wage, rigid forms of work organi-
zation based on the 8-hour day or full-time employment) can change.
2.3 THE EVOLUTION OF THE SER IN THE EU
Contrary to all the forecasts made by Castells and others, there has been no
sign of an end to the SER. In the EU-15, between 1992 and 2003 the
proportion of people in self-employment fell from 16.1 per cent to 14.8 
per cent. The proportion of employees with fixed-term contracts rose from
11.1 per cent to 12.8 per cent and the proportion of part-time employees from 
14.2 per cent to 18.2 per cent (European Commission, 2004). Permanent full-
time employment is still the predominant employment relationship. In this
context, there are interesting differences between individual countries. In
southern Europe in particular, the proportion of people in self-employment
has fallen, particularly in the primary sector. In some countries there are very
high proportions of employees with fixed-term contracts (Spain and the
United Kingdom), or their proportion has increased rapidly in recent years
(Belgium, Ireland, Portugal). In Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, as the numbers of women in
employment have risen, there has also been a rapid increase in the proportion
of part-time employees, but in Denmark, part-time employment has decreased
and in Sweden it has remained unchanged. Both the proportions of part-time
employees and the rate of women in employment are low in southern Europe.
Since part-time work is primarily structured as women’s work, any attempt to
explain these trends must look first at the conditions under which family
responsibilities and paid work can be reconciled. 
Obviously, the expansion of fixed-term or temporary employment can,
under certain conditions, undermine the SER (e.g., Spain). One possible
reason for this may lie in excessive regulation of the SER, which induces firms
to confine themselves largely to revocable personnel decisions when adjusting
employment levels. Another reason may be inadequate levels of flexibility
within the workforce (because of skill deficiencies, for example), which
encourages firms to opt for external flexibility. 
Part-time and full-time work are often looked at as different forms of
employment relationships. Blyton and Turnbull (1994) subdivided the labour
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force into three broad categories: a core of full-time workers, a periphery of
part-time, temporary, and homeworkers together with the self-employed, and,
finally, the unemployed (p. 53). This polarized view of full-time and part-time
work might make sense in the British context but should not be generalized.
In some European countries, the hours worked by full-timers and part-timers
are beginning to converge as a result of an increase in part-timers’ hours and a
reduction in those of full-timers. In Denmark, for example, it became possible
for many women to work the reduced full-time norm when the generalized
reduction of working time from 40 to 37 hours was introduced. At the same
time, female part-timers now tend to work 30 hours per week rather than the
20 hours they used to work 10 years ago. The reduction of men’s working time
has certainly also helped to change the family division of labour and women’s
labour market behaviour (figure 2.1a). In Germany, these developments are
only in their early stages and are masked in particular by the strong growth in
marginal part-time employment among women (figure 2.1b). In the United
Kingdom, on the other hand, full-time and part-time employment are tending
rather to diverge. The de facto full-time norm among men is far in excess of
40 hours. Obviously unions have lost or never gained control over actual
working hours. Long working hours are a strong indicator for an inner
recommodification of the SER. The large volume of overtime worked by men
means that married women with children, despite an advantageous school
system with relatively long hours, have to be content with marginal part-time
jobs, so that the gap between full-time and part-time employment has widened
even further in recent years. In contrast to Denmark (figure 2.1c), part-time
work is also largely unregulated; it is less well paid than full-time work, so
there is little incentive for households to substitute the low wages earned by
female part-timers for men’s overtime, which attracts premium payments. A
longitudinal survey would probably show even more clearly that the
differences between full-time and part-time employment are becoming more
fluid in Denmark. Temporary rather than permanent part-time working, with
a return to full-time employment, has become part of a normal work history,
particularly as a result of flexible parental leave arrangements.
The empirical evidence presented up to this point has provided only
snapshots of the diffusion of certain employment forms. Such snapshots
cannot reveal whether or not the SER is being eroded from within by
increasing job turnover, which has increased instability over the course of the
working life. Auer and Cazes (2002) investigated the evolution of average job
tenure in various industrialized countries. They found, surprisingly, that
employment stability in most countries had increased (table 2.1). In some
countries (Ireland, the United States) job tenure has increased because of the
high growth rates and the high level of recruitment of new workers. Auer and
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Figure 2.1 Distribution of usual weekly working hours for dependent
employees, 1992 and 2002
Source: European Labour Force Survey 1992, 2002 (calculations: S. Schief, Institut Arbeit und Technik).
Cazes controlled for economic growth rates and the age structure of workers
and came to the conclusion that “we do not find any general and systematic
trend towards declining tenure” (p. 29). A number of other writers (e.g.
Erlinghagen and Knuth, 2004; Doogan, 2001) have reached similar con-
clusions. Erlinghagen (2004) actually shows that the increasing integration of
women into the German labour market has been accompanied by an increase
in the stability of employment of part-time employees in particular. 
With international comparisons of this kind, one must be aware that
apparently comparable statistical categories are often being used to measure
very different things. Because of the low level of statutory dismissal protection
and the decline in trade union power and influence in the United Kingdom and
the United States, a permanent, full-time job in the large areas not covered by
a collective agreement in these countries frequently offers no more protection
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Table 2.1 Average employment tenure, 1992–2000
Country 1992 2000 Percentage change 
1992–2000
Belgium 11.0 11.5 4.5
Denmark 8.8 8.3 −5.7
Germany 10.7 10.5 −1.9
Finland1 n.a. 10.1 −5.6
France 10.4 11.1 6.7
Greece 13.5 13.5 0.0
Ireland 11.1 9.4 −15.3
Italy 11.9 12.2 2.5
Japan 10.9 11.6 6.4
Luxembourg 10.1 11.4 12.9
Netherlands 8.9 9.1 2.2
Portugal 11.1 11.8 6.3
Spain 9.9 10.1 2.0
Sweden1 n.a. 11.5 8.5
United Kingdom 8.1 8.2 1.2
United States2 6.7 6.6 −1.5
EU (14)3 10.5 10.6 1.6
Average 10.2 10.4 2.1
Notes:  1 Change from 1995 to 2000. 2 Average tenure data refer to 1991 instead of 1992. For US and Japan, data refer
to 1998 instead of 2000. 3 Without Austria.
n.a.  not available
Source:  Auer and Cazes (2002), p. 25.
than a temporary contract, so that ultimately it matters little to employers or
employees which kind of contract is concluded. It is hardly surprising,
therefore, that, after the far-reaching deregulation of recent decades, there is
less debate on the SER in the United States and the United Kingdom to match
that being conducted, for example, in Germany. In the neo-liberal model,
permanent full-time work is decommodified only to a limited extent, if at all. 
2.4 THE CAUSES OF THE CHANGE IN THE SER
In empirical terms, this means that the forecast erosion of the SER cannot 
be identified as a universal trend. In this chapter it will be shown that the 
new ICTs are not the only reason for a change in employment relationships,
and that other causes play an equally important part. In particular, new
technologies are embedded in enterprises’ work organization, and do not
affect employment relationships directly, but only indirectly. In this section,
an attempt will be made to bring out the various causes of change. A
distinction will be made here between the following six significant factors: (1)
the flexibilization of product markets; (2) rising employment rates among
women; (3) the combining of education/training and work; (4) rising edu-
cational levels among the working population; (5) the employment situation;
and (6) the regulation or deregulation of the labour market. 
1. Flexibilization of product markets. The continuity and predictability of
working time in the traditional SER did not become possible until product
markets were similarly organized. The manufacturing industry was
dominated by mass production, which enabled firms to deal with
fluctuating demand by holding stocks, and less by varying working time.
In many service industries, standard working time was safeguarded by
fixed opening hours. These arrangements have changed. Mass production
shifted to low-wage countries a long time ago and goods are now
produced virtually exclusively to order. It is no longer possible to keep
parts in stock for the growing number of possible variants; thus stocks can
no longer serve as a buffer between market and production and their role
has been taken by working time. At the same time, opening hours in many
service industries have been extended and hence also the time frame within
which customer flows of varying volumes have to be served. In addition,
and particularly in knowledge-intensive forms of work, such as software
production, there is the pressure of deadlines in project work, which is 
a consequence of, among other things, the diminishing half-life of
innovations. In a generally more flexible economy, firms cannot survive
with the old, rigid employment forms. A return to the early industrial
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forms of hiring and firing offers a solution only in the case of low-level
jobs. In other jobs, employers are increasingly dependent on skilled
workers, whom they wish to retain even in times of crisis in order not to
lose the considerable investment they have made in their know-how.
Consequently, they seek to increase internal flexibility. The rise in job
tenure, despite more turbulent markets, has been possible as a result of
greater internal flexibility. Employees today are better and, more
importantly, more broadly educated and are therefore more versatile
(Bosch, 2000). Moreover, flexible working times mean there are
considerable internal reserves of labour that can be drawn on in the event
of fluctuations in demand. More and more firms today prefer to eliminate
hours of work rather than dismiss employees. Research has shown that the
new ICTs enable companies to manage and control higher levels of
internal and external flexibility than in the past, but they are a neutral tool,
not an independent driving force behind any particular form of flexibility. 
2. Rising employment rates among women. Female employment rates have risen
considerably in recent years in most of the developed industrialized
countries and according to all forecasts will continue to increase further in
the years to come. This additional labour supply is not, like that of men 
in the single breadwinner model, free of the burden of reproductive work
but rather has to combine paid work with domestic responsibilities. The
working hours and employment forms that women are in a position to
accept depend primarily on the social organization of childcare. In coun-
tries with an inadequate childcare infrastructure, many women will be able
only to look for part-time employment or have to remain childless. The
inadequate provision of care facilities for children under 3 and morning-only
schooling are the reasons why women with children in the Netherlands 
or Germany either seek part-time employment or, because of these
restrictions, decide, perhaps reluctantly, not to have children, which is
reflected in the sharply falling birth rate. Substantial differences between the
wages of men and women will mean that, for financial reasons, households
are likely to opt for longer working hours for men and shorter working
hours for women. Another important factor affecting the distribution of
working hours between men and women is pay differences between men
and women (incentives offered by the tax and social security systems for
non-employment or marginal part-time employment (Dingeldey, 2000)).
Thus an increase in women’s employment that is not accompanied by
changes in the wider social environment is a phenomenon with the capacity
to blow apart the traditional SER (albeit one that is concealed by the decline
in the birth rate), and can be defused only by a reorganization of childcare.
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3. The combining of education/training and work. As higher education has
expanded, so the number of high-school and university students seeking
employment has risen. Many industries (call centres, for example) have
based their work organization systems and locational decisions on this
specific labour supply. In the EU, the percentage of young people aged
between 15 and 29 who are combining part-time work and education rose
between 1987 and 1995 from 22 per cent to 33 per cent (European
Commission, 2000). In Germany, a growing percentage of students are
seeking employment, usually part-time employment. In 1991 the
employment rate among students was 51 per cent, but in 2003, 68 per
cent of the some 2 million students were in employment (Deutsches
Studentenwerk, 2003). The Eurobarometer showed an increase in
occasional employment among young people aged between 15 and 24
from 13 per cent in 1997 to 15 per cent in 2001 (Eurobarometer, 2001, 
p. 103). Thus as a result of the expansion of the education system and
the consequent extension of the youth phase of the life course,
employment forms are becoming increasingly differentiated, particularly
among younger people; temporary and part-time jobs have become
standard, albeit temporary employment forms that are not the last points
on individual career trajectories. 
4. Rising educational levels among the working population. In today’s
knowledge society, a good education will increasingly serve as an entry
ticket to the labour market. In most countries, the employment rate for
highly qualified men and women is significantly higher than that for the
less well qualified (figure 2.2). For the more highly qualified, the
influence of educational level on labour market position is now greater
than that of gender. Incidentally, this also applies to working time and
employment forms. The higher the qualification level, the longer the
average working times and the lower the part-time employment rate
tends to be. Thus as qualification levels among the working population
rise, the demand for permanent, full-time employment also rises. In this
respect, the risk to the SER comes from quite another direction. Working
times are especially increasing among highly qualified workers, and 
a permanent, full-time contract no longer fulfils its classic function 
of protecting workers against excessive demands (Wagner, 2000a).
Overlong working hours may lead to internal recommodification, while
external decommodification is maintained. Such an internal recommod-
ification can be observed in the United Kingdom (figure 2.3).
5. The employment situation. The SER is a regulated employment relation-
ship. Only by laying down minimum standards can employment
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relationships in very different firms and industries and among very
different groups of employees acquire the common characteristics
required for the development of a societal standard. If central regulations
(on working time or dismissal protection, for example) were abolished,
then employees would have to negotiate their employment conditions
individually. Under such circumstances, only a small proportion would
enjoy the same level of protection as under the SER. In some countries,
such as the United Kingdom or the United States, labour market
deregulation has been a contributory factor in the wholesale undermining
of the SER. However, deregulation of the SER is not the only problem,
since excessive regulation, as well as the regulations governing other
employment forms, can have similar effects. If the SER is too rigid, firms
will increasingly resort to other employment forms, as the example of
temporary work in Spain shows. Since complete decommodification in a
market economy is not possible, a balance has to be struck between
security and flexibility. However, the reason for the use of other employ-
ment forms may also be that they are under-regulated. If these
employment forms give firms unrestricted freedom to take the decisions
they wish to take, as is the case, for example, with marginal part-time jobs
in Germany, then the regulatory gap between the various employment
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Figure 2.2 Employment rates for men and women (aged 15–64) by
educational qualifications in the EU-15, 2002
Source: European Labour Force Survey 1992, 2002 (calculations: S. Schief, Institut Arbeit und Technik).
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forms can give rise to a powerful suction effect pulling standards
irresistibly downwards. On the other hand, the more strongly all forms
of part-time work are regulated, the more similar they become in all
aspects to the SER, with working time remaining then as the only
significant difference.
6. Regulation/deregulation of the labour market. Full employment and
economic growth formed the background against which the SER came
into existence mainly in the 1950s and 1960s. High unemployment, on the
other hand, together with labour market regulation, has been the most
important factor in the dissolution of the SER. As unemployment rises,
competition in the labour market increases and employees’ bargaining
power declines. Firms are able to shift a greater share of market risks on
to workers’ shoulders and will offer only less well-protected employment
forms. Many workers are unable to realize their employment preferences,
so that they have to accept involuntary part-time work or temporary
employment. However, as unemployment decreases, employers have to
compete for labour, which is in shorter supply, and improve employment
conditions. Under such circumstances, they will even be happy to resort
to standardized employment forms, since these standards limit
employees’ demands as well, thereby removing disputes over distribution
from the everyday life of the workplace. Thus a reduction in unemploy-
ment, which is to be expected in the years to come, not least for
demographic reasons, may strengthen the SER on a lasting basis.
All six of these factors may alter the significance of the traditional SER
in various ways. If the temporal and functional flexibility within the SER is not
developed further in comparison with the rigid Taylorist forms, in increasingly
flexible product markets enterprises will increasingly switch to external forms
of flexibility, such as fixed-term contracts or temporary workers. If women’s
opportunities for integration into the labour market are not improved by
means of improvements in childcare, equal wages and career prospects with
men, and flexible working hours during phases of child-rearing and other
domestic care, there will be a polarization between part-time and full-time
work, resulting in a lessening of the SER’s importance as has happened in the
United Kingdom. When unemployment is chronically high, competition
between insiders and outsiders will undermine the SER. Policy can play a
widely varying part here. In the social-democratic model, it can develop a new,
more flexible, SER via reregulation, something that has already been achieved
in the Scandinavian countries. However, by recommodifying employment
relationships, as has happened in the United States, it can also create a new
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form of equality between the sexes via the market, with high employment
rates, great insecurity as regards employment, and long working hours for men
and women – in other words, also creating internal recommodification. Since
it makes no sense to select the expansion of the education and training system
as an indicator of the crisis in the SER, particularly since career trajectories are
likely to be stabilized by the expansion of the education system, it would be
sensible to base future investigations of the diffusion of the SER on employees
aged 25 and over.
2.5 APPROACHES TO A NEW, FLEXIBLE SER
It could be shown that the dissolution of the SER is not an inevitable
development, determined by the use of the new ICTs. Castells also expresses
some doubts about his own all too deterministic comments. At some points,
Castells refers to the importance of the experience and knowledge of an
established workforce2 and at others calls into question the universalism of the
“Anglo-Saxon” model and emphasizes the possibility of alternative routes to
social development.3 He seems not entirely unimpressed by the findings of
innovation research, industrial sociology and labour market research which,
from various perspectives, point to the increasing importance of spatial
proximity, stable relationships and close social communication in knowledge-
based work and to differences in societal development trajectories. This has
far-reaching consequences for the structuring of employment relationships,
which can be described as follows: it is true that the technical possibilities for
dividing up work processes and rapidly assembling the parts at any location
have increased. However, only standardized activities whose contents are
known and have been codified can be divided up and put back together again.
In innovative work environments, additional, as yet uncodified knowledge is
created. This includes, on the one hand, knowledge derived from experience,
without which the productive potential of new technologies cannot be
developed. On the other hand, it includes new knowledge that has not yet
become standard. True, companies make efforts to decode such knowledge in
order to incorporate it into technologies or to be able to pass it on through
vocational training. However, these efforts come up against certain
constraints, since demand for standard products is constantly decreasing and
Working time and the standard employment relationship
57
2 Thus he writes, for example: “ the nature of the informational work process calls for co-operation, team work,
worker’s autonomy and responsibility, without which new technologies cannot be used up to their potential” (Castells,
1996, p. 246).
3 Thus he argues that working and employment conditions are by no means necessarily determined by information
technologies: “these trends do not stem from the structural logic of the informational paradigm, but are the result of
the current restructuring of capital–labour relationships, helped by the powerful tools provided by new information
technologies” (Castells, 1996, p. 273).
firms are constantly chasing after new knowledge because of the ever-
quickening pace of innovation. Since the uncodified knowledge is embodied in
individuals or teams and is not transferable, or if it is, only at considerable
cost, it is economically efficient for firms to build up skilled workforces and
to invest in their skills. They offer these core workforces security and in return
expect a high degree of flexibility, together with the motivation and commit-
ment required to mobilize the uncodified knowledge.
However, the traditional SER, based on Taylorist production structures
and the male sole wage earner, cannot survive unchanged. The question of
what policy changes will be sought is a normative issue, but at the same time
it is also a question of efficiency. A welfare state and its labour and social laws
cannot be funded unless they are embedded in efficient economic structures,
and they themselves make a contribution to efficiency. As in the old SER,
efficiency and social security must be combined under new production
conditions and new household structures. 
One of the starting points of this analysis was the fact that a changed
SER should be created not by deregulating the old model, but via reregulation.
In order to be able to describe the levels of reregulation more precisely, it is
helpful to begin by describing the additional functions of a new SER. The old
SER was intended to achieve the following goals: (1) protection of employees
against economic and social risks; (2) reduction of social inequality; and (3) an
increase in economic efficiency. The simultaneous realization of these goals
made it possible to achieve decent work standards (ILO, 1999) through
compromises between the interests of employees, firms and society as a
whole. These objectives have been achieved to a large extent. Social
inequalities in the developed European welfare states have been reduced,
employees were well protected against the major economic and social risks,
and companies have been able to develop highly productive forms of work
organization within the framework laid down through the SER. The old
objectives are still current, but three further goals have to be added to them.
The first of these is equal access for men and women to the employment
system, the second support for lifelong learning in order to improve
employability in a rapidly changing economy, and the third increased
flexibility in the workplace. This would add the functions underlined in 
figure 2.4 to the traditional functions of the SER. The new SER thus created
would be similar in its substance to the old one, but its form would be adapted
to the changed social conditions. 
There will be a change in working hours in particular, as a result of the new
needs of enterprises and of employees themselves. Enterprises will distribute
their working hours more flexibly over the year or over more than one year, and
employees too, in altered household structures, will not always work regularly.
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If both partners in a couple are economically active, the man will no longer have
to earn the family wage by himself. If both partners combine paid work and
family responsibilities, career paths will become more flexible. Workers will
alternate between periods of full-time employment, part-time employment and
career breaks (parental or educational leave). Flexible career paths of this kind
differ from market-driven “human capital portfolios” (Carnoy et al., 1997) in
that they are decommodified. Changes in employment forms over the life
course are not only enforced but also self-selected and socially protected.
Just like the traditional SER, its replacement must be socially embedded
and supported. The following structures in particular are crucial elements in
the institutional framework required for its successful realization:
1. Promotion of internal flexibility in flexible work organization systems.
Flexible working times over the life course lead to increased employee
turnover. At the same time, firms are operating in more turbulent
markets. These increased demands for flexibility can be met only by
developing decentralized forms of work organization. Any attempt to
combine business efficiency with increased time sovereignty for
employees inevitably raises the question of work organization. There are
now numerous examples of innovative forms of work organization that
show that such a synthesis can be made to work successfully (Lehndorff,
2001). Employees must adopt a more flexible attitude than in the classic
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NOTE: Additional functions of the new SER are highlighted in bold. 
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Figure 2.4 Functions of the old and the new SER
SER towards both working time and their sphere of deployment. Limits
must, however, be set to the temporal flexibility of employees via
protective norms (maximum working hours, breaks and rest periods,
notice periods for changing working hours). 
2. Promotion of lifelong learning. In the knowledge society, there is a risk,
even with short career breaks, that skills and qualifications will become
obsolete. Thus social protection can no longer be confined to passive
transfers for those experiencing difficulties in achieving labour market
integration, as it was in the past; rather, as the quid pro quo for the
establishment of more flexible forms of work organization, it must
improve opportunities for lifelong learning.
3. Development of the public childcare infrastructure for children under 3 and
for those of school age (all-day schooling). Extension of the childcare
system must take priority over financial transfers that support economic
inactivity among women (e.g. child-rearing allowance) and also over any
increase in child benefits. Only if the social infrastructures are reliable do
mothers and fathers have genuine freedom to choose how to organize
their labour supply.
4. Increased opportunities for choosing working hours. The rigid full-time
standard seriously restricted individual choice of working hours. Surveys
of employees’ working time preferences across Europe (Bielenksi et al.,
2002) show that most employees would prefer a weekly working time
within the 25- to 38-hour range. In most countries, however, individual
preferences still founder on the rigid division between full-time and part-
time work, which must be relaxed. More men, reluctant to shift to
part-time work with its attendant discriminations but more than willing
to contemplate a few hours’ reduction in their working time or blocks of
free time distributed over several years, would then be likely to reduce
their working hours. In this way, it would be possible to share out the
volume of paid work, not only among women but also between the sexes.
5. Derived entitlements to social security should be replaced by individual
rights. Independent social protection for women will have to be built up
primarily through continuous economic activity. When women are
economically active in their own right, then some derived rights, such as
widows’ pensions, would be claimed less and less and could probably be
abolished. Equal treatment for different lifestyles and the ending of tax
subsidies for married couples without children (e.g. the tax-splitting
system for married couples) will help to encourage women to enter the
labour market and hence build up their own social security entitlements.
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The first two points can be integrated by developing occupational
labour markets, i.e. the risks involved for the individual in changing jobs can
be reduced and at the same time enterprises’ internal flexibility can be
increased. Castells would object that the half-life of qualifications is
declining and hence recognized occupations no longer afford workers any
protection in the labour market. However, he does not make sufficient
distinction between the various levels of qualifications. When it is used,
general knowledge lasts a lifetime; basic knowledge of a trade or occupation
also has a long half-life but must be continuously supplemented; specialist
knowledge is being renewed ever more rapidly. High-quality vocational
training, updated through further training and experience, allows workers to
change employer without loss of status. Since occupational labour markets
have developed in Germany right down to the lower qualification categories,
there are particularly good opportunities here for encouraging the extended
internal mobility we have outlined. Figure 2.5 shows the considerable
possible overlap between internal and occupational mobility. Because job
tenure has remained largely stable, the regulations on dismissal protection
and social security arrangements associated with the long-established SER
have not become outdated. However, they must be expanded to include
support for occupational training and further training, in order to safeguard
workers’ employability. Investment in qualifications will in future become
even more important than monetary compensation in the event of dismissal.
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This is also an advantage for companies. Interfirm cooperation can function
only on the basis of communicable stocks of knowledge and shared know-
how. Communicable stocks of knowledge are acquired through standardized
vocational training, while familiarity with comparable work processes and
interfirm exchanges of experiences make it possible to acquire a minimum
level of know-how that is at least reciprocal. In order to keep frictional losses
in interfirm networking as low as possible, it is rational for firms to employ
workers with a vocational training whose contents can be communicated to
other firms and to locate themselves in regions with a large number of
potential partners who, by virtue of their physical proximity, can exchange
their know-how with each other and, in the case of complex processes, plan
to cooperate on a long-term basis, thereby making their investment in the
development of shared know-how more worthwhile.
What might an SER capable of fulfilling such a complex list of objectives
look like? The Scandinavian model demonstrates one possible way forward.
Its starting assumption is a certain degree of flexibility in patterns of labour
market behaviour, in which working time is freely chosen in the individual
stages of the working life. Full-time work for both partners can be combined
with paid and unpaid career breaks and periods of part-time work, depending
on individual situations and needs. During career breaks, only socially
recognized activities, such as child-raising or further training, are paid for,
while the realization of other individual preferences remains unpaid. The
choices open to employees with children are extended by a highly developed
childcare system. Workers who have opted for such flexible patterns of labour
market behaviour are protected from poverty in old age by minimum
pensions. Moreover, a narrowing of the gender pay gap reduces the negative
incentives for a redistribution of paid work between men and women. At the
same time as changes were being made to the traditional family model, the
Scandinavian countries also invested more than other countries in education
and training and the development and diffusion of new forms of decentralized
work organization and the introduction of semi-autonomous work groups.4
The recent extension of the occupational labour market by creating new IT
occupations can also be regarded as a reference point in the sphere of the new
ICTs (Bosch, 1999).
4 In Norway, for example, the first programmes on work organization and the introduction of autonomous work
groups were jointly implemented by the unions and the employers’ organizations as early as in the 1960s. The purpose
of the first generations of these programmes tended to be the improvement of the working conditions; nowadays,
however, the state-supported “Enterprise Development 2000 Programme” is more focused on improvements in
competitiveness (Bosch, 1997, p. 222).
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Don’t mourn for me, friends, don’t weep for me never,
For I’m going to do nothing for ever and ever.
Epitaph written for herself by an old charwoman,
as quoted in Keynes, 1930
It is high time to rid ourselves of the notion that leisure for 
workmen is either “lost time” or a class privilege.
Henry Ford, 1926
[T]ime must be conceived of not only in terms of working
time, as a measure of the trading of labour for pay, but also as a
subjective experience, i.e. as time in the life of the worker.
Alain Supiot, 1999
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The assumption of economic theory that workers exercise free choice over
their working time has always stood in stark contrast with their day-to-day
experiences at the workplace. The charwoman’s epitaph is a reminder of how
working time was perceived during the period of early industrialization, when
it was gradually established as a way of disciplining workers in the factory
system and protecting the workplace from the pre-industrial lifestyle,
generating “a clear demarcation between ‘work’ and ‘life’” (Thompson, 1967).
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Hours spent outside work were seen simply as “lost” time. From the workers’
perspective, this process meant in practice the subordination of their lives to
production demands, and a disregard for their lives outside of work. Gradually,
however, the importance of guaranteeing “free time” or “leisure” for workers
was recognized, and perceptions of working time changed. Time outside of
work came to be recognized, by Henry Ford among others, not as lost time,
but as essential for both the quality of working life (predominantly health and
safety) and economic progress (Ford, 1926). Indeed, the economic value of
leisure (“a workman would have little use for an automobile if he had to be in
the shops from dawn until dusk” (ibid., p. 614)) has often been seen as the
driving force in the post-war prosperity that was generated by the Fordist
system (Aglietta, 1979). During this period, the issue of working time
regulation was centred on the reduction of working hours to achieve the
standard of the 8-hour day and 40-hour week.
While Ford predicted a further universal reduction of daily working hours
as the probable next step, instead, “the historical trends towards a progressive
standardization of working time have given way to a diversification,
decentralization and individualization of working hours” (Anxo et al., 2004a,
p. 2; see also Bosch, Chapter 2 in this volume). At the same time, there have
been increasing demands for the reconceptualization of working time to
“embrace workers’ lives as a whole and guarantee the harmony of the various
kinds of time making up these lives” (Supiot, 2001, p. 85). As part of this call
for the reconceptualization of working time, the issue of workers’ choice and
influence over their working hours has taken central stage, as evidenced by 
the growing body of theoretical, empirical and policy studies on this issue
(Anxo et al., 2004a and 2004b). As a result, evidence has accumulated regarding
the extent to which actual working time reflects workers’ needs and prefer-
ences, and the reasons for mismatches between these two.
However, despite this increasing recognition of variations in workers’
needs and preferences, and the importance of realizing them through
increasing workers’ choice and influence, conflicting views have been put
forward regarding how to capture and interpret workers’ preferences and what
needs to be done to increase worker choice. In particular, it is interesting to
note that the shift in focus to individualized working time has paved the way,
in some countries, for the resurgence of market fundamentalism: the belief
that the individualization of working time means a reduced role for “universal”
policy interventions, such as limitations on working hours. This has been
accompanied by a Hayekian belief that workers’ preferences are best
communicated through market transactions, and that social interventions
would simply distort this process. In contrast, several countries have taken a
different route, towards increasing social interventions, including through the
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introduction of social policies that aim to help workers better realize their
preferences over their working time arrangements. 
This chapter aims to provide a research and policy framework for these
issues by arguing that real individualization based on workers’ needs and
preferences requires strong, not weak, social support. We believe that the
“capabilities approach” developed by Sen provides a promising avenue for
better understanding and elaborating the issues related to choice and
preferences in the area of working time; evaluating the policy interventions
intended to advance them; and suggesting some considerations for future
policy directions. This is because the capabilities approach gives individual
workers and their preferences a central role without falling into the trap of
ontological or methodological individualism – due to its explicit recognition
of the role of institutions in facilitating individual capabilities and its recog-
nition of “preference formation through social interaction” (Sen, 1999, p.
253). As a result, the capabilities approach offers an alternative framework
within which workers’ preferences can be interpreted and realized. 
Section 3.2 develops the concept of working time capability based on
Sen’s capabilities approach. Relying on this concept, section 3.3 reviews
existing studies on working time preferences, focusing in particular on
different ways of understanding preferences among those workers in part-time
work and those with long working hours. Section 3.4 draws on recent
literature on capabilities and social rights to discuss the types of social support
that are needed, with the goal of improving working time capabilities for
individual workers, by focusing on the role of individual rights to influence
working hours and outlining their primary forms. This chapter concludes in
section 3.5 by drawing on the working time capability approach to suggest
some of the considerations that need to be addressed in the future
development of policies to advance individual influence over working hours.
3.2 THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH AND 
WORKING TIME
In an attempt to evaluate individuals’ well-being in terms of their real opportunity
to pursue their desired objectives, Sen has proposed the concept of capabilities.
Capability refers to “the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible
for [individuals] to achieve” or “the substantive freedom to achieve alternative
functioning combinations” (Sen, 1999, p. 75). These functionings reflect “the
various things a person may value doing or being” (ibid.), which naturally 
have individual variations. This conceptual framework differs fundamentally from
the outcomes-based approaches typical of mainstream economics, which
concentrate on the “choices” made without considering the options from among
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which they were selected. Under the capabilities approach, having x when there
is no alternative should be distinguished from choosing x when substantial
alternatives exist: “fasting is not the same thing as being forced to starve” 
(ibid., p. 76). 
A central aspect of the capabilities approach is that a person’s capability is
determined by “conversion factors”, which include not only personal charac-
teristics, such as mental and physical conditions, but also social characteristics,
including social norms and institutions.1 The role of social conversion factors
is particularly significant in the analysis of the labour market. Deakin, who has
applied the capability approach to the labour market, has emphasized the
relevance of this aspect of the capabilities approach in reformulating the
concept of social rights in the age of neo-liberal reforms (2004). He suggests
that “a key role for social rights is to act as conversion factors which extend the
range of alternative functionings available to individuals” (p. 48). This aspect of
capabilities is discussed in more detail in section 3.4.
The capabilities approach holds the potential of specific applicability to
the field of working time, particularly with regard to workers’ ability to exercise
choice over the duration and arrangement of their working hours. The
capabilities approach to working time is basically concerned with the
opportunities given to workers to choose and change their working time so as
to improve the quality of their lives. Workers are typically faced with a choice
over how to allocate the given physical hours (“universal” individual entitle-
ments). Their choice will be made among the set of feasible, alternative
combinations of working time and personal activities (“vectors of func-
tionings”). It should be noted that working time in the capability set refers to
both the length (e.g., daily hours) and arrangement (e.g., unsocial hours) of
working time. Thus, as is illustrated in figure 3.1, the current working time
pattern would be the outcome of a worker’s choice over this functionings set.
It is typically assumed in economic theory that this choice is utility
maximizing and that the labour market will function effectively so as to
realize workers’ preferences. The common assumption is that workers’
preferred hours of work correspond to their actual hours, thanks to the
presence of an effective adjustment function in the labour market that
ultimately resolves any mismatches (Ghez and Becker, 1975). What
differentiates the capabilities approach from this kind of an economic
approach is the explicit recognition of the conversion factors that tend to
make individual capacity sets much smaller than is assumed in mainstream
economic theory. For example, different working time capacity can be
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1 “For example, a person who is disabled may have a larger basket of primary goods and yet have less chance to lead a
normal life . . . than an able-bodied person with a smaller basket of primary goods” (Sen, 1999, p. 74).
gauged from the differing views of the charwoman and the Fordist worker
identified at the outset of this chapter. It is also clear that women’s working
time capability is dramatically reduced in the presence of the traditional
gender division of childcare and domestic work. At the same time, the long
working hours of professional women workers in industrialized countries,
while often the outcome of restricted choice, cannot be considered to be
comparable to those of poverty-stricken women workers in the informal
economy of developing countries, although both work similarly long hours.
While working time capability is constrained for both groups of workers, it
is much more limited for the latter. Therefore, the capability approach
captures the degree to which choice can be exercised (see figure 3.1).
Working time capability reflects the substantive freedom to adopt
different working time patterns. From this perspective, attention needs to be
paid not only to the hours that workers are working now, but also to the
options from which they have had the opportunity to choose. Moreover, given
that workers would often like to make different choices in changed
circumstances, which is essential to the life-course perspective on working
time (see Anxo et al., Chapter 4 in this volume), this approach captures the
ability of an individual worker to change his or her working time preferences.
For example, suppose that two workers currently “choose” to work on a 
part-time basis, but that one has the capability to change to full-time work,
while the other does not. Similarly, suppose that two workers are working
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Figure 3.1 Working time capability
equally long overtime hours, but that one has the capability to refuse to work
overtime, while the other does not. Under the working time capabilities
approach, these part-time and long-hours workers cannot be viewed as
enjoying the same capability, although their working time arrangements are
both “voluntary”. The capabilities approach to working time, therefore,
requires the broadening of the information base from existing working time
arrangements to the alternative patterns that are meaningfully available to the
workers in question.
3.3 WORKING TIME PREFERENCES 
AND CAPABILITIES
As discussed in section 3.2, the capabilities approach to working time requires
the broadening of the informational basis for research and policy decisions,
including encompassing what workers would like to achieve. In this regard,
the increasing interest in workers’ preferences over their working time is a
welcome development, to which this chapter is intended to contribute. It
draws on and seeks to further advance the work of Anxo et al. in identifying
the primary elements of working time policies that promote decent work, and,
in particular, on their suggestion that these policies should advance individual
choice and influence over working hours (see Anxo et al., 2004b).
A growing body of research is questioning the economic assumption
concerning the redundancy of preferences: that working hours are optimally set
while matching preferred and actual hours. Even when the income implications
of adjusted working hours are taken into account, workers’ ability to exercise
choice over their working hours, or to realize their preferences, is to a large
extent constrained. In other words, the evidence suggests that working time
capabilities in contemporary market economies are constrained.
One important trend identified in various studies is what Drago (2000) calls
the “working time divide”: that workers would prefer not to work very short or
very long hours, and that the gaps between their current and preferred hours of
work are associated with their current working hours (Lee, 2004). This
phenomenon is demonstrated in figure 3.2, which shows, for the EU-15
countries, the proportion of working hour surpluses (preferred hours are shorter
than actual hours) and deficits (preferred hours are longer than actual hours)
within each hour band. Longer hours are associated with a higher proportion of
working hour surpluses, while shorter hours increase the probability of working
hour deficits. From the perspective of working time capability, this implies that
the set of working time capabilities (alternative functionings of working hours
and incomes, which are the focus of most empirical studies) is more likely to be
limited for individuals who work either very short or long hours.
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The role of conversion factors is also notable. As regards individual
conversion factors, gender is of great significance. Women workers tend to
prefer shorter work hours than their male counterparts. As figure 3.2 shows,
they have a lower proportion of working hour deficits and a higher proportion
of working hour surpluses in each hour band. This gender difference can, to a
large extent, be attributed to the influence of the traditional gender division of
domestic work, and therefore to the fact that women workers often have a “no
paid work” option, which is not typically available to male workers. Gender
factors, then, are not purely individual conversion factors, but are to a large
extent shaped by social conversion factors. The interaction between these two
and its implications have been subject to close scrutiny, as will be discussed
later in this section. 
Age also appears to play a role in shaping working time capabilities. There
is evidence that, with age-related changes, such as the deterioration of mental
and physical strength, and age-specific events, older workers tend to prefer
shorter working hours. Instead, their actual working hours remain relatively
stable (figure 3.3). Also interesting is that as the “no paid work” option is
available for older workers, those with considerable working hour surpluses
may withdraw from the labour market. As figure 3.3 indicates, inactive older
workers tend to prefer much shorter working hours than younger age groups
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Figure 3.2 Working hour gaps: Working hour surpluses and deficits in 
EU-15, 1998 (percentage within each working hour band)
Source: Calculated from the Employment Options for the Future Survey (1998).
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(see Jolivet and Lee, 2004 for a detailed discussion).2 This forms part of a
broader trend under which working hour preferences tend to change over
time, depending on the different stages of working life (see Anxo et al.,
Chapter 4 in this volume; Clarkberg and Moen, 2001). 
Social factors are also significant. With regard to labour market structure,
one of the key findings of the empirical studies is that workers with working hour
gaps are more likely than others to change their working hours, which means that
these gaps could be a useful predictor of future working hour adjustments. From
the perspective of the working time capabilities approach, however, it should be
noted that this adjustment is normally effected through changing jobs or
employers (Boeheim and Taylor, 2003; Clarkberg and Moen, 2001; Drago et al.,
2004; Euwals, 2001; Altonji and Paxson, 1988; Fouarge and Baaijens, Chapter 6
in this volume). As many studies have demonstrated, the extent to which workers
with working hour gaps are capable of achieving the required mobility is rather
limited. More importantly, the fact that the difficulties and costs involved in job-
or employer-change are considerable for many workers is often ignored.3 Why,
then, are employers reluctant to allow workers to change their working hours?
It appears that, in contrast to typical economic assumptions, employers tend to
provide “rigid” working hours, thus reducing workers’ capability to change their
working hours. Such rigidity is often suggested to be associated with the presence
of fixed employment costs (Schor, 1992),4 but the current understanding of this
issue is not satisfactory. In this regard, recent interest in the presence of structural
reasons for rigidity in working hours deserves more attention. Rebitzer and
Taylor (1995), for example, have shown that the failure of the labour market in
eliciting accurate preferences from workers may result in working hour surpluses,
or, more specifically, in the underprovision of part-time work (see also Lang 
and Kahn, 2001). 
Social norms and institutions as well as public policies are also important.
In retrospect, it is clear that the recent interest in workers’ choices and
preferences regarding working time is related to various developments that
have contributed to improving working time capability, most notably for
women. One example is the combination of paid work and childcare, which
used to be limited to a small group of women, but is a common feature among
many more women today. However, great caution is required in evaluating the
2 Other personal factors are also important. See, for example, Bell (2000) on the difference in working hour preferences
between African-American and white workers in the United States.
3 This point is illustrated in two recent popular works on low-paid workers in the United States and the United
Kingdom: “Changing jobs means a week and possibly more without a pay check” (Ehrenreich, 2002, p. 116); “People
tend to stick with the friends, routines and procedures they are familiar with because there might be worse out there”
(Toynbee, 2003, p. 101). 
4 In the United States, for example, the probability of receiving fringe benefits, such as medical insurance, increases
with the length of working time (Averett and Hotchkiss, 1995).
extent to which working time capability has been improved. For example,
Hakim’s preference theory is based on the assessment that recent changes in
social conversion factors5 have opened genuine choices to women, while
“contextual and institutional” factors are less important (Hakim, 2000). This
historical development, she argues, has also revealed the existence of
heterogeneous preferences among women, who can be categorized into three
groups: work-centred, adaptive and home-centred. For Hakim, then, the
diversification of employment patterns among women workers should be seen
as reflecting this heterogeneity. The upshot of her theory is the recognition of
preferences as a crucial independent variable.
It should be noted that Hakim’s discussion of preferences, rather than
being concerned with the details of working hours scheduling, is more generic.
Her concern is with three broad groupings: no employment, part-time em-
ployment and full-time employment. However, the way in which preferences
are interpreted in her theory deserves particular attention. From the per-
spective of working time capability, preference theory implicitly assumes that
these three groups of women have similar working time capability; otherwise,
her assertion concerning “genuine” choice would be ungrounded. In other
words, Hakim’s theory requires the assumption that three alternative
combinations of functionings are included as the capability set for all women.
However, there are no convincing reasons to believe this is the case, even
where the changes in conversion factors that Hakim identifies have occurred
(see Nussbaum, 1999; Folbre and Nelson, 2000).6 In adopting the working
time capability approach, it is the nature of the preferences that is most
important, and especially the presence of “adaptive preferences”, which refers
to the individual adjustments to circumstances that make life bearable in
adverse situations (see Sen, 1992). As Sen (1999, p. 63) pointed out,
“[D]eprived people tend to come to terms with their deprivation because of
the sheer necessity of survival, and they may, as a result, lack the courage to
demand any radical change, and may even adjust their desires and expectations
to what they unambitiously see as feasible.”
Such differences in understanding preferences are associated with
different evaluative and policy directions. A good example is “voluntary” 
part-time work among women workers. Hakim (1997) is of the view that
“part-time work is typically chosen voluntarily by women who prefer to give
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5 Hakim (2000, Ch. 1) refers to five such changes: the contraceptive revolution; the equal opportunities revolution;
the expansion of white-collar occupations; the creation of jobs for secondary earners; and the increased importance of
attitudes, values, and personal preferences in lifestyle choices. 
6 Interestingly, Folbre and Nelson (2000) note, concerning the dynamic development of female employment and care
work, that “[t]he recent political shift (in the guise of ‘welfare reform’) to a belief that putting one’s dependents in
paid care and taking a job is financially and logistically feasible for all parents has likely worsened the standard of living
for women with especially high personal caring responsibilities and low market wages” (p. 138).
priority to non-market activities and hence work not at all or only part-time”
(pp. 44–45). This appears to be consistent with the fact that the overall
proportion of involuntary part-time workers (i.e., those who have taken 
part-time jobs because they could not find a full-time job) is very low in the
EU. However, labour statistics often define “voluntary part-time work” in
ways that capture many workers who are arguably working on an involuntary
basis. For example, part-timers who are considered “voluntary” include
workers who have taken part-time jobs so as to look after children or adults.7
In the United Kingdom, these workers accounted for 45.2 per cent of part-
time workers in 2002, compared to 7.1 per cent in the Netherlands. It is
interesting to note here that the lowest proportion of involuntary part-
time work for women is found in the Netherlands (1.9 per cent) and the
United Kingdom (6.3 per cent) – although there are substantial differences
between these two countries in the quality of part-time work. Thus it is hard
to infer whether and how those part-time workers who mentioned care
responsibilities as a reason for working on a part-time basis see their
preferences reflected in their working time arrangements (see, for example,
Walsh, 1999).
From the perspective of working time capability, then, it is possible that
statistical depictions of “voluntary” part-time work capture “adaptive”
preferences (see Lee, 2004). Hakim’s analysis lacks crucial information on
whether those “voluntary” part-time workers were provided with a genuine
opportunity to undertake full-time employment as well as to engage in full-
time domestic labour. In this regard, great caution is called for in interpreting
this type of preference data, taking into account the process of preference
formation through social interaction.8 As Fagan (2001, p. 244) has noted,
[A] general feature of questions about preferences, satisfaction or other
measures of desired change is that people are required – whether explicitly or
implicitly – to draw comparisons between their current situation and an
alternative in order to arrive at their answer. They formulate their answers by
making comparisons on the basis of experience plus the amount and type of
information they have access to about less familiar alternatives. This partial or
“bounded” information is used by the individual to assess which arrangements
are feasible or desirable in light of their existing domestic and workplace
circumstances . . . people’s satisfaction levels and preferences adapt in light of
perceived alternatives.
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7 According to Eurostat, in 2002, about 13 per cent of part-time women workers were involuntary part-timers while
32 per cent did not want a full-time job. Another 32 per cent were working part-time due to childcare or elder care
obligations (European Social Statistics: Labour force survey results, 2002). 
8 Sen treats this process in a more positive way, in order to emphasize the need for the sensitivity of social decisions to
the development of individual preferences and norms (see Sen, 1999, p. 253). By contrast, this chapter is more interested
in the conditioning effects of social decisions or interactions on workers’ preferences.
It should also be noted that, despite the low incidence of involuntary part-time
work, part-timers often encounter working hour deficits (see figure 3.2),
which means that even many of the “happy” part-time workers are not really
content with their current hours in their part-time jobs. In addition, full-time
workers who prefer part-time work are often unable to realize their preference
for various reasons, including the fear that their employers will not permit a
change in their hours.
A similarly careful reading of preferences is required for the analysis of
long working hours. Although it has already been shown that long hours are
not normally preferred, there are workers who are working long hours
apparently without resentment, despite their potentially negative health
impacts (Spurgeon, 2003). The proportion of these workers is relatively low in
many European countries (see figure 3.2), but tends to be higher in countries
in which long working hours are more common (e.g., Australia, the United
Kingdom and the United States; see Golden, Chapter 8 in this volume).
Interestingly, the phenomenon of “happy overworking” is sometimes used as
a caution against policy intervention to discourage long hours. In Australia,
where “unreasonable” hours have been extensively debated, Wooden and
Loundes (2001) found that the majority of those working more than 48 hours
per week had relatively high job quality and would like to maintain or even
increase their current hours. From this result, they concluded that “much of
the high incidence of long-hours working is supply generated” (emphasis
added).9 The implication of this logic is that long hours can be attributed to
workers’ preferences, and therefore, social interventions will be ineffective.
Analyses based on preference or satisfaction data, however, are
problematic from the perspective of working time capability. First, the
relationship between capability and poverty and low income must be taken
into account. When Keynes (1930) made the optimistic prediction that his
grandchildren’s generation (us!) would work 3-hour shifts or a 15-hour week,
his point was really that working time capability would remain limited unless
the “old Adam” (i.e., the “money incentive” or “economic necessity”) was
satisfied. The dramatic failure of his prediction can be explained by the fact
that he was right for certain groups of workers, but not for all individuals. In
other words, despite the economic success since achieved, low-paid workers
for whom long working hours are a survival strategy still exist. As mentioned
earlier, strong preferences for, or satisfaction with, long hours among these
workers require careful analysis, especially in relation to the possibility of
adaptive preferences. More importantly, while poverty should clearly be seen
as capability deprivation (Sen, 1999), it should be noted that low income has
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the same effect, in that the working time capability of low-paid workers is too
small for them to be able to make a genuine choice over their hours. 
In addition, workers’ preferences can be influenced by the workplace
dynamics of working time. Burawoy (1979) observed the “voluntary”
intensification of work through the creation of an absorbing workplace game
(termed “making out”), which resulted in relative satisfaction and more
importantly the “consent” of employees. Subsequent research has shown that
workers often participate in a workplace game under which working hours are
used as a performance indicator, which workers accept as a “rule of the
game”.10 For example, Landers et al. (1996) show that promotion criteria that
favour long working hours result in a “rat race” towards long hours, and, at the
same time, penalize workers who prefer shorter hours (see also Schor, 1992).
The gender implications of this finding are demonstrated by Eastman (1998),
who shows that because women tend to prefer shorter hours, this kind of
workplace game is more likely to punish them. The point here is that where
working hours are set by a competitive game, the working time capability of
individual workers is reduced: changes in working hours, even where needs
arise, are beyond them.11 In addition, in the context of labour market
segmentation, these studies show that such situations are more likely to occur
in the primary sector, where there are relatively good employment conditions.
The resulting shortage of part-time work, then, is more likely to occur in this
sector, while most part-time jobs are created in the secondary sector and
attract low wages (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995). Therefore, it is entirely
plausible that a labour market that tends to create working hour surpluses can
also generate working hour deficits at the same time, thereby resulting in a
polarization of working hours (see also Clarkberg and Moen, 2001). 
The discussions thus far indicate that working time research and policies
would benefit from shifting their focus to working time capability, and
examining the alternative opportunities available for individual workers. In
addition, there are good reasons to believe that working time capability is to a
large extent determined by a broad range of social conversion factors,
including incomes, gender, social norms and workplace practices. This calls for
greater caution in interpreting preference information and evaluating the
actual situation of working time, as any meaningful analysis requires a more
careful investigation of working time capability. In a utilitarian world
(invoking “freedom-invoking rhetoric”), in which market transactions are
believed to achieve the fulfilment of preferences, it is tempting to believe that
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10 See also Sharone (2002), who discusses how engineers at a high-tech company worked long hours without resistance.
11 This aspect needs to be taken into account in evaluating “high-performance” management practices. For example,
see White et al. (2003).
workers are responsible for their current situations, and therefore that social
interventions are neither necessary nor desirable. However, as Sen (1999, 
p. 284) has noted, “responsibility requires freedom . . . Without the
substantive freedom and capability to do something, a person cannot be
responsible for doing it.” 
3.4 WORKING TIME CAPABILITY, SOCIAL RIGHTS 
AND WORKER-CHOICE LAWS
As mentioned in section 3.2, the capabilities approach has recently been drawn
on to reconceptualize social rights as conversion factors (Browne et al., 2002;
Deakin, 2004; Deakin and Wilkinson, 2000). In this context, it has been
suggested that there is a substantial role for legal regulation. As Browne et al.
(2002) have argued,
The Capabilities Approach justifies a wide range of legal relations or “social
rights”, which may require substantial policy intervention in the labour market and
elsewhere in order to guarantee that externalities or market failures are corrected
and individuals are equipped with largely equal “capability sets”. (pp. 12–13)
From this perspective, social rights, rather than hindering the functioning
of labour markets, constitute a central feature of those that facilitate the
optimum realization of a society’s resources (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2000).
The capabilities approach, however, does not itself prescribe any specific
substantive rights, instead offering a frame of reference from which to evaluate
the range of potential policy approaches (Deakin, 2004). This embrace of social
intervention, then, encourages speculation on the types of measures that can be
adopted towards enhancing working time capability by offering workers
genuine freedom to influence their working time arrangements.
As part of their suggestions for elaborating on decent work in the area of
working time, Anxo et al. (2004b) have recommended a range of working time
policy measures, a number of which can contribute towards advancing
working time capability (see further Messenger, Conclusion, in this volume).
It is apparent, for example, that traditional forms of regulation – of daily and
weekly working hours, overtime work and unsocial hours – play a key role in
the capability approach towards working time, by enabling the exercise of a
certain degree of choice. Most obviously, strong limits on working hours can
permit greater numbers of workers to realize their preferred hours by curbing
excessive hours. Similarly, limitations on night work represent a strong form
of protection for those who prefer to work during daylight hours. Indeed,
although realizing the working time preferences of individual workers is not
usually identified as among their policy goals, these traditional working time
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measures can be viewed as ensuring what Sen refers to as basic capabilities: 
“the ability to satisfy certain crucially important functionings up to certain
minimally adequate levels” (Sen, 1992, p. 45). In other words, these laws form,
at the very least, the necessary conditions for the minimum set of working
time capabilities or for meaningfully defining working time capability (Peetz
et al., 2003, p. 141).
However, in addition to these forms of regulation, social supports are
also required to improve working time capacity beyond basic capability;
towards allowing individual workers to influence working time in ways that
cannot be comprehended by traditional collective regulatory approaches. As
Fagan has noted about work/family measures:
[W]hile a general reduction in hours sets an important upper limit on the work-
place demands that can be made on people’s time, it is too blunt a tool to resolve
the complexity of work/life balance on its own. Rather, it is a foundation to sup-
port the efficacy of other measures tailored to accommodate the changing care
responsibilities of workers at different stages in their lives (Fagan, 2004, p. 138).
Traditional forms of legislation are inevitably limited in the extent to
which they can broaden the range of functionings by responding to the
diversity of individual workers’ preferences, even if they can capture their
broad orientation, for example towards shorter hours. Policy suggestions for
extending worker choice and influence over their working time that
recognize preferences can differ and offer one way of responding to this
diversity are of particular importance (Messenger (ed.), 2004). Thus, for
example, in addition to the part played by conventional working time laws,
the promotion of flexi-time and time-banking schemes can enhance working
time capability by extending the number of available working time options
that allow workers a choice over how they arrange their time within and
outside of paid work (ibid.).
The focus of the remaining sections of this chapter, however, is another
of the policy suggestions identified as having the potential to contribute
towards worker choice and influence: legislation that provides individual
workers with a degree of direct influence over their working time
arrangements. Given the recent extension of this approach, and the role
ascribed by the policy rhetoric to the potential of these measures to advance
worker choice, our goal is to elaborate on this element of Anxo et al.’s work
(Anxo et al., 2004b). Individual-choice measures also serve as a useful subject
for a preliminary attempt to explore the policy implications of the working
time capability approach. To this end, this section briefly indicates the range
and extent of these laws, while section 3.5 applies the notion of working time
capability in order to make a number of observations regarding the potential
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of these kinds of policies, and to suggest some policy considerations that
could be taken into account in their future development.
Laws that offer individual workers the right to influence their working
hours can be seen as embodying two coexisting approaches towards
operationalizing individual worker preferences. The first, the “negative”
approach, is reflected in rights to refuse to work in certain working time
arrangements, and has emerged with respect to a number of different schedules.
Most widespread is the entitlement to refuse to work at night. In a number of
jurisdictions, this right is available only to specific categories of workers
recognized as facing particularly acute risks to their health or well-being, or as
needing to balance paid work with family or other caring responsibilities.
Pregnant workers are one such group. The most recent international standard,
the ILO’s Night Work Convention, 1990 (No. 171), requires measures to
ensure that an alternative to night work is available to women during pregnancy
and after childbirth;12 and most industrialized countries have enacted some kind
of rules on the performance of night work by pregnant and breastfeeding
workers, often in the form of a right for individual workers to request a transfer
to day work. Rights to refuse to work at night that are available to all workers
are less common, although one is in operation in Switzerland.13
Refusal rights can also be made available with respect to overtime hours.
The strongest legislation in this regard appears to be that enacted in Finland,
where the agreement of individual employees is required for any overtime
work.14 In other jurisdictions, this right tends to be more circumscribed. In
the US state of Maine, for example, employers are prohibited from requiring
their employees to work more than 80 hours of overtime in any consecutive
2-week period.15 Elsewhere, the right to refuse to work overtime hours may
cover only specific categories of workers, including in New South Wales,
Australia, where employers cannot require part-timers who are party to a Part-
Time Work Agreement under the Industrial Relations Act 1996 to work
additional hours.16 A more recent development relates to work performed on
Sundays or on another day of rest, and is exemplified by legislation enacted in
the Netherlands in 2003, which offers a right to refuse to work on Sundays, by
requiring that the workers concerned must agree in each specific instance.17
In recent years, this trend in labour law towards refusal rights over
working time has been accompanied by an increase in measures that offer a
12 Article 7(1).
13 Loi sur le travail, article 17(6). 
14 Työaikalaki No. 605/1996 (Working Hours Act), section 18. 
15 26 MRSA §603.
16 Industrial Relations Act 1966, section 80. 
17 Arbeidstijdenwet (Working Hours Act) article 5:4(1).
right not merely to refuse to work certain schedules, but to influence working
time arrangements in more substantial ways. Again, these rights may cover
only select groups of workers. In Norway, for example, workers are entitled to
reduce their hours for health, social and welfare reasons.18 A right to work part
time can also be extended to older workers through progressive retirement
schemes, which are in operation in a number of European countries, and have
been introduced in legislation in Austria and Spain (see Jolivet and Lee, 2004).
Rights to influence working hours, like those to refuse specified working time
arrangements, can also be made available to pregnant and breastfeeding
workers, most commonly in legislation that permits mothers to request breaks
or hours reductions in order to breastfeed.
Rights to reduce hours are also increasingly being granted to parents. At
the international level, this approach is reflected in the ILO’s Part-Time Work
Recommendation, 1994 (No. 182), which suggests that workers should be able
to transfer to part-time work in specified circumstances, including during
pregnancy or due to the need to care for a young child or a disabled or sick
family member. At national level, the right for parents to change their working
hours can be granted under parental leave schemes, by permitting the leave to
be taken in the form of reduced working hours. These kinds of measures
follow an approach that first emerged in the Swedish parental leave legislation
in the 1970s. In some countries, the entitlement for parents to reduce their
working hours can be available over a relatively long period. In Sweden,
parents have a right to reduce their working hours up until their child is 8 years
old;19 and in the United Kingdom, a right to request “flexible working” –
covering both reduced hours and working from home – extends to parents of
children under 6 or disabled children to the age of 18.20
This trend towards legislating rights to working time adjustments has
most recently been strengthened by the enactment of laws that are applicable
to all workers. The softer version of such laws entitles part-time workers to
priority in applying for full-time vacancies in their employers’ firms and vice
versa. In this vein, the EU’s part-time work directive encourages employers to
give consideration to requests from workers to transfer between full-time and
part-time jobs, and to requests from part-timers to increase their hours,21 a
suggestion which has been adopted in a number of EU Member States. The
most significant development in this trend, however, is the rights available to
all workers not merely to transfer to available part-time or full-time positions,
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18 Arbeidslivets lover (Act No. 4 relating to worker protection and working environment), section 46A.
19 Föräldraledighetslag (Parental Leave Act), section 7.
20 Employment Rights Act 1996, Part 8A.
21 Council Directive (EC) 97/81 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE,
CEEP and the ETUC [1998] OJ L14/9, Clause 5(3).
but to change their working hours within their existing jobs. The Netherlands
and Germany have both recently introduced such a universal right to working
time adjustments. In the Netherlands, the Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur
(Working Hours Adjustment Act), in force since July 2000, is part of a
package of measures under its umbrella legislation on work and care. Building
on similar provisions in collective agreements, the Act permits the adjustment
of working hours, encompassing their reduction and extension, as well as the
redistribution of existing hours. This legislation has been followed by the
enactment of a similar measure in Germany, the Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und
befristete Arbeitsverträge (Act on Part-time Work and Fixed-term Employment
Contracts), which was partially modelled on its predecessor and came into
force in January 2001. This Act permits both reductions and extensions of
hours, although the right to adjust the distribution of working hours can only
be claimed in conjunction with a request to change their duration.
3.5 TOWARDS ADVANCING WORKING TIME 
CAPABILITY THROUGH WORKER-CHOICE 
MEASURES: SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to pointing towards the policy approach on which we have focused
in this paper – the introduction of legal rights for individuals to influence their
working hours – the capabilities approach provides the criterion for evaluating
this form of intervention by demanding a focus on whether these legal rights
are merely formal or whether they can in fact allow effective worker choice.
The experience of individual-choice legislation is at a sufficiently advanced
stage for the process of evaluation to have begun, and questions as to the
effectiveness of these laws are being raised (Fouarge and Baaijens, Chapter 6
in this volume; Holt and Granger, 2005; Munz, 2004; Palmer, 2004). In this
section, we hope to contribute to this process by relying on the working time
capability approach to raise questions about the potential of these laws and to
make a number of suggestions for their future development.
First, we would suggest that by providing support for workers to realize
their working time preferences, the kinds of choice-rights over working time
discussed in section 3.4 have the potential to play a role in generating and
sustaining working time capability. Perhaps most significantly, these measures
mark a response to the risk, highlighted in section 3.3, that workers who
would prefer to reduce their hours will be compelled to find another job that
is offered on a part-time basis, often one of a lower status (O’Reilly and Fagan,
1998; Drago et al., 2004). By allowing workers to remain in their existing jobs
while altering their hours, these laws have the potential, when enacted
together with a right to equal treatment of part-timers under labour law and
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social protection regimes, to broaden the range of occupations in which part-
time work is available, in particular by extending it to managerial and
professional jobs. On this basis, worker-choice laws can be viewed as an
institutional support for individual capabilities (see Deakin, 2004). Where
women are forced to downgrade jobs in order to work on a part-time basis,
there is no incentive for either employers or the workers themselves to invest
in skills and training, to the detriment of the economy and society as a whole.
In contrast, where women can choose part-time work, there is an incentive for
employers to provide training and for women to take it up.22
These laws also have the potential to help workers realize another form
of preference: that over how they care for their children. Anxo et al. (2004b)
have stressed the importance of this element of choice: for individual workers
to decide for themselves not only how to balance work with childcare, but also
on the form the childcare will take – whether it will be carried out by the
parents themselves, outsourced, or arranged through a combination of both
(ibid.). Rights to refuse certain working hours, or to influence how they are
arranged, have the potential to operationalize this choice by preventing
parents from being compelled to rely entirely on outsourced childcare and
allowing them to help structure the relationship between their work and
domestic lives, for example through synchronizing their work days with the
availability of childcare. By doing so, they would extend the combination of
functionings available to individuals, in both work and non-work time.
However, the working time capability approach also raises a number of
concerns about the potential of legislated rights-to-change to advance real
choice. The concern here is whether individual-choice laws, rather than
offering a genuine opportunity for individuals to pursue their desired
objectives, instead could operate as an infringement on working time
capability by closing down avenues of choice. The reliance on individual rights
as an element of working time regulation must inevitably be subject to certain
constraints. The goal is to ensure that they do not reflect the form of market
fundamentalism, mentioned at the outset of the chapter, which tends to
detract from policy interventions in the field of working time by undermining
collective limits on working hours. Most significantly, it is not being suggested
that individual-choice rights be extended into the regulation of hours limits. It
is notable that the evidence of the relationship between weak working time
regulatory regimes and long hours encompasses both the United Kingdom23
and New Zealand,24 both of which permit “individual opt-outs” from their
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22 See Deakin’s analysis of pregnancy discrimination legislation (2004, pp. 48–50).
23 Working Time Regulations 1998, regulation 4(1).
24 Minimum Wage Act 1983, section 11B. 
weekly working hours limits (Anxo and O’Reilly, 2000; Lee, 2004). Although
individual-choice rights would represent an advance in jurisdictions in which
the traditional forms of regulation are weak or absent, and may even pave the
way for stronger measures, they are clearly optimally situated in regimes in
which firm hours limits are in place. 
A related concern about the direction of modern working time law stems
from the desire to preserve those times and days traditionally reserved for the
entire community. The Supiot report is particularly forceful on this point,
stressing that the individualization of working time, while welcome, may, if
not carefully designed, have the potential to undermine what the report terms
“community time patterns” – such as night-time and Sunday rest periods and
midday breaks – and the social institutions that they support, including both
families and trade unions (Supiot, 2001). From the perspective of working
time capability, the risk is that enhancing the working time capability of some
workers, by allowing work to be performed on Sundays, limits the capability
of others to fully enjoy non-work time. This concern usually arises with
respect to liberalizing Sunday work, rather than to individual-choice rights,
and calls for a comprehensive approach to working time regulation that
recognizes the value of both allowing a degree of individual control over work
schedules and preserving time devoted to community life. However, individual
rights over working hours can contribute towards the community time
approach, which provides a rationale for measures like the Dutch law
discussed in section 3.4 that allow individual workers to refuse to work on
Sundays. In sectors or jobs in which work is carried out on the weekly rest day,
then, the individual worker’s right to refuse to work, coupled with the
necessary supportive measures prohibiting discrimination on this basis, has
the potential to ensure that workers’ religious beliefs, family obligations,
and/or preference for the customary day of rest cannot be disregarded.
On the other hand, the imposition of limits on work on the weekly rest
day – and, more broadly, the community time approach towards working time
regulation – can be viewed as a limitation on the working time capability of
those workers who would prefer to work on Sundays. This highlights the need
to consider whether there should be external limits on working time capability,
introduced for reasons independent of the desire to enhance worker choice.
Indeed, the collective regulation of working hours limits, on the basis that it
is more effective than an individual or voluntary approach, could itself be seen
as one such external limitation, as could the policy goal of ensuring that
working time schedules preserve workers’ health. The latter can be considered
to justify curbing the working time capability of even those workers able to
exercise a genuine choice to work longer hours, on the grounds, for example,
of reducing the related medical costs or preventing accidents resulting from
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worker fatigue. Alternatively, the notion of social rights can be expanded in
line with the reasoning of Deakin and Wilkinson, who have suggested that one
of the primary purposes of social rights is to empower individual workers to
realize their potential in a sustainable way that enhances their well-being
(Deakin and Wilkinson, 2000). From this perspective, the choice to work
detrimentally long hours would be unacceptable, due to its impact on the
worker’s health.
An additional policy consideration relates to the role of regulatory
measures beyond the field of working time. It has been pointed out that the
traditional forms of working time regulation facilitate basic working time
capabilities by operating as the framework of fundamental entitlements within
which individual choices are made. Limits on daily and weekly hours, overtime
work, and evening, weekend and night work ensure that certain periods of the
day and week are beyond the reach of paid labour, and therefore are available
for family life, leisure interests and community responsibilities. In doing so,
they lend meaning to the choice to spend time in these pursuits, by ensuring
that there is no pressure to go to paid work during these times. However,
other kinds of labour law rights can also support and enhance refusal rights,
implying the need for attention to be directed to whether the overall structure
of labour law is likely to advance working time capability. Most obviously, it is
clear that minimum wage laws lend meaning to the right not to work overtime
hours, by preventing workers from being compelled to work additional hours
in order to earn a decent income.
If the findings on the impact of regulatory regimes on hours’ distri-
butions apply with respect to other forms of regulation, it would appear that
achieving equality of capabilities requires social intervention. Golden’s
analysis of the availability of flexible working hours in the United States, for
example, confirms that voluntary measures cannot evenly spread the
availability of worker choice across the working population, with already
disadvantaged groups being at particular risk of exclusion (Golden, 2004). It
cannot be assumed, however, that regulatory measures alone are capable of
fully realizing worker preferences over working time. A range of external
factors contributes to the potential of legal measures to promote decent
working time arrangements and working time capability. We discussed in
section 3.3 the influence of social norms and institutions in structuring
working time. The kinds of workplace “games” alluded to there are an
element of workplace and national cultures that value long hours as a sign of
commitment and productivity, and which are inevitably resistant to part-time
work. The need to implement the goal of allowing hours adjustments can,
then, be expected to circumscribe to some degree an employer’s freedom to
organize working time. As Schmidt has noted, the German choice legislation
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has required an adjustment of the traditional legal doctrine that the decision
as to whether employees are hired on a full-time or part-time basis belongs
solely to the employer (Schmidt, 2001). Worker-choice rights, then, may
require the revision of some traditional notions of entrepreneurial freedom.
Moreover, it can be expected that measures directed towards reshaping
workplace cultures would be a primary element in the effectiveness of
worker-choice laws, given the reluctance of many workers to request changes
in their working hours (Fouarge and Baaijens, Chapter 6 in this volume;
Fagan, 2004).
In addition to the need to address social norms and workplace cultures,
the role of collective actors and mechanisms in advancing individual choice
is crucial. Indeed, facilitating individual choice necessarily requires a broader
focus than one confined to individual workers and legislative measures. It is
clear that collective negotiations can also allow individuals to exercise choice
over their working time. Indeed, although our discussion has been centred
on legislated rights to influence working hours, the individual-choice
approach was pioneered in Dutch collective agreements, and this form of
regulation continues to generally be preferred to legislation for introducing
flexi-time and time-banking arrangements, at least in addressing the detailed
design of these schemes. It is also apparent that the kind of individual
entitlements offered by worker-choice laws are likely to be best effected in
circumstances of collective strength, since workers with limited bargaining
power are susceptible to being compelled to forgo their employment rights.
The implication that can be drawn for policies on the regulation of working
time is that laws that strengthen collective actors have the potential to
promote worker influence in collective agreements, and to strengthen legis-
lated rights to choose.
Within this broader framework, we would also suggest that the needs of
two particular groups of workers need specific consideration. First, workers
with family and other caring responsibilities require special attention. A key
factor in structuring parents’ work/family-related working time needs, for
example, is the availability of childcare during working hours, whether that 
of quality professional childcare or of a relative who cares for the child, or 
the working time patterns of the worker’s partner. In countries in which
professional childcare is scarce, the juggling act involved in synchronizing the
different actors involved can be challenging. These difficulties imply, then,
that an element of choice over distribution of hours, rather than being sec-
ondary to those on their reduction and extension, can be crucial. In a recent
decision on the Dutch worker-choice legislation mentioned in section 3.4, for
example, an office manager who requested to have her hours distributed over
3 days in a week was granted instead the same number of hours worked over
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a 4-day period.25 It can be suggested, however, that the arrangement of hours
over this longer period may hamper her ability to take care of her family
responsibilities (Burri et al., 2003). 
Individual-choice laws also raise particularly complex issues for the
working time capability of women. The legal entitlement to work part time is
intended as one method of encouraging men to play a more significant role in
family and domestic work, and can be hoped to at least create the conditions
in which this kind of role could be possible. However, if it is to contribute
towards enabling a redistribution of paid and household labour, workplace
cultures and complementary policy supports are of central importance.
Otherwise, worker-choice laws could operate merely as a conduit for
reinforcing the kinds of “adaptive preferences” discussed in section 3.3, by
enabling women to achieve the hours they require due to the impact of the
domestic division of labour. Instead, the working time capability approach
requires a vital role for childcare, leave and gender equality policies, if it is to
be able to fully extend to women workers.
This kind of interaction between various forms of labour market
interventions is essential, since the ultimate aim is not an isolated legal
instrument, but the creation of a social norm supporting flexibility in working
time that is “self-enforcing in a way which is independent of the law itself ”26
(Deakin, 2004, pp. 49–50). Individual-choice rights can be viewed as an
element in the shift from a substantive towards a procedural approach in the
regulation of working time, in that they do not impose specific standards, but
rather enable the identification and promotion of the substantive outcomes
that individual workers need or prefer. As such, they have the potential to
reshape workers’ preferences, playing a part in the process of preference
formation through social interaction, by involving individual workers in an
ongoing process of influencing decision-making on working time. It can be
suggested, then, that their procedural nature may advance the “seeding”
process,27 although this question deserves more attention and is an avenue for
future research.
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25 Ktr. Haarlem 17 May 2001, JAR, 2001, p. 117, discussed in Burri et al. (2003), p. 334.
26 Deakin makes this point with respect to pregnancy discrimination legislation.
27 Browne et al. describe the aim of public intervention as being to “seed” social conventions “to the extent that they
are ‘taken for granted’ in the way that conventions of property and contract currently are” (Browne et al., 2002, 
pp. 13–14).
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last century, the regulation of working time has changed its focus,
encompassing longer and longer time frames: initially the single working day
(the 8-hour-day reform), then the week (free weekends), then the year (paid
holidays), and finally the entire life course (retirement age). However, the
regulation of working time implied the establishment of homogeneous
standards that did not give individuals any real autonomy in the organization
of their working time schedules or the possibility to adapt periods of work and
non-work during their life course. On the contrary, the regulation of working
time contributed to a segmentation of individuals’ lives into three major and
fairly strictly watertight sequences: initial education, market work and, finally,
retirement. Until recently, this tripartite division of the life course has not
been called into question, even if the timing of transitions between these three
sequences has changed over time, principally through longer schooling and
earlier withdrawal from the labour market.
Stimulated by economic, social and cultural changes, life-course
arrangements are becoming more diverse, more self-directed and subject to
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negotiations (Krüger, 2003). Most people do not expect to be doing the same type
of work all their lives, as was usually the case for the majority of the population
in traditional cultures (Giddens, 1993). Citizens’ living conditions and approach
to life courses are becoming increasingly varied. Hence, extended possibilities to
adjust working time to the changing needs of workers during their lifetime appear
to be in line with the growing heterogeneity of households’ preferences. As
stressed by Heinz (2003), if individuals consider their life course as a project in
which they perform paid work with varying intensity depending on their
circumstances and preferences, then a new social system would have to offer
citizens the opportunity to design their own projects.
Currently, combinations of and transitions between different social
activities are not always facilitated. This is clearly illustrated by those women who
want to combine employment with raising young children: the high cost and/or
low availability of childcare might well constrain their labour supply following
childbirth. A second example is the lack or inadequacy of training institutions for
promoting investment in knowledge and skills over the entire job career, while
societal interest in expanding knowledge is steadily increasing (Leijnse et al.,
2002). As stressed in a Dutch governmental report, the division between paid
work and other activities and the allocation of income over the life course are far
from ideal. The generation between the ages of 30 and 45 is currently experiencing
a great deal of time pressure as a result of having many obligations and aspirations.
During this life phase, most people want to pursue a job career, take care of
children (or others), participate in training and invest in social contacts and
networks. In the Netherlands, for example, this time pressure has led to an
increasing number of individuals suffering from stress and an increasing incidence
of premature cessation of employment due to disability (ibid.).
The concept of a new organization of time and income over the life course
implies that individuals are better equipped to adapt their time allocation between
paid work and other social activities in relation for example to changes in their
working life (investment in human capital, job mobility, etc.) and/or to changes
in preferences or circumstances regarding activities outside the labour market
(child-rearing and other family commitments, voluntary work, leisure, etc.).
From this perspective, the concept of a new organization of time becomes part
of a strategy to develop and implement work–life balance policies. 
Several forms of employment and/or working time patterns allow – at
least theoretically – employees to influence their time and income allocation
over the life course: part-time work, progressive early retirement schemes,
working time accounts and different forms of leave arrangements. However,
the conditions and environment which generally surround these systems –
e.g., the tax and social protection structures, the employment situation (high
unemployment rates) – restrict the possibilities for individuals to adjust their
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working time over the life course. The growing volatility of employment
patterns (periods of unemployment, successive short-term contracts or
interim missions with periods of inactivity, etc.) are generally more endured
than desired, often being imposed either as a result of employment policies
developed by governments and/or the social partners, or due to firms’
strategies for increasing productive efficiency. In short, these discontinuities
are more often associated with the words “precariousness” and “insecurity”
than with freely assumed choice. On top of this, some of these time and
income arrangements may promote age and gender discrimination. Therefore,
policy measures aiming at enhancing the range of options to adapt working
time patterns over the life course appear to be of high relevance in societies
where men and women tend to participate in a wider range of social activities
and where life expectancy is increasing in a context of declining fertility. 
In our view, this kind of policy echoes the five significant dimensions of
“decent working time” as suggested by the International Labour Office (ILO)
Conditions of Work and Employment Programme (Anxo et al., 2004;
Messenger, Conclusion in this volume). In order to be “decent”, working time
patterns should be healthy, and there is reason to believe that a new organi-
zation of working time over the life course might be a way to secure workers’
health – especially in a period of the intensification of working time, of
increased complexity in coordinating competing demands during certain life
phases, and of the lengthening of their working lives as promoted by the
European Employment Strategy. A second dimension of decent working time
is to allow workers to better balance work and family (family-friendly), one of
the main fields of application for life-course policies both at the institutional
and firm level. We argue in the following discussion that the lack of family-
friendly working time arrangements (and more substantially for better
balancing work and life) is an obstacle to the implementation of gender equal
opportunity, which is another dimension of decent working time. We assume
that working time options such as working time accounts, sabbaticals or
lifelong training schemes could play a crucial role in the enhancement of firms’
competitiveness and productivity (the fourth dimension of decent working
time) via an increase in human capital, together with an improvement of the
social capabilities of their employees. As illustrated by some Swedish firms
encouraging fathers to take parental leave, the workers become more flexible
in their work behaviour after such an experience (Den Dulk, 2001). Regarding
the fifth dimension of decent working time, working time options designed
from a life-course perspective entail greater choice for workers, if we assume
that in post-industrial societies there is an increasing emphasis upon individual
decisions and responsibility in the shaping of life trajectories (Heinz, 2003).
Obviously these five dimensions are interrelated since, for example, workers
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with extended possibilities to better adapt market work to social and family
commitments will be more involved in their work, leading to an increase in
productive efficiency (Osterman, 1995). But it is worth noticing that existing
working time options designed in a life-course perspective do not
automatically entail possibilities for all to shape their biographies. It is
important to stress that a new organization of time over the life course also
necessitates policy measures that prevent individuals from incurring a large
income loss over the life course or negative path dependencies that may entail
gender discrimination or a dramatic decrease of pension rights. Universal
rights might also suffer from drawbacks, such as for example variations in the
take-up rates between different social categories due to large differences in
their working time capabilities (see Lee and McCann, Chapter 3 in this
volume). As stressed by Hörning et al. (1995, p. 167): “Without support of a
reflexive visualization of the conception of life, greater latitude to shape
lifestyle organization is of no value . . .”.
4.2 THE RELEVANCE OF A NEW ORGANIZATION 
OF WORK THROUGHOUT THE LIFE COURSE
Reviewing the major theoretical developments in the literature on the life course,
the relevance of the life-course perspective for understanding the major changes
experienced by contemporary societies appears to be of prominent importance.
In The handbook of the life course (2003), “life course” is defined as “inter-
dependent sequences of age-related social roles across life domains (family,
education, work, health, leisure). In this sense it is a product of the linkages
among state (welfare), market and familial (gender) institutions and demographic
behaviours across the life span” (O’Rand, 2003, p. 693). Helga Krüger identifies
the major markers of life-course dynamics: “historical or personal events in
biographical time and their effects in accordance with ageing . . . transitions
between specific life stages . . . the duration of life stages; changes in participation
patterns and status configuration over the life span” (Krüger, 2003, pp. 33–56).
Furthermore, she identifies the coexistence of three quite distinct units of life-
course structuration: the attainment logic which emphasizes status attainment
(rests on the serial programme of successfully progressing through education,
labour market positioning and corresponding retirement benefits); the tandem
logic of the labour market and the family in the period of adulthood; and the back-
up logic of private and public costs and benefits in intergenerational life-course
settings, which results from the rules of sharing care and reproductive work
between the state and the family (Krüger, ibid.). 
Another important issue in our understanding of life trajectories concerns
the ways of analytically disentangling the impact of individual behaviour, 
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e.g. agency (choices and actions), from the influence of the social structure in a
broad sense and the dynamic of social changes. Obviously, the institutional
environment (social protection systems, labour market policies, regulatory
framework concerning working time options, tax and transfer systems related
to the different life phases and household categories, etc.) plays a crucial role
in the patterns of households’ time and income allocation over the life course.
For instance, the educational system, labour market institutions and the social
protection system channel individuals and organize their life courses around the
employment system. But social structures are also influenced by the changing
values and the evolving representation attached, for instance, to different social
activities (paid work, family, leisure, social commitments, etc.) and the ways in
which individuals and different social categories support and implement them.
There is a complex and interrelated relationship between social structure and
individual agency over the life course.
An important dimension of the life-course approach is its attempt to take
a holistic view, in that the analysis no longer focuses on isolated specific events,
phases or demographic groups as being discrete and fixed, but rather considers
the entire life as the basic framework for empirical analysis and policy
evaluation. Considering the life course as a whole is also a way to acknowledge
the importance and consequences of early transitions for later experiences and
events. Hence focusing on these early events and transitions such as educational
attainment, the extent of labour market participation (part time/full time,
continuous or erratic labour market entry and job career), and family
formation (union formation, parenting, separation) is a way to recognize that
these early events might have large consequences in the later years of life. In
other words, the present situation of individuals is not independent of the
choices, transitions, opportunities and constraints encountered in the past. To
some extent we may observe that some form of path dependency and past
experience matters, and may restrict an individual’s options in the future. The
social implications and consequences of early transitions and choices will
obviously differ depending on the historical and societal context. The
availability for example of public lifelong training systems or active labour
market policy programmes may reduce the “social” costs of early drop-out
from the educational system. Hence if time is irreversible,2 life trajectories may
be reversible and the social implications of early “negative” choices in life could,
depending on the institutional context and options, be “corrected” later on in
life. This appears particularly important in a context in which “the tasks of life
planning are being increasingly assigned to individuals, who are compelled to
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2 “Even God could not change the past” (Aristotle).
intensify the thematization of the course of their lives” (Hörning et al., 1995, 
p. 140). Alain Supiot has directly related this individualization tendency to the
issue of working time regulation: “the new principle governing working time 
is self-regulation of time . . . ultimately by individuals themselves, now
responsible for the organisation of their own time providing they commit
themselves to their employer’s objectives” (Supiot, 2001, p. 83).
4.2.1 Changes that foster the need for a new organization of 
time throughout the life course
Individuals nowadays change roles more often during their life course than
previously. This is partly the result of individual decisions, and partly due to
the fact that jobs and relationships, for example, offer less long-term security
than was previously the case. Changes are also occurring in the relationships
between employers and employees, some of which are conflicting: employers
demand strong commitment and flexibility, while employees strive for auto-
nomy and security. As stressed by Heinz:
There is cross-national evidence that economic and social change has modified both
cultural standards and persons’ biographical timing, which in turn has led to a more
flexible sequencing of male and female work life courses. Instead of relying on age
as the major indicator of the individual life course, the timing, kind and duration
of a person’s involvement with labour market institutions are more useful as a focus
of career analysis. A career then can be analysed as a sequence of life events and
movements in education, work and family life, a sequence which is co-constructed
by institutional gate keeping and personal decisions. (Heinz, 2003, p. 194)
During recent decades, major changes in the timing of transitions over 
the life course have occurred. Globally, the industrialized countries have
experienced a postponement of entry into the labour market due to later exit
from the educational system, combined with earlier exit from the labour 
market due to early retirement schemes and a lowering of the pension age.
Simultaneously, the trends toward individualization, the emergence of new
lifestyles and changes in values and norms have largely modified the traditional
family life-cycle model of marriage, parenthood, followed by retirement within
a stable marriage, which was still prevalent during the 1950s and 1960s (Beck,
1992; Giddens, 1990). The overall reduction in marriage rates, increased rates
of divorce, consensual unions, lone parenthood, the decrease of family size, the
postponement of family formation (average age at first child), the rising rates
of childlessness and the increase in life expectancy, coupled with the growing
instability in the labour market, have certainly modified individuals’
expectations and options over the life course. Hence, if the traditional tripartite
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sequencing of work history (education–employment–retirement) or the se-
quencing of critical life phases (singleness, marriage/cohabitation, children,
empty nest, etc.) remains predominant in many industrialized countries, most
advanced economies have experienced a rescheduling of traditional critical
events, an increase of instability and risks (separation/divorce, unemployment),
and therefore a growing heterogeneity of life trajectories.
The significant changes in the timing of transitions at the two ends of the
age distribution have shortened the period of “active working life”. The
various reforms aiming at reducing weekly and yearly working time have also
reinforced the diminution of time spent on paid work. If we take into account
the large increase in life expectancy, the time devoted to market work has
dramatically decreased during the last decades. Thus there has been both an
absolute reduction in the amount of time devoted to market work over the life
course, as well as a proportionate reduction relative to life expectancy. This
trend applies particularly to men, for, as discussed above, in recent decades the
time allocated to paid employment during the lifetime has increased for
women, partly offsetting the reduction for men.
Time devoted to housework has also decreased due to the growing
availability of household goods and services offered in the market and/or
provided by the public sector (outsourcing). Technological progress and
increased capital intensity in home-produced goods and services have also
contributed to a huge increase in productivity in the home sector and the
reduction of time spent on household activities. Households contain fewer
children, and so the total time devoted to child-raising has fallen (even if the time-
intensity per child is higher than in earlier historical periods). Hence, globally,
recent decades have seen a large increase of “leisure time” over the whole life
course. However, gender inequalities in time-use persist. At the household level,
the reduction of men’s paid working time has been partially compensated by the
increase of female labour supply, but the bulk of unpaid housework and care
activities are still predominantly performed by women – even though in many
countries the male share of household production has increased (see Anxo et al.,
2002; Gershuny, 2000). The resilience of a traditional gender division of labour
also has dynamic implications in terms of career prospects, expected life-cycle
earnings and welfare development over the life course. 
4.2.2 The emergence of life-course policies in Europe
In this context, it is not surprising that one of the major objectives of the
European Employment Strategy is to augment the overall employment rate,
which is critically dependent upon a further integration of women and the
retention of older workers in the labour market. This employment goal
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therefore requires the implementation of pro-active policies making it possible
for both men and women to better reconcile work and other social
commitments over the life course. Hence policy reforms aimed at increasing
individuals’ working time options and ensuring the reversibility of individual
choices over the life course might be a good policy instrument for fostering a
time and income allocation conducive to an increase in the overall employment
rates supporting the sustainability of the social protection system.
The idea of a new organization of time and income over working life is not
new. The pioneering works of Jean Fourastié (1965) and his concept of “the
40,000 hours”, as well as Gösta Rehn’s free choice society (1972, 1977), are two
illustrations of early attempts to conceptualize time and income allocation over
the life course that depart from the traditional tripartite division between
education, continuous employment and retirement.3 More recently, and in a
totally different economic, social and cultural context, the transitional labour
market approach has focused on determinants of various transitions over the
life course (Gazier, 2003; Schmid and Gazier, 2002), while Alain Supiot has
made a plea for the recognition of the social utility of time devoted to care
activities and social commitments such as human assistance (Supiot, 2001). 
At the European Union level, the idea of promoting flexibility in
working life has been a key issue in efforts to improve the employment
content of economic growth. In order to promote a more modern labour
organization, the social partners have been exhorted to negotiate agreements
(at the appropriate level) to introduce flexible and innovative methods of
labour organization reconciling firms’ competitive constraints and employees’
preferences regarding working time patterns (Social Protocol of the
Maastricht Treaty and Luxembourg’s four pillars). From 2000 onwards, the
European Strategy for Employment has stressed the need to foster the
development of a knowledge-based society (Lisbon Summit, 2000) and to
increase the overall employment rate by implementing employment policies
aimed at increasing the labour market participation of women and older
individuals (Barcelona Summit, 2001). This quest for new forms of negotiated
flexibility has taken the form of agreements on the reduction of working time,
the “annualization” of working hours, the development of part-time work,
“lifelong” education and career breaks. Even though these EU-level efforts to
promote the emergence of negotiated flexibility and the development of new
time policies are partly in line with the idea of increasing the variability of
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3 The political awareness, at that time, of the necessity of implementing new patterns of time allocation over the life
course can also be illustrated by an OECD report from 1973: “Both the economic aim of using the whole potential
labour force and the social aim of meeting each individual’s preferences do demand that people can choose their
working time – its length and its allocation per day, per year and per life – with as few constraints as possible” (Evans,
1973, quoted in Boulin and Hoffman, 1999, p. 17).
working time over the life course, they are still piecemeal measures and not
part of an integrated model combining reforms of social protection and the
allocation of time. Thus they are not in a position to challenge the major
influence of the institutional framework upon the life-course trajectories of
men and women, as can be shown by a cross-country comparison of the
gender disparities in the patterns of labour market integration and working
time arrangements over the life course (Anxo and Boulin (eds.) 2006). 
4.3 LIFE-COURSE PROFILES: A CROSS-NATIONAL
COMPARISON
Life-course research has emphasized the emergence of more flexible and
individualized ways of integrating work and other social commitments over
the life course: job entries, employment spells and exits from the labour
market across the life course are becoming increasingly more diversified.
Employment, family and intergenerational arrangements are being trans-
formed (Heinz, 2003). These transformations are mediated by social
institutions in the labour market and in the educational, family and the wel-
fare systems influencing the way individuals shape their working and life
trajectories. They provide guidelines and resources for individuals who are
constructing their careers through decisions and self-reflexive actions in the
context of interrelated biographies (ibid.).
When looking at the role of institutional contexts in the framing of
individual biographies, analyses differ in the extent to which they accentuate
the standardization of modern life-course patterns or their deregulation
(Krüger, 2003). Some countries (Germany, for example) have strong life-
course regimes due to structural linkages between social background and
educational attainment, between education credentials and labour market
entry, and between employment careers and retirement benefits (ibid.). For
instance, comparing Germany and the United Kingdom, Heinz (2003) shows
that in the United Kingdom, 15- to 20-year-olds exhibit a higher employment
rate, mainly in the casual labour market segment, whereas in Germany most 
of the teenagers are either still at school or in apprenticeship training.
Conversely, labour market exits occur relatively early in Germany, where
employment rates start to decline by age 55, and just 43 per cent of men and
15 per cent of women older than 60 are still in the labour force. This contrasts
with the United Kingdom, where more than half of men and 18 per cent of
women are still employed, or Norway where almost three-quarters of men and
60 per cent of women in the same age group remain in employment. These
results show that entry into paid work and career prospects hinge on the
linkage between educational and labour market institutions: formal and
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connected pathways create less variability in the transition and less uncertainty
in the work life course compared with more market-driven and flexible
arrangements in the United States or the United Kingdom (ibid.).
4.3.1 Gender disparities in the patterns of labour market 
integration and working time arrangements over the 
life course
One of the most salient features and persistent trends in advanced economies
is the increased feminization of the labour force; the related shift from the
single male breadwinner household towards dual-earner households; and the
increased diversification of household structures. Despite these common
trends implying a significant reduction of the gender employment gap, there are
still large differences in the patterns of household labour market integration
over the life course. In a previous study (Anxo and Boulin (eds.) 2006,) we 
have shown that this pattern and the magnitude of gender differences differ
considerably between European countries. Four broad patterns of labour
market integration and working time arrangements over the life course are
identified in figures 4.1–4.8.4
The Nordic “universal breadwinner” model of high and continuous labour
market participation over the life course involving long part-time or full-time
hours, portrayed here by Sweden, is characterized by high employment rates (in
particular at the two ends of the age distribution); high employment continuity
(sustainability) over the life course; and relatively low gender disparities in 
labour market integration (figures 4.1 and 4.2). In Sweden, neither marriage/
cohabitation nor family formation significantly affects women’s employment
rates. The main impact of family formation is a temporary reduction of working
hours to long part-time hours while children are young. Compared with other
European countries, the large opportunities to adjust working time over the life
course – through various forms of income-compensated “legal absenteeism” 
(e.g., parental leave, leave for sick child or relatives) with a complete employ-
ment guarantee and a reversible reduction in working time – allow a more flexible
management of work and family constraints. More globally, this strategy appears
to be an efficient tool to secure women’s labour market integration, foster
employment continuity, and improve gender-equal opportunities.
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4 In order to visualize life-course profiles of labour market integration and working time arrangements, we have selected
a range of household categories coinciding with different transitions and phases in the life course: transition out of the
parental home and entry into the labour market (young singles without children), union formation (cohabiting couples
without children), parenting (differentiating couples according to the age of children); the midlife “empty nest” period
(middle-aged couples without cohabiting children); and lastly the elderly phase and exit out of the labour market
(couples older than 60 years). See Anxo and Boulin (2006) for a more detailed discussion of our methodology and also
an extension of the analysis to seven European Member States.
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Figure 4.1 Employment rates, Sweden, 1998
0. Young singles without children 4. Couples with children more than 13 years old
1. Young couples without children 5. Couples without children, female more than 45 years old
2. Couples with pre-school children 6. Older couples without children (spouses more than 60
3. Couples with children less than 13 years old years old)
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Figure 4.2 Weekly working time, employed, Sweden, 1998
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Figure 4.3 Employment rates, France, 2000
0. Young singles without children 4. Couples with children more than 13 years old
1. Young couples without children 5. Couples without children, female more than 45 years old
2. Couples with pre-school children 6. Older couples without children (spouses more than 60
3. Couples with children less than 13 years old years old)
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Figure 4.4 Weekly working time, employed, France, 2000
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Figure 4.5 Employment rates, Spain, 2000
0. Young singles without children 4. Couples with children more than 13 years old
1. Young couples without children 5. Couples without children, female more than 45 years old
2. Couples with pre-school children 6. Older couples without children (spouses more than 60
3. Couples with children less than 13 years old years old)
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Figure 4.6 Weekly working time, employed, Spain, 2000
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Figure 4.7 Employment rates, United Kingdom, 2000
0. Young singles without children 4. Couples with children more than 13 years old
1. Young couples without children 5. Couples without children, female more than 45 years old
2. Couples with pre-school children 6. Older couples without children (spouses more than 60
3. Couples with children less than 13 years old years old)
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Figure 4.8 Weekly working time, employed, United Kingdom, 2000
Source: ECHP and HUS for Sweden, own calculations; Anxo and Boulin (2006), Chs. 2 and 6.
In the “modified breadwinner” model, illustrated here by France (see
figures 4.3 and 4.4), some women exit the labour market when they have
young children, while the majority work full time or long part-time hours.
Hence, in contrast to the situation in the Nordic countries, family formation
and motherhood are still associated with withdrawal from the labour market
for some groups of women. Most mothers who are employed work full time
or long part-time hours in “reduced-hour” arrangements. This life-course
pattern for French mothers is supported by the high coverage rate and low
cost of public childcare, as in Sweden, but high levels of unemployment
undermine the ability of women with low levels of qualifications to follow this
route. Even though the activity rate of French prime age adult women started
to rise for generations from the mid-1950s onwards, the trend is still that
younger generations of mothers have more continuous participation profiles
across their working lives than their predecessors. When the younger
generations enter these older age groups, we might expect them to maintain
higher levels of labour market integration than are observed for the current
cohort of older women, which will operate to reduce the gender gap in
working time among older age groups.
The Mediterranean “exit or full-time” model, illustrated here by Spain, in
which women’s employment rates are low but largely involve full-time work.
As shown by figures 4.5 and 4.6, family formation and the presence of child-
ren have a clearly negative impact on female labour market integration, 
but essentially in terms of lower labour force participation despite rising
participation rates as younger cohorts of women move through their working
lives. Fewer women are employed, but when they are employed they generally
work full time. The relatively low public provision of childcare facilities for
young pre-school children, the low income replacement rate, and the weakness
of subsequent employment guarantees for parental leave still constitute a
barrier to women’s labour market integration and support the “housewife”
system of childcare and the “male breadwinner” system of family provisioning.
The prevailing working time rigidities, in particular the low availability of part-
time jobs, constitute a barrier to women’s labour market integration and
encourage a traditional gender division of labour. As in France there is a strong
cohort trend of higher labour market participation profiles emerging for
younger and better-educated generations of women across the period of
family formation and into the older age groups. However, in Spain as in Italy,
the difficulty of combining employment with motherhood has contributed to
an accompanying sharp decline in fertility rates. Younger generations of
women defer or avoid motherhood in order to become established in the
labour market, particularly in the context of high unemployment – com-
pounded in the case of Spain with a high incidence of temporary contracts. 
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In the “maternal part-time” work model, illustrated here by the United
Kingdom, the onset of motherhood is associated with a reduction in the
employment rate that is less than that found in France or in Spain, but where
part-time hours are the norm for mothers and generally remain the norm even
when children are older (see figures 4.7 and 4.8). Furthermore, the hours
worked by part-timers are typically shorter than the more substantial part-
time hours that prevail in Sweden and to a lesser extent in France. This
“maternal part-time” model is also underwritten in the British welfare state
regime. While childcare is now expanding, it still falls short of that found in
France and the Nordic countries. By comparison to other countries with a
high incidence of female part-time work, like Germany or the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom part-time model is also characterized by a predominance
of very poor quality part-time work (see Fagan, 2001). 
Two main conclusions might be drawn from this evidence. First, this
comparative analysis emphasizes the predominant role of the institutional
context in shaping the patterns of labour market integration of men and
women over the life course. The cross-country comparison clearly shows the
impact of legal options allowing employees to vary the extent of their labour
market commitment (e.g., by taking temporary leave), and thereby adapt their
working hours during different life phases. They highlight not only the role of
these legal provisions, but moreover the importance of their conditions of
implementation: employment guarantees, income compensation and the
maintenance of social protection coverage. In this sense they illustrate the
linkages and interrelated effects of various institutions, such as the educational
and care systems, the labour market and the social protection system in
shaping individual life trajectories:
When these linkages are tightly coupled and universally salient in a population,
their coherence and normative strength lead to a more highly institutionalized,
age-graded life course. When they are loosely coupled, variability (de-
institutionalization) in the life-course increases: the relationship of age to role
transitions weakens and the synchronization of roles across life domains becomes
less standardized. (O’Rand, 2003, p. 693)
Second, our analysis shows also that the gender division of labour varies
according to social and cultural contexts. As stressed by Helga Krüger, this
tends to elevate gender to a pivotal mechanism of resilience in dealing with
contradictions between the institutional demands of status attainment and
interdependencies between life courses (Krüger, 2003).
Despite its crucial relevance in the framing of gender discrepancies in the
profile of labour market integration over the life course, the gender division of
labour is not the focus of this chapter. The following section analyses the
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changes in the institutional framework and firms’ practices aiming to enhance
individuals’ possibilities to influence their work–life balance. It is worth
noticing that in flexible and weakly regulated labour markets individuals must,
to a larger extent than in other regimes, bear the cost of transitions between
different status and time arrangements (such as investment in human capital)
and act as the producers of self-constructed pathways through the employ-
ment system (Heinz, 2003). However, the extent to which there is individual
autonomy in time and income allocation depends on the institutional set-up of
labour market transitions and the nature of welfare policy. The balance between
regulation of the labour market and welfare state provisions5 differs between
neo-liberal, conservative and social-democratic regimes, creating a range of new
opportunities as well as substantial risks and uncertainty over the life course.
4.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE EMERGENCE
OF A LIFE-COURSE PERSPECTIVE IN TIME
POLICIES
A recent study from the European Foundation reported a large, untapped
preference for part-time working hours (not necessarily part-time jobs)6 among
men as well as women across the EU, among both the employed and those
wanting employment (Fagan, 2001; see also Bielenski et al., 2002). Overall, 
19 per cent of employed men and 23 per cent of employed women are
employed full time and would prefer part-time hours. This preference for part-
time hours is mostly for a finite period (typically between 1 and 4 years) at
particular stages in the life course (notably when parents have young children,
when they approach retirement, or when they have elder care responsibilities).
There are also important national differences in the extent of this untapped
preference for an expansion of part-time work, and it can coexist with high
levels of involuntary part-time work, such as in France and Sweden. The study
also recorded widespread support for a number of other measures that would
increase options for individuals to vary their working time over the life course;
notably, sabbaticals (including unpaid ones) were considered attractive by a
large share of the workforce, as was time banking among those working
overtime. Finally, these preferences coexisted with a widespread awareness
among the workforce of the obstacles to and penalties of trying to secure 
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5 In which we include measures favouring the variation of working time duration and organization throughout the 
life course.
6 The distinction made here is that working hours are only one dimension of a job, and part-time jobs can be viewed
negatively, and as something to avoid, in labour markets where such employment is concentrated in poor-quality and
low-paid parts of the economy. Hence someone might prefer to reduce their working hours to part-time if they could
remain in their current “job” (such as under the Swedish parental leave system or the Dutch working time legislation),
but would not want to change jobs to obtain this working time adjustment.
part-time hours, in terms of inferior social protection entitlements,
employers’ reluctance to permit such working time adjustments in their
current post, or career penalties if they did secure this adjustment. In other
words, the desire or capability to translate working time preferences into the
preferred arrangements was institutionally constrained by national policy 
and workplace features. We now turn to highlighting what are the main trends
in this field.
4.4.1 Trends at the institutional level
In our research for the European Foundation (Anxo and Boulin (eds.), 2005),
we have identified a clear trend towards the emergence of life-course-oriented
“working time options” (WTOs). When looking at the institutional
developments, several working time options allow – at least theoretically –
individuals to influence their time allocation over their life course: reversible
working time reductions (from part time to full time and conversely), maternity
and paternity leaves, parental leaves, care leaves, sabbaticals and career breaks,
educational leaves, working time accounts and flexible retirement schemes.
The regulatory framework, in particular the level of regulation, for these
WTOs varies significantly among European Member States.7 These national
disparities in the nature of working time regulations, particularly the extent
and scope of legal rights regarding working time reductions or various forms
of leaves of absence, appear to have significant implications for employees’
opportunities to adapt working time over the life course, and therefore on
their ability to combine market work with other social activities. Our analysis
shows that significant differences exist between, on the one hand, countries
with a regulatory regime mainly based on statutory regulation (universal
citizen rights) and/or collective agreements covering a large portion of
employees, and, on the other, countries in which working time options are
mainly regulated through company agreements or through individual
employment contracts. In countries such as Sweden, Germany and the
Netherlands, the regulation of WTOs results from negotiated compromises in
which both the public authorities and the social partners play a crucial role in
shaping households’ and companies’ time management. At the other end of
the spectrum we find more liberal and market-oriented countries, such as the
United Kingdom, where both the Government and social partners are less
involved in developing WTOs and where these options are mostly initiated
and regulated at the company level.
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7 Six countries have been surveyed in this report in order to assess the trends in the institutional frameworks: France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Another important difference among the European countries analysed
here relates to the conditions linked to these different working time options.
Taking parental leave as an example, the gap is wide between Sweden, where
the duration of the leave is 15 months and the income replacement rate is up
to 80 per cent, and most of the other countries discussed here, in which the
leave duration is the basic EU norm (3 months) and is unpaid (most of the
countries) or is paid at the lowest rates (a lump sum), e.g. in France or
Germany. One of the main conclusions of our survey is that, seen from a life-
course perspective, the Swedish working time options provide the most
support for different stages in the life course.
Making a distinction between specific life-phase/events-oriented WTOs
and life-course-oriented WTOs, some conclusions may be drawn from our
cross-country analysis of the national regulatory frameworks:
1. Concerning the specific life-phase/events-oriented WTOs, we may observe
the following:
(a) most of the countries surveyed have implemented mainly WTOs
corresponding to specific life phases, such as parenting and
retirement;
(b) the most common trend during the last 20 years concerning these
life-phase-oriented WTOs has been a shift from short periods of
leave (maternity leave periods are generally up to 16 weeks) towards
longer leaves of absence. To illustrate, parental leave that covers
longer periods has recently been introduced among Member States.
If parental leave provisions tend to be generalized due to the
existence of an EU directive, the main differentiation lies in the
rules concerning their duration, the flexibility in the use of such
leave (e.g., the possibility to take it on a part-time basis and to
extend its use until the eighth birthday of the child), and the extent
of income replacement;
(c) another difference lies in the possibility to return to the same or a
similar job (Sweden, Germany) and/or the sustainability of the
employment contract (Sweden versus the United Kingdom) when
taking up this kind of leave;
(d) concerning exit from the labour market, a shift can also be observed
towards a more dynamic approach – away from early retirement
schemes through which employees used to retire permanently from the
labour market before the legal retirement age and towards more flex-
ible retirement schemes (before or after the standard retirement age).
Decent working time in a life-course perspective
111
Decent working time
112
2. Life-course-oriented WTOs are less common and have appeared more
recently. Our survey also provides some information concerning these
WTOs:
(a) although all the countries studied have regulations on part-time
work, the right to temporarily reduce or increase working hours
(which is one of the main preferences of the European people) is
statutorily regulated only in the Netherlands, while in Germany
there is a right only to reduce working hours. Moreover, the right
to reduce working hours must be appraised while keeping in mind
the conditions that surround part-time contracts, which are
different from one country to another;
(b) during recent years some countries have introduced regulations on
working time accounts (Germany, the Netherlands and France). This
is a mechanism for financing sabbaticals, lifelong learning periods or
other career breaks that until now were barely paid (even though
there are statutory provisions for them in most of the countries
surveyed). From a life-course perspective, a distinction should be
made between short-term and long-term working time accounts.
The latter allow for more controlled, flexible, destandardized 
life-course profiles, while the former are generally the result of 
a compromise between firms’ economic needs (annual production
cycles) and employees’ preferences, embedded in a standardized
conception of the life course. Consequently, in countries in which
working time accounts are regulated, one should also look at the
scope and limits of how the working time accounts can be filled and
at their conditions of use (after how much time or up to which
amount of accumulated leave; limitations concerning the ways of
using the working time accounts; limitations imposed by employers;
transferability between companies, etc.);
(c) individual lifelong learning schemes which aim to overcome the
problems of financing training courses that are not directly linked
to the job have also appeared recently (this has spread in all the
countries studied except the United Kingdom).
As a general conclusion concerning the institutional framework, we
would like to highlight three marked trends:
1. The first trend refers to the regulation of more life-course-oriented working
time options which (theoretically) allow for the construction of individual
biographies linked to the differentiated needs and lifestyles of employees.
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2. The second trend acknowledges the increasing orientation towards
working time options that allow for longer leave periods that facilitate
deviations from the standard working time regimes.
3. The third trend concerns the level and mode of regulation of these
working time options. Although during the last 25 years there has been a
trend towards the decentralization of working time regulation in Europe
(from legislation and/or national collective agreements or industry-level
agreements towards firm or unit agreements), the regulation of working
time options designed in a life-course perspective tends to be, in its
general principles (to provide a right to use them that is a question of
social equity), regulated at the national level, mainly by law, even in 
those countries in which working regulations used to be ruled primarily
by collective agreements (the Netherlands constitutes a good example).
Conversely, conditions and modes of enforcement tend to be regulated
through industry- or firm-level agreements.
4.4.2 Firms tend to limit the use of WTOs to parenthood and
exit from the labour market
A publication by the Harvard Business Review (2000) foresees that a growing
number of companies will be compelled to implement time policies in order to
reconcile their economic needs with the increasing demands of their em-
ployees to better balance work and life. The management of the relationship
between the working sphere and the personal and social sphere of employees
constitutes, in their view, one of the most important levers for change in
organizations which have to take account of environmental, social and societal
evolutions.
Evidence from different surveys shows that a growing number of firms
are implementing working time arrangements that depart from the standard
organization of working time. This is not new since, for more than 20 years,
companies have implemented flexible working time schedules in order to
improve their economic efficiency. What appears to be new is the imple-
mentation of working time arrangements that reconcile both employees’ and
employers’ needs and that allow employees more leeway in their life-course
profiles. If it is difficult to assess the extent of such developments at the
company level due to the lack of surveys in many countries,8 several social,
8 The United Kingdom is an exception, and company survey data on working time developments are available from a
number of sources, including the government’s new regular “work-life balance” survey, as well as from the periodic
Workplace Employee Relations Survey.
economic, cultural and institutional trends that tend to constitute a favourable
context for these kinds of developments have been identified: higher
educational attainment, changes in aspirations and lifestyles, greater inte-
gration of women into the labour force, the development of information
technologies, new values attached to the different social times, etc.
A growing economy may favour such developments because employers are
more willing to create employment conditions that fit the needs of their work-
force than in a declining economy. Economic and employment growth, moreover,
favour a more diverse workforce because many workers are needed. And the more
heterogeneous the workforce, the greater the pressure on employers to provide
facilities that support the reconciliation of work and life. The above-cited
publication by the Harvard Business Review concludes that firms that react
positively to the wishes of their employees are generally more productive.
However, the life-course perspective (long-term working time accounts, 
possibilities of reducing/increasing working hours, lifelong learning schemes)
is less developed; it is more likely to be found in large firms and in certain
industries (finance, high technology). At the firm level, we have identified the
prominent place of work/family arrangements, and more generally of working
time arrangements that fit with specific phases in the life course. This clear
tendency to focus on specific life phases, essentially parenting and the
transition towards retirement, can be partly related to the European strategy
aiming to enhance gender-equal opportunity, and also to major changes in the
composition of the workforce (feminization) and the demographic context
(e.g., the ageing of the population). In certain industries these kinds of policies
are also related to the necessity of attracting and retaining employees in the
context of tighter labour markets. 
Our analysis has also highlighted a recent tendency towards the imple-
mentation of more dynamic working time arrangements, such as working time
accounts or lifelong learning policies. Here also we might yield to the
temptation of making a correlation with the European Employment Strategy
as designed in Lisbon and Barcelona, and with a trend towards the
implementation of statutory regulations related to these working time options
in some European countries. Another study (Seifert, 2004) stresses the fact
that companies play an ever more prominent role in regulating working hours,
and the key question concerns the extent to which they are really willing to do
so. Employers certainly tend to prefer the ability to decide for themselves
which working time arrangements they will provide and to which employees
they should offer certain options. From the company perspective this makes
human resource management easier, but it can lead to a situation in which not
all employees are offered the option to take advantage of life-course-specific
working time options. It is not the biographical situation of the individual –
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for example the necessity to provide care or a desire for professional reori-
entation – which determines the option, but the position of the employee in
the company or similar factors. Some employers tend to use schemes designed
at the institutional level (parental leave, working time accounts, (progressive)
early retirement schemes, lifelong learning schemes) for purposes other than
those for which they were originally adopted.
It seems to us that there is a major risk of inequity if there are no basic
principles defining the conditions of access to working time options defined
at the statutory level that afford rights to individuals. The main conclusion of
our analysis of firms’ practices in the area of life-course policies that are based
on both the principle of employee autonomy in the design of their life-course
profile and the need for the firm to adjust its working time regimes to the
economic evolution is that there is a need for an institutional framework (at
European and/or national levels through the “subsidiarity principle”) that
might provide for collectively agreed regulation of individual choices.
4.5 CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING A NEW 
ORGANIZATION OF TIME OVER THE LIFE 
COURSE
From a life-course and a comparative perspective, we have shown that the Nordic
working time regimes, portrayed here by Sweden, constitute the more integrated
and coherent system of time and income management over the life course. Family
formation is positively related to female labour market participation, and the
impact of young children on female labour supply remains limited to very young
children. Actually, the broad “palette” of individual working time options in
Sweden – backed by a complete employment guarantee and extended childcare
facilities – provides large opportunities for households to adapt their working
time to various situations and commitments over the life course without
significant income losses. Sweden constitutes a good illustration of a regime of
negotiated flexibility, in which the social partners are largely involved in the
shaping of working time options, thus ensuring their social legitimacy. In Sweden
the working time options over the life course also seem to be better adapted to
both companies’ productive requirements and employees’ needs and preferences.
In other words, Sweden appears to meet most of the criteria of the decent
working time concept. In the other European countries surveyed in our study,
the legal opportunities to adjust working time over the life course appear to be
much more limited, fragmented and often restricted to specific life phases,
specific bargaining areas or certain companies. These legal options are
furthermore associated with a weaker employment guarantee and often entail a
larger income reduction compared with the Nordic countries.
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However, even in Sweden, working time adjustments typically incur
penalties in terms of reduced career and earnings development in subsequent
working life. In all countries, it is largely women who make these adjustments,
and in part the penalty incurred in career and wage evolution is because it is a
gender “signal” of women’s deviation from the standard employment
relationship. Men incur these penalties when they deviate too, presenting a
further obstacle for those men who would prefer to deviate from the standard
employment relationship at different stages in their life course. Men’s take-up
rates of various types of extended leave are almost universally low, although
progress has been made in some areas, such as the Swedish parental leave
system9 and with the proportion of male part-timers in the Netherlands. The
question of how to raise men’s take-up rates of extended leave and other
working time adjustments is a key consideration if such adjustments over the
life course are to be promoted as a policy instrument for reducing gender
inequality in employment and care work. This means that conditions should be
fulfilled in order to favour an organization of working time over the life course
that is not limited to certain categories such as women, low-skilled workers,
ethnic groups, etc.
4.5.1 Conditions related to the social protection system
In a comparative perspective, one crucial issue is to identify to what extent the
national design of the social protection system establishes different incentives
or disincentives for households’ patterns of labour market integration and
working time profiles over the life course. An analysis of the relationships
between the patterns of labour market integration over the life course and
social protection has to consider the interrelated and intricate relationships
between the nature of the welfare state regime, the broad range of working
time options and the individual and collective implications of different time
options/arrangements on social security.
An assessment of the impact of time options/arrangements on the
household’s social protection needs to differentiate between “career
interruptions” and systems that allow a flexible distribution of working time
over the life course (reversible part-time working for instance). The right to
take leave does not automatically guarantee some form of income com-
pensation. In fact many prevailing parental leave schemes in the EU countries
do not provide the right to a “decent” income replacement, except in the
Nordic countries. Sabbaticals are generally unpaid unless they are linked to
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9 Around 80 per cent of Swedish fathers use their right to parental leave. On average their relative share of the total
number of compensated days amounted to 20 per cent (80 days) in 2004.
active labour market policies, such as in Denmark during the 1990s10 or
implemented in order to limit sickness absenteeism and to improve employees’
health.11 In most countries training leave is financed through employers’ social
contributions, state subsidies and/or individually through subsidized loans,
such as in Sweden. More recently companies have introduced time credits that
can be used for personal development through training leaves.12 The principle
is the same as for working time accounts that are based on an intertemporal
redistribution of time and income by the user. This gives people some options
while the continuation of the employment contract ensures that social pro-
tection is granted. However, as far as social security protection is concerned,
such arrangements contain some risks. One serious shortcoming is that many
of the time credits earned in working time accounts are (to date) not insured
against the insolvency of the employer.
Long-lasting periods of part-time work, even in the Dutch context where
its reversibility is statutorily regulated, still contain an additional risk of
poverty. From a life-course perspective, the total duration of part-time spells
is a decisive factor for subsequent income development later in life and for
later pension claims. Special social risks are also connected with “marginal”
part-time jobs. In order to avoid these drawbacks in the case of temporary
shifts towards part-time work, there is a necessity to “bridge” this right to vary
the number of working hours with working time accounts.
Independent of the existing rights to interrupt working life or to adjust
the number of working hours over the life course, universalistic and individ-
ualized social security schemes – e.g., health-care systems or pension systems
based on citizenship or residence – give people some room for manoeuvre to
use different time schemes and options. In this respect the Scandinavian
countries, as well as the Netherlands, provide a better institu-tional environ-
ment for a flexible allocation of time and income over the life course than some
of the continental/conservative or Mediterranean countries.
Another crucial issue is to identify to what extent the different time
options and their take-up rates have an impact on the expenditures and the
financial sustainability of the social security and social protection systems. In
principle all leave systems that provide income replacement or cash benefits
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10 In 1992–94 the Danish Government implemented long periods of paid leave (parental, training, sabbatical), in order
to reduce the unemployment rate through a job rotation system. This country has registered a drop in the
unemployment rate from around 12 per cent down to 4 per cent between 1992 and 2000.
11 After an experiment in 12 local authorities, Sweden has recently (1 January 2005) implemented a system of sabbaticals
that allow employees to have a break when they feel they need one, instead of being compelled later to be on sick leave.
Beyond preventing the “burn-out” syndrome, the scheme also aims at a job rotation with priority given to unemployed
persons to replace the worker on sabbatical.
12 For instance, a French national collective agreement (2003) confirmed by the law has endowed employees with a time
credit of 20 hours per year over 6 years to be used for educational leave (Droit Individuel à la Formation).
cause direct social expenditures. However, the prevailing leave schemes so far
have not contributed much to the financial imbalance of most welfare states.
First, many leave schemes (e.g. several European parental leave schemes) are
unpaid or subject to a low level of income replacement such as in France.
Second, many leave schemes (e.g. sabbatical leave schemes) have had, up until
now, low take-up rates. Third, public expenditures on certain leave schemes can
in the long run lead to savings in social security expenditures. The Danish job
rotation programmes or some Swedish active labour market policy schemes, in
which training or sabbatical leaves are combined with employment oppor-
tunities for unemployed persons, can serve as examples of this situation. It is
worth noticing that other kinds of work interruptions (in particular
unemployment and “inactivity”) threaten the financial sustainability of many
social security systems to a much larger extent. Working time accounts based
on an intertemporal redistribution of time and income do not affect the
financial sustainability of social security systems, particularly if they are linked
to job rotation schemes in countries with high unemployment rates.
4.5.2 The new organization of time over the life course as part
of the employment dynamic and as a device for 
enhancing social cohesion
We may assume that the current reforms related to the life course will have
contrasting impacts depending upon the position of people in the life course.
To illustrate this point, we may expect that the current reforms concerning
pension systems will not only affect older workers’ labour market/retirement
behaviour, but will also impact on the time allocation decisions of younger
cohorts. Put differently, in terms of social justice and equity, we may assume
that the consequences of such reforms may affect individuals’ earnings develop-
ment over the life course quite differently depending on the distribution of
risks concerning career and employment disruptions among socio-economic
groups. Hence the reforms of the social protection systems ought to consider
the diversity in the patterns of labour market integration over the life course
and the uneven distribution of risks by limiting the cost of necessary work
interruptions linked to parenting, care activities, or involun-tary employment
disruptions such as unemployment, disability or sickness.
Several conditions for the implementation of such new schemes can be
derived from these remarks:
• All leave systems must be associated with a subsequent employment
guarantee – i.e., the right to return to the former job or a similar one. 
If this employment guarantee is not granted, a period of leave can turn out
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to be detrimental to any future career, and this fact may well have a negative
influence on the take-up rate. Moreover, as has recently been decided in
France for those who are on parental leave, such leave must not constitute
an obstacle to the career progression of the taker and must not entail a
decrease in their social protection entitlements. This means that the person
on leave has the possibility to be involved in the firm’s training courses and
to contribute to the social security and pension funds, etc. These are also
preconditions for encouraging more men to ask for such schemes, and thus
reducing the gender bias in the current take-up patterns.
• These conditions are difficult for a firm alone to fulfil – particularly a small
or medium-sized company. That is why a distinction should be introduced
between leave that is subject to universal rights which grant each employee
an entitlement to take it due to their societal (e.g. collective) status, and
other types of leave which are more correctly related to the personal life and
development of the individual. Alain Supiot (2001) supported the idea that
some time allocation (devoted to care for children or the elderly, to human
assistance or other voluntary involvement) ought to be assimilated into
working time and subjected to similar entitlements as working time periods.
It is up to society to decide what kinds of leave ought to be included in this
category. Other types of leave related to the personal trade-off between
work and leisure should be financed by individuals through an intertemporal
redistribution of their time and income.
• The intertemporal allocation of time and income also has a collective dimen-
sion, at the firm level or at the local level. Consequently, savings for leave and
training will have to be further developed and promoted. The social partners
may elaborate integrated and collective working time accounts in order to
avoid the risk of insolvency of the firm and to give the possibility to (younger)
employees who have not accumulated sufficient time credits to benefit from
their existence. The level of integration could be the firm, but preferably the
sector in order to secure the transfer of time credits from one firm to another
and to build a unified, comprehensive and coordinated system for financing
periods of leave. Existing savings schemes in the area of leave and training will
have to be combined wherever possible to provide transparency and a more
integrated approach. Leave schemes will also have to adopt a more generic
character, i.e., a reduced distinction between the various forms of leave.
4.6 CONCLUSION
The basic assumption of this chapter is that embedding working time policies
in a life-course perspective might give substance to the notion of “decent
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working time”. While statutory limitations on long working hours or a general
reduction of standard working time may, for countries with a high incidence
of long hours, be a means for curbing excessive hours, the need for working
time flexibility over the life course cannot be satisfied only by standardized or
statutory regulations giving little room for individual differentiation.
Moreover there is a conflict between the short-term time horizon of firms and
the life-course perspective. The current trend towards the development of
short-term contracts and precarious employment is in conflict with the
emergence of sustainable life-course career options. In this context of growing
uncertainty, there is a need to find collective solutions that secure sustainable
life-course trajectories. If we add the current trend towards the growing
heterogeneity in household needs and preferences, there is scope for
introducing legal options making it possible to adapt working time over the
life course, thus favouring a better reconciliation between paid work and other
social activities. Therefore policy measures have to be undertaken to extend
and secure the range of working time options – in order to better adjust
working time to various events and risks over the life course. Some national
initiatives to secure, through statutory provision, the individual right to
modulate working time over the life course, such as recently in the
Netherlands, appear promising and largely in line with the European
Employment Strategy. In our view, an increased individual freedom in time and
income allocation over the life course not only has to be guaranteed through
the application of a universal citizens’ right, such as in the Netherlands, but
also has to be complemented by an integrated system of income redistribution
and income transfers, such as in Sweden. Removing rigidities in the prevailing
working time regimes – in particular by increasing the range of statutory
and/or negotiated options to adapt working time over the life course without
large income losses – appears, therefore, crucial not only in terms of gender-
equal opportunities and better work–life balance, but also in order to secure a
better and more efficient allocation of time and resources over the life course.
Hence it is necessary to favour a holistic approach and recommend the
implementation of a unified, comprehensive and coordinated system for
financing all periods of non-paid time (Anxo et al., 2001; Supiot, 2001).
Individual freedom and sovereignty in time allocation over the life course
could be guaranteed through the application of a universal citizens’ right,
complemented by an integrated system of income transfers that could be
implemented through industry and/or local agreements. Along these lines, the
introduction of an income insurance fund with access to individual drawing
rights could provide a high degree of flexibility in the allocation of time 
and income over the life course (Rehn, 1972, 1977). Besides an inter-temporal
allocation of time and income implemented through working time accounts,
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we could also imagine an inter-individual redistribution through a
mutualization of working time accounts at the industry or inter-industry 
levels and an active labour market policy through the implementation of job
rotation schemes.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
The organization and management of working time is at the heart of the
employment relationship. The employment relationship has been defined by
the agreement to work under the direction of an employer for a specified time:
“what the worker sells, and what the capitalist buys, it is not an agreed amount
of labour, but the power to control labour over an agreed period of time”
(Braverman, 1974, p. 54). Working time is taken as fixed and continuous; it is
the effort level and the reward that remain in contention. The argument to be
made here, drawing on the analysis found in the influential Supiot (2001)
report and in complementary empirical research recently undertaken in
United Kingdom employer organizations, is that time is being made to take on
new roles in shaping employment relations. For some employees, it is the
period of time that is neither agreed nor specified; instead the employment
relationship is moving from a clear contract of service based on time, to
contract for services related to outputs or results. For others, the agreed
period of time is becoming fragmented into shorter, discontinuous periods
and is being scheduled across the week or the year to match the requirements
of employers. The scheduling of time becomes part of the process through
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which employers manage the amount of labour provided under a time-based
contract, as periods of slack demand are eliminated from schedules. Thus, as
a contribution to debates about “decent working time”, this chapter argues for
the need to understand the role of the demand side – that is, the changing
objectives of, and pressures upon, employers – in transforming the rules and
norms of the organization of time at work.
These arguments are made, and supported by empirical evidence at the
organization level, for the United Kingdom labour market. However, while it
might be argued that these developments are specific to the United Kingdom
social, economic and institutional context, the evidence we have found of
changing employment relationships around the issue of time management
certainly suggests what might happen in other countries were their systems of
working time and employment regulation to be changed in a similar manner.
5.2 RECONSTITUTING THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP: THE IMPACT OF WORKING 
TIME CHANGES
Under the standard employment relationship, the benefits for employers can
be identified as the bringing of labour under the direct control of the
employer or his or her agent so that the effort expended may be directly
monitored, thereby ensuring that the benefits of changes in technology and
work organization may be captured by the organization (Marglin, 1974), and
so that employers are able to change, within limits, the composition of tasks
to be performed without recontracting (Williamson, 1985). The guarantee 
of continuous employment over a standard working week should be
interpreted as the price that employers have to pay for the right to exercise
that direct control. Indeed the establishment of rights to continuous
employment and guaranteed earnings has been a major plank of trade
unions’ efforts to regulate the standard employment relationship and to
ensure that it offers protection to workers and does not simply act to subject
workers to the discipline of the employer. Marsden (1999) has made the
argument that for employers, this trade-off – whereby the employer provides
regular and guaranteed work in return for opportunities to directly influence
the labour process and to respecify tasks without recontracting – has proved
to be a price well worth paying. Indeed, the relatively slow move away from
the internalized employment relationship, despite the claims over the
emergence of the network firm, is taken as an indication of the superiority
of this relationship and indeed the potential for a win-win solution for both
employers and employees. However, this argument perhaps overlooks the
ways in which the internal employment contract is being restructured
Decent working time
124
through the use of new approaches to time management among other
factors, thereby enabling employers to change the basis of the trade-off and
to reduce the costs of the standard relationship. The relevant comparison is,
therefore, not simply between internalized contracts of service and external
contracts for services, but between different approaches to the management
of the internalized contract. 
The Supiot report (2001) on how the employment relationship is changing
has argued that we have witnessed the spread of two main types of working
time principles in opposition to the standard time-based employment
relationship, namely the increasing move from a means-based time-regulated
employment relationship to a results-based system; and the increasing tendency
within time-based employment relationship to adopt a more fragmented
approach to time. These divided logics correspond to the increasing promotion
in the management literature of targeted human resource practices, aimed at
workers with different types of skills and located in different segments of the
production process (Lepak and Snell, 1999). These two tendencies in human
resource practice have been identified as part of the change from a Fordist to a
post-Fordist employment regime. 
The new principle governing working time is self-regulation of time: . . . ultimately,
by individuals themselves, now responsible for the organization of their own time
providing they commit themselves to their employer’s objectives. In the light of
this trend, the surrender of their time ceases to be the primary purpose of the
obligation of employees, which moves from being means- to being results-based.
(Supiot, 2001, p. 83)
This new system, in replacing for some groups of employees the clock-
based control of the Fordist model, could potentially, if combined with
employee representation and more democratic control, provide a basis for a
more autonomous system of working that restores discretion and responsibility
back to the workers. However, this is by no means an automatic or likely
outcome, and instead workers may be required to surrender not just time but
also “their hearts and minds” to the organization (Thompson, 2003). The
second logic of the post-Fordist system – the intensification of work within
time-based systems through the move to fragmented time – has a similar
double-edged impact as “flexible working hours hold out both the promise of
freedom and the threat of greater subordination” (Supiot, 2001, p. 223).
While the two human resource strategies appear to have opposing logics,
they both impact upon two fundamental elements of the standard or Fordist
time-based employment relationship: first, both challenge the standard time-
based system of allowing some customary “paid on the job inactivity”, a
practice that is associated with the notion of purchasing labour in chunks of
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standard time, whatever the work flow. The development of the notion of
standard and regular working hours led to the principle that employers should
pay for all time when the employee was “at the employer’s disposal at the
workplace” (as defined in French labour code, for example) (Supiot, 2001, 
p. 65). Employers needed to develop a regular and reliable workforce, and, 
as a consequence, were willing to accept these variations in productivity in 
return for securing the commitment of the workforce to regular employment.
However, issues of rights to lay off workers for short or longer periods of time
with or without notice are a major area of contention in industrial relations,
and while employers benefit from internalized systems, they have only
reluctantly accepted the fixed or overhead element embedded in the standard
employment relationship (Jacoby, 1984). 
Fragmented time is explicitly aimed at removing “paid on the job in-
activity”, or the porosity of the working day, while a results-based system is
aimed instead at removing the cost to employers of unproductive time at
work. Employers can distribute tasks in a way that assumes no unproductive
time and if staff cannot always work at full productivity they may have to
complete their tasks outside standard or contractual hours without additional
payment. There may be limits to the extent to which extra, unpaid hours are
acceptable to employees (even to those in managerial/supervisory positions),
but the employer may not be identified as the primary cause of the overload.
This is because results-based systems are being developed in the contexts of
more self-regulated work systems, where the individual or the team is held
responsible for managing workloads (Sewell, 1998), or where staff are being
asked to respond directly to customer demands. Such developments may not
only reduce opportunities for shirking that have traditionally been associated
with management-directed systems, but may also distract attention from the
employer as the prime source of the additional demand and extended working
time, with instead the “customer” or the “client” being constructed as to
blame for the need to work longer, harder, or both (Beynon et al., 2002).
The changes taking place in the organization of working time may
therefore contribute to multifaceted pressures towards work intensification.
Where working time is fragmented or individualized, the opportunities for
staff to develop customary norms relating to reasonable effort levels are
reduced. For results-based workers, the impact may be to increase either work
intensity or the length of working hours or both; for those on fragmented
time, the impact is to increase work intensity during paid hours but also
potentially to extend the time boundary, or the length of time, over which an
individual may be called in to work.
These two approaches to human resource management also call into
question collective aspects of the organization of work and life by challenging
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“the community time patterns that have governed life on and off the job (night-
time rests, Sunday rests, midday break) and bring about the collapse of solidarities
based on such patterns (trade union, family, neighbourhood)” (Supiot, 2001, p.
84). Results-based employment relationships blur the boundaries between work
time and free time while fragmented time relationships often explicitly facilitate
the scheduling of work in parts of the day or week that would previously have
been considered “community time”. One factor in permitting this scheduling
across borders is the diversification of social and family relations that may be
rendering previous notions of community time patterns outdated. However,
while institutions become outdated and need renewal, new community time
patterns more in tune with the new gender divisions and capable of sustaining
balance across the different aspects of life are unlikely to spontaneously emerge
through a process of primarily individualized and employer-driven change in
working time arrangements (Perrons et al., forthcoming). For a summary of the
impact of the different principles, see table 5.1.
5.3 EXPLORING THE PROCESSES OF WORKING 
TIME CHANGE
Now that we have established that there are changes taking place in the
management of time, with significant consequences for the employment
relationship, we need both to provide some evidence in support of this
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Table 5.1 The impact of three different working time principles
underpinning the employment relationship
Working time principle “Paid on-the-job inactivity” Standard or community time
Standard time-based Paid for standard hours Shared communal leisure/
employment relationship when at the disposal of break times; compensation
employer at workplace; for disruption to division
activity levels dependent between work and
on provision of work by community/private time
employer
Results-based employment Self- or customer-driven Requirement to work
relationship activity levels; performance- whenever and for however
not time-related pay long to complete tasks/meet 
performance targets
Fragmented, time-based Work scheduled by Work time fragmentation 
employment relationship employers to maximize leads to scheduling of
activity levels, minimize work across standard and
paid on-the-job inactivity community time borders
hypothesis and to begin to explore the conditions under which these changes
are taking place. The evidence of change will be limited to the United
Kingdom and primarily to case studies of organizations carried out within the
research programme of the European Work and Employment Research Centre
(EWERC) at the University of Manchester with which the authors are
associated.2 We would argue, however, that the framework that we will use to
explore the conditions associated with these changes has more general
applicability and might identify the conditions under which similar changes
may occur in other industrial nations. 
The framework we use draws upon that developed by Karston and
Leopold (2003), who see time management as shaped by interactions between
employment relations (here the main social actors are the social partners and
government), the organizational sphere (involving the system of competition
and cooperation between firms), and the domestic sphere (involving both the
social division of labour and time constraints at the household level). These
spheres are also all influenced by pan-national legislation, in the shape of
European-level regulation. 
This framework is a general one; the main actors shaping employment
relations are the social partners including government, but while in many
European countries these actors are mainly active at the societal and sectoral
levels, in the United Kingdom the shaping of employment relations takes
place primarily at the level of the organization (except in the public sector
where there are still national-level negotiations). This means that there is
potentially even more interaction in the United Kingdom between the
organizational sphere and the employment relations sphere. Indeed, in
contrast to accounts that focus on the lack of social regulation of working
time in the United Kingdom (for example Supiot, 2001, p. 72), the argument
made here is that this approach underestimates the influence of the particular
form of industrial relations and collective bargaining in the United Kingdom
(Rubery, 1998; Rubery et al., 2005). The United Kingdom industrial relations
system has historically promoted working long hours as a means of generating
higher guaranteed earnings and created strong notions of custom and practice
at the workplace that provide the basis for claims for higher earnings for
additional and unsocial hours working. This organization-level regulation of
working time has been identified as a major means of regulating the
wage–effort relationship in the United Kingdom (Blyton, 1992; 1995);
consequently changes to working time arrangements, including, for example,
experiments with annualized hours working, need to be interpreted not as
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2 For more information on the European Work and Employment Research Centre (EWERC), see www.mbs.ac.United
Kingdom/ewerc
mainly or only aimed at introducing more variable working time, but rather as
a means to change the wage–effort relationship, through eliminating expensive
paid overtime and promoting work intensification (Heyes, 1997; Bacon and
Storey, 1996; Gall, 1996). Thus the organizational drivers towards working
time changes are rooted not only in the systems of competition, but also in
managerial efforts to challenge the traditional system of industrial or
professional relations (Beynon et al., 2002). 
While stressing the interactions between the three spheres, we address
each sphere in turn. First, we look at changes in working time management
associated with changes in employment relations, and with developments in
collective bargaining and regulation. Second, we examine the changes taking
place in the organization of work and employment within companies. Third,
we consider explanations for workforce compliance in working time
arrangements that appear to be incompatible with private and family life.
Much of the argument we develop here is based on detailed case studies of a
wide range of organizations that we have been engaged in in the United
Kingdom since the mid-to-late 1990s. The research involves in-depth inter-
views with both managers and employees, including in several cases follow-up
interviews to identify the pattern of change over a 2- to 3-year period (see
Appendix, table 5A.1 for summary details of projects). We do not present the
detailed evidence here (for further information on the case studies see
Marchington et al., 2005; Beynon et al., 2002; Bosch and Lehndorff, 2005), and
provide only a small “taste” of the detailed interview material (again see
Beynon et al., 2002; Marchington et al., 2005).3 Instead, summary tables in the
Appendix show the main examples of changes that we identified in the
movements towards results-based or fragmented time systems. We also draw
on other secondary source material on changes in United Kingdom working
time, including other case studies and more general information on the pattern
of and regulation of working time in the United Kingdom to situate our
findings in a broader context.
5.3.1 Employment relations and new working time 
arrangements
To consider the role of changing employment relations in the reshaping of
time management we discuss changes in collective regulation and in legal
regulation. In the case of legal regulation of hours, this is a new development
in the United Kingdom and indeed was implemented after many of the case
studies we report on here were completed. 
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3 Fictitious company names are used when presenting the case study material.
In the United Kingdom, collective regulation now only applies to a
minority of employees – particularly in the private sector. Sectoral- and
national-level bargaining outside the public sector is rare – although some
research has identified a legacy of such arrangements with respect to working
time in sectors where sectoral bargaining on those issues was particularly strong
(Arrowsmith and Sisson, 1999). Here we discuss the changes that have taken
place within those sectors that are still covered by collective bargaining –
although the existence of many organizations outside of collective regulation
is of course one factor promoting change within the regulated sectors. 
Traditionally in the United Kingdom working time standards – including
standard working weeks, days, overtime and unsocial hours premia – were set
in considerable detail by sectoral- or national-level agreements. These
standards in turn provided a framework for the development at the workplace
of systems of work organization which shaped the wage–effort relationship
and where informal or local methods of regulation and control took on
particular significance. The guarantees with respect to overtime and unsocial
hours premia provided incentives at the workplace level for employees to
promote systems of work organization that spread the work over a longer
period to generate overtime opportunities and to shift the wage–effort
relationship more in favour of employees.4 Such systems included, for
example, the effective enforcement of customary job demarcations (so that
the shortage of one type of labour could lead to overtime opportunities for
all); the systematic use of absenteeism to generate overtime opportunities for
fellow workers (Heyes, 1997); and controls over the pace of work to maximize
overtime opportunities (Noon and Blyton, 1997, ch. 4). The study by Heyes
(1997) of a chemical company introducing annualized hours is illustrative.
Here the main motivation from management was to reduce the incentives to
create overtime opportunities. Before the new hours system, craft mainten-
ance workers had ensured that machine problems were not dealt with until late
in the working day, thereby creating overtime opportunities for themselves
and potentially other shop-floor workers. There was also, according to
management, a systematic use of absenteeism so that other shop-floor
workers were offered the opportunity to work a double shift at a premium rate
when a fellow worker called in sick. Annualized hours systems reduced these
incentives as additional hours were worked out of the allowance of “stand-by”
hours, and thereby inconvenienced fellow workers by requiring them to work
hours that had already been paid for and which would not have to be worked
if no one were absent and/or the work were done on time. 
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4 These strategies were used in the United Kingdom by employees and the unions that represented them as a means of
increasing what were often relatively low wages, in a way of making up a living wage. 
It is in this context that the role of employment relations in shaping
recent changes in time management in the United Kingdom needs to be
understood. While there has been a major decline in the sectoral and national
regulation of working time, there are still some forms of workplace control
over working time, based on both informal custom and practice, as well as
more formal current collective agreements and contractual employment
conditions. Our case study work suggests that one of the main motivations for
employers to change working time arrangements in this context is to reassert
control over work organization and the wage–effort relationship. 
The main evidence of change in employment relations as a factor in the
trend towards results-based and fragmented time employment relations is
found in the following changes in the employment relations framework:
• removal of, or evasion of, premia prices for unsocial hours or extra hours;
• reduction in union/employee influence on the implementation of working
time systems and the organization of work at the workplace level;
• removal of union influence through derecognition of unions or
contracting out, where unions are less likely to be in a position to
represent the demands of employees.
The distinction between standard and non-standard hours has been a
hallmark of the United Kingdom employment relations systems, but in almost
all the organizations we studied (see Appendix tables 5A.2a and 5A.2b), there
had been either direct changes to the premia rates system or increased oppor-
tunities for employers to evade these higher rates, despite, at the same time,
the increases in the need for flexible scheduling. This blurring of the standard
/non-standard hours divide, which provides the basis for less costly systems of
flexible scheduling, was achieved through a range of different processes, as we
now outline: 
• the cutting or removing of the supplements (for example in a large media
company Mediaco – a newspaper group – where unions were derecognized,
and in a large supermarket company Retailco which still recognized unions
but cut premia in line with other large retail companies);
• the negotiation of new supplements, but at lower levels than the previous
rates (a large bank – Bankco – had established a new call centre without
any premia but had kept the traditional premia for its staff who had
previously worked at one of its now closed branches; however, when
operating two systems created barriers for staff movement, a new
harmonized system was introduced, with premia set at lower levels than
the older branch rates); 
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• the extending of standard days from, for example, 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. to 
8 a.m. to 8 p.m. (for example at a large telecommunications company –
Telecomco – and a large bank, Bankco); 
• the transferring of staff to new companies which did not pay for
overtime, at least for higher-grade staff (a large customer services firm –
TCS-L – and a computer services firm, Futuretech);
• the varying of rights to overtime pay according to the wishes of clients –
in the case of a multi-client call centre set up by the customer services
organization TCS-NW;
• the use of more flexible scheduling for standard hours (flexible days,
start and finish times) (in the case of Bankco, Telecomco, Retailco,
Mediaco, and a large council – Councilco); and
• simple evasion by using part-timers and direct-hire and agency-placed
temporary staff who were not eligible for the payments (found
particularly in public sector organizations such as Councilco and a large
hospital – Healthco – still subject in principle to national agreements
setting premia rates).
This removal of extra payment increases the incentives both to extend hours
and to schedule hours whenever required, as the cost of each hour becomes
the same. In some cases union acceptance of the changes was obtained as part
of an apparent package of benefits to the workforce or to the union. In Bankco
and Retailco the changes were introduced as part of the consolidation 
or establishment, respectively, of union partnership agreements; and in the
public sector, the evasion of the rates through the hiring of more part-timers
and temporary workers was seen as the price to be paid for advantageous
collective agreements negotiated at the national level for those on permanent
contracts.
The change made to the premia rates, or their implementation, is already
symptomatic of the second change – that is, the reduction in the power of
unions to influence the pattern of work organization and associated working
time workplace arrangements. Mediaco and TCS-NW were the only cases in
our studies where there was no union presence, meaning that much of the
change we found was taking place in apparently collectively regulated
environments. Nevertheless, we found very few examples of collective
resistance – and even these proved to be short-lived. At Councilco the union
did try to resist a decision to activate a longer standard working day from 8
a.m. to 8 p.m. for homecare workers who had been accustomed to working
more standard days. Complaints were made to employment tribunals, but
Decent working time
132
after some modifications (in particular the agreement that the family
circumstances of individual workers would be taken into account but
monitored on an annual basis), the longer working days were agreed upon and
the complaints dropped. At CouncilA a similar change in contracts was
planned, with some increase in basic pay offered in return for flexible
scheduling, but at the time of our study the council was anticipating fierce
resistance and possibly a strike. 
The airport – Airportco – provided a further, and arguably more extreme,
example of a successful erosion of union workplace power by the employer. At
this airport, which was collectively owned by the local authorities, the baggage
handlers had been able to control both rates of pay and employment policies
(reducing the share of seasonal and temporary staff to deal with fluctuations in
demand, thereby allowing for more on-the-job paid inactivity). Government
competition policy forced the airport to put baggage handling out to tender,
and in order to be competitive with the private sector, Airportco formed a new
wholly owned subsidiary which employed staff on new lower rates of pay and
on more flexible and temporary staffing contracts, often guaranteeing only
part-time hours to manage the variations in demand over the seasons. The 
new company was still unionized by the same union but was not able to resist
the employer’s introduction of “market rates” and core/periphery employ-
ment policies.
The weakening of union control was more common than derecognition:
the main example of derecognition among our cases was the newspaper
Mediaco, which had not only derecognized the union in the 1990s, but had
also, at the same time, introduced a new set of terms and conditions that ended
paid overtime and introduced compulsory unsocial hours working, with time
off in lieu as the only compensation available for extra hours. This “bold”
move to change the whole basis of the employment relationship followed on
from the severe weakening of the previously strong print unions when they
lost a major strike in the 1980s to stop Rupert Murdoch from sacking all the
Fleet Street printers. While these changes to collective bargaining took place
in the early to mid-1990s, they provided a framework in which it was easier to
introduce new shifts requiring more weekend working without additional
compensation. An example of Mediaco exercising its new-found political
muscle occurred while we were researching the organization, when in 2001–2
the company introduced a new, free newspaper to counter competition from a
rival new, free newspaper, and oversaw this introduction by changing the
working times of most of its employees.
Another means of removing union influence was through the transfer of
staff to companies with only a weak or, indeed, no union presence. The
promotion of contracting out within the United Kingdom public sector is
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particularly noteworthy here, although it parallels developments in manu-
facturing in the United Kingdom where research has shown employers to be
reviewing continually the decision whether or not to keep an activity inhouse
or subcontract it out of house (Ackroyd and Proctor, 1998). This contract
culture reduces the power of unions at the workplace to control the wage–
effort bargain. In the case studies we have undertaken, contracting out to
private companies has been important in bringing in a results-based approach
to the employment contract for professional, supervisory and lower-level
managerial staff previously employed under time-based contracts in the public
sector. Both of the private sector organizations – one a large American 
IT company (Futuretech) and the other a customer services organization
(TCS-L) – in practice expected staff to work whatever hours were required to
complete a job. This was explicit at Futuretech, in which there was no provision
in the contracts of employees for paid overtime or time off in lieu, and where
staff who opted to retain civil service employment conditions, where extra
hours could be taken as flexitime, were effectively disadvantaged in their career
prospects. At TCS-L the right to claim overtime existed in principle, but the
workplace ethos was such that staff found it difficult to claim in practice. 
While collective regulation of working time has declined, legal regulation
of working time was introduced into the United Kingdom for the first time 
in 1998, implementing the European Union’s Working Time Directive. Some
of the case studies we are reporting on here were conducted before this
legislation had been fully implemented, but the likelihood of regulation was
already widely known. Nevertheless, for the most part the regulation of
working time did not feature as a major factor in our case studies. Almost no
one reported changes (or planned changes) as a result of the EU Working
Time Directive, possibly because of the widespread knowledge that a vol-
untary opt-out from the regulations would be in place. Where changes were
planned – for example to reduce the length of part-timers’ shifts in the case of
Telecomco – the primary aim of employers was to evade the legislation by
ensuring that they did not have to provide paid breaks for part-timers. There
was no expectation among managers whom we interviewed that regulation
would enforce a move away from the emergent results-based employment
culture for higher-level staff. The hospital – Healthco – was adjusting to
interim national measures to limit doctors’ working hours to 56 as a means of
implementing a gradual and long-term adjustment to a possible 48 hours limit
in the future. Nurses’ hours were also being affected by this 56-hour limit and
this was requiring management to consider more effective ways of maintaining
nurses’ hours; while full-time staff only worked 37.5 hours, they were free to
contract to work extra hours through nursing agencies both at their own
hospital and elsewhere; thus extra hours were not recorded. Hence, in some
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cases, managers could not assume that nurses were only working the hours
they worked for them when seeking to manage the consequences of the
reduction in the working hours of doctors.
The changes to employment relations and regulation are summarized in
table 5.2.
5.3.2 Organizational and workplace drivers for new 
working time arrangements. 
Interrelated changes in the management of work and performance have
contributed in our case study organizations both to the tendency towards a
results-based employment system, and to a more fragmented time-based
system (see table 5.3). We discuss these tendencies in turn.
Results-based employment system
Results-based employment systems are dependent upon employees
feeling either obliged or incentivized to work whatever hours are required, or
a mixture of both. Feelings of obligation are associated with more devolved or
responsible autonomy systems of work organization (Sewell, 1998); while
incentives derive from discretionary systems of job and pay promotion, based
on fewer permanent vacancies (as a consequence of, for example, delayering
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Table 5.2 Changes to employment relations and regulation
Protection of standard time- Erosion of source of Erosion of standard time and move to
based work contract protection and move to fragmented time
results-oriented employment 
relationship
Collective agreements – Decline in coverage of Reduction and removal of 
pay related to standard time agreements – excluded unsocial hours/additional 
– compensation for extra workers more likely to hours premia in non-union
and unsocial hours or time be found on results- environments or under “modern”
off in lieu (TOIL) based contracts collective agreements or local
implementation of agreements
– fragmentation to pay for
overall improvements
Legal regulation Voluntary opt-out plus Regulation of rest periods may
exclusion of managerial encourage fragmentation of
staff from regulation work time
permits the continued 
development of a results-
based system
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and downsizing), and on the demonstration of performance in the job with
reference to specified criteria. Evidence from national surveys in the United
Kingdom suggests that there has been an increase in unpaid overtime hours
accounting for long hours of work; over two-thirds of those in managerial and
professional jobs working long hours (over 48 per week) were not provided
with any compensation in pay or time off in lieu, and even among associate
professionals and clerical and related workers, the shares not receiving com-
pensation were around 30 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively (see Kodz 
et al., 2003, figure 3.10, based on Workplace Employee Relations Survey data
for 1998). It should also be noted that the overwhelming majority of those
working long hours as a consequence of unpaid overtime reported that the
main reasons were “to get all my work done” or because “it’s required as part
of my job” (Kodz et al., 2003, figure 4.1).
At their most extreme, results-based systems require employees not only
to simply carry out their tasks, but also to take responsibility for generating
new and repeat business through their actions. Within our case studies we
found such requirements were very much part of the work culture at two
software companies (Largeco and Smallco). Such requirements reduce the dis-
tinction between those in direct employment and the self-employed, who are
responsible not only for their assigned tasks, but for generating the contracts
that pay their wages, thereby adding to the pressure to work whatever hours
are required.
In other cases the pressures came from managing too high a volume of
work or from work responsibilities that spread over a long period of the week,
rather than from concerns about generating new work. In particular, the
extension of organizations’ operating and opening hours was often not accom-
panied by increases in supervisory staffing levels. As a result, the hours of
supervisors and staff were decoupled, leading to an increase in pressure on
supervisory and managerial staff to cover extra and unsocial hours. A Retailco
supervisor at a store that stayed open 24 hours a day explained that “my staff
start at six o’clock in the morning, and the last ones don’t finish until eleven
o’clock at night, so to be able to see those people means that . . . sometimes 
I will work from seven o’clock till eight o’clock at night just so that I can see
my own staff ”. And a Bankco team manager at a debt management centre
reported how she had been working in “an 8:30 till 5 o’clock environment and
we’ve now extended that from 7:30 to 7:30, again and we’re looking towards
changing it to an 8:30 finish . . . It has [affected me] as part of being a Team
Manager to have open the area up to 7:30.”
Another common factor placing pressure on staff to work extra and
longer hours was the non-filling of staff vacancies, while retained staff still had
to meet targets related to the “customer” or “client” demands, or meet the
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specified staffing levels laid down by companies or by regulation. In Retailco,
the company required a fresh-food manager to be present at all times, but had
not replaced a manager when she went on maternity leave and did not return,
as the one manager on duty in the city-centre store explained: “I did it
temporary while one of them was on maternity leave – they said – for six
months. It’s nearly two years down the line, and they’ve not replaced her. It’s
the wage cost, the wage budget.” In the case of a local council – Councilco –
the responsibility for resolving the dilemma of how to meet the new
government targets to meet care needs in the community in a context of a
chronic shortage of homecare workers was effectively devolved to homecare
organizers, who would have to stay at work until they had ensured that the
vulnerable older people would receive some care the next morning. This
management strategy was premised on the strong sense of responsibility that
employees felt for their clients.
Promotion opportunities were also directly linked with pressure to
accept long hours of work, this pressure often accompanying even a minor
promotion. For example at Retailco, those shop-floor staff who were accepted
on to the training programmes that could lead to future promotion were
expected to demonstrate commitment before advancement. As one employee
in the city-centre store remarked, “You get no extra pay going on this
Options, and you’ve got to work longer hours, more responsibility – I don’t
want to go on it because . . . they’re getting you to do all the dirty work with
no extra pay, no incentive. There’s not even a guaranteed job at the end of 12
months.” Even more common was the practice of offering temporary
promotions – opportunities that were known as “acting up” at the next grade
– with confirmation in the higher grade being dependent, at an uncertain date
in the future, on performance. As an employee at Telecomco’s repairs call
centre explained, “All the team coaches at the moment are ‘acting’. There’s no
substantive team coaches out there.”
Even when promoted, many of the staff we interviewed appeared to
accept the obligation to work whatever hours were necessary, on the grounds
that this was the price they had to pay for having a higher-paid or a more
responsible job. As an IT worker at Futuretech contrasted the old time-based
employment system in the government department to the new approach at
Futuretech, “You’re paid this much a year to finish the job, and although they
don’t use those words, that’s the way”. This approach could also rule out the
possibility of compressed working weeks, so that even though more than
contractual hours were worked within the first four days at work, anyone with
management responsibilities might have to be present the whole working
week, as a manager at Bankco’s debt management department explained,
“When I started I did look to do four long days a week, which was a shift that
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a lot of my Team Managers were doing. But unfortunately I then had to get
called into so many different meetings every day that I couldn’t afford to be in
four days. So that was a little bit irritating, but I really just wanted my cake and
eat it. I appreciate it goes with the job. It goes with the money. It’s reflected
in the salary so it’s no issue.”
This expectation that supervisory or managerial staff would work
whatever hours were required of them to fulfil their own tasks was in some
cases explicitly built in to the system of pay and rewards: thus as one manager
at a Bankco call centre explained, “If they’re missing a team manager at a
weekend for instance, because they’re on holiday, then I would be able to
apply for paid overtime to cover that missing team manager. But if I had more
tasks in my own area that I couldn’t fit in on a working day that needed to 
be completed, then that overtime would have to be unpaid.” Furthermore,
pressures for managerial and supervisory staff to work with and motivate their
staff could also lead to pressures to work outside standard hours to fulfil basic
managerial tasks. As one Telecomco manager at a repairs centre explained, “I
see myself as a team member, although I have a different job, and because of
that I don’t have enough time to sit quietly doing all the paperwork . . . those
are the kind of things I tend to take home and do . . . I suppose it’s a choice
because I want to be available to the staff and I can’t do two things.”
Despite these findings, it is important to recognize that results-based
systems do not necessarily lead to a long-hours culture. Avoidance of long
hours is only likely, however, if employers are obliged to adjust staffing levels
to meet workload requirements. Otherwise, and in the absence of institutional
restrictions, the temptation may be too strong for employers to allow the staff
to absorb any additional workload without more resources. Working time,
under these conditions, may spiral upwards, with numerous “knock-on
effects” in terms of health, job satisfaction, stress levels and well-being, both
inside and outside of the workplace (Burchell et al., 1999; Green, 2001).
Fragmented time employment systems
Fragmented time systems are frequently associated not simply with
changes to the length or pattern of working time, but also to changes in the
mode of monitoring and rewarding work. While the extension of operating
and opening hours may provide for some fragmented time jobs simply to
cover additional hours, in general the introduction of fragmented time jobs has
provided employers with an opportunity to rethink their commitments to
purchasing labour in continuous and regular chunks of time which usually also
implies some acceptance of some paid on-the-job inactivity. Fragmented time
systems tend to be introduced in a context of much closer monitoring of
productivity and performance within labour processes and it may indeed be
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the monitoring of effort levels and/or customer demand that leads to the
planning of labour demand on a fragmented time basis. 
This hypothesis was borne out in a number of our cases where we found
evidence of the more sophisticated planning of time schedules against demand
(see Appendix table 5A.2c. In particular, these were being increasingly used in
contexts where employment and therefore labour costs remained time
dependent – and where there appeared to be scope for enhanced productivity
and/or responsiveness to demands through such detailed tailoring. Evidence
was found not just in retailing, where IT-based sales information has long been
used to implement detailed staffing schedules based on variations in demand
measured by 15-minute intervals or less, but also in call centres and in councils,
where, for example, permanent staffing levels were fixed to the low point of
demand (such as in the school dinner service to the few weeks in the summer
when some students have left after examinations), and during the rest or main
part of the year extra hours were added according to demand. At the TCS-NW
multi-client call centre one client, Gambleco, wanted labour supply to be
matched to its racing/betting schedule: temporary staff in particular were
brought in for very short bursts of activity – sometimes for no more than two
hours. Even in more stable industries, clients wanted to retain maximum
flexibility, so that staff at TCS-NW working for a truck rental company still did
not receive their schedules for the next week until just a few days beforehand.
In part, the need to schedule working hours to meet these variations in client
demand arose because of the use of dedicated staff for each client; this
separation of contracts was based in part on variations in client-specific
demands and in particular on the need for the subcontract staff to identify with
the client so as to represent the client image to the external customers.5
Fragmented time systems could be used to manage workloads and
productivity during all working hours, but this process may lead to ever more
demands for more fragmented schedules: in homecare, the time needed to visit
each client was increasingly counted in minutes rather than halves or quarters
of an hour, so that the more precise monitoring of work effort levels and 
the more flexible scheduling of working hours went hand in hand. In some
cases this time monitoring led to “multiskilling” to reduce paid on-the-job
inactivity. In the post office low-paid hybrid post office/retail staff workers
were replacing higher-paid, specialized post office staff, a move stimulated by
concerns about variations in work flows for the post office section of
integrated retail and post office stores. Nor was this time accounting limited
to lower-skilled jobs: in the IT companies we studied (Largeco, Smallco),
Decent working time
140
5 This is increasingly a rare occurrence: there is growing evidence in the United Kingdom of multi-client call centres, where
operators will answer the calls for more than one client, changing their on-the-phone greeting and engagement on the
basis of the information provided to them by the caller when they enter their needs in the form of keyed-in numbers. 
individual staff had the responsibility to ensure that all work time was
chargeable project time. In the case of Smallco the company had become, for
want of a better word, “obsessed” with time accounting, such that it became
increasingly hard to find time for activities such as training, as this could not
easily be “valued” and there was no account code to which it could be charged.
In this case, a time accounting system is combined with full-time employment
that had eliminated “paid on-the-job inactivity” by introducing results-based
performance criteria into the employment relationship (Smith, 2001). 
For professional workers, such tight scheduling may result in their
personally working additional unpaid hours outside of standard hours to ensure
that a system works smoothly. In other examples, it is the supervisory and lower
managerial staff who have to work extra hours to manage a system of work
organization for the supervised staff based on tight time scheduling: for
example when a local authority first contracted out housing benefit work to
TCS-L, the performance indicators were set too tight, with the result that
supervisory and managerial staff had to work additional hours to keep the sy-
stem going as the estimated staffing levels relative to work volumes proved to
be far too low. Alternatively, the over-tight scheduling may lead to unplanned
overtime: at the airport the airlines tended to pay for too few handling agent
staff to cover the check-in, despite the strict on-time departure goals set by
both the airlines and the airport. In practice additional labour often had to be
found, so that there was frequent use of “on-the-day stay-backs” – that is,
unplanned overtime to cover staffing shortages. This points to some of the
differences between policies in principle and the situation in practice. 
5.3.3 Employee compliance: How employers succeeded in
implementing the new working time practices
The organization of the domestic sphere – or the fit between working time
demands and personal and family life commitments – could be anticipated
(Karston and Leopold, 2003) to represent a third set of factors shaping
working time. The United Kingdom is a country with a high level of dual-
earner households and also a reasonably high birth rate. However, neither of
the systems we have described appears to provide a very good fit with United
Kingdom domestic life, even though their emergence may not be unrelated to
the growth in one-and-a-half and two-income households: the results-based
system often involves not only long, but unpredictable hours, and while frag-
mented time systems do facilitate the development of part-time working, they
may also involve acquiescence in the flexible scheduling of work. The issue,
therefore, is not so much how working time has adjusted to family life but
how and why “family-unfriendly” working time arrangements have been
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allowed to develop in the United Kingdom, while at the same time more
family members are now performing paid work.6 Our projects were mainly
concerned with the workplace rather than the domestic sphere, such that we
will primarily address this issue from the perspective of what we found from
our interviews about the reasons for individual compliance at the workplace. 
There is a range of factors that explain these developments. Some of
these can be located in the employment relations sphere, such as the weak
collective regulation and the lack, until recently, of legal regulation. One of the
major factors that may explain compliance at both the individual level and by
trade unions is the changes taking place in employment security. Certainly in
the public sector individual security has been eroded as a consequence of the
widespread system of contracting out services to the private sector, leaving
most public sector workers exposed to potential threats of either a change of
employer or actual employment loss. To avoid the threat of transfer, staff
faced with having to tender for their own jobs are willing to break the link
between pay and hours of work: as one catering supervisor put it after a
retendering process which reduced the time allocation for meal production,
“My actual contracted hours have not increased, my actual time that I actually
am in this kitchen and work in this kitchen has increased because I can’t get
through the job any other way . . . We used to have 13 staff here and now we’ve
got nine. But we’ve still got to do the work of 13 staff ” (Councilco). We found
many lower-level managerial and supervisory staff working in the public
sector, either for the public employer or contracted private sector
organizations, where, as a TCS IT manager put it, it was “not an option for me
to do my job within 37 hours”. While in the past pressure exerted on
individuals to work long and flexible hours might have been resisted through
job quits and other individualized strategies, many of the staff we interviewed
felt that these changes were not specific to their organizations, but would be
found wherever they moved; in particular for many managers and supervisory
staff it was simply felt that “it goes with the territory”. Acceptance of these
arrangements among our interviewees also seemed to be reflective of a
perception that the new results-based employment relationship was now to be
found in most workplaces – and that the public sector might simply be
catching up with private sector practices. For some of our interviewees the
change to working time arrangements had been incremental and not fully in
place when they had first moved on to supervisory or results-based-types
systems. We found some remarkable examples of stoicism in the face of clearly
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6 We are not suggesting that all working time arrangements in the United Kingdom are currently following these
“family-unfriendly patterns”; many part-timers do for example work fixed hours that have been chosen to fit their
family arrangements. However, in some of our case studies the rights to hours arrangements to fit with domestic
conditions were being challenged as employers increased pressure for more extended or more flexible working. 
extremely inconvenient schedules: a team manager at Bankco, who was also a
lone parent, described a new requirement to work late occasionally as “fitting
in with her lifestyle”, as she was “fortunate enough” to have a free evening
once in a while when her ex-husband took the kids, and on these free evenings
she could take her turn to cover the extended working hours. 
Acceptance of fragmented time systems appears to be largely based on
two different and to some extent alternative functions of these types of em-
ployment arrangements. For some part-time or temporary employees there
was no alternative to working more weekends than permanent full-timers,
having to take an early evening shift or miss out on break times. It was the
price that had to be paid either for an opportunity to better reconcile their
work and family arrangements or to enable them to get a first foot on the
employment ladder. In some cases – for example at CouncilB – the require-
ment for flexible working was explicitly restricted to new recruits, with
existing staff not required for the moment to change their hours. However,
evidence from other case studies might suggest that once the share of staff
working flexible hours moved towards the majority, additional pressure would
be placed on those on “old” terms and conditions to comply or to leave. Where
the main motivation for taking a fragmented-time job was reconciliation, there
were often limits to the extent to which these staff would be compliant with
employer demands, but this was resolved in part by systems of offering the
least favourable shifts to the new recruits often on temporary contracts.
Alternatively unsocial hours work was contracted out as in the case of home-
care work for CouncilA. However, some very unsocial hours were still
acceptable to those with domestic commitments as they enabled partners to
share in the childcare. As one part-time evening and night-shift worker at
Retailco’s 24-hours store put it, “I would love to work during the day. I would
love to have a proper job again, but it’s just a case of, who’d have the kids?”
While these new working time systems were by no means costless for
employers, with particular problems emerging in turnover rates among those
workers on fragmented time contracts, there was little evidence in follow-up
interviews of any major move away from these new principles for managing
both working time and the employment relationship. Only one example was
found of an employer reversing the results-based system – at Telecomco,
where new shift arrangements had been put in place to stabilize the hours of
managerial/supervisory staff, through the employment of part–time supervisors
to cover the additional unsocial hours in the evening. Over the period that we
undertook the case studies (1997–2002), and despite the issue of work–life
balance becoming more widely debated in political circles and in the national
press, we found little evidence of it changing or modifying these trends
towards more employer-driven working time schedules. 
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5.4 CONCLUSION
The evidence from this extensive body of case studies in the United Kingdom
is that the move towards new employment relations, based around both results-
based and fragmented time systems, is both widespread and ongoing. These
findings are supported by a recent United Kingdom survey of employees that
has found a major deterioration in satisfaction with working hours: the share
of male employees satisfied with their working hours was found to have
dropped from 35 per cent to 20 per cent between 1992 and 2000, and an even
more dramatic fall was recorded for women – from 54 per cent to 26 per cent
(White et al., 2003). The research also identified “long working hours as the
dominant issue for employees”, and found that the implementation of new
systems of work organization associated with so-called high-commitment
workplaces was intensifying problems of work–life balance. 
While the dissatisfaction with working time arrangements frequently
surfaced in our interviews, this dissatisfaction could be often considered more
evidence of reluctant compliance. For higher-level staff there was the view that
extended working hours was the price that had to be paid for even a minor step
up to a supervisory role, say to school dinners supervisor. In other cases, the
extra responsibility did come with a much larger pay packet, but there were
few opportunities in our case study examples for staff to trade a smaller pay
packet for more limited hours; it was an all-or-nothing trade of higher pay for
longer hours, with few opportunities to tailor the package to suit personal
circumstances. Another factor that may help explain compliance is that the
United Kingdom could be said to have a rather fragmented and individual-
ized social and family system with a weak and declining tradition of shared
community time. The lack of strong social norms around, for example, the
free Sunday to spend with families and friends may assist employers in seeking
“compliant” workers for weekend working, and may even give a somewhat
strange twist to what might be considered “family-friendly working
arrangements” in the United Kingdom. Many mothers take “fragmented time
jobs during unsocial hours, precisely so as to economise on childcare that can
be provided by their partners during their ‘free time’” (Harkness, 2002).
However, while many mothers do take on these fragmented jobs, this is often
on the basis of very tightly constrained arrangements, where the individual or
the family is trying to find a means of reconciling the effectively irreconcilable
– due to the lack of childcare and transport infrastructure, the instability and
complexity of family set-ups, and the demand by employers for highly flexible
or long hours of work (Jarvis, 2005; Jarvis et al., 2001). Such complexity
illustrates the interrelatedness of supply-side changes (e.g. household
structure, lifestyle choices) and demand-side pressures (e.g. employer policies
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to fragment working time schedules) in transforming time at work. What is
clear from our evidence, however, is that employer pressures regarding
working time have had a transformative impact on the work environment in a
range of sectors of the economy. There has been much attention focused on
the upward pressures on working time faced by “knowledge workers” – for
whom longer hours are needed to process more information (ILO, 2001) – but
this chapter demonstrates the more widespread nature of change.
Despite problems of low worker morale and motivation, and difficulties
in recruitment and retention, the managers at the organizations we studied
appeared to have little interest in investing effort in moving back to a more
regular time-based system. The notion that work should be fitted into
standard hours where possible had all but disappeared from the managerial
rhetoric; managers stressed that hours schedules needed to fit with the
interests of the employer and/or the clients and customers. To achieve this, a
major objective was to regard all hours as equivalent, with no additional costs
associated with unsocial or extra hours. Where recruitment problems were
encountered, the problem was often passed to temporary work agencies to fill
the most unpopular shifts. The subcontracting of the problem to these
agencies may have encouraged managers to believe that workers’ preferences
and personal circumstances no longer had to be taken into account by
employers. It was also the case that individual managers, struggling to match
the demands placed on them by private and public sector employers alike, are
not necessarily in a position to offer any simple alternative. In the short term
they are reliant on systems that require staff to work whenever and for
however long is necessary to process the volume of work coming into the
organization. They are not necessarily able to contemplate longer-term
strategies to bring work and life back into better balance. All of these
explanations point to the need for the reinstitutionalization of working time
by involving social actors at the regional, industry and national level. The
promotion of “decent working time” will not be effective if it is believed that
a better work–life balance can be forged either through negotiations with
individual workers, or even through actions and policies introduced in single
organizations or workplaces.
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Table 5A.2a Examples of methods of reducing costs of additional and/or
extra hours
Methods Examples from case studies
Reductions in or elimination of premia Leverhulme: Bankco, Councilco, Healthco, 
Mediaco, Retailco, Telecomco 
FOW: Airportco, PFI
NESY: Largeco, Smallco, CouncilA, 
CouncilB 
Use of part-time or temporary staff to Leverhulme: Bankco, Councilco, Healthco, 
evade overtime/unsocial hours premia Retailco, Telecomco 
FOW; Airportco, FI, TCS-NW
Use of staff grades where no eligibility Leverhulme: Telecomco, Councilco, Retailco, 
for premia or for claiming overtime Healthco
Transferring staff to new organizations FOW: Futuretech, TCS-L
where no premia or overtime paid 
(in principle and/or in practice)
Extending time deemed to be standard Leverhulme: Bankco, Councilco, Healthco,
hours Mediaco, Retailco, Telecomco 
FOW: Post Office, TCS-NW 
NESY: CouncilA, CouncilB
New consolidated salaries to include Leverhulme: Councilco, Healthco 
premia for weekend working, etc. NESY: CouncilA
Variations in premia according to client FOW: TCS-NW – for agency staff
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Table 5A.2b Examples of methods of reducing paid on-the-job inactivity
Methods Examples from case studies
Results-based Increased workloads/reduced Leverhulme: Healthco, Retailco 
staffing levels or unfilled FOW: TCS-L, Futuretech
vacancies
Temporary promotions/ Leverhulme: Telecomco
“acting” up – pressure on 
performance
Increased use of targets Leverhulme: Councilco 
and/or time auditing NESY: Largeco, Smallco
Fragmented time Time scheduling according to Leverhulme: Telecomco, Retailco,
customer demands Bankco
FOW: TCS-NW
Time measurement of tasks – Leverhulme: Healthco, Councilco
used for flexible scheduling FOW: Post Office/Cornerco
of hours and/or for increased NESY: CouncilA, CouncilB
multiskilling to reduce inactivity
Minimization of core staff – use Leverhulme: Councilco,
of part-time, temporary, overtime Telecomco, Retailco
to match with variations in FOW: TCS-NW, Airport-BH, FHL
demand NESY: CouncilA, CouncilB, 
Largeco
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Table 5A.2c Examples of erosion of standard working time/community
leisure time
Methods Examples from case studies
Results-based Extended opening and operating Leverhulme: Bankco, Councilco,
hours – supervisors/managers Healthco, Mediaco, Retailco, 
on call Telecomco
Difficulties in taking time off Leverhulme: Bankco, Councilco,
in lieu Healthco, Mediaco, Retailco, 
Telecomco
Devolved responsibilities for FOW: TCS-L, Futuretech
tasks/functions Leverhulme: Bankco, Councilco, 
Healthco, Retailco, Telecomco
Requirements to generate new FOW: Futuretech, TCS-L
business/keep clients happy FOW: Futuretech, Airport-
BH, FHL
Fragmented time Scheduling across extended days NESY: Largeco, Smallco 
Leverhulme: Bankco, Councilco, 
Retailco, Telecomco 
FOW: TCS-NW, Post Office – 
Cornerco, Localco
NESY: CouncilA, CouncilB
Scheduling across week/weekend Leverhulme: Bankco, Councilco, 
Healthco, Retailco, Telecomco
FOW: TCS-NW, Post Office – 
Cornerco, Localco
NESY: CouncilA, CouncilB 
Variable scheduled hours at short Leverhulme: Retailco
notice FOW: TCS-NW
Variable extra hours at short notice Leverhulme: Retailco, Councilco
FOW: Airport-FHL
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PART II
INDIVIDUAL CHOICES AND COLLECTIVE
OPTIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION
In the Netherlands, annual average working hours per job – incorporating full-
time, part-time and flexible jobs, but no overtime – have decreased 39 per cent
between 1950 and 2001 (Baaijens and Schippers, 2003). This decline can
primarily be explained by a shortening of the full-time working week and a
rapid growth in the number of part-time jobs. The latter has mainly taken
place among women, while most men are still in full-time employment. Even
though the working week has become shorter and more diverse over the last
decades, still not all employees’ preferences with respect to the length of the
working week seem to be fulfilled. Our research shows that in the year 2002
about a quarter of all employees reported a desire to change their number of
working hours.
The existing discrepancy between preferred and contractual working
hours has been deemed undesirable by the Dutch Government. In order to
facilitate employees’ adjustment of working hours, the Government has
recently introduced the Adjustment of Working Hours Act. The Act states
that employers must honour employees’ requests for either upward or
downward adjustment of working hours, unless precluded by conflicting
business interests.
The ILO identifies five guiding principles that contribute to decent
working time (Messenger, ed., 2004): healthy working time, family-friendly
155
LABOUR SUPPLY PREFERENCES AND
JOB MOBILITY OF DUTCH EMPLOYEES
Didier Fouarge* and Christine Baaijens**
6
* Institute for Labour Studies (OSA) and Tilburg Institute of Social and Socio-Economic Research (TISSER), Tilburg
University, The Netherlands.
** Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University, The Netherlands.
working time, gender equality through working time, productive working
time, and choice and influence regarding working time. This study
investigates the discrepancy between preferred and contractual working
hours of Dutch employees and whether they succeed in realizing an
adjustment of working hours. Therefore our focus on the possibilities to
adapt working hours to life events and preferences fits well within the
concept of decent working time.
Adjustment of working hours is often studied in the context of job
mobility. In other studies this has been defined as a change of employer. 
A novelty in this chapter is that we make a distinction between job mobility
in terms of a change of employer and within-firm mobility. A second novelty
is that we investigate whether or not the introduction of the aforementioned
Act has led to behavioural changes among employees. 
We find that only a small portion of Dutch employees who are not
satisfied with the length of their working week successfully adjust their hours.
We further find that changes in working hours often coincide with either a
change of employer or within-firm mobility. New Dutch legislation in the area
has thus had no effect on these patterns to date.
6.2 THE DUTCH LABOUR MARKET IN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Since the beginning of the 1970s, most European Union (EU) countries have
seen a marked growth in the proportion of part-timers in the total labour
force. Exceptions include the southern European countries, where the
incidence of part-time employment has remained low. Figure 6.1 shows the
relative growth in part-time employment in both the Netherlands and the EU
as a whole.1,2 Between the mid-1980s and today part-time employment rose
relatively faster among male workers than female workers, both in the
Netherlands and the EU. However, since initial levels of male part-time
employment were very low, the share of male part-time employment in total
part-time employment remains low. Moreover, at least in the Netherlands,
male part-time jobs are often held by students. Part-time work remains,
therefore, a predominant feature of female employment. The gender im-
balance not only exists in countries in which part-time employment is a rare
phenomenon, but also in those countries where part-time employment is
common, as figure 6.2 shows. The “femaleness” of part-time employment is
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1 Note that Eurostat bases the distinction between full-time and part-time work upon a spontaneous response by the
respondent.
2 Note that the ten new countries that joined the European Union in 2004 have not been taken into account. 
often associated with women’s roles as housewives and mothers. However, the
impact of motherhood on women’s working patterns is found to differ among
countries (Fagan and Rubery, 1996, pp. 231–235).
In no other EU country is part-time employment as widespread as it is in
the Netherlands. Its unique position is illustrated in figure 6.2, showing that,
on the basis of harmonized European data, the Dutch incidence of part-time
employment is much higher than in any other EU Member State. The large
share of part-timers in the Netherlands today is the result of a combination of
labour demand and supply factors. On the demand side, the advance in part-
time employment can be explained by a changing attitude among employers
who started to see its advantages in a context of extending operating hours and
a growing service sector (Lomwel, 2000). On the supply side, the entry of
married women into the labour force has contributed greatly (Baaijens, 1999). 
Dutch labour market policy has contributed to a large degree toward the
normalization of part-time employment by introducing, in the last decade,
various measures to improve the legal position of part-timers. In 1993, exist-
ing thresholds that related to the number of hours worked were removed 
from entitlements to the statutory minimum wage and the minimum holiday
allowance. Legislation in 1996 elaborated on the subject by prohibiting dis-
crimination between employees based upon the number of working hours.
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Figure 6.1 Share of part-timers in total employment in the Netherlands and
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Source: European Commission (2002, pp. 173–188; 2000, p. 85, 95; 1996, p. 47).
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The Act awards part-time employees an explicit right to equal treatment – pro
rata – in areas negotiated by the social partners, such as wages, holiday pay and
entitlements, bonuses and training. As a result, part-timers and full-timers
today enjoy similar conditions of employment in the Netherlands. Moreover,
in many branches of industry – such as healthcare, the public sector, education
and services – and in many organizations part-time work has become a normal
and accepted phenomenon. In this respect the Dutch situation sharply con-
trasts with the situation in countries such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, France and Germany, where part-time employment is often a 
form of marginal employment (Visser, 1999). Nevertheless, even in the
Netherlands, part-timers seem to have less career development and fewer
chances to enter management jobs than full-timers. In addition, part-time
employment seems to be more accepted among women than among men.
6.2.1 A right to change the number of working hours
With the legal position of part-timers secured, the Dutch Government turned
its attention towards increasing the number of part-time jobs. One of the
reasons for this is that part-time employment is seen as a means for both 
men and women to combine work and caring activities. It is in this context
that the Adjustment of Working Hours Act (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur)
was introduced in July 2000. According to this Act, employees have a right to
request an upward or downward adjustment of working hours in their current
job. In principle, employers have to honour such requests unless precluded 
by pressing conflicting business interests. Although this does not imply that 
all requests have to be honoured, it does imply that employers have to 
justify refusals. Employees, however, are under no obligation to specify the
motivation for their request. This different treatment of employers and
employees shows in particular that the legislators have taken sides with
workers in their struggle to realize their desired working hours. 
Within the European Union only Germany has a somewhat comparable
law. This law came into force in January 2001, and is called the Part-time Work
and Fixed-term Contracts Act (Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete
Arbeitsverträge). Although this is the subject of ongoing debate, it has been
argued that, contrary to its name, the Act also grants workers the right to
extend their working week (Jacobs and Schmidt, 2001). The German Act does
not apply to workers in organizations with fewer than 15 employees, nor does
it apply to civil servants. The Dutch Act also excludes organizations of fewer
than 10 employees. However, according to the Dutch Act these companies
have to make their own arrangements. The Dutch Act is equally applicable to
the market sector and the public sector.
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We have shown in this section that one key feature of the Dutch labour
market is its large part-time segment. On top of that the Adjustment of
Working Hours Act was introduced to facilitate the transition from working
full time to working part time. In the rest of this chapter, we turn to the
investigation of the processes by which employees adapt their working hours.
We examine to what extent changes in working hours are associated with job
mobility. Then we question whether legislation in the area has contributed to
behavioural changes of Dutch employees.
6.3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The question of working hours preferences has been the subject of several studies
over the past decades. These studies, mostly descriptive, reveal that although a
majority of Dutch employees are satisfied with their contractual working hours,
some groups of employees report a discrepancy between preferred and current
working hours (for an overview, see Baaijens, 2000).3 In general women more
often than men state a desire to either increase or reduce their working hours.
What we see in the Netherlands is that women in general, when staying in the
labour market, reduce their working hours after the birth of their first child
(Steenhof, 2000; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 1997; Kragt 1997; 
Portegijs et al., 2004). For men a connection between having (young) children
at home and a desire to work fewer hours does not seem to exist.
The fact that employees state that they would like to adjust their working
hours does not mean that they make attempts actually to do so. Various Dutch
studies reveal that a minority of the employees who would like to adjust their
working hours make such a request to their employer. In addition, these
studies show that not every request put forward is honoured. In a study
among male workers more than half of the employees with a desire to reduce
hours did not follow through (Spaans, 1997). Most of the employees did not
make attempts because they thought that it would not be possible in their
position. Of those who did request a change in working hours, 59 per cent
were successful. 
Research by Statistics Netherlands shows that only 22 per cent of men
and 37 per cent of women undertake action when they desire to work fewer
hours. However, these attempts are reasonably successful: of the men and
women who did request a reduction of working time to their employer, 60 and
74 per cent, respectively, were successful (Boelens, 1997). Employees seem to
be less hesitant to submit requests to extend contractual working hours. The
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3 Variations in the results of these studies depend highly upon differences in the phrasing of the relevant questions and
by characteristics of the group of employees under investigation.
same study reveals that 38 per cent of men and 51 per cent of women with a
desire to work more hours undertook steps to increase their working hours,
with respectively 61 and 58 per cent of the attempts being successful. Since
women are less hesitant to undertake steps than men, they more often
experience a change in working hours. For example, between 1996 and 1997,
32 per cent of women changed working hours as opposed to 10 per cent of
men (Schobben, 1998).4
Using the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, Euwals (2001) finds that
flexibility of working hours within jobs is low among female employees. As a
result, women who stay with the same employer have a much smaller chance
of adjusting their working hours than women who change jobs. In addition,
Baaijens and Schippers (2003) – using the OSA Labour Supply Panel; see
below – find that employees who change jobs succeed significantly more often
in realizing a desired adjustment of the working week. 
How do the Dutch findings compare with those in other countries?
According to a study covering 15 EU Member States plus Norway (Bielenski
et al., 2002, p. 43), half of the workforces surveyed preferred fewer hours and
11 per cent preferred more hours. However, almost two-thirds of full-timers
assume that their current employer would not agree to let them work part time
(ranging from 71 per cent in Austria to 44 per cent in Finland), while almost
half of them say that working part time would harm their career prospects
(ranging from 55 per cent in Germany to 31 per cent in Denmark) (Bielenski
et al., 2002, p. 57).
In their seminal contributions, Altonji and Paxson (1986, 1988, 1992)
have studied the adjustment of working hours of married women in the
United States. They distinguish between women who stay in their job and
women who change employers and conclude – using the US Panel Study of
Income Dynamics – that the working hours of married women are two to four
times more variable when changing employers than when staying in the same
job. Based upon the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Martinez-
Granado (2003) finds that for prime-aged males the variance of the change in
hours is more than six times higher across jobs (defined as a change of
employer) than within jobs. Both findings suggest that in the United States
both male and female employees have substantial difficulties in adjusting their
working hours without changing employers. In addition, Böheim and Taylor
(2004) find – using the British Household Panel Survey – that job changers in
the United Kingdom are more able to adjust working hours in line with their
preferences than those who stay in the same job. 
Labour supply preferences and job mobility of Dutch employees
161
4 A 4-hour cut-off was used in this study to eliminate changes to weekly working hours due to a collective reduction
of the work-week.
6.4 MODEL AND DATA
From previous research it seems that restrictions (or perceived restrictions)
on the labour demand side play an important role in the process of adjustment
towards the desired number of hours: when an adjustment is taking place, it
will generally involve a job change. The question is whether this relationship
between job mobility and changes in working hours also holds in a “part-time
economy” such as the Dutch economy and, if it does, whether legislation in
the area leads to behavioural changes. To provide answers to these questions,
longitudinal information is required on actual and preferred working hours of
individual employees, as well as on job mobility. Such longitudinal information
is available in the OSA Labour Supply Panel, a panel of Dutch persons (aged
16 to 64) that started in 1985. As of 1986, data are collected every other year
among some 4,500 persons in more than 2,000 households. In this chapter, we
use nine waves of the panel covering the period 1986–2002. The data include
information on demographic characteristics on the level of the individual
(gender, age, marital status) and the household (household composition),
socio-economic characteristics (labour market status, income), job character-
istics (sector of activity, contract type) and human capital indicators
(educational level, health status). 
The data also include information on actual and preferred working
hours, which is crucial for this research. We use information on contractual
working hours, which are the hours that employers and employees have
agreed upon. The data account for arrangements for collective working time
reductions, which are common in the Netherlands. Contractual working
hours exclude overtime hours. We do this because we want to test the effects
of working time legislation, which only applies to contractual working hours;
however, overtime hours are used as an explanatory variable in the analyses.
We have computed contractual working hours in a way that is consistent over
the years. Between 1986 and 1998 preferences for working hours were
assessed by asking employees for their preferred number of working hours.
A comparison of contractual and preferred working hours revealed whether
employees were satisfied with their working week or not. However, in 2000
and 2002 respondents were asked directly whether they wanted to work
more or fewer hours.5 This change in the questionnaire has had no effect on
the proportion of employees reporting that they want to work fewer hours:
the proportion fits well within the trend-series. However, the change in the
questionnaire has resulted in a reduction of the proportion of employees
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5 It is important to note that, in all years, respondents had to assume that their hourly wage and the labour supply of
other household members remained unchanged when reporting their preferred number of working hours. It was made
explicit that working fewer (more) hours implied a reduction (increase) in income. 
who report that they want to work more hours (see Fouarge and Baaijens,
2003, pp. 38, 52–53). Therefore, one should be cautious when comparing the
information concerning preferences for more hours before and after the
change in questionnaire.
6.4.1 Modelling the effect of the Adjustment of 
Working Hours Act
We have a biennial measure of contractual working hours for the employees in
the dataset in the 1986–2002 period and estimate the probability – using a
probit model (see Appendix 6.1) – that an employee (we have excluded the
self-employed) will reduce his or her working hours between two years. In a
second model, we estimate the probability that an employee will increase his 
or her working hours between two years. The models, which are estimated
separately for male and female workers, include a number of explanatory
variables measuring personal and household characteristics as well as job and
firm characteristics.
Among the explanatory variables, we include a set of dummy variables 
to measure job mobility (within-firm mobility or change of employer),
preferences for working hours (preference for more or fewer hours) and time
(1986–1992, 1992–2000, 2000–2002) as well as interactions of time with job
mobility and preferences. The time dummy for changes in the working hours
between 2000 and 2002 indicates the period following introduction of the
Adjustment of Working Hours Act.6 On the basis of the existing literature
(see section 6.3), we expect changes in the number of working hours to be
positively correlated with job mobility, and we expect working time pref-
erences to be good predictors of actual changes in working time. However, we
anticipate these associations to have changed after the introduction of the Act.
In particular, we expect increases or decreases in the number of working hours
to be less associated with job mobility in the post-Act period (i.e. we expect a
negative sign for the cross-term between job mobility and the post-Act time
dummy 2000–2002). In addition, we expect that it should be easier for
employees who are dissatisfied with their working hours to change their hours
after the introduction of the Act (i.e. we expect a positive sign for the cross-
term between dissatisfaction and the post-Act time dummy 2000–2002). We
take both measures as empirical tests for the effect of the Act and discuss the
results of the estimations in section 6.7. Although it is probably true that
being unsatisfied with one’s number of working hours is not the only reason
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6 The Dutch economy showed an economic downturn in the 1992–93 period, and a strong growth of labour market
participation in the period thereafter. Therefore, the 1986–92 dummy reflects the pre-downturn period; the 1992–2000
dummy the growth period; and the 2000–2002 dummy the post-Act period.
why people change jobs,7 additional analyses on our data do show that
individuals who would like to work more or fewer hours are indeed
significantly more likely to change jobs.8
6.5 WORKING HOURS PREFERENCES
Are Dutch employees satisfied with the number of hours they work? Not all
of them. In 2002, as many as 16 per cent of Dutch employees would have
preferred to work fewer hours (at least half a day) than their current con-
tractual number of hours and 6 per cent would have liked to extend their
working hours (table 6.1). These percentages vary strongly between males and
females. Fifteen per cent of male employees want to work fewer hours and 
10 per cent want to work more hours, whereas the respective percentages
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7 Career motives or the desire to do something new are important factors as well.
8 The analyses are not shown but are available on request.
Table 6.1 Preferences for working fewer or more hours, Dutch employees,
2002 (percentages)
Desire to work Satisfied with Desire to work
fewer hours current number more hours
of hours1
Total (N=3,361) 17 77 6
Male employees (N=1,803) 20 77 3
Female employees (N=1,558) 14 77 9
Male employees by educational level 
Primary school or lower 24 72 4
Lower secondary 19 77 4
Higher secondary 19 78 3
Higher education 16 82 2
University 22 74 4
Female employees by educational level 
Primary school or lower 17 72 11
Lower secondary 8 80 12
Higher secondary 12 80 8
Higher education 19 73 8
University 32 62 6
Note: 1 Desired change is less than 4 hours.
Source: OSA Labour Supply Panel 2002.
among females are 18 per cent and 13 per cent. Higher-educated workers
especially wish to reduce their working week. If all Dutch employees were to
act upon their preferences, this would potentially result in a sharp reduction
of the total labour supply. 
Over the years 1986–2002, an increasing number of male workers wanted
to reduce their working hours, but the reverse holds for female workers.
Despite this trend, as we saw in figure 6.2, the incidence of male part-time
employment has remained low in the Netherlands. It seems that male workers
cannot, do not dare, or do not wish to realize their latent preferences. Our data
offer information on the extent to which employees with a desire to change
their working hours think they will be able to do so within one year and, if not,
the reasons why. The results for 2002 are displayed in table 6.2. Males who want
to reduce their number of hours worked are less confident than females that
they will be able to do so within a year. They are, however, more confident than
females that they will be able to increase their hours. In the majority of cases,
when employees think they will not be able to change their hours, they state
that this is because of their employer or their job. In particular, male employees
who want to work fewer hours see their employer or their job as the main
impediment. However, whether this perception is correct can be questioned. 
As has been elaborated above, previous research has shown that although
employees are reluctant to address the issue of adjusting working hours to their
employer, those employees who do so are often successful (Boelens, 1997).
Of course, at the individual level, some employees do succeed in adjusting
their working hours in accordance with their preferences. But to what extent is
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Table 6.2 Extent to which Dutch employees think they will be able to
achieve their desired change in working hours within one year,
2002 (percentages)
Possible Not possible within Not possible within Does not
within one one year because of one year for other know
year employer or job1 reasons2
Male employees (N=432)
Desire to work fewer hours 20 52 21 7
Desire to work more hours 58 19 16 7
Female employees (N=390)
Desire to work fewer hours 41 29 16 14
Desire to work more hours 50 17 16 17
Notes: 1“Job does not allow a change” or “employer does not allow change”. 2“Health does not allow change”,
“childcare activities do not allow change” or other reason.
Source: OSA Labour Supply Panel 2002.
this taking place? Table 6.3 depicts the changes in contractual working hours
between two years in the period 1986–2002. Three main conclusions can be
drawn from the table. First, most workers who are dissatisfied with their
working hours in one year – they would like to adjust hours either upward or
downward – have not changed their hours two years later. Second, given
employees’ preferences, it seems easier to increase working hours than to
reduce them. Third, male employees have a more stable employment pattern
than female employees. Male employees work full time and tend to keep on
doing so, irrespective of their preferences. Female workers, however, tend to be
more flexible and adjust their working hours more often in accordance with
their preferences. Presumably, there is a relationship between male and female
behaviour: because they are flexible in adjusting their working hours, female
workers render it possible for males to remain inflexible. This, however, should
be the subject of further investigation.
6.6 CHANGES IN WORKING HOURS
6.1.1 Reducing labour supply
Working hours changes are driven by four sets of factors: individual pre-
ferences for working hours, individual and household characteristics, job
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Table 6.3 Desired working hours and change of contractual working hours,
Dutch employees, 1986–2002 (rows add up to 100 per cent)
Change of working hours between t and t + 2
Desired working hours Fewer hours No change1 More hours
Male employees (N=8,107)
Fewer hours 10 87 3
No change1 5 92 3
More hours 4 82 14
Total 6 90 4
Female employees (N=4,785)
Fewer hours 33 62 5
No change1 13 73 14
More hours 6 50 44
Total 16 67 17
Note: 1 Desired or realized change is less than 4 hours.
Source: OSA Labour Supply Panel 1986–2002.
characteristics, and labour demand and institutional factors.9 It has been
shown that a preference for a different number of working hours is a strong
determinant of changes in actual working hours: individuals with a preference
for fewer (more) hours are more likely to reduce (extend) their labour supply
(Euwals et al., 1998; Böheim and Taylor, 2004; Baaijens and Schippers, 2003;
Fouarge and Baaijens, 2003). 
In table 6.4, we present model estimates for the probability of reducing
the number of hours worked between two years. It appears that the household
context – having a partner, having children – plays a crucial role in the case of
female workers. This tends to confirm Becker’s specialization hypothesis
according to which individuals will specialize in activities where they yield the
highest return (Becker, 1985). Although the household context is of less
importance to male workers with a preference for fewer working hours, similar
to their female counterparts, they tend to reduce their labour supply following
the birth of a child. The effect for female workers is, however, much stronger.
Given that one has a partner, the longer the working hours of the partner, the
lower the likelihood that female workers reduce their labour supply. However,
we find the opposite effect for males. One explanation could be that there
exists a “homogamy of working hours”: the more often employees search for
and find a partner with an equal educational level, the greater the probability
that both partners will want to work the same number of hours. Thus, given
the fact that female employees in the Netherlands often work part time, it
could be argued that female employees do not reduce their hours if their
partner is working long hours, but male employees do.
Female managers are less likely to reduce their working hours. Although
we found the same sign for this effect for male managers, for them it is
insignificant. The fear of negative future career consequences is probably the
main reason for this, especially since it is still more difficult for female workers
to get into higher management levels than it is for male workers. It is, however,
also possible that it is the organizational culture that makes it difficult for
female managers to reduce their working hours when they prefer to do so.
Male workers engaged in manual labour or who are dissatisfied with their
current job are more likely to reduce their working time. Male part-time
workers are also found to be more likely to reduce their working time further,
while the opposite effect is found for females. The difference is most probably
due to the fact that male part-time workers are engaged in “substantial hours”
part-time work, while female part-timers work, on average, in jobs with an
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9 Preferences are influenced by individual and household characteristics on the one hand, and job characteristics on
the other, but such characteristics also have a direct effect on the probability that an individual will change his or
her labour supply.
already small number of hours. Females working full time are especially likely
to reduce their labour supply.
Changes in labour time are also driven by individual preferences.
Employees with a preference for a shorter working week are indeed more
likely to reduce their working hours. The Adjustment of Working Hours Act
should make it easier for employees to adjust working hours to their
preferences. Hence we would expect dissatisfied workers to be more likely to
adapt their working time after the introduction of the Act; that is, we would
expect a positive sign for the cross-term between dissatisfaction and the
dummy variable 2000–2002 (indicating the period after the introduction of the
Act). Yet we find no such effect.
Individual preferences, however, are not the only determinant of changes
in working hours. Labour demand and institutional constraints also play an
important role in shaping working hours. Earlier, we referred to the demand
side as a major contributor to the growth of part-time employment in the
Netherlands. However, the incidence of part-time employment still varies
strongly among firms. Moreover, as previous research has shown, there are
labour demand constraints on the labour market (Altonji and Paxson, 1992).
As a consequence, it is not always possible for employees freely to change
their number of working hours in accordance with their preferences.
Therefore, changes in the number of hours worked often coincide with job
mobility. In the model, labour demand factors are accounted for through the
inclusion of a set of sector dummies and firm size dummies (see table 6.4). In
addition, dummy variables for change of employer and within-firm mobility
have been introduced. The sector of activity plays no role in female working
hour changes. However, male employees in the sector “education” or “health
care” have a higher probability of reducing their number of hours. This is
probably because these sectors offer a large number of part-time jobs. 
Our analyses confirm that changes in working hours often coincide with
job mobility, be it a change of position with the same employer or a change of
employer. As table 6.2 shows, most employees who do not think they will be
able to adapt their working hours in accordance with their preferences
attribute this to the unwillingness of the employer or the impossibility to 
do so within their current job. Additional analyses have shown that such
constraints indeed affect the probability of adapting the number of hours
worked. Employees who report that their job or their employer do not allow
for changes in working hours are less likely to adapt their working hours 
in accordance to their preferences and are more likely to change their job
(Fouarge and Baaijens, 2003, pp. 82–84).
As explained above, the new Adjustment of Working Hours Act was
introduced with the aim to facilitate working hours changes within the
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Table 6.4 Parameters for the probability of working fewer hours between 
t and t + 2, male and female workers, 1986–2002
Males Females
Individual and household characteristics
Age 0.029 0.032
Age squared (/100) −0.025 −0.037
Educational level (ref: primary school or lower)
Lower secondary 0.031 0.037
Higher secondary 0.091 0.022
Higher education 0.161 0.2581
University 0.202 0.5022
Household type (ref: couple without child)
Couple with child −0.004 −0.023
Divorced/widowed 0.208 −0.3853
Single 0.1761 −0.4163
Birth of a child 0.1821 0.9373
Number of hours worked by partner 0.0063 −0.0053
Job characteristics
Ln(hourly wage) −0.2092 −0.5353
Permanent contract −0.1731 −0.099
Manager −0.062 −0.2043
Heavy work 0.2043 0.046
Dissatisfied with work 0.1351 0.079
Part-time job 0.3163 −0.1792
Overtime work −0.04 0.086
Labour demand factors
Sector (ref: commerce, catering, transport)
Industry or agriculture 0.011 −0.09
Financial business services 0.074 −0.159
Other services 0.138 0.054
Public sector 0.044 −0.007
Education 0.7183 0.063
Healthcare 0.2462 0.102
Firm size: (ref: 100 or more employees)
11–99 employees 0.026 0.1472
1–10 employees 0.025 0.052
Time (ref: 1992–2000)
1986–1992 0.2012 −0.114
2000–2002 0.4053 0.3743
/cont’d
present job. The institutional change is captured in the model through the
inclusion of three dummy variables: one dummy indicating the period
following the introduction of the Act, and two dummies indicating job
mobility (within-firm mobility or change of employer) after the introduction
of the Act (i.e. a cross-term between mobility and the post-Act time dummy
2000–2002). If the downward adjustment of working hours were less
associated with job mobility in the post-Act period, we would expect in our
model estimates a significant negative sign for the cross-term between job
mobility and the post-Act time dummy 2000–2002. However, our model
estimates show no such results. This means that working hours reductions are
no less often associated with job mobility after the introduction of the Act
than they were prior to the Act. Summarizing, both measures we have used as
empirical tests for the effect of the Act turn out to be insignificant.
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Table 6.4   (/cont’d)
Males Females
Job mobility
Change of employer 0.5723 0.8393
Within-firm mobility 0.152 0.3603
Time and job mobility
Change of employer 1986–1992 0.054 −0.16
Change of employer 2000–2002 0.08 −0.092
Within firm mobility 1986–1992 0.2861 0.4042
Within firm mobility 2000–2002 0.296 0.143
Preferences
Prefers fewer hours 0.2882 0.6653
Prefers more hours −0.165 −0.265
Preferences and time
Prefers fewer hours 1986–1992 0.029 −0.14
Prefers fewer hours 2000–2002 0.038 −0.094
Prefers more hours 1986–1992 0.123 0.323
Prefers more hours 2000–2002 0.224 −0.265
Selection (lambda) 
for selection equation, see table 6A.1 in Appendix 6.2 −2.7433 −0.584
Constant term 1.6423 0.562
N= 6 813 3 518
Pseudo-R2 0.123 0.167
Notes: 1 Significant at 10%; 2 significant at 5%; significant at 1%; robust estimator of variance for clustered data.
Source: OSA Labour Supply Panel 1986–2002.
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6.6.2 Increasing labour supply
The results of the model estimates for the probability of increasing the labour
supply are presented in table 6.5. The hourly wage affects the probability of
increasing labour supply positively. This means that employees in high positions,
and therefore earning a high wage, are better able to increase their labour supply.
For male and female employees, having a permanent contract reduces the prob-
ability of increasing labour supply. It must be noted, however, that most male
workers on permanent contracts already work full time, and that, in this case, 
it is almost impossible to increase the number of contractual working hours.
Mothers of young children are less likely to increase their labour supply,
supposedly because of the caring activities involved.
As in the previous model, labour demand factors do affect male labour
supply, but have little effect on female labour supply. Males working in non-
commercial services and in the education sector are more likely to increase their
labour supply. Both males and females are more likely to increase their hours
when working in firms of average size (11–99 employees). 
Again, working hours preferences are found to be a strong determinant of
working time changes: male and female employees with a preference for longer
working weeks are more likely to increase their working hours than employees with-
out such preferences. For males, this association between their preferences and
working time changes has changed after the introduction of the Adjustment of
Working Hours Act: after the introduction of the Act male employees with a pref-
erence for working more hours are less likely to actually change their hours. However,
it is possible that this effect is due to changes in the questionnaire (see section 6.4).
To what extent are increases in the number of hours worked associated with
job mobility? Both male and female employees are more likely to change working
hours when changing employers. In addition, female employees are also more
likely to increase working hours when changing jobs with the same employer.
Thus we can deduce that hours restrictions do play a role, especially for female
employees. Turning to the effect of the Adjustment of Working Hours Act, if the
upward adjustment of working hours were less associated with job mobility in the
post-Act period, we would expect in our model estimates a significant negative
sign for the cross-term between job mobility and the post-Act time dummy
2000–2002. The empirical results are mixed. For female employees we can
conclude that the association between mobility and working hours increases has
not changed after the introduction of the Adjustment of Working Hours Act.
However, for males we find that they are less likely to change job in order to
increase working hours after the year 2000 than they were in the period prior to
the introduction of the Act. Again it is possible that this effect is due to a different
phrasing of the relevant questions (see section 6.4).
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Table 6.5 Parameters for the probability of working more hours between 
t and t + 2, male and female workers, 1986–2002
Males Females
Individual and household characteristics
Age −0.025 0.0712
Age squared (/100) 0.009 −0.1133
Educational level (ref: primary school or lower)
Lower secondary −0.027 −0.068
Higher secondary −0.136 −0.064
Higher education −0.111 0.005
University −0.24 −0.3651
Household type (ref: couple without child)
Couple with child −0.023 −0.3533
Divorced/widowed 0.189 0.158
Single 0.122 0.2261
Birth of a child 0.011 −0.218
Number of hours worked by partner 0.002 −0.003
Job characteristics
Ln(hourly wage) 0.4003 0.3113
Permanent contract −0.3073 −0.3913
Manager −0.12 −0.2253
Heavy work 0.071 −0.047
Dissatisfied with work 0.08 0.1731
Part-time job 1.6013 1.2603
Overtime work 0.045 0.043
Labour demand factors
Sector (ref: commerce, catering, transport)
Industry or agriculture 0.125 0.088
Financial business services −0.047 −0.142
Other services 0.4493 0.135
Public sector 0.006 0.008
Education 0.5273 0.109
Healthcare 0.04 −0.008
Firm size: (ref: 100 or more employees)
11–99 employees 0.174 0.2303
1–10 employees 0.16 0.129
Time (ref: 1992–2000)
1986–1992 0.2992 0.143
2000–2002 1.2423 0.3582
6.7 CONCLUSION
Our main focus in this chapter has been on the adjustment of working hours
to workers’ preferences, which fits well within the concept of “decent working
time” developed by the ILO (Messenger, ed., 2004). We have questioned
whether or not legislation can improve this adjustment process and henceforth
contribute to more decent working times. We have shown that a quarter of
Dutch employees are dissatisfied with the number of hours they currently
work. They would prefer to work either more or fewer hours. However, from
our analyses of the OSA Labour Supply Panel it turns out that, even in the
Dutch part-time economy, only a small portion of employees that would like
to adjust working hours is actually doing so. Between 1986 and 2002, only 
15 to 27 per cent of employees with a desire to work fewer hours, and 22 to 35
per cent of employees with a desire to work more hours, have adjusted their
working hours accordingly two years later. One of the main conclusions of
this chapter is that it is easier to realize an upward adjustment of working
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Job mobility
Change of employer 0.7083 1.0723
Within-firm mobility 0.226 0.8203
Time and job mobility
Change of employer * 1986–1992 -0.3642 -0.2781
Change of employer * 2000–2002 -0.5152 -0.122
Within-firm mobility * 1986–1992 -0.091 -0.006
Within-firm mobility * 2000–2002 -0.343 0.107
Preferences
Prefers fewer hours -0.008 -0.26
Prefers more hours 0.7223 0.6233
Preferences and time
Prefers fewer hours * 1986–1992 0.212 0.06
Prefers fewer hours * 2000–2002 0.104 0.149
Prefers more hours * 1986–1992 0.009 0.044
Prefers more hours * 2000–2002 -0.9422 -0.127
Selection (lambda)
for selection equation, see Table 6A.1 in Appendix 6.2 0.682 1.3672
Constant term -3.1413 -4.3923
N= 6 699 3 472
Pseudo-R2 0.3796 0.263
Notes: 1 Significant at 10%; 2 significant at 5%; 3significant at 1%; robust estimator of variance for clustered data.
Source: OSA Labour Supply Panel 1986–2002.
hours than it is to realize a downward adjustment. We also found large
differences between male and female workers. Male employees show more
stable working hours patterns, whereas women show more flexible patterns. 
Although it is possible to adjust working hours within the same job and
with the same employer, our analyses show that changes in working hours
often coincide with job mobility, be it changes of position with the same
employer or a change of employer. Employees who report that their job or
their employer does not allow for changes in working hours are indeed not
only less likely to adapt their working hours in accordance with their prefer-
ences but also more likely to change jobs. With the introduction of the
Adjustment of Working Hours Act in 2000, Dutch policy-makers were expect-
ing to smooth away such labour demand constraints. We therefore expected
adjustments in working hours to be realized less often by means of job
mobility after its introduction. However, we found no significant effect. In
addition, we did not find the expected result that it should be easier for
employees who are dissatisfied with their working hours to change their hours
after the introduction of the Act.
6.7.1 Policy implications
What lessons can we learn from the Dutch experience to date? First of all we
need to give a word of caution. In our study, the period following the
introduction of the new Adjustment of Working Hours Act is relatively short
(2 years). It is possible that the positive effects of such policy measures will
only materialize in the longer run. For example, it could be the case that this
policy measure allows more female workers to remain in the labour market (be
it on a part-time basis) when they become mothers. It is also possible that the
new legislation will induce a further “normalization” of part-time employ-
ment, and thus lead to more transitions between full-time and part-time jobs
over the life course. However, it is difficult to evaluate such long-term effects
because they can also flow from all sorts of contextual changes that one
cannot control for.
Apart from the official evaluation of the Act by the Dutch Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment (MuConsult, 2003) there is, to our
knowledge, no other evaluation of the effects of this new legislation available
in the Netherlands. The official evaluation is, contrary to ours, positive about
the Act. However, this is primarily based on the potential use of the legal
framework – it is argued that the large number of employees dissatisfied with
their working hours justifies the legal framework – and much less on its actual
effect on generating greater working hours flexibility. With respect to the
German Part-time Work and Fixed-term Contracts Act, an evaluation using
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methods similar to ours also comes to the conclusion that job mobility is a
means of adjustment in working hours, and that the German Act has had no
effect on this relationship (Munz, 2004). Thus the results are in line with our
findings for the Netherlands.
Many employees with a desire to adjust working hours are reluctant to
put forward such requests. Our results show that particularly male employees
think that their employers or their jobs are important obstacles in realizing a
preference for working fewer hours. They seem to fear that their employer will
not approve or to think that it is not possible in their job, although this may
not objectively be the case. Fear of possible negative consequences for their
careers is also likely to play a role. Employees may be justified in fearing such
effects. As a recent Dutch study shows, part-time employees who switch back
to full-time jobs display lower wage rates and lower wage growth even after
some years of full-time employment – although there is a slow recovery for
male workers (Román et al., 2004).
Over the years employers in the Netherlands have realized the advan-
tages of part-time employment as a form of flexible labour and as a way of
increasing labour supply in a situation of shortages in the labour market. After
all, part-time employment makes it possible to combine paid employment
with care activities. From this perspective it is plausible that employers will
grant changes in working hours if requested by employees. Previous research
has indeed shown that although employees are reluctant to request adjustment
of working hours, their attempts are reasonably successful. Nevertheless, both
employer and employee behaviour is likely to be different in the various phases
of the business cycle. When the labour market is tight, an employer will be
more willing to grant an employee’s request for working hours change rather
than see him or her leave the firm for another job with the preferred number
of hours. Under these conditions employers and employees will work out a
solution that benefits both, and thus there is no need for legislation. In an
economic downturn, however, employees can be expected to be reluctant to
address the issue of changes in working hours: on the one hand, there is little
scope for increases in working hours and, on the other hand, requesting a
reduction in working hours would send the wrong signal to one’s employer.
From that perspective as well, whether or not employees have legal back-up
for such a request would not seem to make much of a difference.
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APPENDIX 6.1 PROBIT MODELS FOR THE
DECREASE AND INCREASE IN WORKING HOURS 
Contractual working hours are measured for i = 1, …, N individuals over 
t = 1, …, 9 time periods. Since these time periods are 2 years apart, we can
measure the change in contractual working hours between t and t + 2. We
estimate two probit models: one for the probability that an employee reduces
his or her working hours between 2 years (model A) and the other for the
probability that he or she increases them (model B). The models, estimated
separately for male and female workers, are specified as follows:10 
[y*=βX+δ1M+τ1P+γT+δ2M*T+τ2P*T+v,]
with 
y=1 if y*=HCt+2 – HtC≤ 4, and y= 0 if y*= |HCt+2 – HtC |<4 in model A; 
and 
y=1 if y*=HCt+2 – HtC ≥ 4, and y= 0 if y*= |HCt+2 – HtC |<4 in model B.
In both models, Ht
C represents the number of contractual hours per
week, X is a set of individual, household and job characteristics (such as age,
marital status, household composition, sector of activity, etc.), M indicates
whether job mobility has taken place between t and t + 2, P represents a
preference for working fewer or more hours at time t, and the Ts are time
dummies, one of which indicates the period after the introduction of the
Adjustment of Working Hours Act. In both models, the reference group is
composed of those who did not change their labour supply.
In both models, we use a 4-hour cut-off regarding preferences to change
working hours and changes of working hours. Thus an employee is said to
have a preference for working fewer (more) hours when his or her preferred
number of working hours is at least 4 hours less (more) than his or her
contractual working hours. Likewise, an employee is said to have reduced
(increased) working hours when his or her current working hours are at least
4 hours less (more) than his or her working hours 2 years before. This is not
only done in order to account for small measurement errors, but also because
it is assumed that small adjustments in working hours are easily negotiable
with the employer.
Selective attrition in the panel is likely to bias the coefficients estimated.
In addition, the coefficients will also be biased when the probability of
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10 We have estimated random effects probit panel models. However, as in Böheim and Taylor (2001), the individual
effects turned out to be insignificant. Hence, probit models estimated on the pooled person-year data perform equally
well. Standard errors are corrected to account for the fact that the observations are not independent.
remaining in paid employment is selective. To account for that, we estimated
the following selection equation (see Heckman, 1979) and included a selection
term in our main equation (two-step procedure):
[ zs = (β sXs + u > 0)]
In other words, we only observe y when zs >0. zs >0 if the respondent is
employed in two consecutive years. It is equal to 0 if the respondent has left
either the panel or paid employment between two consecutive years. The
explanatory variables in the selection equation (Xs) include age, household
status, time dummies and, in order to identify the model, a dummy variable for
new respondents. The idea is that being a new entrant to the panel influences
the probability of remaining in the panel, but not the probability of changing
working hours.
APPENDIX 6.2 SELECTION EQUATION
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Table 6A.1 Results from the selection equations for the probability of
remaining in paid employment between t and t + 2
Males Females
Age 0.1323 0.0663
Age squared (/100) −0.1933 −0.094
Household type (ref: couple without child)
Couple with child −0.1202 −0.2673
Divorced/widowed −0.2071 0.012
Single −0.052 0.1672
New respondent 0.014 0.013
Time (ref: 1986)
1988 0.024 −0.061
1990 0.1462 0.2313
1992 −0.005 0.068
1994 0.058 0.1742
1996 −0.5633 −0.1902
1998 −0.5863 −0.111
2000 0.2553 0.3963
Constant term −0.7743 −0.318
N 9 467 5 972
Notes: 1 Significant at 10%; 2 significant at 5%; 3 significant at 1%; robust estimator of variance for clustered data.
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7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.1.1 Reduction of working time – a lever for improving decent 
working time?
Can the reduction of working time act as a lever for improving employees’
working, employment and living conditions, while at the same time meeting
companies’ demands in terms of economic performance? It is precisely because
French legislators answered this question in the affirmative – until the second
Aubry law (Aubry II) – that they insisted on intervening in the area of the
organization of working time. Thus, from the 1982 ordinance on reducing the
working week from 40 to 39 hours until Aubry II in 2000, which brought the legal
standard down to 35 hours, the authorities introduced a set of measures
encouraging industrial and professional sectors and/or companies to reduce and
reorganize their employees’ working time (see box 7. 1). The permanent role of
the State regarding a topic that is dealt with elsewhere in Europe via collective
bargaining can be explained by the special attention given to the reduction and
organization of working time in French public employment policies.
Debates on these policies have often been heated, but in fact the issues
have hardly changed over the past 20 years. The only real change concerns the
gradual weakening of the link between the reduction of working time and
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employment, which had been postulated a priori. Thus there was talk of
“sharing employment and income” and then, more recently, of “win-win”
agreements. The latter imply that collective bargaining on working time could
not only lead to satisfactory compromises for all actors involved, but also
contribute to corporate competitiveness and thus, indirectly, to job creation.
During this period, a number of companies were regularly identified as 
having reached agreements which were considered exemplary, in that they
harmoniously link the various dimensions that are at the heart of reducing
working time, namely, employment, work and production organization,
working and living conditions and productive efficiency.
In theory – and many examples provide evidence of this – an approach to
organizing working time that is based on consultations and negotiations can
thus contribute to regulating the employment market, while at the same time
maintaining both corporate competitiveness and the quality of employees’
working, pay and living conditions. In other words, organizing and reducing
working time makes it possible – in certain situations – to reconcile economic
and social aspects or, to use more recent terminology, to fit “decent working
time”1 and “productive working time” into the same mould (Messenger, 
ed., 2004). However, is it still possible to verify – under the conditions of
Aubry II, according to which the reduction of working time becomes a legal
obligation, whatever the particular situation in each company – what action
could be taken at the level of a company in the context of incentive measures?
7.1.2 The Aubry laws – public controversy and corporate 
compromise
This question has greatly structured our thinking throughout the survey, whose
main results are presented here.2 It seemed essential to understand – via longi-
tudinal observation of several firms – the kinds of compromises that are
negotiated when moving from a situation that is well marked out by incentives
to reduce working time to one in which the switch to the 35-hour work-week is
imposed. The hypothesis at the outset was that a concern for competitiveness –
which was that much stronger given that the economic situation had deteriorated
since the implementation of the law – could lead to a deterioration of working
and employment conditions for employees: increased flexibility, intensified
work, stagnating or even lower pay, etc. In other words, to what extent does an
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1 The notion of “decent working time” incorporates several complementary components: health, work–life balance,
gender equality, productive efficiency and employees’ ability to influence their working time.
2 This text expands on research that was carried out for DARES (Ministry of Labour). The final report was submitted
in December 2003: Pilotage du changement, gestion des temps et action collective: Les incidences de la loi Aubry II sur
l’organisation. 
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Box 7.1 The Aubry laws
Following on from the Robien law (11 June 1996), the first Aubry law (13 June 1998),
called Aubry I, introduced a system of incentives for reducing working time and
constituted the first stage before changing the legal length of the working week. This
was set at 35 hours on 1 January 2000 for companies with more than 20 employees
and on 1 January 2002 for the others by the second Aubry law (19 January 2000),
called Aubry II.
More precisely, Aubry I enabled companies to benefit from “financial incentives” if they
reduced working time before 1 January 2000. In order to qualify for this financial aid,
working time of all or some employees had to be reduced by at least 10 per cent; this
gave the employer a right to a reduction of their social security contributions for 
5 years. The obligation to preserve employment for 2 years was the same as in the
Robien law, but the required level of job creation for the proactive component was not
proportional to the reduction of working time (commitment to 6 per cent job creation
or preservation for a 10 per cent reduction of working time). Receipt of financial
incentives was subject to negotiation of a company agreement.
Aubry II set the legal duration of working time at 1,600 hours per annum and thus
introduced – for the first time since 1936 in a general way – an annual standard. This
standard provides for “variable working time” (modulation), namely variations in
weekly working hours in line with economic fluctuations. The term “annualization” is
used when the reference period is a year. With Aubry II, financial incentives were
abolished and replaced by “long-term subsidies”, which merge with reduced
employers’ social security contributions for low- to medium-pay levels. This measure
is no longer subject to the condition of creating or preserving jobs, nor to a fixed mode
of calculating working time, thus enabling companies to exclude from actual working
time certain breaks, training time and public holidays, which were previously included.
Aubry II is also innovative regarding conditions for accessing long-term subsidies.
Access thus depends on negotiating an agreement that is accepted by the majority
at the level of the company or establishment, or on applying an extended sector-level
agreement. This possibility of “direct access” concerns companies with fewer than 50
employees. As was the case with the Robien law and Aubry I, Aubry II confirms the
possibility of negotiating a company or establishment agreement with an employee
who is authorized by a representative trade union, and provides for organizing a
referendum of employees, which is also required when the unions which sign an
agreement do not represent the majority of the employees concerned. There are
specific provisions for companies with 20 or fewer employees.
imposed major reduction of working time run the risk of leading to a
deterioration of certain components of “decent working time”?
Following on from assessments of previous measures on the organization
and reduction of working time, there is a series of recurring questions regarding
the nature and balance of negotiated compromises and, therefore, the conditions
for compatibility – as mentioned earlier – between different kinds of social time.
Therefore, the issues raised here are not really new – they have been widely
discussed over the past 20 years in a context of increasing flexibility and gradual
challenging of the weekly framework for calculating working time. However,
they are sharper now, not only because of the size of the reduction in hours and
the generalized nature of the measure, but also because fierce debates regarding
their appropriateness have resumed. Several firms have recently negotiated a
“rearrangement” of initial compromises (SEB and Bosch, etc.) and the chal-
lenging of the legal standard of a 35-hour week encourages political jousting with
the prospect of possible “relaxation” of the rules. Opponents of the law consider
that it puts French firms in a “disadvantaged position regarding competition” and
also “devalues work”. However, during current debates on the draft law relaxing
the 35-hour week, it is clear that the 35-hour week is a social gain to which the
majority of employees are attached, and many companies are not in a hurry to
negotiate again. Even if one puts to one side the ideological nature of the debates
between those in favour of and those against the Aubry laws, it is difficult for
outside observers to have a clear opinion of what is at stake and the real
implications of the 35-hour week (see box 7.1), because of the controversy they
have stirred up and still arouse.
The difficulty of making a precise assessment of the impact of the law is
related to the size of the reduction in working time: by exacerbating tensions
inherent in any negotiations on this topic, the issue of the 35-hour week has
reminded us how difficult it is to reach compromises that are both satisfactory
and lasting among the various kinds of (economic, organizational and social)
logics concerned, which are difficult to reconcile because they are partially
contradictory. Moreover, what is perhaps new is that the reduction in working
time has been able to contribute gradually to changing the perception that the
actors concerned – companies and employees – have of decent work: the 35-hour
week shows that, besides obvious difficulties of combining economic and social
aspects, the various social dimensions at the basis of traditional employment
relationships are subject to arbitration, which is also sometimes problematic.
Those directly concerned do not always think that the results of such arbitration
are satisfactory, but they can be considered acceptable given resulting advantages
and disadvantages. Thus the contradiction between the feeling of some employees
that their working conditions have deteriorated (flexibility, pay moderation and
intensified work, etc.) and their attachment to the 35-hour week is only apparent.
Decent working time
184
7.1.3 Reduced time and combining the components of 
decent working time
It is now easier to see why it is of interest to consider the components of
working time, their relationship, and the conditions for optimizing them. One
cannot deny the existence of potentially conflicting logics between the various
dimensions of decent work, nor the fact that the intensity of such conflicts
and the arbitration that they lead to vary from country to country – women’s
night work and part-time working are good examples of such logics. Standards
also vary depending on the structure of production, occupational categories
and socio-demographic features of employees. So it is no longer a matter of
knowing whether the components of decent working time are independent of
each other, but rather of examining what combinations are possible and on the
basis of what criteria and particular circumstances they can develop. If, instead
of wondering about their degree of independence, one accepts the hypothesis
that the components can constitute a system, one can then reason in terms 
of possible patterns of decent working time. This has the disadvantage of
distancing one from the normative aim of optimizing the various components,
but it has the advantage of reflecting in a more relevant way real, observed
situations. It also has the merit, among other things, of explaining how
agreements on organizing and reducing working time, which are negotiated in
conditions that are not optimal and increase the demands of production, can
produce compromises that are relatively stable over time.
The results of this survey of four companies should, therefore, be
analysed in the context of the above general problem area (box 7.2). The
general idea was not to pass normative judgement on the impact of the law, 
but to understand how it has been implemented and why the negotiated
agreements appear to be stable, even though the main actors involved – both
management and employees – sometimes have strong reservations about them.
The small number of companies covered by the survey means that it cannot
claim to be representative; however, it is sufficient to validate the hypothesis
referred to above concerning the essentially contingent nature of the com-
promises that have been negotiated regarding the organization and reduction
of working time, as well as the notion of decent working time itself. Three
main components have been chosen for analysing the latter notion: ability of
employees to intervene in the definition of their organization (measured by
the role and procedures of collective bargaining), productive efficiency
(assessed in terms of the nature of organizational compromises and the
development of management methods) and working conditions and work–life
balance (analysed on the basis of employees’ perceptions of the reduction in
working time, which are sometimes contradictory).
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Box 7.2 The method
The survey combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. It draws on
monographs of establishments, based on interviews with actors concerned with the
organization and reduction of working time: management, human resources
directors, trade union representatives, line managers (a category that plays a pivotal
role in work and time management) and employees. A closed-ended questionnaire
concerning key analytical variables was submitted to all employees in each
establishment. The interviews and questionnaires were carried out in two phases (the
first from September to December 2002 and the second from August to November
2003). This made it possible to observe any changes and adjustments made since
the signature of the agreements and their implementation and, thus, to assess short-
and medium-term experimentation.
The sample is made up of four companies,1 which are specialized in the production of
intermediate goods and the production of services with high added value for companies
or individuals. Plastic and Conserve produce respectively components for the car
industry and packaging for preserving agricultural and food products. PF1/PF2 and PM
are three call centres, created by Banque, within the framework of rationalizing working
time in its branches (by outsourcing telephone work). SI provides consultancy services
to companies and sends out its IT experts. The way in which they each organize work
varies greatly. At Conserve and Plastic, there is shift work. In the call centres, there are
overlapping and rotating working hours. For some SI employees, working time and
organization depend on the client for whom they are working. At SI – as in the call
centres – work is carried out at a distance from colleagues and, therefore, requires
coordination with intermediaries (at SI, with the technical assistant or head of project,
and at Banque, with tele-assistants and sales staff in the branches). 
Another feature of our sample is that – apart from the call centres, which are
decentralized services of a banking group – we are dealing with small structures, even
if some of them are controlled by a major company. They experience the traditional
difficulties of small and medium-sized companies, especially regarding their restricted
situation in the sector (dependence on a partner up or downstream and attachment
to the local fabric, etc.), which leaves little room for manoeuvre and exposes them
greatly to competition and economic setbacks. The companies that were analysed 
have existed for varying lengths of time, and their markets and corporate activities are
more or less dynamic: growth for Banque, stability for Plastic, maturity and even 
decline for Conserve. SI’s situation is more complicated because of the highly cyclical
nature of IT services. The staff of each company were also varied: on the one hand,
low-skilled employees and a gendered distribution of positions (Plastic and Conserve)
7.2 IMPERFECT BARGAINING CONDITIONS
Both institutionalized representation of employees’ interests (trade union
freedom) and minimum industrial relations regulation (normative system,
which provides a framework for disputes and their regulation) are important
components of decent work. France has already complied with this twofold
imperative for a long time – at least in legal terms. However, in many areas –
especially as far as small companies are concerned – actual labour relations 
are not in line with the legislation, notably because trade unions are absent.
Relatively recent institutional innovations, e.g. the “mandating” mechanism,3
have definitely contributed to improving regulation. But there is still a big gap
between practice and legal rules: for example, negotiations often become
informal and individual arrangements often take priority over collective
agreements.
Our survey highlights some salient features of the shortcomings that still
have to be overcome in order to achieve a social dialogue that fully involves all
the stakeholders concerned by the 35-hour week. It is true that company-
level bargaining is not traditional in French industrial relations. Until the 1980s,
some observers had noted that when it occurs officially, it is more like a kind of
protest and non-dialogue than real discussion leading to reciprocal compromises
(Morel, 1981). The trend towards decentralized collective bargaining, which
started in the mid-1980s, changed the situation somewhat. The Aubry laws
greatly encouraged social actors to negotiate at the level of companies and
establishments, which revealed difficulties in producing satisfactory forms of
regulation for all the actors concerned. The negotiating conditions in the
establishments covered by our survey are outlined in table 7.1.
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and, on the other, higher-skilled staff in services (SI and Banque). In our sample, women
were present, above all, in banking, but less so in industry, where they occupy the most
insecure jobs. At SI, employees are mainly young men with diplomas (up to
baccalaureate + 5 years of study), mostly at the beginning of their careers, whereas at
Conserve, production staff were older and often at the end of their careers (with many
between 45 and 55 years old).
Note: 1Fictitious names are used when presenting interview data from the four companies.
3 The “mandating” mechanism was rendered legal by Aubry I and makes it possible for an employee who is not a union
member and who is willing to be mandated by a representative trade union (Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT),
Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT), Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens
(CFTC), Confédération Général des Cadres (CGC) or Force Ouvrière (FO), to sign a company agreement with the
employer. Sixty-four per cent of Aubry I agreements were ratified using this type of procedure.
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7.2.1 Negotiations on the employers’ initiative
Our first observation is a traditional one, namely that in all the companies we
studied, employers initiated negotiations, whether at the enterprise or overall
group level; in the latter case implementing their decisions throughout the
companies they own. This situation is not surprising, as it is in line with
predominant practice in France regarding negotiations on working time and
other topics (pay and qualifications, etc.). It can be explained by the fact that
French trade unions do not have a management culture and are rarely equipped
for taking initiatives in the area of organizational reform, and also because
unions are weak or even virtually absent from companies, as was, broadly
speaking, the case in our survey.
When we asked a trade union member who had been the main partner
during the introduction of the 35-hour week in one of the companies in our
sample which union he was a member of, he was unable to answer. Although
one cannot generalize, this anecdote says much about the French paradox
concerning negotiations on the 35-hour week. On the one hand, the State
invited companies to carry out decentralized negotiations, while on the other,
trade unions did not have enough representatives and skills to be able to
initiate them – they were thus sometimes reduced to the simple formality of
accepting choices made by management. It is, therefore, not surprising that in
order to validate new working time standards, three of the four companies
opted for a referendum, rather than an agreement.
7.2.2 Negotiations with numerous constraints 
Another observation is that, in all the cases we analysed, the companies
concerned started negotiations both late and reluctantly, with the feeling that
they were doing so in a situation riddled with numerous constraints, whether
economic (the cost of reducing working time), organizational (the effect on
productivity and work organization) or linked to agreements (combining
rules which had been negotiated or were in the process of being negotiated
at sector level). First, economic constraints: for reasons related to the gen-
eral situation, which was hardly favourable, or to their specific situation (the
development of a new activity), all our companies were on a “knife edge” –
at least according to the people we spoke to. Thus, in all cases, manage-
ment felt that the obligation to switch to the 35-hour week was particularly
dangerous, as they had to deal with a relatively depressed economic situation.
Even though they did not have all the accounting tools they needed in order
to optimize their decision, they worked out new time arrangements on the
basis of economic considerations – they refused to award too big a quota of
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“reduction of working time days”4 (henceforth RWT days) in order to avoid
falling below the break-even point, and introduced a system of variable
working time in order to avoid using such expensive measures as short-time
working, etc.
Organizational constraints – or at least as seen by management – also
influenced decisions. Companies procrastinated regarding collective bar-
gaining on the 35-hour week because they anticipated a series of major
difficulties, such as having to manage employees working on the same site but
with very different statuses, as some were already working according to
measures introduced by the Robien and Aubry I laws (see box 7.1), some were
working 4 days and others 5, some were part-time and others agency workers.
However, other companies were able to turn constraints into opportunities,
such as at Plastic, where the 35-hour week was used to negotiate – or at least
undertake – both reform of working time and reorganization of work with the
aim, among others, of improving quality procedures, developing multiskilling
and reducing the number of levels of management.
Finally, one should not underestimate the role of what was seen by
company-level actors as constraints related to collective agreements, i.e.,
framework directives coming from the parent company or sectoral-level
agreements. From this point of view, the case of the bank that manages three
call centres is particularly interesting. Sectoral-level bargaining had been
marked by many twists and turns, and especially by the challenging of the 
4 January 1999 agreement (Aubry I) by the unions that had not signed it
(CGT, CFDT, FO and CFTC),5 which explains why the company started
negotiations quite late. What is particularly interesting is that there is no
automatic relationship between the sector and the company. It very quickly
becomes clear that in the context of standards which have been negotiated by
sectoral-level employer and employee organizations, local actors put a set of
issues on the bargaining table whose implications go beyond the narrow field
of working time. The first is inseparable from the creation in December 2001
of the first call centre for “diverted incoming calls”.6 Unions were originally
not in favour of this initiative because of the risks that the work might be very
strenuous. The issue of work pace is still at the heart of collective bargaining
on the organization and reduction of working time. Unions object to the
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4 Most agreements provide for a reduction of the number of working days, only some of which can be chosen by
employees. 
5 Confédération Générale du Travail, Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail, Force Ouvrière and
Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens. Only one union (the Syndicat National de la Banque et du Crédit
(SNB-CGC)) signed this agreement.
6 In this case, clients think they are calling their branch, but in fact their call is diverted to a tele-adviser, who is working
in a call centre.
option of a 4-day week; however, the majority of employees who are given the
choice of a 4- or 5-day week opt for it. Negotiations also make it possible to
make decisions about breaks, recording conversations, calculating time and
forms of remuneration. Career development is also on the agenda. The
agreement limits time in call centres to between 18 and 36 months – or up to
4 years, if employees so wish. This compromise hides union questioning about
the job of tele-operator, as to whether it is a real occupation or an “interlude
during a career”.
7.2.3 Negotiating issues: Work rather than employment
The last observation brings us to a third common feature of regulating
working time at company level. Even though it may seem that negotiations
have had little impact on working conditions (attendance time, how time is
calculated, and forms of remuneration), in fact, they – rather than jobs – have
been at the heart of negotiations. One has to remember that the main aim of
the Aubry laws was to stimulate job creation and – unlike in the 1970s – not
to contribute to changing employees’ working and living conditions.
However, in fact, the latter issues were at the centre of discussions.
At Conserve, for example, management said they wanted to increase
flexibility by using a new system of variable working hours, which would not
only avoid using short-time working (work-sharing), but also loosen
constraints imposed by existing rules concerning prior notice required before
changes in work schedules. Employees, however, wanted to have 23 RWT
days. Calculations of the real impact of switching to the 35-hour week (which
notably incorporates breaks) led to a possible reduction of only 9 days. On
this basis, 70 per cent of employees rejected the proposed agreement.
Management then agreed to add an extra day off. In all, increased flexibility
(annualization with individual monitoring of hours worked) led to 10 RWT
days, half of which could be freely chosen by employees. Such transactions
clearly not only involve opposition between management and employees, but
can also lead to disagreement among employees.
Focusing on working conditions – not on employment – also manifests
itself in a concern often expressed by employees, namely their attachment to
relative stability of compromises concerning their working hours. At Plastic,
for example, management used a firm of consultants to propose various
scenarios regarding the switch to the 35-hour week. In the end, they came up
with two proposals: either introducing a system of five alternating shifts or
opting for a number of RWT days. During the referendum, employees chose
the latter proposal. The reason for this is simple: those who work day shifts do
not want to change their work schedules, whereas those who work nights and
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weekends do not want to lose their financial benefits. On this basis, an
agreement was concluded and ratified with a union representative. A reduction
of 30 minutes per day was awarded to administrative staff and 20 minutes to
production staff. The former also have 10 RWT days per annum, while the
latter have 12 days. The involvement of the trade union representative served,
above all, to legalize the process, because he played a very discreet role in the
discussions.7
To conclude on the issue of negotiations, we should note the weak impact
of the adoption of the 35-hour week on the industrial relations dynamic of all
the companies. This is significant, given that one of the parallel objectives of
Aubry I was to render industrial relations more dynamic by making financial
incentives for companies depend on reaching a company-level agreement.
Aubry II did not keep this measure. In any case, the results regarding our
companies are somewhat ambiguous, given that, on the one hand, negotiations
were either of a purely formal nature or mobilized few people and, on the other
hand, both commissions, which were created at Conserve and SI to monitor the
agreements, only play a minor role in the life of these companies. The only
outcome was the signing of an additional clause at SI – at the request of the
CGT representative – aimed at clarifying the situation of executives and
explicitly designating those who are considered to be autonomous, and at
Conserve aimed at fighting absenteeism by reducing RWT days.
In short, despite a legal framework that is quite favourable from an
industrial relations point of view to promoting decent working time, it has 
to be noted that practice has not always been in line with the letter and spirit
of the Aubry laws. This deficit is particularly marked in the case of our
companies, as they started negotiating late. It is, therefore, possible to put
forward the hypothesis that the relative dynamism of negotiations observed in
the wake of the Aubry laws – at both sector and company levels – does not
prejudge the “decent” nature of the negotiated regulations that result.
7.3 FROM RULES TO PRACTICE
Is it possible to reconcile the search for productive efficiency and decent working
time in actual working practice? In order to assess the degree of cohesion between
these notions – and even the gap which can exist between them – in companies
that have signed Aubry II agreements, we have chosen two approaches: first,
analysis of the content of the organizational compromises that were made at the
time of negotiating agreements on the 35-hour week, and then the adjustments
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7 In this company, we recorded the greatest criticisms by employees – especially manual workers – of the effects of the
switch to the 35-hour week on pay. In all the companies, bargaining led, at best, to a pay freeze and, at worst, to lower
pay resulting from less overtime.
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that were rendered necessary after a year of experimenting with these rules; 
and second, analysis of management methods and “management measures”8 that
were implemented in order to regulate the 35-hour week and that also influence
employees’ working conditions.
7.3.1 Compromises and adjustments of standards, negotiated 
in conditions of economic uncertainty
At the beginning of this study, we hypothesized that the procrastination of
companies that did not introduce the 35-hour week before it was legally
imposed – and, therefore, did not apply for financial incentives – can be
explained by the absence of an “associated project for change”, which could
have harmoniously combined the various components of decent working
time: work and production organization, productive efficiency and working
and living conditions. These companies’ concern was rather to benefit
economically in one way or another – in terms of flexibility or productivity –
from a social constraint, if only to limit its costs. We observed this logic in
three of the companies in our sample, which did not have an ex-ante or
concomitant project. The one exception to this rule was Banque, whose
project was to make the reduction of working time coincide with a new
strategy (the agreement came at the same time as – and in support of – the
large-scale introduction of a new service activity). All three companies that did
not link bargaining on the 35-hour week to an economic project have little
market power for various reasons: they are small in mature markets, which are
highly competitive; they are service providers or subcontractors in areas in
which their clients have significant negotiating power; and they are highly
exposed to short-term risks. In short, all three have little control over their
medium- and long-term development policies. Thus they can be compared
with small companies, which experience similar difficulties (Charpentier and
Lepley, 2003, p. 100): “the ability of companies to anticipate the 35-hour week
and draw up a project associated with the reduction of working time is greater
if they are in a phase of growth and/or have significant market power. The
main discriminating variable in this context is not so much company size as
their strategic situation.”
There is no doubt that the search for productive flexibility has become –
in this context and for all four of our companies – a shared regulating ideal. As
a subcontractor in the car industry, Plastic has to manage very unpredictable
flows of corporate activity. Peaks are absorbed in a system that is already
8 In line with the work of Berry (1983) and Pezet (2004), we are interested in social “nanotechnology” and “invisible
technology”, in order to “reveal effects, other than those related to their supposed efficiency and performance”.
organized on the basis of continuous production by using temporary agency
staff. At Conserve, annualized working time replaced the old system 
of variable working hours. This makes it possible to be more in line with flows
of corporate activity by avoiding short-time working in periods of low
production and extending work to Saturdays in periods of high production. At
SI (staff sent out to work in client companies’ offices), employees depend on
clients’ pace of work. Closures imposed by clients and periods in between
contracts constitute expensive slack time. In order to absorb such losses, the
company has placed 50 per cent of RWT days during such slack periods. As far
as Banque is concerned, the search for flexibility operates on the basis of the
two-way link-up between the branch (an increase of 13 per cent in sales and
marketing time freed up) and the call centres, which take on board clients’
calls, using standardized treatment of their requests and longer opening hours.
A year later, the economic situation had deteriorated: 2003 was
disastrous for Conserve because of competition and also because of the heat
wave, which led to a huge drop in vegetable production. Short-time working
and transfers of staff between two sites were organized and employees were
forced to take annual leave and RWT days. Both Plastic and SI suffered a great
deal in 2003 – the former from clients’ increased demands and the latter from
significantly reduced corporate activity in markets for IT services (many
corporate customers reduced their budgets). These difficulties, which were
partly short term, contributed to maintaining or even reinforcing demands in
terms of productivity and, in the case of SI, led to reducing the workforce.
More than ever before – and given this particularly depressed economic
situation – working time seems to have become a major adjustment variable
for adapting the time when people are present to variations in corporate
activity. With the Aubry II agreements, the regulation of RWT days has
gradually been introduced as a tool for optimizing work flows. Thus, at
Conserve, Plastic and SI, such specific days off, which were sometimes freely
chosen by employees during the first year of implementing Aubry II, are
increasingly regulated by management. They are now used to absorb periods
of short-time working, deal with peaks of activity and absorb periods of
inactivity between contracts. With the Aubry II agreements, sources of
flexibility also extend to training periods. At Plastic, for example, a training
programme has been developed to help operators to carry out new functions
in the context of the ongoing reorganization, but the training has been
organized entirely outside working time, because of the requirements of
continuous production. Time in training is paid as additional hours, not as
overtime, so there is little incentive for employees to attend (absenteeism 
is as high as 40 per cent). The 35-hour week led to recruiting ten young
technicians at Conserve, but also, when they arrived, to an abrupt end to
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training for assembly line operators. Finally, it should be noted that more or
less agreed “clandestine” forms of flexibility emerge here and there: thus at
SI, time which overruns working hours is not billed, but leads to informal
arrangements between IT engineers and client companies. It is not rare to
hear some administrative staff or line managers in more traditional industrial
activities (notably at Plastic) talk about agreed, uncounted time, which
overruns allotted working time, in order to finish urgent work. Moreover,
such company practices are part of management measures and methods
which consecrate the search for productive efficiency. 
7.3.2 Managerial logic and management measures as 
sources of tension for employees
Following Pezet (2004, p. 2), we use the term “management measure” “because
it covers the idea of an arrangement and assemblage of techniques and also of
ideals and positions (for example, efficiency and performance), social customs
and power games”. We examine each of the four components of such
arrangements: the degree of subjugation of all types of time to productive time;
forms of control; the measurement of time; and planning functions.
These arrangements seem specific and determined by the nature of the
productive activities involved: thus in traditional industries with continuous or
semi-continuous production (Plastic and Conserve), individual working time
is more subjected to productive time (functioning of machinery), to the
detriment of social time (elimination of idle time and collective breaks). Such
pressure on time is evident at several levels: breaks taken in turn by one-third
of employees at a time and the rule of mutual replacement for shift workers;
time for passing instructions on to the next shift cut by a half for assembly line
mechanics and technicians at Conserve. At Plastic, control by the immediate
hierarchy has been tightened (even including more authoritarian regulation of
breaks for smoking); administrative staff say they are working as much in 
less time and those in charge of work schedules say that coordinating all 
the various kinds of absence (sick leave, annual leave and RWT days, etc.) 
has become more complicated. In both companies, the social climate has
deteriorated: a high rate of absenteeism and an increase in the number of those
declared unfit for work at Conserve; a drop in pay because of the abolition of
overtime, lower productivity and increasing absenteeism at Plastic. All these
factors led the company to introduce a new kind of work organization and
management that promotes employees’ initiative (reduced management
structures and control by results). 
However, the 35-hour week does not seem to have led to the same
tensions in companies where control by results prevails. At SI, controlling
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daily working time does not make sense as the client company’s time
predominates, rather than that of one’s own company. Nevertheless,
monitoring time is of strategic importance, as the notion of “person-days” is
the measurement used for billing the service provided. Monitoring one’s own
time is at the heart of assessing individual performance and employees who
invest a great deal in their career and are mostly fairly indifferent to the 35-
hour week (where necessary, when time is overrun, informal arrangements
with the client prevail). In the call centres, employees monitor themselves at
their work station when they log in.9 Time also structures their direct
relationship with clients, as does the position of each person in the team. Time
and performance measurements are closely linked and subjected to new rules:
monitoring one’s own working time is now guided by national standards
(which are always displayed in the call centre) as the call centres are
interconnected. This makes it possible to regulate calls centrally and adjust the
workload of tele-advisers (it is also possible to divert calls to the other call
centres if there is a problem). However, there is still also more traditional
control via direct supervision; supervisors monitor conversations in real time,
which is used to determine pay, and they are also responsible for daily
management of their team on the basis of each person’s performance in terms
of time (they also train tele-advisers, solve problems between tele-advisers and
clients, and schedule break times). 
Within a year, planning time and workloads became essential functions in
three of the companies in our sample. They have generally been given to line
managers, who are not necessarily well prepared or equipped to carry them out
with ease. Thus, at Banque, planners have become central in the call centres,
where work is organized on the basis of overlapping and rotating working
hours. They plan shifts on the basis of the relationship between the volume of
calls and resources of the call centre. At Plastic, combining freely chosen RWT
days with annual leave and sick leave made management of absences too
complicated. At the same time, the unpredictable nature of orders makes the
task of planning workloads more complicated for line managers, who
complain of increased stress.
Adjustments have been made since (much more restricted choice of
RWT days for employees and training organized outside working time), which
are not unanimously supported. Such adjustments have led to monitoring
tools: in industries with continuous and semi-continuous production,
clocking in is still the rule; however, SI has innovated – it has perfected a
system of “activity reports”, which are used to count the number of hours
9 The internal clock of tele-advisers’ computers makes it possible to record employees’ presence (in terms of both
timing and number of hours) and also the length of calls, the time taken transcribing them, training and breaks, etc.
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worked by engineers out on jobs for clients. The engineers mark the number
of hours they have worked on the report, as well as the type of service
provided: before paying, clients ask for the report of the number of hours
devoted to the particular service – signed by the person in charge – as well as
the bill. Unlike both of the previous cases, at SI, client companies plan time
and deal with tensions, not the line managers. They also make informal
arrangements to resolve disputes when planned time budgets are overrun.
7.3.3 The contingent nature of decent working time practices 
and patterns
On completing this study of company practices, we must emphasize the
extent to which they remain contingent. We have shown how a law (in this
case, Aubry II), which a priori is designed to promote certain aspects of decent
working time, is taken on board in very different ways, and thus leads to
company agreements, management measures and working conditions that may
be more or less “decent” in reality. Even though the companies in our sample
have little market power and are in a fragile state because of the particularly
depressed economic situation, they do not interpret their difficulties in the
same way.
Thus interviews showed that none of the three most fragile companies
identified switching to the 35-hour week as being the direct cause of their
difficulties. However – and this phenomenon had already been identified in
previous surveys – greater economic constraints and the management of the
35-hour week in client companies increase pressure on firms that are suppliers
and subcontractors. This is especially clear at Plastic, which observed a
strategy of increasing some in-house activities and relocating others (which
management attributed to the 35-hour week). Pressure is clearly of a very
different kind in a company like Banque, which is also indirectly experiencing
the consequences of the 35-hour week in the changing behaviour of its clients,
who are themselves mainly employees and now have more free time. This can
even lead to increasing margins for organizational manoeuvre given that
clients can now adapt more easily. 
Nor do the same causes produce the same effects. Thus the negative
impact of the particular ways in which the 35-hour week was implemented,
which has been identified here and there (reduced motivation, increased
absenteeism and work accidents, increased proportion of products which do
not comply with standards, etc.), as well as reduced performance in relation
to competition, led one of our companies (Plastic) to adopt a plan for a
proactive reorganization; this strategy was aimed at reducing the number 
of hierarchical levels and giving operators more autonomy, as well as 
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training and incentives in order to be more productive (the introduction of
partly variable pay linked to team and quality performance). Thus the 
35-hour week imposed “with constraints” has, in this case, resulted in
organizational learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978), which encouraged the
company to make the most of it and explore the possibility of more
ambitious organizational changes.
Finally, an analysis of company practices makes it possible to identify
more or less optimal patterns of decent working time. Thus in services,
management measures that combine time management, performance manage-
ment and career development management seem to be a source of satisfaction
for employees; in contrast, in traditional industries with continuous or semi-
continuous production, where the margins for manoeuvre are the smallest,
combinations of time management, tightened control and the lack of career
development prospects are sources of tension. It was on the basis of this
implicit observation – and in order to escape this negative spiral – that Plastic
decided to embark upon a reorganization that makes it possible to incorporate
time optimization within a management system that is more favourable to
developing employees’ skills, encouraging them to take on responsibility, and
promoting team performance. However, employees’ subjective preferences
regarding working time are difficult to interpret, and understanding them
requires an appropriate survey methodology and an analysis of the results,
which we now present.
7.4 SUBJECTIVE WORKING TIME PREFERENCES: 
A COMPLEX INTERPRETATION
Face-to-face interviews and questionnaires made it possible to collect the
opinions of employees in all four companies. This was done in two phases –
the first after the signing of the agreements and the second a year later, thus
making it possible to observe any changes made to the agreements, as well as
medium-term effects. Without claiming to be representative, the survey
involved more than 200 people in service companies in urban areas and
industrial companies in rural areas. It therefore provides a relatively diversified
and significant picture of the effects of Aubry II on working time (box 7.3).
An initial observation can be made: the perception of working time depends
greatly on the organization of production, strategic choices and the contents
of the negotiated agreement – therefore each company is a specific case.
Nevertheless, the study suggests a more common reflection about the
perception employees have of the factors of decent working time, on the one
hand, and on the other, of some of the compromises that the reduction of
working time can imply. 
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Box 7.3 Structure of the sample and variables of decent 
working time
Analysis of results focuses on the second phase of the survey, for which there were
responses from 213 employees in four companies (six establishments). In order to
analyse the answers statistically, weighting was used, which makes it possible to find
in each company distributions by gender, age and qualifications that are similar to
those of the populations of the different establishments and which also gives equal
importance to each company. The population of the weighted sample was 54 per
cent male, which is very close to the proportion of men in the economically active
population in France. However, the weighted sample somewhat overrepresents the
extremes concerning the situation observed in the economically active population,
whether in terms of age:
Percentage
Under 29 years 35
30–49 years 43
50 years and above 22
or in terms of socio-occupational categories:
Manual workers 39
Clerical workers 23
Technicians and supervisors 10
Executives 28
Variables of employees’ perception of time:
• impression of doing the same work in less time (since the agreement on the
reduction of working time);
• adapting the workload to the reduction of working time;
• recuperating from fatigue;
• freedom to take breaks;
• free choice of using RWT days;
• degree of control of working time by line managers;
• possibility of having prior knowledge of one’s work schedules;
• commuting time.
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7.4.1 Perceptions of working time in the four companies: 
A situational perspective
The interviews carried out in each company make it possible to identify four
types of employee perceptions regarding working time.
1. Unchanged time. At Plastic – where the agreement reduced daily working
time by 20 minutes – operators did not notice any real change. During the
first phase of interviews, time pressure was hardly discernible, whereas 
a year later, it was referred to by line managers, who have to deal directly
with clients’ demands, but operators do not seem to suffer from this
pressure. Even though the latter have to work on several machines, instead
of only one, they say that the 35-hour week has hardly changed their daily
work. Demotivation is a good way to describe manual workers’ reactions,
resulting from a pay freeze and uncertain career development prospects.
“Unchanged time” thus also reflects the effects of inertia: demotivation
and a lack of career prospects have led to manual workers’ reluctance to
become involved in the new organizational and training system proposed
by management.
2. Compressed time. At Conserve, where daily working time has not
changed, perceptions of time have crystallized around tensions created
by replacing absent staff. Moving from one work station to another (an
operator can, for example, monitor flows and intervene on two lines at a
time) increases the fatigue of this firm’s employees, whose average age is
high. This phenomenon is greater because breaks are now staggered. As
breaks are now taken in small groups, they no longer allow recuperation
or chatting with colleagues, and are even sources of new forms of
tension. “Compressed time” involves keeping an eye on one’s watch, in
order not to miss out on breaks, and has also increased the pace of work.
Employees do not put this process down to the reduction of working
time, but rather to new production demands and a chronic lack of staff.
Their feelings of discontent are related to the fact that the number of
RWT days is not sufficient compensation for the imposed increases in
productivity (multiskilling and staggered breaks).
3. Incompressible time. At SI, the effect of reducing working time is perceived
in yet another way. The bone of contention also concerns the small number
of RWT days (8 in all); however, the feeling of injustice is even greater, as
it is impossible for engineers effectively to reduce their working time. There
are two reasons for this “incompressible time”: the prevalent in-house logic
(small structure, climate of confidence, possibility of making arrangements
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with management, etc.), which means time is not calculated, and the desire
of “colleagues” to show their personal investment in the company, by
claiming not to know how many hours they really work. Thus the
availability of SI’s employees comes up against problems related to the
availability of employees in some of the client companies, whose RWT 
days can be almost three times as many as those in force at SI.
4. Freely chosen time. In the call centres, the latitude that the majority of
employees have for fixing their working week (4 or 5 days) and, above all,
when they work (work is organized by relays of shifts throughout the
day and on a rotating basis during a 6-day week) explains employees’
relative satisfaction. However, “freely chosen time” should not mislead;
worries crystallize elsewhere, for example concerning the lack of recruit-
ment in a situation of increased workload, and the intensified work that
could result. The latter is far from being perceived in an equally acute way
by all employees. Those staff who come from the back office dread 
the pressure of time, whereas those who come from the front office
recognize that they are under less pressure than when working in the
branch itself – where clients are physically present, files pile up, and it is
impossible to “divert” work elsewhere.
7.4.2 Aspects of decent working time
Besides this initial observation of the contingent nature of perceptions of time,
is it possible to take the first steps towards a more general representation of
decent working time? In order to answer this question, we put a direct
question to each employee in our sample, namely, has the implementation of
the agreements led to intensified work? The aim was not so much to obtain 
an objective measure of work intensification as to identify precisely how the
situation is felt by employees. The hypothesis that we are testing is that the
perception of work intensity is not formally the result of the impression of
doing the same work in less time, but rather the result of a set of variables
which confer greater or lesser “density” on working time. These variables
constitute decisive parameters of decent working time.
Only one-third of those involved in the survey have the impression of
doing the same work in less time since the implementation of the agreement
(i.e., a year later). And, above all, when it does exist, this perception is
generally not directly linked to the reduction of working time: 40 per cent of
employees who say they are doing the same work in less time attribute this to
the reduction of working time; therefore, in all, only 13 per cent think that the
reduction in working time has led to work intensification. As we have already
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seen, this is very clearly the case of employees at Conserve, who suffer greatly
from the pressure of the pace of work, but clearly link it to production
demands and lack of staff. This result also reflects the limits of the effective-
ness of reducing working time, as already emphasized in SI’s case.
Given the difficulty of identifying work intensification, our approach
sought to differentiate between what we called the heart of intensity (the
impression of doing the same amount of work in less time) and how it is 
felt by employees. It is both the convergence and compatibility of a set of
constraints that indicate an increase in the strenuous nature of work: only
one-third of the population studied considers that the planning of the
workload has been adapted well to the reduction of working time, and 40 per
cent think that the latter makes it possible to recuperate better from work
fatigue (the proportion is the same in both phases of the survey).
Assessments vary significantly between the different companies and thus
diverge between employees at Plastic – where the reorganization that was
embarked upon has not been completed (only 11 per cent of employees consider
that the workload has been adapted well and 13 per cent say that they manage to
recuperate from fatigue) – and those at Banque, where new activity has been
planned precisely (the proportions are 57 per cent and 71 per cent respectively).
Differing statuses partly explain the differing perceptions: manual workers were
significantly more negative about both of these questions than clerical workers. 
Commuting time between home and work also plays an important role –
only 12 per cent of employees who live less than half an hour away from work
say that planning is poorly adapted to the reduction of working time; 20 per
cent of those who live between half an hour and an hour away say so; and 40
per cent of those who live over an hour away hold this opinion. Likewise, 88
per cent of those who live near their workplace think that the reduction in
working time makes it possible to recuperate from work-related fatigue. The
proportion drops as commuting time increases – only 40 per cent of those
with more than an hour’s commuting time are of the same opinion.
When seeking to summarize these perceptions, two central themes seem
to play a structuring role. The first concerns the possibilities of recuperating
from work-related fatigue by reducing working time. On the one hand, there
are those who say they are able to recuperate more easily and for whom
planning of the workload has often been adapted well to the reduction of
working time (this is the case of the call centre employees). On the other
hand, there are those who do not feel that they can recuperate better following
the reduction of working time and who say that the latter has led to sacrificing
breaks (typically employees at Conserve). The situation seems better for staff
in both of the service companies in urban settings than for manual workers in
industrial plants in the countryside.
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The second theme concerns the degree of freedom and control of time.
It contrasts those who can choose their RWT days freely and say they are not
subjected to control of their working hours with those who feel an increased
lack of control and difficulties in having prior notice of when they must work
and who also cannot freely choose their RWT days. Such differences are again
affected by the status of the respondents. For example, executives at SI have
autonomy in their work. Paradoxically, in both of the companies in which
negotiations on the reduction of working time were also used as an
opportunity for reorganizing work, the feeling of time constraints is strongest
(i.e., at Banque, where the agreement created the possibility of developing call
centres, and at Plastic, which sought to reorganize work).
Thus the judgements that employees make about their working time do not
just depend on the amount of time worked, but on a set of variables that consti-
tute the perceived bases of decent working time in this case, namely: the freedom
of having proper breaks and discussing matters with colleagues; the forms and
degrees of control of working time; the ways in which the workload is adapted;
the ability to recuperate from fatigue; and prior information about programming
of working hours. These are all interrelated factors that determine employees’ 
ability to take action within the time framework fixed by the agreements. 
7.4.3 The conditions of decent working time
Employees’ perceptions of decent working time can be broadened out to that
of compromises, of which negotiations on working time are a part. Such
perceptions probably play a role in the actual development of such com-
promises. Our introductory comments show that the latter have significantly
changed over time: from seeking win-win agreements, based on a harmonious
relationship between corporate performance, employment and employees’
well-being, to more bitter and unstable compromises in which freed-up time 
is increasingly subject to productive constraints, if it is not quite simply
jeopardized. Our study, which is set in a twofold context – on the one hand, an
unfavourable economic situation and, on the other, political delegitimization of
the Aubry laws – highlights certain key factors of imbalance in the terms of this
exchange and, at the same time, poses some possible conditions for imple-
menting decent working time.
7.4.4 Decent working time and decent pay
Responses to the questionnaire highlight a clear judgement: three-quarters of
the employees in our sample put life outside work at the top of the list of
improvements resulting from the reduction of working time. This point is
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fundamental, because it explains that, in spite of deteriorating working
conditions referred to above, the reduction of working time continues to be
acclaimed by the great majority of employees. Nevertheless, one factor tempers
this significant result – shorter working time has led to a drop in income for a
quarter of those surveyed. At Plastic, as many as half of the employees have lost
out financially. In all the sites, one-third of all women employees estimate that
their pay has dropped compared with only one-sixth of men. One-third of
manual workers and technicians say the same thing, compared with one-sixth
of executives and clerical workers. Those categories of employees who consider
that they have lost out financially more than others are also those who are the
least inclined to say that their quality of life has improved: 61 per cent of
women – compared with 81 per cent of men – put life outside work at the top
of improvements resulting from the reduction of working time.10 In a similar
manner, employees in the service sector who live more than an hour away from
their workplace are also less likely (64 per cent) than those with shorter
commuting times to put life outside work at the top of the list of improve-
ments. In other words, insufficient pay, on the one hand, and commuting time,
on the other, are both elements that temper improvements in life outside work.
Manual workers at Plastic, who have even calculated exactly how much they
have lost financially because of the loss of overtime (between 20 per cent and
30 per cent of previous pay), describe their situation clearly – free time without
financial means is hardly attractive. As they mainly do home building and 
repair work, free time “without money” is synonymous with lost time. It
should be said that this point of view is not that of the majority, but it 
identifies definite limits to compromises concerning working time, especially
for manual workers.
7.4.5 Decent working time and staff cohesion
The second factor of imbalance is related to certain tensions among the staff.
This is clear in the case of Conserve, where employees’ disappointment with
the reduction of working time was increased by a feeling of inequality. During
the referendum on the establishment’s agreement, solidarity that developed
during the strike did not continue: “at the beginning, we fought for the 
same thing” and “some got more compensation (13 RWT days, financial
compensation and additional recruitment for mechanics), but we, ‘minor
10 Studies by DARES also show that life outside work is the item that is most acclaimed by employees when they are
asked to put the positive effects of the reduction of working time in order of preference. However, these studies
conclude that women are generally more satisfied than men. This result differs from ours because of the structure of
our population, which includes few women executives, whereas DARES’s surveys show that executives in general, and
women executives in particular, are those who gained the most, in terms of declared satisfaction, from switching to the
35-hour week.
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figures’, got less (operators only have 10 RWT days)”. As a result of Aubry II,
supervisors at Conserve were promoted to executive grade. Another symp-
tomatic case is the differing situations of production, administrative and
temporary agency workers at Plastic. The first group benefited from a greater
range of tasks; the second was subjected to a cut in income; and the third was
quite simply left out of the agreement. At Plastic and SI, another division
emerged – between those employees who are in direct contact with clients and
suppliers and the rest of the staff. The former – production quality control
staff, sales and marketing staff and those who are sent out to work for other
companies – mention more often than the latter increased difficulties in being
able to work efficiently because of an increased lack of synchronization
between their working hours and those of their external contacts.
7.4.6 Decent working time and stable rules
Perceptible tensions concerning the 35-hour week are greater today, as the
reduction of working time can be negotiated with infinitely variable
compromises. In small companies that have introduced a reduction of weekly
working time, the switch to the 35-hour week has been relatively neutral in
terms of its effects, provided they have been able to quickly stabilize their new
way of operating and impose rules that have been negotiated – sometimes with
difficulty – but have become accepted benchmarks. This has not been the case
as far as the four companies analysed. They have been subjected much more
than others to the whims of the market and competitive pressures and have,
therefore, not been able to reach such a balanced state of affairs. The inter-
views and results of the questionnaires show this very clearly. Employees say
they don’t appreciate situations where a social advantage (the 35-hour week)
– which they did not necessarily seek out, but to which most are now strongly
attached – is offset by management-related factors, over which they have no
control and which can also change over time. This could explain the preference
– which a priori might appear to be a paradoxical one – that some of them have
for a real reduction of weekly hours rather than RWT days, over which they
feel they have less and less control.
7.5 CONCLUSION
The results of our survey emphasize a surprising feature of the laws on the 
35-hour week. A major reduction of working time was not desired by
companies because of the constraints involved, nor did it correspond with a
strong aspiration among employees, who saw it also as a threat regarding pay,
intensified work and worsened working conditions. However, the current
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proposed legislation aimed at relaxing the Aubry laws has led to hostile
reactions from employees and has been less than enthusiastically welcomed by
employers. This situation leads us to draw three main conclusions.
First, it confirms that the introduction of agreements on the
organization and reduction of working time involves prior collective
bargaining, which, by definition, can at best lead to a satisfactory compromise
for all actors concerned. And even when the compromise is contested by
management or employees, it is most often only marginally changed. But a
return to the previous situation is rarely desired, because of the cost – in both
financial and human terms – of the changes that would be involved. The
equilibrium made possible by negotiations is thus, most often, preferable to a
head-on challenge of the initial compromise.
Second, and following on from the first remark, changes introduced as a
result of a new way of organizing time concern many aspects of the notion of
“decent working time”, some of which are improved (such as increased free
time for employees) while others may deteriorate (such as intensified work
and a relative worsening of pay conditions). Therefore an overall assessment
of the agreements cannot be reduced, as was traditionally the case, to an
appraisal of observed advantages and disadvantages for the different categories
of actors involved. It is also the result of individual perceptions, which
themselves are compromises created by each person depending on their
personal characteristics and on changes made to the various components of
working time. One thus realizes with Aubry II that previous assessments of
measures concerning the organization and reduction of working time
implicitly contrasted the employees’ point of view with that of the company,
as represented by its management and executives. However, today there is a
new situation, because executives themselves are concerned by the reduction
of working time. This makes it easier to understand why it is so difficult to
make a normative judgement of the impact of the Aubry laws, because the
latter have meant that the actors concerned – executives, manual workers and
clerical workers – have had to choose between pressures that are sometimes of
a contradictory nature (e.g., free time, constraints of corporate activity, and
intensified work). As such choice is also related to individual constructions,
combining the working, family and social spheres for each person, it becomes
clear that employees prefer the status quo and have a pronounced loathing for
change and uncertainty. In this context, one can see that challenges to the 
35-hour week run the risk of being seen as coming only from employers, and
not including those – of whom there are many both in big and small
companies, as our own surveys showed – who prefer the current compromise
to an improbable renegotiation of the organization of working time. This is
perhaps also the opportunity for us to point out that the idea of the stability
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of the patterns that have been produced by negotiated compromises can also
be an aspect of the notion of “decent working time”.
Third, and more generally, new patterns of the organization of working
time that have resulted from negotiations on the 35-hour week also reflect a
fundamental change in individuals’ perceptions of what “decent working time”
would mean for them, because this notion is, as we have seen, an essentially
subjective and contingent one, and is deeply affected by the mental images that
structure employees’ perceptions. It should be emphasized that even if the
principle of annualization of working time, which was consecrated by the
Aubry laws, remains a controversial issue for unions, it is nevertheless some-
thing that exists and that individuals at work are gradually learning to come to
terms with. Exchanging free time for flexibility is now too long-standing and
commonplace to lead to the same kind of opposition as at the beginning of the
1980s, when the first measures breaking with the principles introduced by 
the 1936 laws were introduced. The stacks of legal derogations which have
been introduced since the 1982 ordinance on the 39-hour week find a kind of
logical outcome in the Aubry laws: collective working hours (i.e. the same for
everyone), assessed on a weekly basis, have now been replaced by other criteria
that are based on an annual standard and are, above all, increasingly varied.
Initial texts contributed to developing flexibility by emphasizing the
differences between the situation of stable employees and that of those with
insecure jobs. It would seem that the new segmentations, which are reinforced
by the introduction of the 35-hour week, now affect even core employees,
depending on the economic situation of their companies and also on the
different categories of employees within the same company – i.e., executives
and non-executives, manual workers and clerical workers, and also according
to age and personal situation, etc. Without always saying so explicitly, those
who defend the Aubry laws seek to limit this trend, which these laws have
nevertheless accentuated, towards even more individualized management of
work relationships and a more contractual and bilateral approach to
employment relationships.
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8.1 INTRODUCTION
Achieving “decent working time” requires that employees have at least some
discretion, if not control, over the duration of their work-hours, in order to
close or eliminate gaps between their actual and preferred working hours. If
hours worked are longer than those preferred by a worker, other aspects of
decent working time may be undermined as well – if the additional hours lead
to health risks associated with overwork, diminished per hour productivity,
greater time conflict with executing family responsibilities and such
imbalances fall relatively more heavily on one gender. In the United States,
there is only a smattering of information concerning how many, which and by
how much workers may be employed beyond their preferred number of work-
hours. By their nature, hours preferences are not directly observable, precise
or stable, and may be influenced by constraints, either real or perceived.
Nevertheless, constraints in a given job or workplace or restrictions on
individuals’ choice of hours of work are widely acknowledged as a central
feature of the labour market in many conventional economic studies of labour
supply (e.g., Idson and Robbins, 1991; Dunn, 1996; Kaufman, 1999; Euwals
and van Soest, 1999; Feather and Shaw, 2000; Altonji and Oldham, 2003;
Böheim and Taylor, 2004; Hart, 2004). This chapter focuses on the state of
“overemployment”, defined as workers’ inability to obtain reduced hours
despite a willingness to proportionately sacrifice income. 
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The May 2001 Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) is the
main data source because it queried United States households directly, for the first
time since 1985, regarding a hypothetical choice between more income with more
hours, fewer hours for less income or the same hours and income. Section 8.2 
of this chapter generates estimates of the “rate of overemployment” in the United
States workforce, which can be contrasted to previous estimates using identical
instruments (Shank, 1986), different instruments or samples (e.g., Bell and
Freeman, 1995; Kahn and Lang, 1995; Bond, 2003; Merola and Clarkberg, 2003;
Reynolds, 2004), as well as to the volume or rate of overemployment observed
in comparable countries (Fagan, 2001; Bielenski et al., 2002; Sousa-Poza and
Henneberger, 2002; Tijdens, 2002; Merz, 2002; Stier and Lewin-Epstein, 2003;
Böheim and Taylor, 2003). Consistent, accurate estimates of the level of over-
employment have proven elusive, largely because they are highly sensitive to
question wording and the range of options presented in surveys. Section 8.3
explores the potential theoretical reasons underlying observed changes in the rate
of overemployment, including a dynamic process of endogenous preference
formation. Section 8.4 – the crux of the chapter – uses the CPS data to establish
empirically the determinants of overemployment according to workers’ personal
and job characteristics. The extent and actual concentrated locations of
overemployment in the United States labour market should be used by policy-
makers as a guide to better target legislative and regulatory reforms that would
promote more decent working time. By facilitating more reduced-hours options
for workers, this would indirectly help promote the decent working time
attributes of healthier work, more family-friendly working conditions, greater
equality between the genders and all those employed. Overemployment, no
matter how common, represents a key, often neglected, threat to decent working
time arrangements, especially those directly affected, but also those indirectly
burdened, such as the underemployed. 
8.2 MEASURING OVEREMPLOYMENT
Overemployment is considered herein to exist when there are workers
employed who are willing but unable to reduce their hours of paid work at their
current (or comparable) job if they are prepared to accept (proportionately)
lower current or future income. Estimates of the volume or rate of
overemployment vary considerably, in the United States as elsewhere.
Estimates depend heavily on the type of sample, instrument, wording and
context of the question from which it can be derived. Table 8.1 summarizes the
various available estimates from a wide range of relevant studies, both in the
United States and elsewhere, considering the technical aspects of the survey
attempting to measure hours preferences and the existence (or size) of a
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discrepancy with actual hours. The overemployment rate represents the volume
of overemployment as a ratio of those employed or a measure of overutilization
of labour resources (which is not strictly comparable with the rate of volume
of underemployment, see Simic, 2002; Pierce, 2003). The relevant survey
questions are those querying the employed regarding who is willing but unable
to reduce hours (at either their current or in another comparable job) in
exchange for lower income. The rates of overemployment are higher in most
EU states than in the United States (OECD, 2004). However, there is
considerable variation between EU Member States.2
The Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) and General Social Survey
(GSS) yield estimates ranging from 6 to 10 per cent (Bell and Freeman, 1995;
Kahn and Lang, 1995; Reynolds, 2003) in the United States. Other surveys find
much higher proportions. Even plausible estimates vary in large part because
the question posed regarding the willingness to trade income for time varies so
much. First, it is generally the case that if the set of survey questions includes
an alternative option of obtaining higher income, especially when the survey
adds that this would involve more hours of work, the proportions of respon-
dents indicating a preference for fewer hours are typically lower. When
presented simultaneously with the alluring “more money” option, choosing
fewer hours may lose its relative appeal, even if such hours are not available at
their current job.3 In contrast, if workers are presented only with various hours
and pay reduction options, proportions indicating overemployment are higher.
For example, among those wage and salary workers on a fixed hour schedule
(not free to choose when or how long they work), over 50 per cent were willing
to work fewer hours for proportionately lower income in order to have more
free time (Feather and Shaw, 2000). A recent survey found that as much as 
27 per cent of unionized and 39 per cent of non-union employees were willing
to reduce their incomes (progressively, by either 10 per cent, 20 per cent, etc.)
in order to get proportionately shorter weekly hours (Friedman and Casner-
Lotto, 2003). Another survey revealed that over 28 per cent of respondents
would give up a day’s pay for one fewer days of work per week (Galinsky 
and Bond, 1998). Another 1998 survey found that 17 per cent would accept a
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2 By way of contrast, in the United Kingdom, almost 11 per cent of the employed indicate overemployment (Simic,
2002), although estimates range as high as 34 per cent (Fagan, 2001). The overemployment hours gap among male
industrial workers is 4.3 hours (Stewart and Swaffield, 1997). For reasons including a higher level of income inequality,
the ratio of those preferring more hours to those preferring fewer is higher in the United States, see Bell and Freeman
(1995) and Osberg (2002).
3 There are exceptions. The Heldrich Center Work Trends survey found that 30 per cent in 1999 (up from 28 per cent
in 1998) prefer fewer hours (for less income), given the choice, about twice as many who prefer more hours. A Roper-
ASW (a market research firm’s) poll consistently finds somewhat stronger general preference for money over time,
but a sizeable proportion valuing more time. In 2003, 34 per cent of North Americans “would prefer more time to more
money” (only slightly lower than the 40 per cent observed globally and about the same as the 35 per cent found in 2001
and 37 per cent found in 2000). 
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20 per cent pay cut to get a 4-day work-week while over 50 per cent would
accept a 10 per cent cut in their pay to get it (Schor, 2001). Estimates are higher
when there is greater precision in the trade-off offered, such as “one day off per
week,” “4-day work-week” or “more time to spend with family members” or
“more free time” (Schor, 1995).
Another factor that will suppress the rate of overemployment is that it will
vary inversely with the extent to which respondents inherently believe they are
unable in practice to change their own hours to their truly preferred hours.
Workers may perceive that hours reduction is infeasible or penalized (no quality
part-time or shorter standard work-week options) or not permissible (e.g.,
mandatory overtime). Third, respondent openness to hours reduction is typically
greatest when surveys do not explicitly state any direct trade-off of lower income.
For example, in the National Study of the Changing Work Force (NSCW), over
60 per cent of workers’ “actual” exceeded their “ideal” work-week, rising from
about 5 hours in 1992 to 11 hours in 1997 (Jacobs and Gerson, 2001; Galinsky
and Bond, 1998). Estimates of the proportion overemployed also tend to be
greater if individuals are also asked to specify how many hours they would have
preferred to have worked in a given week, rather than just indicating fewer (or
more) hours. But questions with hours preferences are challenging, not only
because they are trickier to measure than actual working hours (Tijdens, 2002),
but because it is often left unclear whether and how workers would get their
“preferred” number of hours and whether they implicitly assume they would get
a more (or less) than proportional reduction in compensation, such as access to
employee benefit coverage or premium pay. For obvious reasons, more workers
prefer fewer hours for no less pay than for less pay. In the United Kingdom,
among the 12 million employed indicating a desire for fewer hours, about 3
million would accept less pay (Simic, 2002). Fourth, surveys tend to query only
those employed, whereas it is conceivable that many of those who have been
recently overemployed may be between jobs, via either lay-off or a voluntary quit,
or outside the labour force. On the other hand, some analysts are sceptical
whether workers’ stated preferences would become revealed preferences. Fifth,
fewer hours may not be desired if a worker anticipates a period of under-
employment or unemployment in the future. Workers employed in cyclically
sensitive, downsizing industries or insecure jobs may “prefer” longer hours as a
hedge against anticipated future reduction of income or an “insurance” against
future lay-off (Roche, 1987; Bell and Freeman, 1995; Bluestone and Rose, 1998). 
Finally, willingness to sacrifice income for more time might be an issue of
magnitude. Preferences are not necessarily linear with respect to the size of the
hypothetical changes. More workers might prefer to spend “a bit less time”
than “much less time” at work, and these combined are far greater proportions
than indicated by the more general “work less” option (Bell and Freeman, 1995;
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Schor, 1995). Moreover, because survey questions do not address the intensity
of work, respondents may well be interpreting the “work less” question as
implying not only less pay, but also greater work effort or pace. In sum, survey
estimates of overemployment may be biased downward if a survey provokes
certain implicit assumptions about the current income foregone, and the
amount and dimensions of hours reduced and type of gains realized in time off.
8.3 REFINING THE CONCEPT OF OVEREMPLOYMENT
The conventional economic model of labour supply aptly identifies the initial
sources of overemployment. However, the factors that increase individuals’
desired labour supply are typically relegated to the status of “exogenous
changes” in preferences or constraints. This is unfortunate, not only because
these “shifters” are crucial to understanding recent trends in preferred work-
hours and overemployment, but also because some of the “shifters” may
become endogenous with actual hours. A richer way to conceive of over-
employment would be as a dynamic process. This would explain why
overemployment may either persist or dissipate over time despite its various
spillover costs, and it would differentiate the microeconomic and macro-
economic sources of overemployment.4
8.3.1 Overemployment at the microeconomic level
In the conventional microeconomic model of labour–leisure choice, it is
assumed that workers form their desired number of work-hours and are
assumed to adjust their hours of labour supply until the unique point where
their relative preference for an hour of leisure vis-à-vis work exactly equals
their market wage rate. Workers may face constraints, often binding, imposed
by their employer, such as fixed shift lengths and minimum hours
requirements for a job, resulting in overemployment. However, in the
conventional model, it is assumed that in the long run, workers and firms sort
themselves to match desired and required hours of work. If hours demanded
exceeds hours desired, employers will not be able to retain labour, losing
workers to other firms that offer shorter work hours in accordance with their
preferences, or to non-labour force participation. That said, a “synthesis” view
in the literature recognizes that hours mismatches can persist indefinitely,
where optimizing employers regularly require longer hours than employees
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4 Overemployment may be more likely among employees who face pressure from their employer or supervisor to work
overtime hours. This comprises from 16 to 28 per cent of the full-time employed (Ehrenberg and Schumann, 1984;
Idson and Robbins, 1991; Cornell University Institute for Labour Studies, 1999; Golden and Wiens-Tuers, 2005), a level
not inconsistent with those found elsewhere, such as in Australia (Campbell, 2002). 
might prefer (Kahn and Lang, 1995; Rubin and Richardson, 1997; Contensou
and Vranceanu, 2000; Maume and Bellas, 2001; Campbell, 2002). The labour
market does not truly offer “diverse durations” of shift lengths; instead, it has
a tendency to underprovide short-hour jobs (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995). The
distribution of hours within firms may reflect workers’ personal character-
istics and preferences within firms, but there is no tendency for workers to be
sorted by hours preferences among firms (Bryan, 2004).5 The main way in
which workers seek actual hours of work that move towards their preferred
hours is through job mobility. Changes in workers’ hours take place mainly
through their changing of jobs (Altonji and Paxson, 1992; Drago et al., 2004).
8.3.2 Overemployment at the macroeconomic level
Labour–leisure models portray overemployment as an individual or single
labour market phenomenon; however, it can also be viewed from a
macroeconomic perspective. Categorizing the contributing economic sources
of overemployment can be treated as analogous to classifying the sources of
unemployment. There are three distinct types: structural, cyclical and
frictional. Structural overemployment occurs because of the presence of
structural incentives inherent in labour-market-related institutions or work
organization that lengthen hours demanded per worker. Such work organi-
zation includes the growing use of mandatory (compulsory) overtime practices
(Golden and Wiens-Tuers, 2005). Such labour market institutions include those
that heighten the fixed costs of hiring employees, such as computerization
(Hubler, 2000); required hiring and training costs (Contensou and Vranceanu,
2000; Glosser and Golden, 2004); and the escalating cost of premiums for
employee health benefit coverage, structured in the United States as employer
contributions per employee rather than pro-rated by hours worked.6
Institutional practices include the degree of non-compliance with the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime regulations or the intensity of
government enforcement of regulations (see Belman and Belzer, 1998; Golden,
1999). The introduction of the weekly overtime pay premia rules measurably
restrains average work hours (Hamermesh and Trejo, 2000; Costa, 2000; Hart,
2004). Finally, the diminishing presence and weakening of labour unions in 
the United States undermines a traditional brake on overtime hours, as in
Australia (Peetz et al., 2003). Cyclical factors may also alter the extent of
overemployment. When demand (orders, customers) is surging, cyclical
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5 The main theoretical justification for the persistence of mismatches – compensating wage differentials for
inconvenient hours – has to date received little empirical support (Ehrenberg and Schumann, 1984; Altonji and Paxson,
1992). 
6 A lack of quality part-time jobs is a source of hours restrictions faced by unmarried adults (Euwals and Van Soest, 1999). 
overemployment is created when hours demanded per worker are rising faster
than workers’ desired hours (the latter induced by rising wage rates if the
substitution effect on labour supply is dominant). Conversely, cyclical over-
employment would tend to diminish when a weak macroeconomic climate leads
employers to scale back (overtime) hours demanded, leading to greater
underemployment (including involuntary part-time employment). Third and
finally, frictional overemployment stems from the bundling of wages and hours
in typical employment contracts and from incomplete markets and inform-
ation. Frictions in the workplace and labour market exist when there are
barriers to full, perfect information among employers about their employees’
preferences and among worker applicants about job requirements and
alternative jobs. Lags and asymmetries in the transmission of information about
individuals’ changing preferences and the typical hours (when not explicitly
stipulated in contracts) in jobs lead to a greater incidence of mismatches.7
8.4 EXPLAINING THE RISE AND FALL OF OVER-
EMPLOYMENT AS A DYNAMIC LABOUR 
SUPPLY PROCESS
Table 8.2 shows that estimates of the overemployment rate using the 2001 CPS
question on the willingness to trade income for reduced hours has not
increased since last measured in 1985 at 7.6 per cent (Shank, 1986). Given the
widespread acceptance that hours of work have grown – at least among
households if not individuals – it is perhaps surprising that this estimate of the
proportion of workers that prefers the option of reducing their hours and
income is no higher and even a bit lower than 16 years previously. Despite
other surveys displaying contrary evidence of rising rates (such as the
doubling in the rate from less than 6 per cent to over 10 per cent between 1989
and 1998 in the GSS), this deserves serious inspection. 
There may be good theoretical reasons why the rate of overemployment
may be no higher than reported in the year 1985. However, perhaps the relatively
low rate observed in 2001 should be discounted, for a variety of legitimate 
reasons. The wedge between actual and desired hours may cease to grow if either
average hours supplied per worker have become shorter or preferred hours per
worker have lengthened. Regarding the former, actual average hours in the private
sector (which includes all employees, full time and part time) are a full hour
shorter in 2001 than they were in the second quarter of 1985, 33.9 versus 
34.9 hours per week. In 1985, however, 20 per cent reported working longer than
40 hours per week whereas 29 per cent did so in 2001. Thus the slightly falling
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7 Like unemployment, the rate of overemployment can never reach a rate of zero, because there will always be some
unavoidable frictional overemployment.
average masks that there have been growing proportions of workers employed
for longer than “standard” hours, and at shorter hours at the other end of the
spectrum. In addition, average hours demanded per worker were probably 
shorter for cyclical reasons. In the second quarter of 2001 (including the survey
date of May 2001), the economy was in the midst of a recession while in 1985 it
was in rapid expansion. Thus cyclical overemployment was probably a larger
factor in the earlier but not the later period. More likely, however, is that the
wedge has not increased because workers’ preferred hours are longer than they
might have been in 1985, further closing the wedge. For one thing, as would be
stressed in applying a conventional model of labour supply, real earnings of 
non-supervisory workers did not surpass the level in 1985 until the end of the
1990s. Especially among men, there might be a net income effect dominating
opposing substitution effect pressures, increasing the preference for work-hours
over leisure time, on balance.8 A fuller theoretical consideration of overemploy-
ment determination would thus help illuminate why the rate of overemployment
might stay constant across time periods. 
Thus a three-step theoretical model describing the sequential dynamics
of labour supply is needed to better account for the extent and trend in the
mismatch between actual and preferred hours. Just as the state of unemploy-
ment may, in the long run, lead individuals to make adjustments that cause the
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Table 8.2 Employed who prefer to work fewer hours, 2001 (percentages)
Demographic variables Percentage
Usual full-time 6.3
Usual part-time 3.9
Female 8.2
Married 7.1
Divorced/widowed 5.0
Not married 3.8
Not a parent 4.3
No child 7.2
At least 1 in 0–2 7.7
At least 1 in 3–5 7.0
At least 1 in 6–13 6.2
At least 1 in 14–17 6.1
Union members 6.5
Source: US Current Population Survey, May 2001: Work Schedules and Work at Home Supplement.
8 Real hourly wage rates are found to have little impact on the quantity of labour supply (Bryan, 2004).
unemployment rate to subside, such as labour force withdrawal, overemploy-
ment may also rise and then abate on its own. Such endogeneity of hours
preferences suggests that workers either maladapt to overly long hours or
ratchet up their consumption level that solidifies their desire for income over
time (Altman and Golden, 2004). Workers may tend to adjust their pref-
erences upward towards their existing hours, an application of observational
equivalence (Schor, 1995). Step one of a dynamic model presumes that
individuals first assume a predominant identity or role (see Altman and
Golden, 2004). This leads them to then desire a level of market work sufficient
to support their pre-established goals regarding both consumption and non-
market time. Their goals reflect a hierarchical ordering of their physiological
and unsatisfied needs. For women, their desire for paid work time may reflect
where their preferences currently lie along the continuum between home-
centred and work-centred preferences (see Hakim, 2000). The majority are in
the middle, wishing to combine work and home. However, women’s
preferences are far more heterogeneous in this regard than men’s. Thus it is
quite likely that they vary through time as well, perhaps going through
sustained periods of increase. Let us suppose, as in the constrained labour
supply model, that employers require or offer longer actual hours than the
hours initially preferred by workers in many jobs or time periods. 
The second step is that workers’ higher income eventually raises
individuals’ target income. This may occur for at least four contributing
reasons. First, the targeted amount of hours and income desired may be
adjusted upward as attitudes associated with loss aversion are adopted (Dunn,
1996). If income foregone takes on proportionately greater value than income
gained, then there will be an inherent bias against giving up income. Second, if
individuals, particularly at higher income levels, are subject to interdependent
utility, then working longer than one’s initially preferred labour supply may
make individuals or households become accustomed to the higher level of
consumption facilitated by the additional income. In addition, if the higher
consumption spending is financed in part by taking on higher household debt-
to-income ratios, such as (virtually irreversible) higher mortgage or revolving
credit expenses, preferred hours ratchet upward. Indeed, the observed increase
in work hours in the United States is largely attributable to increased hours
worked among dual-income households (Jacobs and Gerson, 2001; Osberg
2002). Thus, what may begin as predetermined wants may be changed
(Altman, 2001) if higher income leads individuals to seek fulfilment of new,
unsatisfied wants up the hierarchy of wants. A third reason is that higher
income probably leads to greater exposure to the marketing and advertising
that help create tastes for more and more market goods and services (see
Fraser and Paton, 2003). In addition, to the extent that individuals and
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households may compete more for higher relative status by acquiring or
accumulating social-status-conferring goods and services by emulating the
consumption patterns of the rich, this requires that relatively less well-off
individuals work more hours in order to sustain their relative position,
especially among lower- and middle-income households (Schor, 1995; Altman,
2001). A fourth and final reason is that a period of overemployment creates
time scarcity. This tends to shift household preferences from self-produced to
market-produced goods and services. Workers alter their consumption
preferences from time-using toward more time-saving goods and services
(Rothschild, 1982), which requires a perpetuation of the flow of income. All
four of these forces tend to ratchet up the individual’s target consumption
level and gradually dissipate the initial desire for shorter work hours,
exemplifying endogenous labour supply preferences.
In the third step in the dynamic process, continuous employment may
reinforce preferences for longer hours to the extent that employers enhance
the reward for overemployment and/or penalize short hours. Employers
might interpret “presenteeism” as an indication of an employee’s level of
effort and commitment, thus using longer hours as a signal of promotability.
A greater dispersion among pay grades motivates workers to exceed the
hours worked of their fellow workers, to engage in positive signalling tactics
(Bell and Freeman, 1995). Among those who expect to be in managerial
positions, there is a positive empirical association between the number of
work-hours they “prefer” and the actual work-hours of their co-workers
(Eastman, 1998). There is also a rising presence of professions that valorize
long hours, which promote a “rat race” with workers increasing their own
work-hours for reasons of relative status, such as jobs in law and consulting
(Landers et al., 1996). Correspondingly, there are negative signalling effects
for workers requesting shorter hours (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995). Those
expressing a wish to reduce work-hours may be passed up for hiring in an
adverse selection model of hiring decisions. In addition, in a context of
growing job or income insecurity, longer hours might be used by workers to
build up an income to buffer against expected future job or income losses
(Bluestone and Rose, 1998). If workers believe their employer is screening
before a downsizing or reorganization, they may view longer hours as an
inoculation against the risk of future job loss, income loss or demotion.9
Moreover, if the amenities offered by the workplace outpace those associated
with work in the household, from on-site day care to a more stimulating
environment, time in the workplace becomes relatively more alluring
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9 Better matching or “congruence” between preferred and actual hours status is associated with employee performance.
This suggests that overemployment may lead to work behaviours antithetical to productivity on the job (Holtom et
al., 2002; Savery and Luks, 2000; Dollard and Winefield, 2002).
(Hochschild, 1997). To the extent work yields less disutility, by becoming
more intrinsically rewarding, stimulating, safer or autonomous – over time or
over one’s life cycle – this will erode any resistance to long hours (Kaufman,
1999; LaJeunesse, 2004). For example, between 1985 and 2001, the
proportion of the work force with flexible daily work schedules doubled, to
over 28 per cent. They are more accessible to those who work longer than
standard hours (see Golden, 2005). Thus, the advantage of working long
hours has gained, to the extent workers can use the flexibility to shift some
of their workload to different times of the day or locations, a means of easing
some of the pressures that contributed to workers’ past willingness to reduce
hours. Indeed, workers who greatly value daily start- and end-time flexibility
thus may even choose overemployment over standard hours. If the part-time
compensation differential is sufficiently severe, workers may rationally prefer
overemployment at standard hours over a part-time job at their desired,
shorter hours. Thus, to the extent that the quality of part-time positions has
improved over time, this might reduce the duration and incidence of
overemployment. Full-time workers would become less reluctant to make
transitions to part-time positions (see Drago et al., 2004).
In sum, individuals may eventually choose to work longer than initially
preferred, not only because their own real wage, non-wage income or con-
straints have changed, but because their hours preferences are not set purely
exogenously in a static climate in isolation from their social reference groups
or workplace incentives. A dynamic process occurs whereby an individual may
start out working long hours involuntarily and later do so voluntarily. This
suppresses any rise in the rate of overemployment even when average hours per
week are lengthening. This is supported by a greater willingness among workers
to forego future more than current income, such as a coming year’s rise. Indeed,
a recent survey reveals a much stronger preference for hours reduction in the
more distant future than in the current period (Hart and Associates, 2003) – 
15 per cent would prefer hours and income reduction now, but over 40 per cent
favour this some time in the near future.
Who is more likely to be overemployed? Individuals whose actual hours
(h) exceed desired hours (h*) given their current wage and job:
h*< h
This gap may occur so long as some employers are not induced to adjust
h downward toward h*. If
λ(h – h*)θ given λ > 0; θ > 1
the gap can persist so long as:
(1) administrative costs (λ) associated with facilitating a constant adjustment
of h toward each employee’s h* are large;
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(2) the size of the gap between h and h* is not overly large; 
(3) long-term risks on the organization of overemployment are small or
discounted (θ near one);
(4) employees lack bargaining leverage to impose adverse consequences
(e.g., absences);
(5) employees are induced to tolerate or discount the (cumulative)
consequences of overwork;
(6) it is relatively less costly for firms to induce employees to adjust upward
their h*, by internalizing the pressures from their reference groups in the
workplace (or consumption targets).
8.5 HYPOTHESES
Not all workers are equally likely to experience a gap between desired and
actual hours. Thus the distribution of decent working time may not be
allocated evenly across types of sectors and workers. Some workers may be
more prone to time surpluses and others to time deficits (see Messenger, ed.,
2004). It is likely to be more prevalent among workers:
• with personal characteristics that on average tend to be associated with
relatively shorter hours preferences because they have significant
caregiving responsibilities, such as dual-earner parents with children
present in the household (Merola and Clarkberg, 2003; Reynolds, 2004);
• whose preferences are more apt to shift towards shorter desired work-
weeks after becoming employed at certain key intervals in their life cycle,
such as approaching retirement;
• with personal characteristics associated with relatively higher relative wage
rates and less apt to be underemployed, such as whites rather than minorities; 
• with jobs whose hours are longer and/or growing for either cyclical or
structural reasons; 
• with jobs that make them face more structural constraints on reducing
their hours at their current jobs or a paucity of job alternatives; 
• whose bargaining leverage is insufficient for adjusting hours downward
as needed when their preferences shift as such, such as younger or non-
union members;
• in jobs with insufficient job autonomy to exert control over hours
(Reynolds, 2004);
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• in occupations and industries with relatively higher earnings per hour, if
overemployment is positive in the real wage, particularly at high wage
levels (and/or underemployment is negative in the real wage, particularly
at relatively low wage levels); and
• in industries where there is at least some productivity per worker gained
while the additional wage cost is negligible, such as jobs compensated
with salary rather than hourly wages.
8.6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF OVEREMPLOYMENT
The May 2001 CPS Supplement sample of households includes over 57,000
individuals, with information on their demographic and work characteristics.
The distribution of overemployment by personal, occupation and industry
characteristics appears in Tables 8.3 and 8.4. The sample collapsed responses
into 52 detailed industry and 46 detailed occupational classifications. The key
question asks households if individuals, “given the choice, [would] opt for
more income and more hours, less income and fewer hours or the same
income and hours?” The cross-tabulations presented in the tables show an
incidence of overemployment noticeably higher for women, parents of young
children and workers on relatively longer work-weeks. Tables 8.3 and 8.4
reveal discrepancies among occupations and industries of the employed. It
appears to be higher in certain occupational classifications such as
managers–administrators and in industries such as health care and utilities. 
More rigorous empirical testing allows us to identify the personal and job
status characteristics that contribute to the likelihood that an individual
prefers “fewer hours and less income”, controlling for all possible other
factors. The three general sets of factors observable in the May 2001 CPS
Supplement are: personal characteristics such as age, gender, race, marital
status, and parental status; actual work-hours, such as usual full-time or part-
time job or on a non-traditional shift; and job characteristics, such as their
occupation and industry of employment, and flexibility of schedule in their
job or workplace. The likelihood that an individual prefers the option of
reducing both hours and income is determined by a probit regression on a
comprehensive list of a given worker’s personal and job characteristics.10
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10 The model estimates the probability of being overemployed as a function of personal (β) as well as job (δ)
characteristics, including work hours, and the respective vectors of estimated coefficients, X and Y:
OVERi = α + Xiβ + Yiδ + ε
The model is estimated using probit analysis. The dependent variable is bi-variate, taking on a value of one if the employed
worker reports having a preference for fewer hours and less income over their current level. The coefficients represent
the marginal probabilities that an individual possessing a given characteristic prefers fewer hours and less income. 
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Table 8.3 Overemployment rate by detailed occupation, full-time employed
Occupational classification Percentage
Officials and administrators, public administration 6.5
Other executive, administrative and managerial 8.7
Management-related occupations 8.6
Engineers 8.2
Mathematical and computer scientists 7.6
Natural scientists 10.2
Health diagnosing occupations 12.2
Health assessment and treatment occupations 11.9
Teachers, college and university 9.8
Teachers, except college and university 7.8
Lawyers and judges 9.2
Other professional speciality occupations 6.8
Health technologists and technicians 9.1
Engineering and science technicians 5.8
Technicians, excluding health, engineering and science 7.8
Supervisors and proprietors, sales occupations 6.3
Sales representatives, finance and business services 6.6
Sales representatives, commodities, excluding retail 5.9
Sales workers, retail and personal services 4.6
Supervisors and proprietors, sales occupations 8.1
Computer equipment operators 8.1
Secretaries, stenographers and typists 7.8
Financial records processing 7.3
Mail and message distributing 6.5
Other administrative support, including clerical 7.1
Private household service occupations 4.2
Protective service 3.9
Food service 3.2
Health service 4.7
Cleaning and building service 4.1
Personal service 3.0
Mechanics and repairers 3.9
Construction trades 1.9
Other precision production, craft, and repair 5.2
Machine operators and tenders, excluding precision workers 3.4
Fabricators, assemblers, inspectors 3.0
Motor vehicle operators 4.8
Other transport and material moving occupations 4.0
Construction labourers 2.2
Freight, stock and materials handlers 3.1
Other handlers, equipment cleaners, labourers 2.4
Farm operators and managers 0.3
Farm workers and related occupations 3.1
Forestry and fishing occupations 1.1
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Current Population Survey, May 2001: Work Schedules and Work at Home
Supplement. 
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Table 8.4 Overemployment rate by detailed industry, full-time employed
Industry Percentage
Goods producing – agricultural services 4.3
Goods producing – other agricultural 1.7
Mining 3.6
Construction 3.0
Manufacturing – lumber and wood products, excluding furniture 4.1
Manufacturing – furniture and fixtures 3.8
Manufacturing – stone, clay, concrete, glass productss 2.3
Manufacturing – primary metals 4.8
Manufacturing – fabricated metals 3.7
Manufacturing – machinery, excluding electrical 6.7
Manufacturing – electrical machinery, equipment supplies 6.3
Manufacturing – motor vehicles and equipment 5.7
Manufacturing – aircraft and parts 4.7
Manufacturing – other transportation equipment 5.5
Manufacturing – professional and photo equipment, watches 8.3
Manufacturing – toys, amusement and sporting goods 11.0
Manufacturing – miscellaneous manufacturing industries 6.8
Manufacturing – food and kindred products 4.8
Manufacturing – tobacco products 4.1
Manufacturing – textile mill products 6.6
Manufacturing – apparel and other finished textile products 4.2
Manufacturing – paper and allied products 8.5
Manufacturing – printing, publishing and allied industries 7.1
Manufacturing – chemicals and allied products 7.1
Manufacturing – rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 5.6
Manufacturing – leather and leather products 1.1
Transportation 5.9
Communications 7.3
Utilities and sanitary services 9.9
Wholesale trade 6.6
Eating and drinking places 4.3
Other retail trade 5.4
Banking and other finance 6.9
Insurance and real estate 7.7
Private household services 4.9
Business services 5.4
Automobile and repair services 3.9
Personal services excluding private households 4.6
Entertainment and recreation services 3.3
Hospitals 10.6
Health services, excluding hospitals 8.1
Educational services 8.0
Social services 5.2
Other professional services 7.6
/cont’d
The empirical tests find that female workers are more at risk of being
overemployed than their male counterparts, all else constant. This cannot be
attributed to the type of jobs they hold. In addition, as workers age, their
preference for additional time over income grows, but this preference dimin-
ishes later in the life cycle. This is apparently attributable to getting their
preferred work-hours length and shifts. Being married raises the likelihood of
overemployment. Being divorced, separated or widowed, however, does not.
Having children in the household (relative to having either no or fully grown
children) is important, but with nuances. When the youngest child in the
household is younger than 3 years old, this raises the likelihood of feeling
overemployed. Having children aged 3 through 5, i.e., pre-school age, has a
significant but weaker effect, about half the magnitude of the youngest
children. Interestingly, when the youngest child present in the household
reaches the age of 14, this reverses the effect of having children on the
likelihood of overemployment. Thus it is apparent that when children first
appear, there is a significantly greater demand for time. However, as they age,
parents gradually shift their preference toward income, to the point where they
actually prefer more income relative to time when their children are teenagers.
8.7 FINDINGS: WORK-HOURS AND JOB STATUS 
CHARACTERISTICS 
As a full-time worker’s average reported work-week lengthens, there is a
progressively higher likelihood of being overemployed. Working a standard
work-week of exactly 40 hours creates a higher likelihood of being over-
employed relative to those who report usually working 35 to 39 hours.
Working from 41 to 49 hours raises the probability of overemployment
considerably, and working 50 or more raises it still further. Workers whose
hours are “variable”, in that they are not able to specify a usual work-week,
have a reduced tendency to be overemployed, surprisingly. However, this may
be attributable to the disproportionate share of workers in this category who
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Table 8.3 (/cont’d)
Industry Percentage
Forestry and fisheries 9.9
Justice, public order and safety 3.9
Administration of human resource programmes 6.3
National security and internal affairs 4.6
Other public administration 7.5
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Current Population Survey, May 2001: Work Schedules and Work at Home
Supplement.
are part-time workers. Part-time work (working 34 or fewer usual hours per
week) tends to reduce the probability of experiencing overemployment. Thus
part-time work provides workers with a good deal of (but not complete) relief
from the risk of overemployment.
Those working on a regular daytime shift, the vast majority of US
workers, have a slightly raised likelihood of being overemployed compared to
those working the evening shift (the reference group). Those working on
irregular shift times have the highest probability of being overemployed. This
is traced entirely to men who work on a shift other than the regular day shift.
Workers who have flexible schedules, some ability to vary their daily starting
and ending times of work, have a somewhat reduced likelihood of over-
employment. However, this is exclusively among those who have informal
arrangements in the workplace to arrive later or leave work earlier (which
represent almost two-thirds of all those with flexible schedules, see Golden,
2005). In contrast, formal flexi-time programmes do not reduce the chances of
being overemployed. This dual face of flexibility suggests that the interference
of work hours with work and family balancing is largely separate from
flexibility of the daily schedule. Moreover, being able to perform some work
at home actually exacerbates working longer hours than are preferred.
8.7.1 Job characteristics: Occupations and industries
There are several occupations that heighten the likelihood of wishing for fewer
hours, and many that reduce it. The major occupational classifications that
exhibit the greatest overemployment fall in the managerial and professional
groups. In particular, by order of magnitude, these are engineers, health
diagnosing occupations, natural scientists, mathematicians/computer scientists,
health assessment and treatment, private (but not public) sector managers and
administrators, lawyers/judges, and management-related occupations. There
are two technicians’ jobs – health and those other than health, science or
engineering, and other administrative support (computer equipment operators
is borderline) – in which overemployment is significantly higher. In general, 
it appears that the higher the general pay (skill or preparation) level of the 
job, the greater is the tendency towards overemployment. Several blue-collar
occupations, notably construction trades and labourers, farm operators and
fabricators/assemblers, and in-service jobs such as personal, health or food
service occupations, are less likely to experience overemployment, indeed, they
are more likely to experience underemployment. 
Some industries stand out as creating a markedly greater likelihood of
overemployment than others. Relative to production and service-type
industries, being employed in public utilities raises the likelihood. Relative to
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other, non-service-type industries, the hospital sector raises the risk of
overemployment. The communications and transportation and, to a weaker
extent, wholesale trade, also raises the risk of overemployment, as do medical
services other than hospitals. The latter is not surprising given the greater
incidence of mandatory overtime work, and some high-profile labour disputes
involving the level and distribution of overtime work in these tele-
communications, public utilities and hospital sectors (Golden and Wiens-Tuers,
2005). The sole manufacturing industry producing greater overemployment is
paper products. On the other hand, being employed in social services,
construction, private household, justice/public order, stone/glass manu-
facturing significantly reduces the likelihood of overemployment. This
suggests that hours in these sectors’ jobs may be more responsive to
preferences for shorter hours. Alternatively, the workers employed there may
be less apt to prefer shorter than actual hours.
In sum, overemployment is disproportionately concentrated among
women, parents of young children, long-hours workers, and certain salaried
positions, all else held constant. 
8.8 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS:
TOWARDS DECENT WORKING TIME POLICIES
Every post-industrial country places some sort of limitation on the duration of
working hours. The extent of such regulation reflects a combination not only of
working time preferences among men and women, but also the cultural,
economic and institutional context of the affected domain (see Stier and Lewin-
Epstein, 2003).11 In the United States, the only institutional restraints on hours
of work are: the Fair Labor Standard Act’s (1938) overtime regulations enforced
by the United States Department of Labor, requiring premium pay for hours
worked in excess of 40 in a given one-week period, and the Hours of Service
Regulations issued by the US Department of Transportation, limiting drivers’
hours to no more than 60 per week and no more than 11 hours per 24-hour
period. Sweeping changes have just been imposed in the rules that Department
of Labor regulators will apply to determine FLSA coverage under the exemption
for executive, administrative and professional jobs, which would potentially
remove millions of occupational classifications with typically long-hours
demands from the overtime pay premium requirement. Both houses of the
Congress have proposed FLSA reforms that would permit employers who receive
Decent working time
228
11 The greater are a country’s GDP per capita, income equality and policies to mitigate market risks, the greater is the
desire to reduce work-hours in that country.
written agreement from employees to substitute compensatory (“comp”) time
for premium pay for overtime work (H.R.1119) and a variable, 80-hour, two-
week work-week (S.317). 
Overemployment results from binding constraints on workers that
create a persistent gap between actual and preferred hours. Overemployment
persists despite an inherent tendency for overemployment to diminish on its
own, to the extent that workers endogenously adopt the longer hours of the
preferences of their workplace or national culture. Achieving the goals of
decent working time requires minimizing the incidence of overemployment,
its burden equitably distributed by gender and that the gap be closed by
eliminating constraints that inhibit downward flexibility of hours rather than
by upward escalating of hours preferences. Notwithstanding the conventional
theory of perfect matching of desired and required hours in labour markets,
the May 2001 CPS question yields conservative estimates of the rate of
overemployment at 6 to 7 per cent of the workforce, but it is up to twice that
rate in certain jobs, sectors and workers. The lower rate of overemployment in
other sectors suggests that such constraints need not be considered inevitable.
The relatively low rate of overemployment in the United States, at least as
revealed in the CPS 2001 survey, should not lull policy-makers into a sense of
complacency. Overemployment is significantly more likely among women and
parents of young children, which poses a threat to gender equity. In addition,
it is higher among long-work-week workers and selected occupational
classifications such as managers–administrators, scientists, engineers and some
technicians, and in industries such as healthcare, utilities and transportation.
Although slightly lower in level, it is remarkably similar in distribution to the
United Kingdom, where a preference for fewer hours is also higher among the
older and managerial–professional workforce (see Pierce, 2003).
A key facet of “decent working time” is that there is value to workers in
having a greater degree of choice and a larger array of reduced-hours options,
even for those workers who do not necessarily need to exercise such a choice
at the moment. This could ultimately help break the dynamic of constrained
workers settling for longer hours than they may have initially preferred. This
would also help avoid the currently socially wasteful reliance on workers either
engaging in constant job mobility to attain their desired hours when their
preferences change because of life-course or unexpected events, or
alternatively, simply adapting upward their preferred hours toward those
available or which they judge as feasible in their workplace. Furthermore, the
considerably higher rates of underemployment in the United States could be
somewhat reduced to the extent that the work performed by those relieved of
their overemployment gap in hours was effectively transferred to those willing
to work more hours – who are typically found in hourly paid, lower-wage
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occupations and industries. If a genuine goal of legislative reform is curbing
the incidence, duration and effects of overemployment, the empirical results
suggest that accomplishing that would be more likely if work-hours legislation
and regulation were more precisely targeted toward the types of workers
relatively more prone to overemployment.12 For example, targeted limits on
hours could be established in sectors in which the incidence of
overemployment and mandatory overtime work is most concentrated (see
Golden and Wiens-Tuers, 2005), such as telecommunications, hospitals, and
transportation. Ultimately, some measure of new FLSA coverage would have
to be extended to employees in those white-collar, salaried occupations (see
Schor, 1995) displaying the longest work-weeks, and to workers at vulnerable
points of their life cycle when time for caregiving responsibilities becomes
most valuable, such as when a worker has a child younger than 3 years old. For
example, adopting an American-style version of the individualized, “flexible
employment” option now available in the United Kingdom for employees
who request modifications to their standard work-hours and the adoption of
“Reasonable Hours”, as in Australia, would be important first steps. However,
options alone in the United States may be insufficient because many workers
may not avail themselves of existing opportunities unless they are
accompanied by a change in a workplace culture that currently punishes the
relative status of those choosing shorter-hours options.13
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9.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we consider the phenomenal growth of part-time work and
the emergence of the one-and-a-half earner model in the Netherlands,
comparing this to the growth and the high levels of part-time work that are
also evident in Germany and the United Kingdom. Despite cross-national
differences in the development of part-time work, many working mothers,
in all three countries, seem to accept part-time employment as a way to
combine paid work and motherhood. In the Netherlands, part-time work is
more widely diffused than elsewhere, among both men and women. This
diffusion goes together with a pattern of “normalization” of part-time work
also in terms of employee rights and entitlements, narrowing the differences
between part-time and full-time work. Currently, involuntary part-time work
is low in the Netherlands, with only a minor gap between women’s preferred
and actual working time (Yerkes, 2003). Another indicator is that the
incidence of part-time work among Dutch men and women continued to rise
in the 1990s, in spite of the large drop in unemployment rates, from 5.7 per
cent in 1990 to 2.3 per cent in 2002 for men and from 10.9 per cent to 
2.9 for women in the same period (OECD, 2004). While the initial rise of
part-time employment in the Netherlands may have been shaped by the
threat of unemployment, this is much less plausible for the 1990s. Hence we
need to look at institutions and policies. While in a country like Denmark,
the welfare state, job growth in public services and labour market and tax
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regulations initially produced high levels of part-time employment among
women, there has been a subsequent fall in the incidence of part-time work
among women (Rasmussen et al., 2005). The Dutch situation, even in the
1990s, reflects a different history of women’s work and motherhood, a path-
dependent development that encouraged families, governments and social
partners to see part-time work and shorter working hours as a model for
balancing work-family pressures. In any case, the social partners and
government supported the diffusion and normalization of part-time jobs
towards a standard of “decent work” in terms of choice, rights, earnings and
equality (ILO, 2004). Yet part-time work remains a highly gendered pheno-
menon. In our comparison, we show that in Germany and the United
Kingdom, which share a highly gendered employment pattern and a strong
“breadwinner” welfare state tradition with the Netherlands, part-time work
developed under different conditions that make it more difficult to overcome
“marginalization”. Recently governments in both countries, in response to
European policies, particularly in the context of the European Employment
Strategy, started to address issues related to part-time work, employee rights
and reconciling work–family pressures. 
Women’s working patterns are not a new topic in sociology. Despite this,
women’s labour market participation patterns continue to receive a great deal
of attention from scholars and policy-makers alike because many relevant
questions regarding women’s work remain insufficiently answered. Concerns
abound regarding the proliferation of part-time work as well as care and leave
arrangements within individual welfare states, which have more recently
culminated in a body of research regarding women’s ability to combine paid
and domestic work (see Ackers, 2003; Crompton, 2002; Drew et al., 1998;
Fagan, 2004; Hakim, 2000; Hantrais and Campling, 2000; Higgins et al., 2000;
Kay, 2003; Kirby, 2003; O’Reilly and Fagan, 1998). 
Women’s participation in paid work varies across Europe. The Scan-
dinavian countries are well known for high levels of female labour market
participation, while southern European countries are often noted for having
lower participation rates, with continental European countries exhibiting a
female labour market participation rate generally near the European average.
However, female labour force participation rates are only one part of the
comparative puzzle. Levels of women’s full-time and part-time work vary
greatly across Europe, as do policies maintained by the various welfare states
that affect women’s working patterns. While most European countries have
been moving away from the classic “male breadwinner” model during the most
recent decades, remnants of these policies are still visible and continue to
shape women’s employment patterns and women’s preferences and choices in
combining paid and unpaid work.
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It is with an eye on these employment patterns and preferences that we
consider the dominant one-and-a-half earner model in the Netherlands. Is this
model, as evident in the Netherlands, an example of decent work as
understood by the ILO? Can it be a model for countries in which women have
long remained outside the market for paid work (Visser, 2000)? With rising
concerns about work intensity and pressures that make reconciling work and
family aspirations difficult (OECD, 2001), can part-time employment offer a
solution? What prevents the marginalization of part-time work? In this
chapter we show that mothers in the Netherlands, Germany and the United
Kingdom often prefer part-time work as a way of combining paid and unpaid
work. Yet only in the Netherlands has this preference for part-time work been
achieved in practice. Furthermore, levels of marginal work associated with very
short working hours and flexible employment contracts lacking basic rights
and entitlements are higher, especially in the United Kingdom. In both the
United Kingdom and Germany, part-time employment is more often than not
a highly constrained choice, its quality is poor, and also there are few
meaningful alternatives for balancing work and family in these countries.
Based on the Gender Role Modules in the ISSP1 2002, we observe that men
and women in the United Kingdom experience much higher levels of
work–family conflict and stress than in the Netherlands, which in inter-
national rankings scores the lowest stress levels. Germany takes a middle
position. A plausible explanation for the high stress levels evident in the
United Kingdom is that these are related to the rising number of people
working very long or very short hours, and to the relative lack of control over
working time. The low levels of regulation in the United Kingdom, even after
the application of relevant EU law2 by the Blair Governments, though often at
the lowest possible level and with considerable “opt-out” possibilities for
firms, are less conducive to making part-time work into “decent work”. 
In this chapter we consider with a degree of scepticism the increase of
part-time work and the policies surrounding this development. On the one
hand, and under conditions of conferring on part-time workers the same rights
and pro rata earnings and benefits (sickness, unemployment, disability, old 
age pensions) as full-time workers, part-time work can be a promising
alternative for remaining in the labour force. And it can be a way to address
work–family issues related to having and raising children or caring for others,
especially when the decision to work part time is free and reversible. Finally,
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1 International Social Survey Programme.
2 The relevant EU law, in this case, comprises the directives on parental leave (Directive 96/34/EC (UK 97/75/EC)),
part-time (Directive 97/81/EC (UK 98/23/EC)) and working time (Directive 93/104/EC). Two provisions in the last
directive, and in particular the option for Member States not to apply art. 6 (which defines the maximum working week
at 48 hours) if individual workers consent, were only used by the United Kingdom.
part-time work can be a way to enter or leave the labour force, combining
education or retirement with paid work. In the Netherlands, since 2001,
employees have had the right to request changes to their working hours. Similar
legislation recently became effective in Germany and the United Kingdom.
While legal disputes show that in the Netherlands employees usually find the
law on their side, take-up rates have been very low, possibly reflecting that
aspirations or preferences will not always be acted upon, as this may damage
work relations and careers even in a context of overall low unemployment, as
is the case in the Netherlands (Visser et al., 2004). Therefore, worker choice and
influence over individual working hours should be questioned. Furthermore,
part-time work remains women’s work – while it is often promoted as a way for
both mothers and fathers to achieve work–family balance, gender inequality in
part-time work remains, reflecting differences in access to on-the-job training
and career advantages (Evans et al., 2001). 
9.2 GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Female labour force participation rates increased throughout the most recent
decades across Europe, and there are a number of general explanations for this
phenomenon. The introduction of the birth control pill was a foremost factor,
as well as changes to household size, postponement of motherhood, and
lessening of time spent on household chores. Economically, we also know 
that a number of factors increased the cost of remaining at home, making it
more attractive for women to enter the labour market. Women’s continued
participation in higher education, rising wages and legislative changes in tax
systems, and employment protection and wage setting aimed at reducing or
ruling out the discrimination many women faced in the labour market, served
to entice women to take part in paid labour. These developments were similar
in the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom, although the initial
levels, timing and the nature of policies varied across countries, as did the
resulting increase in female labour market participation.
Female labour market participation was slow to increase in the Netherlands,
and it was not until the 1980s that women entered paid labour in large numbers.
This development began in the 1960s in the United Kingdom and the 1970s in
the former Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).3 In 2003, women’s
labour force participation rates were higher than the EU-15 average of 61.3 per
cent in all three countries studied here (figure 9.1). The United Kingdom has the
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3 As will be discussed in section 9.4.1, due to the full employment policy in the former German Democratic Republic
(East Germany), levels of female labour market participation were much higher there than in the former Federal
Republic of Germany (West Germany). Even following reunification, the labour market participation rates of eastern
German women remain higher than those of western German women.  
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highest labour force participation of the three countries at 69.2 per cent, followed
by the Netherlands at 68.4 per cent and Germany with 64.5 per cent. In the
Netherlands female participation rates increased by 16 percentage points since
1990, in Germany by 9 percentage points, and in the United Kingdom by 
2 percentage points (OECD, 2004).
The differences in female labour market participation across these three
countries become more apparent when we consider selected age groups. As
table 9.1 shows, all three countries have a relatively similar female activity level
for women aged 25–54, yet Germany has a drastically lower participation rate
for young women, and both Germany and the Netherlands have considerably
lower participation rates for women over the age of 55. 
Higher levels of labour market participation in the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom among the young reflect the (increasing) cost of higher
education. School enrolment rates are not very different, but students in the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom are more likely to take part-time jobs
to subsidize their studies. The cost of higher education is lower in Germany,
making it often unnecessary for students to have a job on the side. The lower
rates of participation for women over age 55 in all three countries are relatively
common (also for men), given early retirement tendencies across western
Europe, though this is more pronounced in the Netherlands and Germany
than in the United Kingdom. Lower participation rates among women in older
age cohorts also reflect lower participation rates in the past in both the
Netherlands and Germany.
We should “correct” these patterns and trends with data on working
hours and the division between full-time and part-time employment. All three
countries exhibit high levels of part-time work, with the Netherlands in a
record position (figure 9.2). A total of 59.6 per cent of all jobs held by women
in the Netherlands are part-time jobs. The United Kingdom follows with 40.1
per cent, and Germany with 36.3 per cent; the three countries are the highest
in the EU-15 (compared to 23.6 per cent for Italy, 22.8 per cent for France,
21.9 per cent for Denmark, 20.6 per cent for Sweden and 16.5 per cent in
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Table 9.1 Female labour force participation rates by age group, 2003
15–24 25–54 55–64
Germany 44.9 78.9 34.3
Netherlands 72.7 76.5 32.9
United Kingdom1 63.9 76.6 47.3
Note: 1 Age group 15–24 refers to 16–24.
Source: OECD, 2004.
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Figure 9.2 Part-time employment in the Netherlands, United Kingdom and
Germany, and the EU average, 1993–2003 (as a percentage of
total employment in group)
Note:  The apparent decrease in part-time work in the Netherlands from 1995 to 1996 reflects a measurement error.
Source: OECD, 2004.
Spain) (OECD, 2004).4 Although the incidence of part-time work is (slowly)
rising among (younger and older) men, in combination with study and flexible
retirement, part-time employment remains highly feminized. Three out of
four part-time jobs are held by women in the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands; in Germany women’s share of part-time employment is even
higher, at 83.3 per cent (OECD, 2004). Labour markets are far from gender
neutral (see Beechey, 1988; Daly, 2000; Lewis, 1992; O’Reilly and Fagan, 1998;
Pfau-Effinger, 1998; Tijdens et al., 1997; Tijdens, 1998; Tijdens,  2002). The
Netherlands is an interesting case study, as it exhibits the highest level of part-
time work among these three countries, as well as a seemingly strong female
preference for this work form, shaped however in the context of a history of
a strong “male breadwinner” model. The next section outlines how this
development occurred. 
9.3 THE NETHERLANDS
As indicated in the introduction, the Netherlands is an outlier in Europe with
regard to part-time employment, but it was not until the 1980s that the
Netherlands took over the first place occupied at that time by Sweden,
Denmark and the United Kingdom. During the 1980s the growth of part-time
employment accelerated in tandem with the rise in female and service employ-
ment. The initial diffusion of part-time employment was mostly the
unintended consequence of the late entry of women into the labour force,
following the rise in education and a shift in values, at a time of fewer
employment opportunities, wage moderation and policy pressures towards 
the redistribution of work (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; Visser, 2000). The
absence of facilities and support for childcare made part-time employment the
dominant coping solution for mothers. The part-time option was reinforced
by the labour market adversity and by the wage moderation of the 1980s,
stimulating the need for extra earnings in households. Employers saw part-
time employment as a flexible, reversible and individual solution for
work-sharing, and an alternative to the collective working time reduction
desired by the trade unions. Public sector employers saw it as a way to save
money without having to dismiss employees. Young women wanting or raising
children, especially those working in the public sector, saw it as a way to hold
on to their jobs and continue their careers, rather than retiring temporarily
from the labour market as had been common for their mothers. Politicians,
both left and right, saw it as a method of work-sharing in times of high
(youth) unemployment and as an alternative to expensive public facilities for
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4 We define part-time jobs as those below 30 hours per week. See Lemaître et al. (1997).
childcare. After initial resistance to part-time work, associated with inferior
working conditions, the Dutch trade unions came around in support of it,
often under pressure from their female members. Towards the end of the
1980s, with collective working time reduction on the “back burner”, Dutch
trade unions began to encourage the “normalization” of part-time work,
working towards equal rights and pay compared to full-time workers, the right
of choice of employees, and similar levels of protection. They also pressed for
better leave facilities for parents with young children and for public subsidies
and employer investment in childcare. Several central agreements with
employers in the 1990s tried to put these issues on the agenda of lower-level
bargainers in sectors and firms.
The Netherlands comes from a deeply, socially and culturally, embedded
model of housewifery (Knijn, 1994; Pfau-Effinger, 1998). In 1965, 84 per cent
of the adult Dutch population expressed reservations concerning working
mothers of school-going children. However, in 1970, this disapproval
suddenly dropped to 44 per cent, decreasing to a mere 18 per cent in 1997
(SCP, 1998). It is useful to point out that this change in opinion preceded the
improvement in services and conditions facilitating the combination of work
and childcare. The same goes for institutional factors. Relative wages and
returns from labour are influenced by institutional factors such as government
and union wage policies, taxation and employment bans. All this changed,
often under pressure from relevant EU laws. Until the early 1990s, minimum
wage legislation excluded those working in “mini-jobs” (defined as under 15
hours per week), most of whom were women. The exclusion of part-time
employees, again mostly women, from pension funds became illegal in 1994.
Various smaller discriminations existing in collective agreements were
successively removed during the 1990s. 
In the 1990s, part-time jobs became common. Part-time jobs exist in two
out of three firms with ten or more employees (StAr, 1997), and they can now
be found in all sectors of the economy, as well as in all occupations – even at
the managerial level (CBS-statline). However, short-hours part-time jobs
remain an issue in the retail trade, hotels and catering, cleaning, nursing,
teaching, and in personal services (in the last-mentioned branch, there also
seems to be an issue of informal and undeclared work). In the 1990s, the
Dutch labour market combined a high incidence of part-time work with a
comparatively small divergence in occupational profiles between full-timers
and part-timers (Fagan et al., 2000), which can be taken as one indicator of
“acceptance” and “normalization” of part-time work. As noted in the
introduction, levels of involuntary part-time work are now quite low in the
Netherlands, and part-time jobs are, on the whole, not “marginal” – meaning
that they are covered by the same rights and entitlements as those that apply
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to full-time workers. Legislation regarding the equal treatment of part-time
workers became effective in 1996 (Wet Gelijke Behandeling), and the quality
of part-time jobs in the Netherlands is comparatively high. Furthermore, the
Working Hours Adjustment Act of 2000 (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur)
guarantees individual workers the right to request either an increase or
decrease in their working hours. The reversibility of lengthening or shortening
the individual work-week is a step towards part-time work as decent work. Yet
part-time work is not gender neutral in the Netherlands, and despite policy
efforts to increase men’s participation in caring and household tasks (SZW,
2003), women are still more likely to perform caring and domestic duties.
Also, part-time work does carry disadvantages: some in earnings (especially in
the private sector and mostly in fringe benefits as opposed to wages), more in
lower participation in job training, and also in career development prospects.
And only the long-hours part-time jobs or those with higher earnings would
seem to guarantee individual subsistence, outside of a household with
additional income from earnings, benefits or rents. Yet panel data suggest that
even among younger generations, mothers who have chosen to work part time
when raising young children do not return to working full time when their
children grow older. It is also relevant to note that the persistence of the part-
time pattern continued when unemployment rates among women dropped
significantly in recent years. All this points to part-time work as a choice
above full-time work, in spite of some significant disadvantages but with the
advantage of more disposable time for rest, care, education, travel or leisure. It
goes without saying that such choices are made under constraints, such as
individual and household earnings, the decisions and preferences of partners,
a particular gendered division of household tasks, and job opportunities. 
Concluding this section, we observe that part-time jobs in the
Netherlands are neither atypical nor flexible, though the diffusion of part-
time jobs is likely to have increased the aggregate flexibility of the Dutch
labour market, bringing in more diversity in working time patterns. The
“normalization” of part time is supported by the current process of “negotiated
flexibility” in working time regimes, encouraged by various central, sectoral and
company-level agreements. In recent times, these agreements offer a “choice”
or “à la carte” menu to individual workers – supporting the possibilities of
“working time” accounts or banks, the exchange of money for time, or time for
money. Yet limited childcare facilities remain a crucial factor. Demand for
childcare grew steadily, but it took until 1987 before unions, under pressure
from their female members, began to negotiate childcare facilities in collective
agreements (Tijdens et al., 2000). By its own admission, the Dutch welfare state
does rather poorly, in comparison with other countries, in supporting young
families (SZW, 2000). According to the Central Planning Bureau, the official
Decent working time
244
Dutch economic forecasting institute, the lack of – and the cost of – childcare
facilities can become a constraint, limiting labour supply and putting pressure
on wages (CPB, 1998). There is also the issue of falling birth rates and the high
average age at which women give birth. Finally, although the Netherlands
implemented relevant EU legislation on parental leave, in the private sector
such leave is often unpaid. Like the absence of full-day schooling in some
(rural) parts of the country, this structures the choice towards part time rather
than continuing in a full-time job after a labour market interruption. 
9.4 GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
A high level of part-time work is not solely a Dutch phenomenon (O’Reilly
and Fagan, 1998). While the Netherlands shows extremely high levels of part-
time work, part-time work is also high in Germany and the United Kingdom
in comparison to other EU countries (Fagan and Rubery, 1997; Killmann and
Klein, 1997; OECD, 2004; Pfau-Effinger, 1998). Furthermore, part-time
employment as a proportion of total employment continues to increase in
Germany. Part-time employment has remained relatively stable in the United
Kingdom over the last few years, although as a proportion of total employ-
ment, current levels reflect a growth of nearly 7 per cent in part-time work
over the last three decades in both countries.
Germany presents an interesting research case because of the division
between east and west. Despite unification in 1990, many differences still exist
between eastern and western Germany when considering levels of part-time
work. In unified Germany, part-time work levels are currently 19.6 per cent
(OECD, 2004). This reflects a steady increase of 0.5 per cent per year since
1990 (OECD, 2004). The United Kingdom also has a tradition of high levels
of part-time work. The current level of part-time work is 23.3 per cent, which
is the second highest in the EU (after the Netherlands) and has been relatively
stable since the early 1990s (OECD, 2004). 
Part-time work remains a gendered phenomenon in Europe (Drew et al.,
1998; O’Reilly and Fagan, 1998; Tijdens, 2002). Despite increases in male part-
time working, women work decidedly more in part-time positions, and this is
reflected in women’s share in part-time employment, as well as in the
proportion of part-time employment in women’s total employment. Again,
both Germany and the United Kingdom have lower levels of part-time work
among women than in the Netherlands, but still higher than the EU-15 average
of 30.1 per cent. Part-time levels among women are 36.3 per cent and 40.1 per
cent in Germany and the United Kingdom in 2003 (OECD, 2004). Since 1990,
these levels of part-time work among women have been constant in the United
Kingdom and rising slightly in Germany. In both countries, the incidence of
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part-time work among males is increasing, albeit from very low levels. Male
part-time work is most frequent in the Netherlands (14.8 per cent), followed
by Denmark (10.5 per cent) and the United Kingdom (9.6 per cent), whereas
it is below the EU-15 average (of 6.3 per cent) in Germany (5.9 per cent)
(OECD, 2004). The share of women in part-time work is very high but slowly
falling in both countries.
9.4.1 Germany
Taking a closer look at the development of part-time work in Germany, we see
that part-time work evolved as more of a west German phenomenon. This is not
surprising given the communist past of east Germany, where full employment,
and hence full-time employment for both men and women, was the norm. Due
to these differences, western Germany tends to have a lower female labour force
participation rate. In eastern Germany, the activity rate for women is 14
percentage points higher, and this difference increases to 18 percentage points
when married women are taken into account (Garhammer, 2000). However,
while the level of labour market participation is higher in east Germany, this level
has been decreasing since reunification in 1990, whereas the level of western
German women entering and staying in the labour market continues to rise. This
variation is also reflected in annual average working hours per person. Annual
average working hours for both sexes have declined in the last 13 years in both
eastern and western Germany, but annual average working hours continue to
decline at a faster rate in eastern Germany than in western Germany (OECD,
2004).5 Only in the last year did annual average working hours show a slight
increase in both eastern and western Germany. However, while western Germany
had a higher average of annual working hours at the time of reunification, the
western Bundesländer have since maintained lower annual average working hours
over the last five years in comparison with eastern Germany, and according to
OECD figures, the gap between east and west is closing (figure 9.3).
Whether the differences in annual average working hours between the
old and the new German states will dissipate over the next few years remains
to be seen. Figures from EIRO (2002) suggest that average annual working
hours declined at similar rates in both parts of the country. The dramatic
decline in annual average working hours per person in western Germany in 
the early 1990s reflects reduced contractual working hours for full-time
employees; in eastern Germany unions pressed in the same direction, but with
considerably less success.
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5 Figures reflect annual average hours worked per person, both sexes. Figures on average annual hours worked in eastern
Germany were calculated by the authors, based on OECD figures for unified and western Germany.
Women’s part-time preferences
The development of part-time work in both eastern and western
Germany cannot be attributed to a dominant preference among women. The
male breadwinner model was a dominant factor in Germany during the
development of high levels of part-time work among women; west Germany
was a so-called “strong” male breadwinner state (Lewis, 1992). The “strong”
male breadwinner model places an emphasis on the private responsibility 
of families for childcare and makes the employment of a second earner
disadvantageous. In Germany, while the male breadwinner state actually
created facilities and services for women with children, these policies served 
to push women out of the labour market. Opening times of schools and
kindergartens, and the poor availability of childcare, also discouraged the
active participation of mothers, especially those with young children
(Killmann and Klein, 1997; Pfau-Effinger, 1998). Furthermore, the spouse-
based joint tax-splitting system provided one of the highest levels of sole-
earner relief, thereby supporting the male breadwinner model (Dingleday,
2001). In western Germany, part-time work provided an inroad into the labour
market for many women, and in eastern Germany, part-time work was often
involuntary as full-time work is the norm. Due to these limited options, as
well as social norms regarding childcare, part-time work developed as a coping
solution for many women looking to combine work and family life, rather
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Figure 9.3 Annual average working hours per person, Germany 1990–2003
Source: OECD, 2004.
similar to the Netherlands. However, this holds true only for western
Germany. Part-time work has been forced onto many eastern German women
after reunification, given the scarcity of available jobs and difficulties in
maintaining their position in the labour market.
Remnants of this male breadwinner model still exist in Germany,
allowing part-time work to remain an especially attractive option for mothers
looking to combine paid and unpaid work. Although it is slowly disappearing,
the male breadwinner model still predominates in policies as well as social
and cultural norms. As Pfau-Effinger (1998) argues, the male breadwinner
model in Germany is being updated or, as she calls it, “modernized”. This is
particularly true in western Germany, whereas in eastern Germany, part-time
work is considered to be less prestigious, with lower incomes, resulting in
fewer preferences for this form of working time (Garhammer, 2000). We see
the effects of this development reflected in German women’s working
preferences today. Part-time work is now preferred by many western German
mothers looking to combine work and family life, although many mothers of
young children prefer to remain outside the labour market until their child is
older (Garhammer, 2000; Killmann and Klein, 1997). The same cannot be said
of eastern German women, who continue to prefer full-time work.
The role of government policy
The preferences of western German women for part-time work only 
played an indirect role in the strong development of part-time work in Germany,
yet the initial growth and development of part-time work in Germany is not
diectly attributable to government policy either. Part-time work was not directly
supported by the government until late into the tenure of the centre-right Kohl
Governments (1982–98), later continued by the centre-left coalition under
Gerhard Schroeder (1998–2005). With rising unemployment and in an apparent
move to counter collective work-sharing options of the German unions, the 
Kohl Government, and German employers, began to discover and praise the part-
time job expansion of its small western neighbour. However, there were very 
few concrete policy proposals. In the mid-1990s there were only some job
creation schemes, including some measures to reduce working hours to 80 per
cent of the normal working time in the public sector (Killmann and Klein, 1997).
Under the first Schroeder Government in 1998, support of part-time work, in
the form of “mini-jobs” (with lower levels of wage costs and social protection),
and legislation regarding employees’ ability to work part time became more
important. Some of the more recent efforts to support part-time work during the
second Schroeder Government include the attempt to re-regulate “mini-jobs”
and address work–family balance issues, also in response to European legislation
and policies. 
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In 2001, the new law on part-time and fixed-term work came into effect,
which gives employees the right to request a reduction in working time in
companies with more than 15 employees and places restrictions on the use of
fixed-term contracts (EIRO, 2002). While the long-term effects of this
legislation are not yet visible, initial reports suggest that only a minority of
employees is exercising their right to reduce working hours, less than 1 per
cent in the year the new legislation came into force. Four out of five employees
requesting a reduction in working hours are women (EIRO, 2003a). It is
difficult to say whether greater numbers of employees will make use of this
legislation, yet it theoretically provides many employees with the opportunity
to have more influence over their individual working time. 
The new focus on work–family balance could work to increase the
popularity of reduced working hours, mostly in the form of part-time work.
Legislation introduced in 2002 to promote work–family balance (EIRO,
2003a) intended to promote women’s employment and increase equal
employment opportunities for men and women. This legislation prompted
mixed responses from the social partners and women’s organizations. Social
partners herald the legislation as much needed, yet employers’ organizations
remain sceptical about increased costs. Women’s organizations feel the
legislation is not far-reaching enough to create significant change. The current
work–family balance campaign by the Ministry for Family, Seniors, Women
and Youth, while recognizing problems such as a lack of childcare and the
unwillingness of employers to address work–family issues, mainly recommends
voluntary solutions, to be found in the context of collective bargaining
(BFSFJ, 2003). German collective bargainers seem to have been less promin-
ent in their attempt to raise the profile of part-time work and create a more
sustainable balance of work and family life in comparison with their Dutch
colleagues, possibly reflecting lower levels of cooperation between the social
partners, and less coordination across sectors, using central agreements to
recommend particular solutions or norms. 
Furthermore, new regulations allowing employees to earn up to 400 euros
monthly, exempt from payroll taxes and social security contributions, serve to
increase the number of “mini-jobs” present in the German labour market.
These jobs are mostly found in the service sector, typically performed by
women, and hardly satisfy conditions of “decent work” in terms of earnings,
social protection, and rights at work (EIRO, 2003a). This development is likely
to reinforce the negative qualities of part-time work and contributes to a
“marginalization” rather than a “normalization” of part-time work. By actively
supporting the growth of short-hours jobs, the Government allows “marginal”
part-time work to grow – i.e., those part-time jobs that are often precarious and
poorly paid. And while new legislation allows employees to request a reduction
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in working hours, complementary legislation is necessary that secures the rights
and position of people choosing to reduce their working hours.
The social partners
The growth of part-time work is not attributable to the policies of the
social partners either. German trade unions responded similarly to Dutch
unions, fighting the growth of part-time jobs, and unlike their Dutch
counterparts, German unions were less in need of developing a part-time
strategy. German unions were much stronger and more successful in pressing
the collective solution to work-sharing by means of a reduction of working
hours for all, and with fewer concessions on flexible working time. Before
unification in 1990 and the economic crisis that followed, the economy
performed better and unemployment was lower. Consequently, there was less
pressure to create part-time jobs (for young people and women) as a “second-
best” solution (compared with full-time work, but always better than
unemployment). Other typical pressures, like wage moderation or an early
central agreement in which employers adopted part-time work as a possible
work-sharing solution in times of high unemployment, like the 1982 Wassenaar
agreement in the Netherlands, were absent in Germany. Part-time work did not
become a strategy for entry into the market for paid labour by women, but
rather it became a tool for flexibility in the service sector for employers (Pfau-
Effinger, 1998). This difference – whether part-time jobs result from the
character of the labour supply or derive from the flexibility needs of employers
– tends to have a big influence on the rights and conditions of part-time work,
and on its image in society. Trade unions are slowly changing their perspective
and have become supportive of government legislation allowing employees 
to request a reduction in working hours. Without specifically promoting part-
time work, the German Federation of Trade Unions encourages a continued
reduction of the working week as a means to achieve full employment (DGB,
2003). The reduction of the working week is seen primarily as a means of
reducing the very high levels of unemployment, but also as a means of creating
a better work–family balance. 
Employers continue to resist the reduction in weekly working hours and
have instead pressed for longer working hours as a means to raise competitive-
ness levels (EIRO, 2003a). Due to employer resistance, there have been
relatively few changes to the collectively agreed work-week in the last two
years of collective bargaining, and in 2003 the German unions in metal
engineering lost a major strike on the issue. Many developments – towards
both longer and shorter working hours – now take place in the context of
special company arrangements, using hardship and opening clauses in sectoral
agreements. Some of these, for instance at Volkswagen, Bayer and Deutsche
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Bahn (the German railways), do address work–family balance issues, but it is
impossible to say whether or not this is a general trend (BFSFJ, 2003). 
Summing up, we see that the development of part-time work in Germany
shares some parallels with the Netherlands, yet women’s preferences for “soft”
labour markets appear to be much less widely diffused and defended. The
growth of the service sector, and with it part-time jobs, contributed
significantly to the development of part-time work in Germany, although the
pace of service sector growth was admittedly slower in Germany than in the
Netherlands. Together with the development of “mini-jobs”, this may have
trapped part-time jobs in a pattern of marginalization, rather differently from
developments in the Netherlands. Social and cultural attitudes regarding
working mothers reinforced women’s acceptance of part-time work as a coping
solution in western Germany and the labour market difficulties following
reunification limited eastern German women’s labour market options. These
developments were reinforced by job creation schemes throughout the 1990s
and today, and current legislation strives to increase employees’ flexibility
regarding their working hours. While employers’ organizations are hesitant to
support these measures, some individual employers and trade unions are slowly
coming round to the Government’s call for promoting work–family balance. 
In the Netherlands, this change came earlier and, complemented by strong
advocacy of women’s groups in the unions and central agreements with
employers, support for the “normalization” strategy was stronger. If this
normalization process is to continue, allowing part-time work to develop into
a “decent” working form, the negative qualities of part-time work in Germany,
such as the promotion of short-hours “mini-jobs”, must be addressed, as well
as attempts to increase the gender neutrality of current individual adjustments
to working hours.
9.4.2 United Kingdom
The development of part-time work in the United Kingdom differs from both
Germany and the Netherlands mainly because it is shaped in a much less regulated
labour market. The similarity lies in the heritage of a strong male breadwinner
model (Lewis, 1992). Hence, in the United Kingdom, part-time work also
developed mostly as a means for women wishing to combine paid labour and
motherhood (Bruegel and Perrons, 1998). Nearly all of the post-war growth in
married women’s employment can be explained by the growth in part-time work
(Lewis, 1992). However, there are two distinct differences in the way in which
part-time work developed in the United Kingdom. First, while part-time work
among women differs between the eastern and western parts of Germany, in the
United Kingdom part-time work among women is divided along ethnic lines.
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Full-time, not part-time, work seems to be the norm for minority ethnic women
in the United Kingdom and ethnic minority women are more likely than white
women to be working full time. This full-time pattern varies little based on
occupation or the presence of children in the household (Dale and Holdsworth,
1998). Second, working hours are polarized in the United Kingdom, and part-
time work often consists of “marginal” – i.e., very short – hours, which serves to
increase the level of involuntary part-time work among women. Due to the short-
hours nature of part-time work in Britain, workers are often excluded from social
protection benefits, making their labour market position even more precarious
(Bruegel and Perrons, 1998; Fagan and Rubery, 1997).
Women’s part-time preferences
The growth in female part-time work in the United Kingdom is not
reflective of female preferences for part-time work, but stems from the
necessary practicalities of household and family organization and deeply
entrenched social attitudes, a trend we see in Germany and the Netherlands as
well (Fagan and Rubery, 1997). The largest preference for part-time work can
once again be found among mothers looking to combine paid work with
family responsibilities and childcare. Even with a slight increase in full-
time jobs, most married mothers continue to work part-time (Dale and
Holdsworth, 1998). As noted previously, it is more common for women of
ethnic minorities to remain in full-time employment after having children.
This is also true for highly educated women (Fagan and Rubery, 1997). Yet
even this group of women is significantly smaller in comparison to other
European countries due to long-held social beliefs regarding motherhood and
paid work in the United Kingdom, a trend also visible in the Netherlands and
Germany (Fagan and Rubery, 1997; Pfau-Effinger, 1998). However, the
difficulty of combining paid work with motherhood does not deter all women
from participating in the labour market. Despite a lack of childcare, young
women with children have experienced the highest increase in the rate of
labour market participation in the United Kingdom (Fagan and Rubery, 1997).
The largest inconsistency between the development of part-time work 
and women’s working time preferences lies in the issue of hours. The
precariousness of “marginal” part-time jobs in the United Kingdom is reflected
in these preferences; very short working hours remain unpopular in the United
Kingdom and longer hours are preferred by nearly one in five part-time
workers (Fagan, 2000). In households where aggregate working hours are long,
though, women do have a preference for shorter hours. The development of
part-time work in the United Kingdom was not driven by women’s preferences
and their current preferences reflect the problem of undesirable hours in part-
time work, creating serious obstacles to “decent” part-time work. This is in
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contrast to the Netherlands, where part-time work is more the outcome of
what women want – admittedly conditioned by various constraints, but none-
theless much less under direct influence of employers’ need for flexibility. As
is argued by Berg and colleagues (2003), in countries with little labour market
regulation and low coverage of collective bargaining, as is the case in the United
Kingdom (and the United States), employers have more power to shape when
and how long people work, and employee autonomy is usually very low. This
is, in the case of the United Kingdom, also reflected in higher levels of conflict
and stress over work–family issues among both men and women, compared to
Germany and, especially, the Netherlands (according to ISSP data of 2002).
Fagan (2004) concurs that – apart from the length of working hours – it is the
control of workers over their individual working hours that is crucial.
The role of government policy
This situation of extreme working hours in the United Kingdom stems
partly from the laissez-faire government policies present until the Blair
Administration. In contrast to Germany and the Netherlands, there was no
explicit government policy concerning long working hours or promoting part-
time work. Relevant EU legislation did not apply before 1997 and when it did,
after the change in government, this legislation was applied in a minimalistic
way. The expansion of part-time employment that did take place was market
driven and hardly constrained by legal norms (Fagan et al., 2000). Many part-
time jobs were marginal, without employment protection, and based on very
short weekly hours (fewer than 16). While countries sometimes promote part-
time work or reduced working hours to combat unemployment, this was not
the case in the United Kingdom. The British Government maintained a policy
of allowing firms to choose their own working time arrangements, both very
long and very short hours.
Since the Blair Government took office in 1997, several changes to labour
regulations have been made, including the introduction of a minimum wage in
1999; changes to maternity leave and the introduction of paternity leave
arrangements in 2002; and, similar to Germany, a new effort has been launched
to help employees reconcile work and family life (EIRO, 2003d). In 2000, 
the Government started a new campaign on the reconciliation of work and
family life, asking employers to consider more “family-friendly” policies. This
campaign culminated in the new Employment Act of 2002, which included the
changes to maternity pay and maternity leave as well as introducing a paternity
leave arrangement. However, the new legislation on Flexible Working
Regulations, which allows working parents to reduce working hours under
certain conditions, remains controversial (EIRO, 2003c). The change in
legislation allows parents with children under the age of 6 (or a disabled child
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up to 18 years of age) to ask for changes in working hours and times and to
request being able to work at home. These requests can only be applied for
after 26 weeks of employment with one employer, and are restricted to those
persons bearing responsibility for the raising of the child (EIRO, 2003c).
The new emphasis on family-friendly working time policies is popular
among employees, but both unions and employers have responded with less
enthusiasm. A recent government survey shows that nearly half of the
respondents find flexible working hours more important than other company
benefits: one-third of those employees surveyed would rather have flexible
working hours than a moderate increase in annual earnings of one thousand
pounds sterling (EIRO, 2003b). Currently, the Government is focused on
three goals within the work–family balance campaign. These include focusing
on sectors where the work–family balance is most critical, addressing the long-
hours culture, as well as providing assistance and guidance as employers and
employees adjust to the new policies and regulations. In the United Kingdom,
about one-third of all men and close to 10 per cent of all women in
employment work 48 hours (the EU maximum) or more; in Germany the
percentages drop to 15 and 5 per cent, in the Netherlands to 10 and below 
5 per cent respectively (data taken from the European Labour Force Survey of
2001, Eurostat). While a considerable part of the long-hours culture is
associated with self-employment, it affects a very large number of the depend-
ently employed as well. The current struggle between unions, employers and
the Government, and with the European Commission, over the continuation
of an “opt-out” for individual firms and employees, allowing longer working
hours than those provided by relevant EU legislation, is directly related. It is
the flip side of the unregulated development of part-time work as a special
marginal segment of the British labour market. This certainly does not help to
shape part-time work as a form of decent work, even though with its
disadvantages part-time work has the benefit of allowing a reconciliation of
work–family pressures during a particular phase in one’s life.
The social partners
Just as there was no explicit government policy to promote the development
of part-time work, the social partners did not actively endorse this work form
either. The role of the British social partners differs from that in the Netherlands
and Germany. During the 1990s in the United Kingdom, collective bargaining
no longer took place on the national or sectoral level, and the coverage of em-
ployees under collective agreements dropped to half the levels in Germany and
the Netherlands (EC, 2004). Only a minority of 35 per cent of all employees is
covered by collective agreements in the United Kingdom. In terms of content,
company-level collective agreements in the United Kingdom regulate matters
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of part-time rights distinctively less than even those in Germany, let alone the
Netherlands. The lack of statutory or voluntary regulation, combined with the
growth of the service sector, allowed British employers to cater to consumer-
oriented services, contributing to the growth of part-time work, very short hours
and very long hours, as well as unsocial hours – leaving employees with little
control over their working times. Employers also often created low-skilled
positions to restrict training costs, thereby increasing the number of low-skilled
part-time jobs. British trade unions did little to halt these developments, and 
often remained supportive of overtime and unsocial hours working, with
rendered extra pay (Fagan and Rubery, 1997). In the context of the recent
activities of the Government to promote a better work–life balance, the social
partners have been more vocal. The Trades Union Congress (TUC), the main
organ for labour, representing 71 British unions, now focuses on work–family
issues, with an entire section of its website dedicated to “changing times”
(www.tuc.org.uk), and it is seeking a “partnership” on this issue with employers.
While the TUC is enthusiastic about the new working time legislation, it is
concerned that the legislation is not tough enough, providing employers with the
means to reject employee requests. 
The reaction of employers’ organizations is mixed. While the Confederation
of British Industry (CBI) responded favourably to the new working time
legislation, the Institute of Directors (IoD) condemned the legislation as harm-
ful to businesses, claiming that it will cause conflicts in the workplace (EIRO,
2003d). The CBI also expressed some concerns regarding the costs and con-
sequences of such legislation on the preferences of those employees without
children, many of whom may now want to have “flexible” working times as well.
Despite current similar campaigns to promote work–life balance, the
development of part-time work in the United Kingdom differs from that in
both Germany and the Netherlands in many respects. Precisely because of 
a lack of government labour market regulation, part-time work was allowed 
to expand and grow. Employers made use of this liberal labour market to
promote consumer-oriented part-time jobs in the service sector and low-
skilled part-time jobs. British part-time jobs lack the rights and quality often
found in part-time jobs in the Netherlands. A working hours culture of
extremes developed in the United Kingdom and consequently, part-time jobs
are often short-hours positions with lower pay and poor benefits. All of this
means that most part-time jobs are far from the aspirations and standards of
“decent work”. The gendered nature of part-time work reinforces that
conclusion, although that is an issue in all three countries. However, in the
United Kingdom, the issue of entrapment into low-skilled, low-paid and
unprotected part-time jobs is mainly an issue for women, and is much more
pervasive than in the other two countries. This is reinforced by the short
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supply of accessible and affordable childcare facilities and the very minim-
alistic application of relevant EU regulations on maximum working hours,
paternal leave, irregular work and part-time employment. 
9.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter attempts to explain the growth and high levels of part-time work
in Germany and the United Kingdom by looking at which factors account for
the phenomenal growth of part-time work and the existence of the one-and-a-
half-earner model in the Netherlands. We show that while the growth in Dutch
part-time work is attributable to women’s preferences for “soft” labour
markets, policies of the government and the social partners followed, rather
than preceded, this development. However, the effect of such supportive
policies was much stronger in the Netherlands than in the other two countries. 
A number of similarities in the growth of part-time work are evident
among the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. First, all three
were strong breadwinner states, yet the effect of this on women’s working
times was differentiated within these countries. In Germany, there is a
divergence between its eastern and western halves, with marked differences in
labour market participation and part-time work levels both before and after
reunification. The male breadwinner model present in west Germany
discouraged the active participation of mothers of young children, making part-
time work a more attractive solution. In contrast, until reunification in 1990,
full-time work was the norm for women in east Germany, and the growth of
part-time work among women in eastern Germany often remains involuntary.
The presence of a strong breadwinner state also affected the growth of female
part-time work in the United Kingdom, but here the effects of this model on
working times differentiate themselves along ethnic lines. Part-time work
developed as a norm for white women, whereas ethnic minority women are
more likely to work full time. In the Netherlands, it seems as if levels of part-
time work are homogeneous across all groups of women. Given the difference
in size between the Netherlands and countries like Germany and the United
Kingdom, this lack of variation in part-time work might be expected. How-
ever, despite the seemingly homogeneous nature of part-time work in the
Netherlands, further research is needed to determine whether part-time
working differences might exist along ethnic lines.
Within the Netherlands, but also in Germany and the United Kingdom,
part-time work developed as a “second-best” option for many women,
particularly working mothers. Part-time work was preferred to staying out of
the labour market, or being unemployed (with few rights or benefits) – but
not to a full-time job, with full rights, earnings and benefits. Therefore a
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danger of marginalization was present in all three countries, certainly in the
initial stages of the growth of part-time work. We show that in the
Netherlands this risk was reduced by an early and relatively effective strategy
of “normalization” of part-time work, narrowing the differences in rights,
benefits and earnings with full-time work, a strategy in which unions,
employers and governments played a role. The successful diffusion of part-
time work throughout all sectors and occupations in the Netherlands suggests
some success of this development, although the heavily gendered nature of
part-time work, as well as the lower training and career opportunities, signify
some remaining obstacles and shortcomings on the road to fully defining part-
time work in that country as “decent work”. In Germany there are conditions
for a similar strategy, though there appears to be more reluctance to accept this
strategy, especially among the social partners, but perhaps also among German
employees, both male and female. In the United Kingdom, however, part-time
work developed in a far less regulated context and has, as a consequence,
become heavily associated with marginal employment, low pay and little skill
training. A qualitative strategy of normalization, upgrading the rights and
attractions of part-time work, would require a much greater and most
probably joint effort of the Government, unions and employers.
We conclude with some remaining questions regarding the growth of
part-time work among women that are not answered in this chapter. Why did
Dutch women continue to work in part-time jobs, despite more opportu-
nities for full-time work and rapidly falling unemployment rates? Why did
they not follow the road of Danish women? How decisive or important 
are leave rights in such developments and how do unemployment benefits 
rights factor in? Is the higher rate of full-time employment among Danish
compared with Dutch women also reflective of higher divorce rates and more
Danish women living on their own? How are norms concerning working
hours and leisure, and full-time and part-time work, shaped and changed?
Why is the take-up rate of leave rights among men so low, and why do only
few women use their right to change working hours in all three countries?
How do relative wage differences, education and training rights influence the
gender structure of part-time and leave decisions? Finally, the issue of choice
and control over when and how long one works – in a lifetime perspective –
should be an issue high on the agenda for future research and in the search
for decent work. 
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PART III
FLEXIBILITIES AND CONDITIONS OF WORK

10.1 INTRODUCTION
Unskilled jobs are not disappearing. Indeed, some types of unskilled jobs have
recently increased in number. The premature declaration of the advent of the
knowledge society has caused researchers to neglect the analysis of low-skill
jobs, whether with regard to job content, competences, pay or working
conditions. These jobs are located in industries (retailing, hotels and catering,
personal and domiciliary services, among others) that lie beyond the borders
of the information or knowledge society. They continue to provide large
numbers of jobs in today’s societies. In France, the available data even show
an increase in the number of unskilled workers since the beginning of the
1990s, an increase due in particular to the very strong growth of white-collar
unskilled jobs. More widely, these low-skill and, in many cases, low-paid jobs
often reflect the choices societies make. Thus the majority of the jobs created
in the last two decades have been in low-pay sectors. In the United States in
particular, as many as 80 per cent of the jobs created between 1980 and 2000
were in low-pay sectors (Mishel et al., 1999).
Against this background, the analysis of working conditions takes on a
particular significance and must be given fresh life. The available surveys in this
area show that, despite mechanization and automation, physical arduousness in
work has not disappeared. New risks and constraints emerged (see Gollac and
Vokloff, 2000) in the final decades of the twentieth century, particularly, but not
exclusively, as a result of the expansion of the service sector. However, the
question of working conditions is usually raised with regard to blue-collar
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workers. Thus any proposal to compare the working conditions of these two
broad occupational categories requires a critical re-examination of our under-
standing of white-collar employees’ working conditions. 
It is from this point of view that we investigate in this chapter the
conditions under which work in the so-called “unskilled” occupational
categories is carried out. What is happening with unskilled jobs in France?
Can unskilled white-collar workers be said to work in bad conditions? Are
there differences, in France at least, between unskilled white-collar and
unskilled blue-collar workers? If there are, what are they?
At the international level, it is true that the analysis of working
conditions has been enhanced by the development of various new concepts
(decent work (ILO, 2001), job quality (OECD), suitable employment).
Nevertheless, certain aspects have still not been thoroughly investigated,
particularly the question of the temporal availability required of workers in
the service sector. 
In the French literature, Gollac and Volkoff talk of the “time constraints”
that weigh increasingly heavily on workers (2001, p. 183). Others include
indicators of working hours among the various aspects of work organization.
However, most struggle to evaluate temporal availability in its full extent,
quantitative or otherwise, as a constituent element of employees’ working
conditions. Three dimensions of time (duration, predictability and schedule)
are included into the broad concept of temporal availability, as we regard it,
following Devetter’s contribution. Devetter (2004) legitimates this choice in
the following manner: “First, employees and employers consider them as
substitutable dimensions, as we can see in firms’ agreements or in social
legislation (exchange of reduced working time or greater time sovereignty for
unsocial hours, for example). Secondly, consequences on workers’ health are
quite comparable. Finally, the combination of these three dimensions enables
to determine the ‘normal practices’ linked with social rhythms.”
In this chapter, we examine working conditions in several service
industries, in particular those in which workers are in direct contact with
customers or users. A high share of jobs in these industries is “involuntary”
part-time jobs, and temporal availability lies at the heart of the question of
working conditions. The findings presented here show that it is part-timers
who suffer the greatest hardships linked to increased temporal availability.
This will raise the question of whether involuntary part-time working can be
considered as “decent working time” as defined by Messenger (2004) in his
studies for the ILO – in which he considers working time as one of the
elements that constitute “decent work”.
In order to deal with these questions in their entirety, our analysis is divided
into two stages. In the next section, we characterize, by means of statistical data,
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the unskilled white-collar category and the sectors in which unskilled jobs are
concentrated, highlighting the fact that in France workers in this category are
more likely than those in other categories to suffer poor employment con-
ditions, low pay and poor working conditions. In the following section, we
analyse in greater detail the specific characteristics of working conditions in the
unskilled white-collar category against the background of the question of “decent
working time” (Messenger, 2004). We will show, in particular, that temporal
availability is an ambiguous concept.
10.2 EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS 
OF UNSKILLED WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS
IN FRANCE
10.2.1 Some methodological preliminaries
Defining and quantifying the unskilled white-collar category is a far from
simple task, since there is no unanimous agreement as to its boundaries, either
within the research community in France or in international debates. Should
attention be focused on the low paid, the less educated or on low-skilled or
unskilled workers? The notion of unskilled worker needs to be historically
(and perhaps locally) defined, and international comparative findings are very
sensitive to the definition adopted (box 10.1).
Depending on whether the main concern is with individuals’ lack of
skills, the unskilled nature of job content, or of employment, the emphasis will
be on measuring the level of formal qualification or expertise, job content, or
the level of pay. However, in France, for example, there has been an increas-
ingly evident imbalance between these three dimensions of occupational
grading (Méda and Vennat, 2004) and it would seem, to judge from inter-
national data, that this is true to varying degrees in other countries as well.
Thus, whereas the United States and the United Kingdom have small shares of
low-skill workers in employment compared with France, the share of low-paid
workers is, on the contrary, higher in the English-speaking countries: 19.4 per
cent in the United Kingdom and 19.7 per cent in Ireland, compared with 
15.6 per cent in France – a figure close to the European Union (EU) average
(European Commission, 2004, p. 122).
Furthermore, most of the comparative studies we have been able to
review are concerned more particularly, indeed exclusively, with full-time
employees, which enables them to avoid the measurement difficulties
associated with national variations in working time and sub-national variations
in the use of part-time employment. This is a genuine concern in the case of
unskilled jobs, since it is known that many part-timers are employed in such
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jobs. If such data are used, there is considerable risk that a significant share of
the workforce will be ignored and, with them, the issues specific to that
category, particularly when it comes to working conditions.
For these reasons, we decided to focus solely on the unskilled category 
in France, making comparative references, when possible, to the OECD
countries. Thus our analysis will enable us to re-examine the practices of 
other countries.
Who are the unskilled white-collar workers?
As the service sector has expanded in the developed economies, the
white-collar category has gradually supplanted the manual or blue-collar
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Box 10.1 Skilled, unskilled, less skilled
A distinction is fairly commonly made in the United States between skilled and less
skilled employees. Formal educational qualifications are often the only distinguishing
criterion used, with those workers having no more than a high-school education
considered to be “less skilled” (Blank and Card, 2000).
We have adopted a more constructivist approach to the notion of “unskilled”, one that
takes account of the characteristics of both the individual and the job held. France’s
economic and social history shows, after all, that manual workers were placed in the
unskilled categories on the basis of three criteria: a low level of educational
qualifications, low pay, and relatively simple job content.
For the purposes of our statistical analysis, we had to choose a classification. We
adopted that drawn up by Burnod and Chenu (2001), which uses pay levels as its
main criterion. This is very similar to the international classifications of low-paid
workers. In France, however, two other classifications are also frequently used. These
are as follows:
• Bisault, Destival and Goux (1994) drew up a definition of an unskilled job based
on the employment structure survey, which is used by employers and is based
on institutional distinctions, and when possible, also on collective agreements.
For occupations outside the scope of this survey, the authors used the twin
criteria of level of educational qualification and level of vocational training.
• Chardon (2002) has drawn up a definition “based on the degree of specialized
training individuals in the post require”. Any occupation for which those starting
out on their careers have to undergo a specific course of training is regarded 
as “skilled”.
category. In France, the number of workers in the white-collar category
increased by a factor of 3.5 between 1954 and 2002. Today, there are 7 million
white-collar workers in employment, compared with 6.2 million blue-collar
workers, as table 10.1 shows. Within this dominant socio-occupational
category, “unskilled” workers account for almost half of total white-collar
employment in France (47 per cent, see box 10.1).
This white-collar category is characterized by a very high share of women
(more than 78 per cent compared with 45 per cent across all categories), by a
substantial share of graduates (51 per cent unskilled white-collar workers), by
a not-insignificant share of young people (almost 13 per cent of unskilled
white-collar workers are under 25) and by an extremely high part-time rate –
over 40 per cent (table 10.2).
Where do unskilled white-collar employees work?
Unlike unskilled blue-collar workers, who are evenly distributed among
the major sectors of the economy, unskilled white-collar workers are
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Table 10.1 Evolution of the economically active population in employment
from 1982 to 2002, white-collar and blue-collar workers
(thousands)
1982 1990 1999 2002 Growth over the
period
White-collar 5 501 5 900 6 655 7 002 27.3%
Blue-collar 7 044 6 546 5 905 6 201 −12.0%
Sources: The data for 1982 to 1999 are taken from the population census, see Amossé, 2001. Those for 2002 are taken
from the INSEE Labour Survey, 2002.
Table 10.2 Who are the unskilled white-collar workers in France?
Comparisons with unskilled blue-collar workers, 2002
(percentages)
Share of women Share of young Share of Share of
people foreigners graduates
Active population in employment 
(APE) 45.3 7.7 5.5 71
Unskilled white-collar workers 
(UWC) 78.2 12.7 8.2 51
Unskilled blue-collar workers
(UBC) 36.4 19.3 12.3 40
Source: INSEE, Labour Survey, 2002.
concentrated overwhelmingly in the service sector (table 10.3). Within that
sector, retailing, hotels and catering and personal and domestic services
account for half of all unskilled white-collar workers. This pattern of
distribution is found in most western countries. Again, it is in these three
industries that the rates of low-paid and/or low-skilled workers are highest:
“within the service sector, there are remarkable differences, with 40 per cent
and 26 per cent of low paid employees in hotels and restaurants and trade,
respectively, as against around 12.8 per cent in public administration,
education and health” (European Commission, 2004, p. 169).
It is for these reasons that we have focused in particular on these
industries in the rest of this chapter.1
10.2.2 Employment conditions and pay
Employment conditions
Unskilled white-collar workers do not appear to be disadvantaged when
their employment conditions are compared with those of unskilled blue-
collar workers (table 10.4). Whereas 10 per cent of unskilled blue-collar
workers are recruited on fixed-term contracts, only 6 per cent of unskilled
white-collar workers are on contracts of this type. Unskilled blue-collar
workers are also more likely to be on temporary contracts; this applies to
more than 11 per cent of the category in France, compared with less than 
1 per cent of unskilled white-collar workers. This reflects a fairly specific
characteristic of the market for temporary workers in France, where such
jobs are concentrated among the manual trades; in other European countries,
in contrast, there are considerably more temporary workers in the service
sector (Macaire and Michon, 2002).
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Table 10.3 Where are unskilled white-collar workers employed?
Comparisons with unskilled blue-collar workers, 2002
(percentages)
Agriculture Manufacturing Services
Active population in employment (APE) 4 24 72 
Unskilled white-collar workers (UWC) 0 3 96 
Unskilled blue-collar workers (UBC) 10 42 48 
Source: INSEE, Labour Survey, 2002. 
1 Our statistical data are drawn from the INSEE employment survey, the supplementary survey on working conditions
carried out by DARES (French Ministry of Labour) and a qualitative survey during which some 50 individuals were
interviewed. For further details on the methodology, see the report by Gadrey et al., 2003.
However, and contrary to what the data suggest, many white-collar
workers in France are also employed on various types of precarious contracts.
In order to fully explain the reasons for this, we probably need to invoke the
contradictions between work and employment that Margaret Maruani (1996)
so rightly points to. In essence, the question she poses is the following: how
can we explain why women are so active in the labour market when employ-
ment conditions for them are so unfavourable?
The degree of precariousness measured “objectively” by categories such
as temporary employment or fixed-term contracts is no longer sufficient to
measure precariousness in employment. There are various factors that help to
explain this apparent paradox. The first is the state of the labour market which,
in France more than elsewhere because of the high unemployment rate, creates
reserves of labour and makes it vital for those in employment to cling to their
jobs – on the principle that “any job is better than no job at all”. Forced to
work in order to survive, many employees, a high share of unskilled white-
collar workers among them, take jobs despite the nature of the contract on
offer. This is clearly illustrated by statements such as: “As soon as I can, I’m
getting another job” and “I only stay because I need a job, otherwise I’d have
been out of here a long time ago”.
There are other factors at work as well. One is part-time working2 and
its “procession” of additional hours, as they are often described. This tem-
poral availability shows that employees are the first victims of flexibility,
which can affect both working time and pay. This latter aspect is reflected 
in variable monthly earnings, depending on the number of hours worked.3
When the “smoothing” linked to annualization does not take place, the
absence of any reference point as to the level of their future pay prevents
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Table 10.4 Employment conditions of unskilled white-collar workers, 2002
(percentages)
Part-time Share of Share of
rate fixed-term temporary
contracts contracts
Active population in employment (APE) 16 4 2.5
Unskilled white-collar workers (UWC) 41 6 0.5
Unskilled blue-collar workers (UBC) 17 10 11
Source: INSEE, Labour Survey, 2002.
2 This is usually for those workers on permanent contracts.
3 In this respect, the annualization of working time, which has accelerated with the introduction of the 35-hour working
week in France, has in many cases provided the justification for the annual “smoothing” of wages, although it has often
also led to increased variability of work schedules.
workers from planning for the future and heightens their feelings of
economic insecurity.
The last but by no means least of these factors is that, irrespective of the
quality of their current employment contracts, workers often do not regard
themselves as properly established in a job until they have obtained a full-
time position. We will not examine this argument in any greater detail here,
since it has been set out at length by Maruani and Nicole (1989). Thus the
feeling of precariousness is significantly more complex than mere consider-
ation of the contractual link to employment would suggest and is shot
through with contradictions (Gollac and Volkoff, 2000, pp. 36 and 68;
Maruani, 2000). It also brings into play the social valuation of jobs (and
particularly pay), career prospects (the existence of internal markets) and
working conditions. 
The pay of unskilled workers
A comparison of average wages in the various occupational categories
reveals, first, the strikingly high pay dispersion and, second, the low level of
pay in the white-collar category (table 10.5). The average wage of unskilled
white-collar workers is 40 per cent lower than the average wage of all workers
in France.
These statements are, justifiably, subject to qualification on the grounds
that these wages do not take account of working time, which is much lower
among white-collar employees than among blue-collar workers because of the
significantly higher part-time rates in the former category than in the latter.
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Table 10.5 Average monthly pay by occupational and skill category, 2001
Economy as a whole Deviation from average wage 
(euros) (percentage)
Average wage 1 384 –
White-collar
Unskilled 827 −40
Skilled 1 255 −9
Blue-collar
Unskilled 943 −32
Skilled 1 254 −9
Field:  Wages in bands expressed in euros, adjusted for non-responses (incl. bonuses imputed on a monthly
pro-rata basis.
Source: INSEE, Labour Survey, 2001, authors’ analysis. 
Calculated on the basis of full-time or part-time wages, the pay differentials
among blue-collar and white-collar workers are comparable. Thus the
relatively low level of average pay in the unskilled white-collar category
compared with the unskilled blue-collar category can be explained to a large
extent by differences in the use of part-time work: 41 per cent of unskilled
white-collar workers are part-timers, compared with only 17 per cent of un-
skilled blue-collar workers. The low pay of unskilled white-collar workers is
largely explained, therefore, by the extent of part-time employment. Thus in
the collective consciousness, the duration of working time may seem to be a
major factor in the social (de)valuation of work.
10.2.3 Working conditions characteristic of a changing 
labour market
Statistical surveys still inadequate to the task
The combined use of statistical data and field work results reveals that the
difficulties experienced by employees in the workplace have not always been
taken into account in surveys conducted by national statistical institutes.
Studies of working conditions and, more generally, of job quality carried
out as part of international research projects have been enhanced in a number
of ways in recent years.
Thus the OECD (2001), in its work on job quality in the service sector,
used the European working conditions survey to investigate the working
hours aspect of working conditions, including the constraints associated with
working time and work schedules and the choice of break or holiday times
(European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions, 2001). However, investigation of this time dimension remains
ergonomic and industrialist in its approach, since only night or Sunday work,
irregular schedules and rotating shift systems (3 x 8) are included in the
“constraining” work schedules. 
The European Commission, for its part, has proposed adopting a broader
approach based on job quality. “Job quality is a relative concept regarding a
job-worker relationship, which takes into account both objective character-
istics related to the job and the match between worker characteristics, on the
one hand, and job requirements, on the other” (European Commission, 2001,
interviews conducted for this study). Working time, one of the ten aspects of
job quality, includes both the number of hours worked and the organization of
working time (working time arrangements). The analysis focuses on questions
related to the number of hours habitually worked and additional hours, actual
working hours and the number of hours worked outside core working time,
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the distribution of working time and flexible schedules. Little attention is paid
to temporal availability and, even when it is investigated, it is mainly with
reference to full-time employees.
A comparison of the quality of surveys of working conditions carried 
out in France in different periods (particularly between the mid-1980s and 
the present day) shows4 that efforts have been made to obtain a better
understanding of some of the hardships workers suffer, particularly in service
occupations. For example, the question on tensions with supervisors appeared
in 1998, when 30 per cent of employees in the service sector stated that such
tensions existed; the question on tensions with members of the public
appeared in 1991, and in 1998 half of respondents in the service sector said
they were affected by such tensions. With regard to other aspects of working
conditions, particularly temporal availability, the working conditions survey
still concentrates more on concerns relating to rotating shift systems, to shift
schedules and to night work. This is due in part to its industrialist focus. 
It struggles to capture in all their complexity the new forms of temporal
availability that can be observed on the ground in some service activities,
particularly those requiring a high level of contact with customers or users. As
a result, we have to fall back on surveys that focus exclusively on time, such as
Cottrell et al. (2002), for example.
10.2.4 A change in the nature of working conditions
Different working conditions for unskilled blue-collar and white-collar
workers are characteristic of the changes taking place in the labour market. 
Far from being improved by the expansion of the service sector, working
conditions for the unskilled categories have changed in nature. Analyses of the
Taylorist work organization systems in which manual workers were employed
frequently adopted an approach based on the alienation said to be a product of
the division of labour, leading to the “fragmented work” of which Georges
Friedmann spoke. The routinization of tasks, the separation of planning from
execution and permanent supervision by management characterize situations
in which working conditions (particularly the intensity and arduousness of
work and the work environment itself) are harsh but where certain forms 
of recognition exist. For unskilled white-collar workers, it is the need for
temporal availability and workplace relations (in the fullest sense of the term)
that are the prime causes of the deterioration in their working conditions. As
was noted in the introduction, these aspects of working conditions are less
often adduced as indicators of difficult conditions in the workplace. 
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4 As DARES (the French Ministry of Labour) itself notes in the introduction to its version of the 1998 survey.
Quantitative analysis of the working conditions of unskilled white-collar
workers in France leads to the following observations.
• Across all sectors of the economy, the data indicate that working con-
ditions are comparable in level and nature for skilled and unskilled white-
collar workers, but are slightly more unfavourable for unskilled workers –
contrary to what happens in the case of blue-collar workers. Among the
latter, working conditions are more favourable for the unskilled category,
and the differences between skilled and unskilled workers are slightly
more pronounced than among white-collar workers (table 10.6). It is as 
if the “working conditions” variable played a considerably smaller role in
the apprehension and evaluation of white-collar workers’ occupational
grading. In the case of manual workers, bad working conditions have been
gradually offset, in part at least, by a higher positioning in the pay scales,
achieved through bargaining and a favourable balance of power. This does
not seem as evident when the data on white-collar workers are examined.
In this category, bad working conditions tend to be more prevalent among
the unskilled.
• Considerable differences can also be observed in the perception of
working conditions from sector to sector. Thus in service industries in
which unskilled white-collar workers have to cope with extremely
unfavourable working conditions (in the hotel and catering industry, for
example), it is all occupational categories that are affected, which further
blurs the boundaries between skilled and unskilled workers.
• The results of this same survey also show that certain occupations, such
as domiciliary care, report less burdensome working conditions than
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Table 10.6 Working conditions of skilled and unskilled white-collar and
blue-collar workers: Synthetic indicators
All sectors Skilled white- Unskilled white- Difference Skilled blue- Unskilled blue- Difference
collar workers collar workers UWC–SWC collar workers collar workers UBC–SBC
(SWC) (UWC) (SBC) (UBC)
Work environment 15 18 3 36 31 −5
Workplace relations 36 38 2 29 23 −5
Work intensity 25 24 −1 36 33 −3
Temporal availability 30 32 2 30 29 −1
Note on interpreting the data: the synthetic indicator of the physical work environment for skilled white-collar
workers is 15, on a scale from 0 to 100. The closer the value of the index gets to 100, the more working conditions are
regarded as bad from the workers’ point of view. 
Source: Gadrey et al., 2003.
those for workers in retailing or in the hotel and catering industry, 
as if, in the case of home helps, the “constraint” seemed less oppres-
sive. The hypothesis we formulate is that, for unskilled white-collar
workers in retailing and hotels and catering, there are processes of
objectification at work that increase their awareness of the harshness of
their working conditions. In the case of domiciliary care, other
“naturalizing” processes are at work in minimizing the recognition 
of both competences and working conditions (Gollac and Volkoff,
2000).5
Thus the transition from an industrial to a service economy and the
consequent erosion and destabilization of the working class has not
eliminated bad working conditions. However, the nature of those bad
conditions has changed. Unskilled blue-collar workers are more likely than
their white-collar counterparts to emphasize the work environment and
work intensity as the main causes of the arduous nature of their work.
Nevertheless, the interviews we conducted with unskilled white-collar
workers show that they are not entirely spared such arduousness. In
retailing, these bad working conditions are sometimes used by employers 
to justify the use of part-time staff. Not only shop-floor workers but check-
out staff as well mention the difficulties they experience in handling goods,
some of which are heavy. Furthermore, the quantitative results for this sector
clearly show that work intensity and the work environment are as unfavour-
able as those of unskilled blue-collar workers. This can partly be explained
by systems of work organization that have their roots in or seek to replicate
those found in manufacturing industry with, for example, a considerable
increase in repetitive work. 
In the hotel and catering sector, it is issues related to posture that tend
to be highlighted more (standing position), which shows that blue-collar
workers do not have a monopoly on physical hardship. In the case of
functionally flexible team members in fast-food establishments, the arduous-
ness linked to the work environment and intensity is exacerbated. Workers
describe the severity of the conditions they have to endure, pointing 
in particular to extremes of cold (caused by the need to go outside
frequently) and heat (generated by the cooking equipment), as well as the
dirtiness of their work environment. The hardships linked to hygiene
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5 These authors explain, for example, how nurses changed their view of their work between 1984 and 1991. 
“In 1984, 40 per cent of nurses stated that they carried or moved heavy loads; in 1991, 70 per cent of them made such a
statement. The heavy loads in question are usually patients. They are usually a fair weight, they have no handles and they
cannot be placed in the most convenient position for handling purposes. However, to regard a person as a load requires
nurses to discard a notion of their profession based on dedication without regard for self [Kergoat, 1992] (...) They were
demanding that their dedication be accorded its true value” (Gollac and Volkoff, 2000, p. 10).
conditions6 are as much physical as psychological in nature. Workers in the
fast-food industry criticize the intensity of their work and the resultant
psychological burdens, which result largely from the linkage to be made
between a downgraded form of functional flexibility and autonomy of
execution.
True, work intensification does not automatically cause workers to
perceive deterioration in their conditions and is dependent on essentially
human factors. Thus, in certain cases, employees, managers and organizations
adopt self-preservation strategies, which are reflected, for example, in the
development of a “good general atmosphere” or “good cooperation”, which
makes the arduous conditions more bearable.
This perception also depends on individuals’ personal trajectories. If this
intensification is combined with training strategies and integrated into career
management plans, it tends to be perceived in a better light by employees, who
take the view that it is helping to increase their stock of competences. This
very clearly applies to trainees in the hotel industry, who often report
reasonable working conditions. On the other hand, when the “discordances”
between the three components of occupational grade (qualifications, occup-
ation and pay) are at their greatest, perceived hardship is exacerbated: “the
level of occupational grade and training is not generally commensurate with
aspirations. Perceived hardship begins when the relationship between grade,
training and aspirations can no longer evolve” (Dejours, 2000, interviews
conducted for this study).
For the unskilled white-collar workers in the industries we studied, it is the
requirement for temporal availability rather than any other working conditions
that is the main cause of the hardships they experience at work (table 10.7). This
is why we investigate this topic in greater detail in the next section.
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Table 10.7 Working conditions of unskilled white-collar workers in three
service industries: Synthetic indicators
Service sector Retailing Hotels/catering SPD
as a whole
Work environment 18 20 23 10
Workplace relations 38 29 40 34
Work intensity 24 29 30 16
Temporal availability 33 33 41 30
Note on interpreting the data: see table 10.6.
Source: Gadrey et al., 2003.
6 The problems encountered in cleaning public toilets are mentioned repeatedly by employees.
10.3 UNSKILLED WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS AND 
TEMPORAL AVAILABILITY
10.3.1 The need to go beyond statistical analysis, or the 
importance of interviews in identifying temporal 
availability
In his analysis of decent working time, Messenger stresses the need to 
take account of both the number of hours worked and the timing of those
hours (Messenger, 2004, p. 2). After all, when it is analysed from a quality
perspective, working time turns out to be multidimensional; this, in turn,
raises questions about its duration, timing, variability and predictability.
Working time and the flexibility associated with it lie at the heart 
of human resource management strategies in many service activities. The
various waves of working time regulations recently introduced in France,
which were reflected before 2004 in a reduction in working time in exchange
for greater flexibilization (with variations usually decided by employers),
have further reinforced the already existing trend towards a fairly
pronounced variability of working schedules. This in turn raises the
questions of “family-friendly”’ working hours and of healthy working time,
both of which issues are highlighted by Messenger (2004, p. 30 ff.) and which
are obviously of concern in countries other than France. We will return to
these questions later.
This increased flexibilization is very evident in service activities that
require contact with the public, which is the case with very many unskilled
jobs in industries such as hotels and catering, retailing and personal services.
Direct relations with customers or users are often analysed as service relations.
From this perspective, such relations not only involve face-to-face contact
but are also above all human relations, with all that this implies in terms of
social and, particularly, gender relations. The question Messenger raises 
about the gendered inequality of working time takes on its full meaning here
(Messenger, 2004, p. 33). 
Thus, far from being protected in this respect by virtue of being
frequently at the centre of the service relationship, unskilled white-collar
workers report a considerable degree of flexibility in their work schedules.
This is not unconnected with the high part-time rates that are characteristic of
this category. They also point to time in all its various aspects as one of the
principal causes of their difficult working conditions. In the light of our
statistical analysis, this temporal availability and workplace relations are the
aspects of their work that unskilled white-collar workers regard as the most
unfavourable.
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10.3.2 The forms of temporal availability
Unskilled white-collar workers and the rapidly increasing part-time rate
The use of part-time contracts is increasing, particularly when it comes
to recruiting unskilled white-collar workers. It may seem surprising or
paradoxical to include part-time work among the aspects of temporal
availability because of the shorter working hours it implies compared with 
the working time norm. Nevertheless, our interviews show that in France it 
is part-time workers who suffer the greatest hardships linked to increased
temporal availability – mainly because of the number of hours worked and
how the timing of those hours is imposed by employers.
Part-time working has increased in all occupational categories, with the
part-time rate rising from 10.2 per cent in the mid-1980s to 16.2 per cent in
2002. However, the increase has been significantly greater in the unskilled
categories. Among unskilled white-collar workers, the part-time rate rose
from 28 per cent in 1984 to almost 41 per cent in 2002, a level significantly
higher than that for unskilled blue-collar workers (17 per cent in 2002). This
statistical observation requires further examination. 
Everything would seem to suggest that the unskilled white-collar category
is becoming synonymous with part-time work, with employers increasingly
making an equation between temporal availability and part-time work, on the
one hand, and between part-time work and contact with the public, on the
other (Guignon and Hamon-Cholet, 2003). Thus part-time work is becoming
a prerequisite for the temporal availability that employers require.
The timing, variability and predictability of unskilled white-collar 
workers’ schedules
Examination of the greatest differences between unskilled white-collar and
blue-collar workers in matters of temporal availability shows that the main area
of differentiation is so-called “unsocial working hours”, with more than one-third
of unskilled white-collar workers working on Sundays compared with 15 per cent
of their blue-collar counterparts. Thus when asked “Are there certain days or
weeks when you work longer hours than the usual schedule?”, 56 per cent of
unskilled white-collar workers reply in the affirmative, compared with only 
52 per cent of unskilled blue-collar workers. And when asked “After the shift
changeover, do you have to stay at work longer than scheduled?”, almost one-
third of unskilled white-collar workers reply in the affirmative compared with just
18 per cent of their blue-collar counterparts (table 10.8).
Unskilled blue-collar workers are also more likely than their white-collar
counterparts to be entitled to two consecutive days off work: 40 per cent of
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unskilled white-collar do not enjoy this right, compared with 18 per cent of
unskilled blue-collar workers.
The most extreme form of temporal availability is probably encountered
in retailing, where individuals are defined by their part-time status and, more
generally, by their work schedules. Thus employees are personified by their
working time. Employers refer to their employees by the length of their
contractual working time, as this statement made by a human resources
manager in a department store during our interviews illustrates: “We need two
20 hours and a full-time manager to operate the stand.”
10.3.3 Specific forms of temporal availability
The interviews we conducted in three industries confirm this trend and add
some additional dimensions to this analysis. Thus, in the case of home helps and
workers in the hotel and catering industry and in retailing, our interviews show
very clearly that the working conditions survey is ill suited to capturing the
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Table 10.8 Temporal availability in France, 1998: The variables (percentages)
SWC UWC SBC UBC Total EAP
No choice of break times or have to 
ask permission 53 69 60 73 63
Must agree choice of work schedules with 
colleagues 24 23 14 13 22
Have to stay on after a change of shift 45 30 32 18 35
Schedules laid down by management and 
fixed schedules (neither à la carte, nor 
freely chosen) 76 85 89 92 67
Some Sunday work 25 32 19 15 29
No opportunity to change schedules when 
unexpected events occur 25 31 41 46 31
Work longer hours than usual on certain 
days or during certain weeks 27 29 25 23 33
Night work 15 9 22 14 15
Have to work longer hours than usual on
certain days or during certain weeks 66 56 60 52 69
Do not have 48 consecutive hours off work 18 40 16 18 27
Do not know next day’s work schedule 45 34 36 32 43
Do not know next month’s work schedule 18 24 24 25 27
Do not know next week’s work schedule 61 47 65 59 64
Source: Gadrey et al., 2003.
particular difficulties of temporal availability that are characteristic of part-time
jobs (staggered hours, split shifts, unpredictable changes to timetables, etc.).
“Potential” availability
This is a form of availability often found among part-timers. Usually when
first hired, more rarely on a regular basis, part-timers are required to offer a wide
range of possible working hours on which the employer will draw in order to meet
the demands of day-to-day business. Thus a restaurant worker explained that,
when he was hired, his employer asked him for a potential weekly schedule of 60
hours from which a working week of just 20 hours was to be constructed.7 When
this form of potential availability is not simply required on recruitment, but is
used as a form of daily job management, it can be regarded as a constraint, but
one that employers are careful not to present as such. 
Fragmented work
This affects the vast majority of home helps. Virtually all women, home
helps attend each day to three or four elderly persons in their homes. The
shortening of work sequences mentioned by both employees and employers in
the domiciliary services sector further aggravates the constraints associated
with fragmented schedules. Thus one worker explained that she works a 34-
hour week. Her working week is divided into 17 work sequences and she
attends to a total of 11 people. Her daily schedule comprises seven one-hour
sequences, which all take place either very early in the morning or late in the
evening in order that she can get dependent persons up and/or put them to bed.
Split shifts
The use of split shifts is a form of working time management that is
frequently encountered in the hotel and catering industry as well as in domiciliary
care services. Split shifts affect the length of time employees spend at the
workplace. The intervals between the periods of duty, usually between two and
four hours, are often too short to allow workers to return home.8 Thus workers
in fast-food restaurants or cafeterias feel, paradoxically, that they are devoting
their whole lives to work, while actually being employed only part time.
Extreme unpredictability
The variability of their work schedules often makes employees feel as if
they spend their whole lives in the workplace. Employees tell their supervisor
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7 Another restaurant worker said he had drawn up a potential 90-hour schedule for an actual working week of just 30
hours.
8 Because of transport timetables as well as the time required to change, to “feel clean”, etc.
when they are available and the supervisor then organizes the teams’ schedules.
Employees seldom have more than a week’s notice of their schedules. In the
restaurant trade, there is a high degree of unpredictability, with schedules
sometimes being changed literally at the last minute. The practice of adding
amendments to employment contracts represents the most extreme form of
this temporal availability and is common among new recruits. Other retail
workers9 complain that schedules and the advance notice they receive are
unpredictable, as one assistant in a hypermarket noted during our interviews:
Getting advance notice of our schedules, that’s the big problem. We should be
told three weeks in advance what hours we’ll be working . . . At Christmas, I
was told at the last minute that I wasn’t working, which was good news, but 
I would have had the same notice if I had been working. On the Friday before
Christmas, I didn’t know whether I was working the following Monday.
Unpaid work
The practice of not paying employees for all the time they spend at the
workplace is widespread in the restaurant trade. Workers are often obliged to
arrive before the beginning of their shift (often between 45 minutes and 1
hour in advance) in order to eat, change and possibly attend a briefing on the
day’s activities. This time is not paid for. Thus one worker calculated that, for
a shift involving 4 hours’ paid work, the actual time spent at the restaurant was
about 5.5 hours.
In the case of home helps, these forms of unpaid work are a consequence
of the fragmentation of their work. Between each work sequence, there is an
interval of approximately 15 minutes that is unpaid except for those workers
covered by the “Domiciliary service organizations” collective agreement; even
for these workers, the agreement is applied restrictively, since only the inter-
vals between two work sequences in the same half-day are remunerated, and
travel costs are excluded.
Unpaid time and voluntary work
Another, more qualitative, aspect of temporal availability is specific to
domiciliary care services, where the tradition of unpaid work by female carers
is still an element in the provision of such services for the elderly. It involves
devoting unpaid time to elderly clients as carers seek to develop the relational
aspect of a home help’s work. All the (female) workers we interviewed
mentioned forms of unpaid work linked to their paid work, but there are
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9 This mainly applies to students or new recruits who combine involuntary short-hours part-time jobs with staggered
hours, and have considerable uncertainty as to their future schedules. More established employees tend to have
negotiated contracts offering longer working hours and more stable schedules.
considerable differences between those who attempt to control their working
time and those who do not count the hours and minutes they spend with their
elderly clients. The unpaid work takes different forms. Over and above their
“constant concern”, even outside working hours, for their elderly and
dependent clients, home helps give their own telephone numbers to families
so that they can be called at any time should problems arise. If necessary, they
will even spend the night at a client’s home.
All these aspects, which we were able to capture in the course of our in-depth
field survey, are seldom regarded as constraints arising out of working conditions.
Under these circumstances, can we really talk of “decent working time”?
10.3.4 The five dimensions of “decent working time”
According to Messenger (2004), five dimensions should be taken into account
in evaluating the impact of working time on employees’ lives.
1. Long working days and unsocial hours are damaging to workers’ health
and have negative effects on their families and on their social life as a
whole.
2. The unpredictability of working time is incompatible with the regular
activities and rhythms of domestic life, particularly for the parents of
young children.
3. These first two aspects impact differently on men and women, who are
not time-constrained in the same way by the demands of family life.
4. Extended working days and other factors (e.g., work schedules) can have
negative effects on productivity.
5. Many employees have little control over the choice of their working
hours and schedules.
Various measures are proposed in order to promote working hours
conducive to good health, family life, gender equality, productivity and
increased freedom of choice for employees: protection against excessively
long working hours and unsocial hours; collective working time reductions;
equal treatment for full-timers and part-timers; and a greater role for
employees in choosing their working times and schedules.
10.3.5 Part-time work in services and “decent working time”
Let us set our findings against these five dimensions of decent working
time.
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Long working days and unsocial hours, unpredictable working hours and
no freedom of choice with regard to schedules are the lot of many workers in
the service industries in France studied in the course of the research for this
chapter. Part-timers are increasingly affected by specific forms of temporal
availability: work fragmentation and split shifts, unpaid work, a requirement
for considerable potential availability and a failure to provide sufficient notice
of schedules. These forms of temporal availability particularly affect jobs that
are mostly held by women, and are one of the causes of the very high labour
turnover observed in these industries, as employers who fail to secure their
workers’ loyalty recognize.
It can be concluded, therefore, that unskilled white-collar service
workers whose work involves direct contact with customers or users seldom
enjoy “decent working time”. In France, part-time work and decent working
time scarcely seem to go hand in hand, at least in the service industries
investigated here. In order to understand this paradox, it is necessary, as
Maruani and Reynaud (1993) already have, to investigate the social
construction of part-time work in France, in which two fundamentally
opposed principles are at work. The first, which might be described as “shorter
working time”, is driven by employees’ desire for a reversible reorganization
of their working time. The second, which might be described as “part-time
employment”, is driven by employers seeking to create part-time jobs. This
latter process is largely irreversible, and it is taking place outside of employees’
control and indeed against their wishes. The forms of temporal availability
outlined above have emerged as part-time employment has taken hold.
Can the notion of decent working time be deployed in order to analyse
this temporal availability in depth and put forward corrective measures for
workers in the industries investigated? By breaking down the notion into
five constituent dimensions, it certainly provides some interesting start-
ing points. Nevertheless, further work needs to be done in order to link 
the various dimensions. Messenger (2004) suggests part-time work as one
potentially valuable way of reconciling paid work and family responsibilities
(dimension 2 of “decent working time”). However, what kind of part-time
work does he have in mind? Is equality of treatment for full-timers and part-
timers sufficient to ensure real equality of treatment for men and women
(dimension 3)?
The regulation of excessively long working hours and unsocial hours
(dimension 1) is presented as a measure likely to lead to improved produc-
tivity (dimension 4). However, this does not seem to be a view shared by
employers in the service industries we have investigated in France. This
analysis is indeed pertinent, but it takes insufficient account of the question of
power relations within firms.
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The question of employee choice and influence over working time and work
schedules (dimension 5) is a fundamental one. Unskilled part-time white-collar
workers in some service industries in France often have no control at all over their
work schedules. The issue cannot be reduced to the right to request changes to
working time. It is the whole notion of flexibility as an organizational principle,
orchestrated by firms and, in these industries, inextricably linked with the use of
part-time jobs that is called into question here.
Thus, in the light of the study of temporal availability as it affects
unskilled white-collar workers presented in this chapter, it seems essential to
extend the decent working time approach by linking its various dimensions.
10.4 CONCLUSION
Our analysis of unskilled work in today’s service societies has enabled us to
develop a broader framework for interpreting the working conditions of
white-collar employees. Our focus on unskilled white-collar workers, who
have replaced manual workers as an archetypal figure in advanced economies,
has led us to examine the close links between employment conditions and
working conditions.
Although the notions of job quality and “decent work” include the time
dimension to some extent, studies based on these notions are not always able
to capture unskilled white-collar work in all its complexity. By placing
unskilled white-collar workers at the heart of our analysis, new questions are
raised about the quality and decency of working time as reflected in the part-
time jobs or “half-jobs” that are being created in massive numbers in these
industries. The proliferation of such jobs is being driven by a new productive
and organizational logic.
Against this background, the temporal availability demanded of workers
seems increasingly to be becoming a real criterion for recruitment. As they go
about their work, employees experience the fragmented work and the split
shifts that are part of the process of rationalizing working time. The standard-
ization of time to which white-collar workers are subjected has its roots in
industrialist logic, but frequently comes up against the particularities of certain
situations or clienteles. Under these circumstances, other forms of temporal
availability, such as unpaid work or voluntary work, develop in order to meet
customers’ demands. In these forms, temporal availability seems very closely
linked to competences, particularly relational competences, but this is not
recognized in terms of remuneration.
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11.1 INTRODUCTION
11.1.1 The changing working time regime and 
decent working time
The relations of work to time, place and household are central questions of
social research in general and working life research in particular (Adam, 1995;
Kalleberg and Epstein, 2001). In the industrial working time regime, paid work
is connected with (normal) working time in contrast to free time (or
“produced time”, Adam, 1995), and leisure outside paid work. Correspond-
ingly, paid work is connected with the workplace (factory, office) in contrast
to free time and unpaid housework in the household. The core features of the
industrial working time regime are crystallized in the concept of normal
working time, which has been designed to be an approximately 8-hour
working day with daytime work and free weekends (Boulin, 1998). Normal
working time and temporal institutions that guarantee time off work (free
evenings, weekends, annual holidays and retirement) have established the
grounds for shared time rhythms in society (Garhammer, 1999). However,
during the last two decades of the twentieth century the core elements of
normal working time have been eroding, and a new post-industrial working
time regime has been emerging.
There is much international discussion on the new trends of working
time from diverse perspectives, such as working time research (Boulin, 1998;
289
MANAGERS AND WORKING TIME
IN FINLAND
Jouko Nätti,* Timo Anttila** and Mia Väisänen***
11
* Academy Research Fellow in the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä,
Finland.
** Senior researcher in the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland.
*** Researcher in the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland.
Roberts, 1998), information society, networking theories (Castells, 1996,
1997; Sennett, 1998), and studies on work culture in expert occupations
(Casey, 1995; Hochschild, 1997). Instead of diverse starting points, the
characterization of the new working time trend is similar. The new working
time regime is characterized by deregulation of collective norms, diversi-
fication of the length and pattern of working time, blurring of the limits of
working time, and an erosion of normal biographies. Especially those in
dynamic sectors and a good labour market position – managers and others
with a great deal of autonomy, a good salary, high productivity and career
prospects – tend to work long hours. Demanding knowledge and managerial
work seems to require a marginalization of private life and a concentration on
paid work (Casey, 1995; Hochschild, 1997).
Compared to the industrial working time discipline, the post-industrial
regime creates both new opportunities and risks. At its best, the emerging
working time mosaic (Sennet, 1998) provides an opportunity for individuals
to choose the length and rhythm of their working time. On the other hand,
there are new risks concerning the relationship between work and private life,
the time and energy available for family and social life, alertness and per-
formance (Härmä, 1998; Kalimo, 1999). Furthermore, working time trends
have even deeper effects; they restructure the nature of our culture and com-
munity (Castells, 1997; Garhammer, 1999). The erosion of old, shared time
rhythms (e.g. Sundays) disintegrates society. 
The opportunities and risks associated with the evolving post-industrial
working time regime are analogous with the core dimensions of decent
working time: healthy working time, family-friendly working time, gender
equality through working time, productive working time, and choice and
influence regarding working time (Messenger, 2004). Decent working time
signifies an appropriate match between individual needs, preferences, hours of
work and working time arrangements; the lack of decent working time
constitutes a gap between the hours of work that individuals need or would
prefer and the ones that they are required to work (Messenger, 2004) 
11.1.2 Working hours in Finland
The statutory regular working time in Finland is 8 hours per day at most, or 
40 hours per week. In most branches the agreed working time per week in
collective agreements is shorter, usually 37.5 hours per week, which is near the
EU-15 average (38 hours; EIRO 4/2004). The estimated annual hours in Finland
are 1,673 hours while the EU-15 average is 1,697 hours. In Finland, overtime work
is restricted and an increased salary must be paid for overtime working. In general,
no more than 250 hours of overtime per year is allowed. In practice, however,
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unpaid overtime is common. In the study by Lehto and Sutela (2004), 31 per cent
of Finnish employees reported that they do unpaid overtime work. 
In the mid-1990s, regular working hours were quite uniform in Finland,
concentrating around the collectively agreed working hours (37 to 39 hours
per week); the gender differences were also minor. On the other hand, shift,
evening and Sunday work were more common in Finland when compared to
the EU average (Julkunen and Nätti, 1999). Although there was no dramatic
change in working times in Finland during the 1990s, by the end of the decade
the portrait of working time had diversified slightly (Julkunen and Nätti,
2002). Still, as Antila and Ylöstalo (1999) conclude, the old working time
paradigm yields only gradually; old and new paradigms now live side by side. 
According to the Third European Working Conditions Survey (2000),
usual weekly working hours in Finland (39 hours) were the third longest
among the EU-15 countries (Paoli and Merllié, 2001), while the EU average
working time among employees stood at 37 hours per week (Boisard et al.,
2002). The longer working hours in Finland were mainly the result of the low
proportion of part-time work in Finland (9 per cent of workers work 1 to 29
hours per week) compared to the EU average (17 per cent). On the other
hand, the proportion of employees working 45 or more hours in Finland (15
per cent) was near the EU average (14 per cent) (Boisard et al., 2002).
Furthermore, it is characteristic of the Finnish labour market that the working
hours of men and women are similar; in 2000 the difference was 3 hours per
week, which is the smallest in the EU. 
In a wider international context, long working hours seem to be more
common in the United States, Australia and Japan, where 25 to 35 per cent of
men and 10 to 15 per cent of women work more than 48 hours a week.
However, comparing evidence from different surveys is not unproblematic,
since there are often significant differences among them in how working hours
are defined (i.e., actual or usual hours, annual or weekly hours, for a main job
or total hours, and whether commuting time is included), and how this
information is collected (Kodz et al., 2003). 
11.1.3 Managerial work and working time
By working faithfully eight hours a day, you may
eventually get to be boss and work twelve hours a day.
Robert Frost (cited in White et al., 2003)
Managerial work has been defined as “a stream of disjointed, fragmented
activities occurring at an unrelenting pace” (Tétard, 2000); consequently
managers’ jobs are ambiguous and undefined (Konrad et al., 2001). Time
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pressure (such as having constant interruptions, unscheduled meetings, and
dealing with many issues in a short period of time) has been found to be a feature
of managerial work (e.g. Konrad et al., 2001), yet at the same time, it is the
feature of the work least preferred by managers in a five-country comparative
study (Konrad et al., 2001). Another temporal aspect of managerial work is the
fragmentation of time, which according to Tétard (2000) – drawing on
Mintzberg’s (1973, 1991) characterization of managerial work – has always
existed and remains an element of the work. Interestingly, the fragmentation of
time is increasingly also often a feature in non-managerial work (Tétard, 2000).
The contractual boundaries of time and wage (see Fagan, 2001) may also
affect how working hours are defined and perceived. For some occupational
groups, such as blue-collar workers, the amount of time exchanged for wages
can be explicitly defined, whereas for others, e.g. those in professional or
managerial positions, the time–money exchange is often hidden and time
boundaries are more ambiguous (Kalleberg and Epstein, 2001). Consequently,
among manual occupations overtime is usually paid, whereas among managerial
and professional occupations overtime is usually unpaid (Kodz et al., 2003). 
Working hours vary according to professional status and, as the poet Frost
observed at the beginning of the last century, it is especially true that people 
in managerial positions work long hours. According to the Third European
Working Conditions Survey, managers often worked very long working weeks:
39 per cent of managers worked 45 hours or more, in comparison with 5 per
cent of office workers and 17 per cent of industrial workers (Boisard et al.,
2002). According to the same study, when including only those working full-
time, managers worked an average of 45 hours per week, which is 5 hours more
compared to all full-time employees. Among managers, as in general among
employees, there is a slight gender difference in working time; male managers
worked an average of 46 hours per week and women managers an average of 
42 hours per week (Boisard et al., 2002). According to the Finnish Labour
Force Survey, in 2002 the average working time among managers was 42 hours
per week, which was the longest in comparison with other occupational groups.
During the 1990s the length of working time of managers increased by
approximately 2.5 hours per week (Hulkko and Luomala, 2003). 
11.1.4 Knowledge workers as forerunners of the changing
working time regime: Threat or opportunity for decent
working time?
Managerial work has traditionally been differentiated from the standard
working time practice and lacked the protection of legislation on working
time (e.g. Messenger, 2004). A more recent development is the increase of
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knowledge workers, which has implications for the relations of work to time
and place, and shares some similarities with managerial work. Therefore, we
examine managers and working time in the context of knowledge work. 
Although it is commonly agreed that the share of knowledge work is
increasing, the concept of knowledge work is far from unambiguous (Cortada,
1999; Julkunen et al., 2004). In simple terms, knowledge work includes two
dimensions, which are in principle independent of each other; namely a high
level of education and the use of information technology at work (Blom et al.
2001). Autonomy of work can also be added as a third criterion in defining
knowledge work. Knowledge workers can be defined as those who regularly use
information technology at work, and whose work requires planning and who
have an upper secondary or higher level of education. Thus knowledge workers
are similar to the concept of the “symbolic analyst” used by Reich (1991). In
this chapter, too, the criteria for knowledge work are a high level of education,
knowledge of work content, and the use of information technology at work. 
Knowledge workers are assumed to be especially affected by the new
working time regime as a consequence of the nature of the work. Knowledge
work can be captivating and interesting in itself; besides economic success, it
can also offer other rewards. Similar to managerial work, it is typically personal
and endless; you can always do it better, and then work more and longer hours.
In addition, demanding knowledge work or symbolic–analytical work is, in
principle, detachable from a certain time and place (e.g. Bentley and Yoong,
2000). Consequently, it is usually assumed that knowledge work cannot be
controlled by counting working hours, and work does not remain in the
workplace; on the contrary, it spills over into the private sphere and can be
carried out at home or during travel. One possible cost of more autonomous
forms of work is a reduction in the right to separate working time from non-
working time, coupled with pressures towards increased work intensity
(Rubery and Grimshaw, 2001; Van den Berg and Schlak, 1997), thus creating a
possible threat to “decent working time”. 
Essentially, knowledge and managerial work capture an interesting
interplay of the core dimensions of “decent working time” (Messenger, 2004).
On the one hand, managers and knowledge workers enjoy high working time
autonomy and control over timing of work, enabling a better match between
individual needs and organizational demands. On the other hand, they are
affected by the lengthening of working time, and the blurring of the
boundaries between work and non-work – which may have negative outcomes
– for example, increasing adverse health and productivity outcomes and
worsening the work–family balance (Kodz et al., 2003). 
A recent Finnish study on IT professionals (Kivistö and Kalimo, 2002)
found that IT professionals have long working hours (the average working
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week was 43 hours), and over 80 per cent of them worked weekly overtime 
(an average of 10 hours). Furthermore, their work was mentally exhausting,
time pressure was hard, and health problems were common, even among the
younger age groups. On the other hand, IT professionals had good possi-
bilities to influence their own work. 
11.1.5 Factors behind long working hours
There seems to be a consensus that a long working week “comes with the job”
in managerial work. For example, Moen and Sweet (2003, p. 27) state that
“some jobs simply have (or employers expect) high demands and long hours”
(see also Tengblad, 2001). Factors behind stretching working hours among
managers can be divided between individual and job-level characteristics,
organizational culture-level aspects and economic factors. 
The individual-level factors include demographic, personality and family
status factors. Accordingly, managers who are more likely to work long hours are
usually male, single, carrying the role of the family breadwinner, have a higher
level conscientiousness and achievement motivation, and a low investment in
hobbies and leisure (Feldman, 2002). Similarly, Kodz et al. (2003) report that
respondents working long hours are highly committed to their work and by
working long hours they secure good career prospects. People wish to devote
more time to what they are most valued for, e.g. a high-status job (Hochschild,
1997). However, there are also gender differences. Men working long hours are
likely to be married and with children, while women working long hours are likely
to be single and without children (Kodz et al., 2003). 
The job-level factors of the lengthening of working hours include, on 
the one hand, a high visibility of work, less specific appraisal criteria and
procedures, a high amount of job challenge and good working conditions
(Feldman, 2002). On the other hand, Kodz et al. (2003) suggest that on the
basis of reviewing research literature, a major reason for long working hours,
particularly when they are unpaid, is the volume of work. Factors increasing
the volume of work relate to new organizational initiatives, including a
flattening of organizational structures due to delayering; increases in project-
based work; a greater emphasis on customer focus; a meetings culture; staff
shortages; information technology and email overload; and an increasing need
for some employees to travel for their work.
The organizational culture, with its informal rules and norms, has an
impact on workplace behaviour, including leadership, selection and the social-
ization process in the organization. As a result, managers’ long hours can be
produced by a narrow range of employees acting as managers (sharing similar
values, attitudes and beliefs), and an institutionalized socialization process
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within the organization (Feldman, 2002). Also, according to Kodz et al.
(2003), the attitudes and expectations of managers and co-workers can be
critical in engendering a long-hours culture in which “being present” is valued
as a sign of commitment to work. The availability of time for work is often
regarded as evidence of high performance and motivation for advancement
(Perlow, 1998; Florida, 2002). Rutherford (2001) claims that a long-hours
culture may also act as a mechanism reinforcing patriarchal structures: where
the ability to work long hours has become one of the most desired manage-
ment attributes, women are less likely to have equal opportunity to advance
towards managerial positions because of the gendered division of domestic
labour. Working time is also affected by economic factors facing the
organization as a whole. The threat of declining profitability, layoffs and 
job insecurity can increase the number of hours worked (Feldman, 2002; 
Kodz et al., 2003). 
All in all, earlier research findings show that many employees working
long hours do so for a combination of reasons. Furthermore, the reasons given
for working long hours depend, to a certain extent, on who is asked and how
the questions are asked (Kodz et al., 2003).
11.1.6 Preferred hours
In the framework of decent working time, a crucial dimension is to what
extent preferred and actual working hours match each other. In economic
literature, it is often assumed that employees’ preferred working hours
correspond to their actual working hours (Lee and McCann, Chapter 3 in this
volume; Messenger, 2004; Stewart and Swaffield, 1997). However, in empirical
studies there is often a discrepancy between preferred and actual hours
(although it is clear that preferences should be interpreted very carefully),
partly because it depends on the wording of the preference questions. In
addition, preferences are dependent on the situational context within a specific
economic and social framework – as is the development of working time itself
(see Bielenski et al., 2002; Väisänen and Nätti, 2002). Furthermore, Lee and
McCann (Chapter 3 in this volume) stress the role of social and institutional
conversion factors (e.g., available working time options and workplace culture)
affecting employees’ ability to realize these preferences.
Bielenski et al. (2002) have hypothesized six factors influencing working
time preferences across countries, including the employment situation;
regulation of labour markets; work organization; individual and household
characteristics; and household economic situation. Although covering
extensively the main macro- and micro-level components, their study does 
not recognize gender-specific working time culture, which is influenced by
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norms and role expectations and, in turn, influences both behaviour and
preferences (e.g. Pfau-Effinger, 1999; Väisänen and Nätti, 2002; Stier and
Lewin-Epstein, 2003).
According to the Employment Options for the Future study, conducted
in 1998 and covering 15 EU Member States and Norway, about half of
employees want to reduce their working time; only 12 per cent prefer longer
hours. On average, employed men preferred a 37-hour week and employed
women a 30-hour week, which means an average reduction of 6 hours per
week for men and 3.5 hours for women (Fagan, 2002). In Finland, the
preferred working week was 36 hours for men and 33 hours for women, and
the average preferred reduction was 5 hours for men and 4 hours for women
(Bielenski et al., 2002). 
Working time preferences are influenced to a considerable extent by
actual working times. On the one hand, the longer actual working time is, 
the longer preferred working time tends to be. On the other hand, more
employees with long working hours would like to reduce their working time
than those with short working hours. Furthermore, working time preferences
are more homogeneous than actual working times, converging towards
working times of between 30 and 40 hours per week. Men’s preferred hours
are influenced primarily by their actual working hours, while for women
household-related factors also play a role; e.g., when there are children in the
household, then women would prefer reduced working hours. In addition, age
increased willingness to reduce working hours (Bielenski et al., 2002).
Fagan (2002) has reported similar results when specifically examining
full-time employees’ likelihood of wanting a substantial reduction (5 hours
or more) in their working hours. Full-time employees preferred reduced
hours if they were working long hours and had a managerial position; were
older (men); had young children and a spouse; and worked in large private
sector companies (men). In addition, living in certain countries (especially in
France, Sweden and the United Kingdom) increased the likelihood to prefer
reduced hours.
A comparative analysis of 22 countries based on the 1997 International
Social Survey Program (ISSP) data (Stier and Lewin-Epstein, 2003) found that
working time preferences were affected by both individual- and country-level
characteristics. At the individual level, those whose standard of living is better
secured (higher education, high household income and older age) would
prefer to reduce their working hours, while the opposite is true for less
educated workers with low incomes. At the country level, the greatest
dissatisfaction with the number of hours worked is found in countries that
experience economic hardship (low rates of economic growth, high rates of
inequality and low levels of social welfare). 
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11.1.7 Aims and study approach
In the empirical analysis we investigate three questions that address dimensions
of “decent working time” and the process of creating “decent working time”
among knowledge workers. First, we examine how unambiguous working times
are. In the literature there is an assumption that the limits of working time are
blurring and employees have difficulties drawing a line between what is work
and what is not work (although this has not often been investigated in surveys).
On the basis of the literature, we assume that managers, in particular, have
difficulties in defining their working hours. 
Second, we analyse the extent and antecedents of long working hours. In
the literature it is often assumed that knowledge workers, especially those in
dynamic sectors (as in information and communication technology, ICT) and
who have good labour market positions (e.g., managers and professionals),
tend to work long hours. 
Third, we study the extent and antecedents of stretching working hours:
how employees see factors contributing to stretching hours. On the basis of the
literature, we assume that factors stretching working hours may be linked to
both the attractions and rewards of the work; to one’s position in the organ-
ization (i.e., managerial position); and to tight schedules or other problems in
work organization.
Fourth, we examine preferred working hours and their relation to actual
hours. In particular, we examine the extent and antecedents of those
employees who prefer a substantial reduction (5 hours or more) in their
working hours. On the basis of the literature, we assume that work-related
factors promote, and family-related factors inhibit, working long hours.
In studying these three research aims, which demonstrate aspects of the
changing working time regime, we are especially interested in the gender
differences. Are there differences between women and men concerning the
extent and antecedents of the three phenomena? The predictors of ambiguous,
long and preferred working hours include both individual (e.g., age, family
situation, work commitment), and job-related (e.g., occupational status, time
pressure, time autonomy) factors, as well as the organizational culture.
11.2 METHODS
11.2.1 Participants and procedure
Our empirical analyses are based on a representative survey among highly
educated Finns, conducted by Statistics Finland in the spring of 2001. 
The random sample consisted of 3,000 people between 25 and 64 years 
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of age, who had finished tertiary education (ISCED level 5A and 6). The 
postal questionnaire was answered by 1,839 people (63 per cent). In the
present study, data analysis was restricted to those who were employed
(1,643 people). 
Of the employed respondents, 49 per cent were women and 51 per cent
were men, and a majority of them were between 35 and 54 years of age (63 per
cent). The mean age was 42 years (men 43, women 41 years). Three out of four
were living with a partner, men more often compared to women. Four out of
five partners were also employed; more often among women (88 per cent)
compared to men (77 per cent). About half of the subjects had children, most
commonly one or two. 
Between the genders, the most obvious differences concerned
occupational status and the industrial sector. Despite the similar educational
background, men (34 per cent) were more often managers compared to
women (14 per cent). The largest occupational group consisted of (university-
level-educated) professionals (73 per cent of women, 56 per cent of men). The
rest of the respondents were employed either as technicians and associate
professionals, or clerks and other types of professionals. Another clear gender
difference concerned industrial division, reflecting the strong horizontal
gender segregation of the Finnish labour markets. Men were concentrated 
in manufacturing, and women were concentrated in health and social services
and in the educational sector. 
Knowledge work is defined in this chapter on the basis of a high level of
education and the use of information technology at work. Almost all survey
participants had finished tertiary education (96 per cent), and almost all (98
per cent) used information technology (e.g., a personal computer at work).
Therefore, in practice all participants can be defined as knowledge workers.
Sample attrition analysis, measures, methods and statistical analyses are
described in Appendix 11.1. 
11.3 RESULTS
11.3.1 Blurring working hours
On the basis of the literature and public debate, we can assume that the
concept of working time is no longer unambiguous. For a growing number of
employed people, describing how much they usually work is ambiguous and
inexact. The borders of working days are obscure. Many people do part of
their work at home, at meetings, in training, or by travelling. 
The first aim of the empirical analysis was to examine to what extent
working hours are unambiguous. Participants were asked if they could express
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their total working hours without ambiguity. Overall, about half of the
respondents (55 per cent of women and 47 per cent of men) said that for the
most part, they could express their working hours without ambiguity.
Correspondingly, half of the respondents had problems to some degree.
About one-third of respondents (31 per cent of women and 36 per cent of
men) stated that expressing the average total working hours was somewhat
problematic. Furthermore, 14 per cent of women and 18 per cent of men said
that it was rather difficult to draw a line between what is work and what is 
not work. Thus men often felt more difficulty in defining their working hours
compared to women (p = 0.002). 
We continued our analysis by examining the antecedents of problems in
defining working hours among women and men, and investigated if
knowledge worker managers in particular have problems in defining their
working hours by using a logistic regression analysis (table 11.1). The
dependent variable was having problems and difficulties in defining working
hours (1 = yes, 0 = no). Based on the hypothesized factors, the analysis
included three groups (individual, work and organizational culture) of
explanatory variables. A positive value (Exp (B)) indicates an increase in the
likelihood that the phenomenon will occur. 
The most important factor in predicting problems and difficulties in
defining working hours was occupational status. Among women, managers
were 5.0 and professionals 4.4 times more likely to have problems in defining
working hours when compared to technicians. The corresponding figure
among male managers was 2.3. Besides occupation, industry also mattered.
Among women, working in education (6.4) and “other industries” (2.5)
increased the odds when compared to those working in public administration.
The corresponding figures among men were 3.5 and 2.4, respectively. On the
other hand, and contrary to our assumptions, working in the ICT sector was
not linked to problems in defining working hours. 
In addition, problems in defining working hours were linked to
working time culture, time autonomy and time pressure. A workplace 
culture favouring long working hours increased the likelihood of having
problems in defining working times (2.4 times among women and 1.7 times
among men) when compared to a workplace culture favouring normal
working hours. Working time autonomy increased the likelihood of having
problems in defining working time (1.6 times among women and 2.4 times
among men). Similarly, high levels of time pressure increased problems 
in defining working time by 1.9 times among women – but not among 
men – compared with low levels of time pressure. Age, family situation,
children or work commitment were not linked to difficulties in defining
working hours. 
Managers and working time in Finland
299
Decent working time
300
Table 11.1 Factors affecting having problems and difficulties in defining
working hours, by gender, logistic regression
Women Men
Exp(B) (sig.) Exp(B) (sig.)
Age (ref. 55–64)
25–34 0.914 1.077
35–44 0.67 1.415
45–54 0.891 1.653
Living with a partner (ref. No) 1.077 1.029
Children (ref. No children)
Child 0–7 years 1.059 0.909
Child 8+ years 1.048 1.133
Work commitment (ref. Low) 1.088*** 1.329**
Occupation (ref. Technicians and associate professionals 
and clerks)
Manager 4.989*** 2.311**
Professional 4.363*** 1.337*** 
Industry (ref. Public administration)
Manufacture 1.491 0.668
ICT 1.091 0.78
Finance 0.994 1.119
Education 6.396*** 3.486***
Health, social services 0.862 1.07
Other industries 2.475* 1.875*
High time pressure (ref. Low) 1.897*** 1.19
Working time autonomy (ref. No) 1.580* 2.425*** 
Long working hours are desirable (ref. Normal working 
hours are desirable at the workplace) 2.410*** 1.665*** 
Constant 0.044*** 0.175*** 
Chi Square 215.090*** 118.123*** 
–2LL 825.896 967.762
N 761 785
Note: Sig.: <0.05*, <0.01**, <0.000***. Dependent variable: having problems or difficulties in defining working
hours (1 = yes, 0 = no)
11.3.2 Long working hours
The second aim was to investigate the extent and antecedents of long working
hours. Participants were asked how many hours per week they normally put
into their main occupation, including job-related work performed at home and
overtime work. Actual working hours varied from 1 to 84 hours, the average
being 41.6 hours per week (43 hours for men and 40 hours for women). Only
a small proportion of employees (11 per cent of women and 7 per cent of men)
worked on a part-time basis (1 to 34 hours per week). Half of all women (52
per cent) and 40 per cent of men had normal working hours (35 to 40 hours).
One-third of women (37 per cent) and half of men (53 per cent) worked more
than 40 hours per week. Thus men worked longer hours compared to women
(p = 0.000). 
Besides gender, working hours also varied by occupational status. The
mean hours among managers stood at 46 hours among men and 44 among
women, while the corresponding figures were 43 among all men and 40 among
all women. The proportion of managers who work excessive hours, at least 48
hours a week using the threshold found to be particularly harmful for workers’
health (Messenger, 2004), stood at 35 per cent among men and 27 per cent
among women, which is significantly higher compared to all knowledge
workers (18 per cent).
In table 11.2 we continue the analysis by examining the antecedents of
a long working week among women and men using a logistic regression
analysis. The dependent variable is a long working week (41-plus hours per
week; 1 = yes, 0 = no). The most important factors in predicting long
working hours were occupational status, high time pressure, and the working
time culture. Among women, managers were 3.3 times, and professionals 2.0
times more likely to work long hours when compared to technicians and
other occupations. The corresponding figure among male managers was 2.2.
High time pressure increased the likelihood of working long hours by 3.3
times among women, and 1.9 times among men, compared to low time
pressure. A workplace culture favouring long working hours increased the
likelihood of having long working hours by 2.5 times among women, and 2.6
times among men, when compared to a workplace culture favouring normal
working hours. 
In addition, working time autonomy and high work commitment
increased the likelihood of working long hours by 1.5 and 1.9 times among
women, respectively. Among men the corresponding figures were 2.2 and 
2.2 times, respectively. Among women, industry also mattered. Working in
education (2.2 times) increased the odds when compared to those working in
public administration. Furthermore, among women, having children at home
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Table 11.2 Factors affecting long working week (41+ hours per week), by
gender, logistic regression
Women Men
Exp(B) (sig.) Exp(B) (sig.)
Age (ref. 55–64) *
25–34 0.899 1.184
35–44 0.539 1.117
45–54 1.202 1.075
Living with a partner (ref. No) 1.256 1.012
Children (ref. No children) **
Child 0–7 years 0.503** 0.636
Child 8+ years 0.547** 0.856
Work commitment (ref. Low) 1.900*** 2.164***
Occupation (ref. Technicians and associate professionals 
and clerks) ** ***
Manager 3.312*** 2.220**
Professional 2.021* 0.863
Industry (ref. Public administration)
Manufacture 2.098 1.088
ICT 1.546 0.73
Finance 1.802 1.081
Education 2.150* 0.631
Health, social services 1.282 1.25
Other industries 1.554 1.255
High time pressure (ref. Low) 3.283*** 1.936***
Working time autonomy (ref. No) 1.534* 2.201***
Long working hours are desirable (ref. Normal working 
hours are desirable at the workplace) 2.510*** 2.567***
Constant 0.059*** 0.243**
Chi Square 176.200*** 180.008*** 
–2LL 804.789 894.978
N 746 777
Note:  Sig.: <0.05*, <0.01**, <0.000***. Dependent variable: long working hours (1 = 41+ hours per week, 
0 =1-40 hours per week).
reduced the likelihood of working long hours compared to those without
children at home. On the contrary, age and family situation were not linked to
difficulties in defining working hours. 
11.3.3 Reasons for stretching working hours 
The third aim was to investigate the extent and antecedents of stretching
working hours. Having a long working week partly indicates the stretching of
working hours. In addition, participants were asked directly if their work hours
(including overtime) stretched beyond the agreed or ordinary (about 37 to 40
hours per week) working hours. According to the results, 28 per cent of women
and 41 per cent of men reported that their working hours regularly stretched
beyond the ordinary working hours. Furthermore, 42 per cent of women and
35 per cent of men reported that sometimes the work piled up. The rest of the
respondents (30 per cent of women and 24 per cent of men) said that this was
seldom the case. Thus men more often reported stretching working hours
compared to women (p = 0.000). Predictors of stretching working hours were
similar to those in the case of long working hours. Therefore we were more
interested in the reasons for stretching reported by the respondents.
Reasons for the stretching of working hours were obtained by presenting
14 factors and asking how important each of them was. The items were rated 
on a 3-point scale (1 = no impact, 2 = some impact, 3 = major impact) 
(table 11.3). The most important factors included nature, challenge and
“infinitude” of the work (89 per cent of the respondents put major or some
impact on it); one’s own enthusiasm and commitment (88 per cent); a position
with responsibility (75 per cent); and scarcity of personnel (70 per cent). The
least important factor was willingness to work overtime (17 per cent). Overall,
men saw most factors as more important compared to women.
To examine the factors behind stretching working time, three sum variables
were constructed by using factor and reliability analysis. The first sum variable
indicates the nature of work, including four items: (i) the nature, level of
challenge, infinitude of the work; (j) one’s own enthusiasm and commitment; (g)
having a responsible position; and (l) work as a lifestyle (Cronbach alpha = 0.71).
The second sum variable indicates career orientation including two items: (k)
desire to succeed and acquire wealth, and (n) aspirations to advance one’s career
(alpha = 0.73). The third sum variable indicates problems with work organization
including five items: (a) the company has too few employees in proportion to the
amount of work to be done; (b) poor management of duties, poor planning and
delegation; (c) the project’s scheduling is too stringent; (d) the schedules
demanded by the customers; and (e) co-workers who don’t fulfil their own duties
(alpha = 0.62). 
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Table 11.3 Reasons for stretching working hours by gender (major or some
impact) (percentages)
Women Men Total (Sig.)
The nature, level of challenge, infinitude of the work (i) 87 90 89
One’s own enthusiasm and commitment (j) 88 88 88
A position with responsibility (g) 69 80 75***
The company has too few employees in proportion to 
the amount of work to be done (a) 71 69 70
Schedules demanded by the customers (d) 57 68 63***
The projects scheduling is too stringent (c) 56 64 60***
Poor management of duties, poor planning and 
delegation (b) 57 57 57
Desire to succeed and acquire wealth (k) 47 60 54***
Work is my lifestyle (l) 42 45 43
Aspirations to advance one’s career (n) 41 45 43
Pressure from the work community (h) 35 31 33
Social interaction is integrated with work (m) 30 34 32
Co-workers who don’t do their own duties (e) 28 30 29
Willingness to work overtime or secondary job, for pay (f) 16 17 17
Note: Sig.: <0.05*, <0.01**, <0.000*** (chi-square test).
The means of the sum variables indicated that both women and men
ranked the nature of work as the most important (women 2.08 and men 2.12),
followed by problems in work organization (women 1.74 and men 1.78), and
career orientation (women 1.54 and men 1.64). Overall, men stressed the
importance of the three sum variables more compared to women. 
In table 11.4, we continue our analysis by examining factors affecting the
importance of different sum variables (nature of work, career orientation and
work organization) behind the stretching of working hours among women
and men by using a logistic regression analysis. For the analysis the depend-
ent variables (nature of work, career orientation, work organization) were
dichotomized (values 2.00–3.00 = 1 indicating major or some impact; values
1.00–1.99 = 0 indicating no impact). 
In the first analysis we concentrated on the importance of the nature of
work as a factor stretching working hours. In the final model the most important
factor was again occupation. Among women, managers were 5.3 and professionals
2.3 times more likely to stress the importance the nature of the work when
compared with technicians and those in other occupations. The corresponding
figures among male managers were 4.0 and 1.4, respectively. In addition, the
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Table 11.4 Factors affecting the importance of different sum variables
(nature of work, career orientation, work organization) behind the
stretching of working hours, by gender, logistic regression
The nature of work Career orientation Problems in work
organization
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Exp(B)(sig.) Exp(B)(sig.) Exp(B)(sig.) Exp(B)(sig.) Exp(B)(sig.) Exp(B)(sig.)
Age (ref. 55–64) *** ***
25–34 0.628 1.019 6.190*** 7.890*** 0.86 1.264
35–44 0.591 1.439 3.050** 4.833*** 0.994 1.625
45–54 0.995 1.017 2.401* 3.054*** 0.962 1.131
Living with a partner (ref. No) 1.023 1.201 0.688 1.11 0.988 1.254
Children (ref. No children)
Child 0–7 years 0.96 1.113 0.911 0.949 0.728 0.659
Child 8+ years 0.929 2.180*** 0.99 1.271 0.744 1.017
Work commitment (ref. Low) 3.117*** 2.898*** 3.073*** 3.021*** 1.228 1.039
Occupation (ref. Technicians 
and associate professionals 
and clerks) *** *** * ***
Manager 5.305*** 3.952*** 2.297* 2.458** 0.85 1.096
Professional 2.338** 1.349 1.778* 1.248 0.778 1.439
Industry (ref. Public 
administration) ** ** ** **
Manufacture 0.737 0.701 0.781 1.132 1.11 1.411
ICT 1.055 1.11 0.731 2.230* 0.682 1.342
Finance 1.168 1.234 0.954 1.886 0.961 1.16
Education 2.304* 1.161 0.602 0.686 0.557 0.417**
Health, social services 1.107 0.899 0.300*** 0.724 0.991 0.73
Other industries 0.995 1.556 0.516 0.841 0.845 1.031
High time pressure (ref. Low) 2.004*** 1.865*** 1.31 1.262 3.309*** 4.187***
Working time autonomy 
(ref. No) 1.498* 1.704** 1.585* 1.881*** 1.346 0.962
Long working hours are desirable
(ref. Normal working hours are
desirable at the workplace) 1.722** 2.274*** 1.577* 1.361 2.110*** 1.588**
Constant 0.255** 0.185*** 0.089*** 0.034*** 0.324** 0.155***
Chi Square 151.114*** 172.614*** 135.470*** 183.357*** 111.824*** 138.237***
–2LL 877.58 854.853 833.766 877.194 866.801 919.992
N 761 785 761 785 761 785
Note: Sig.: <0.05*, <0.01**, <0.000***. Dependent variables: The nature of work (1 = yes, 0 = no); 
Career orientation (1 = yes, 0 = no); Problems in work organization (1 = yes, 0 = no).
nature of work was linked to work commitment, time pressure, working time
autonomy and working time culture. High work commitment increased the
likelihood of stressing the importance of the nature of work by 3.1 times among
women and 2.9 times among men. The high odds result from the fact that both
variables indicate (partly) the same phenomenon (r = 0.21). High time pressure
increased the odds by 2.0 times among women and 1.9 times among men,
compared to low time pressure. Similarly, working time autonomy increased 
the odds 1.5 times among women and 1.7 times among men. A workplace cul-
ture favouring long working hours increased the likelihood of stressing the
importance of the nature of work by 1.7 times among women and 2.3 times
among men. Furthermore, among women, working in education (2.3 times)
increased the odds, when compared to those working in public administration.
In the second analysis, we examined the importance of having a career 
orientation as a factor in stretching working hours. In the final model the most
important factor was age. Younger age increased the odds when compared to older
(55 to 64 years old) employees. Besides age, occupational status mattered as well.
Among women, managers were 2.3, and professionals 1.8 times more likely to
stress the importance of career orientation when compared to technicians and
those in other occupations. The corresponding figures among male managers were
2.5 and 1.2 times, respectively. Working in the industrial sector was also linked to
the importance of career orientation. Among women, working in health and social
services (0.3 times) reduced the odds when compared to those working in public
administration. Among men, working in the ICT sector (2.2 times) increased the
odds. In addition, working time autonomy increased the odds by 1.6 times
among women and 1.9 times among men. Furthermore, among women, a work-
place culture favouring long working hours increased the odds by 1.6 times, 
when compared with a workplace culture favouring normal working hours. 
In the third analysis we looked at the importance of work organization 
problems as a factor in stretching working hours. In the final model the most
important factor was high time pressure, which increased by 3.3 times among
women, and 4.2 times among men, compared with low time pressure. Again the
high odds result from the fact that both variables indicate (in part) the same 
phenomenon. In addition, a workplace culture favouring long working hours
increased the odds of work organization problems by 2.1 times among women and
1.6 times among men. Furthermore, among men, working in education (0.4 times)
reduced the odds when compared to those working in public administration.
11.3.4 Preferred working hours
The fourth aim of the study was to investigate preferred working hours.
Participants were asked the ideal number of working hours per week at their
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present stage of life. Based on this question, the preferred working hours
reported varied from 0 to 80 hours; the average was 34 hours per week (36
hours for men and 32 hours for women). Half of women (49 per cent) and
more than one-quarter of men (27 per cent) preferred part-time work (1 to 34
hours per week). Normal working hours (35 to 40 hours per week) were
preferred by half of women (48 per cent) and 62 per cent of men. Only a small
proportion of women (3 per cent) and men (11 per cent) preferred more than
40 hours per week. 
Compared to their actual working week, employees prefer a reduction of
7 hours on average (men 7 hours and women 8 hours) (table 11.5). Thus
women prefer just a slightly larger reduction in working time compared to
men. Besides gender, the preferred reduction of the working week is larger
among managers and professionals compared with technicians and others.
In table 11.6, we complete our analysis by examining the antecedents of
a substantial reduction (5 or more hours) in the working week among
women and men by using a logistic regression analysis. The dependent
variable is a preferred substantial reduction of the working week (1 = yes, 
0 = no). Based on the hypothesized factors, the analysis included three
groups of explanatory variables (individual, work, and organizational
culture). Furthermore, we also added into the model actual long working
week (0 = 1–40 hours, 1 = 41 hours or more); problems in defining working
hours (1 = yes, 0 = no); stretching working hours (1 = yes, 0 = no); and the
three reasons for stretching working hours – the nature of work (1 = yes, 
0 = no), career orientation (1 = yes, 0 = no), and problems in work
organization (1 = yes, 0 = no), in order to examine their role in preferred
working time reductions. A positive value (Exp B) indicates an increase in
the likelihood of the phenomenon to occur. 
Overall, 63 per cent of employees preferred a substantial reduction of
weekly working hours. In the final model, the most important factor was
Table 11.5 Actual and preferred working week by occupational group and
gender (hours)
Occupational status Preferred hours Actual hours Difference (preferred – 
actual hours)
Women Men Total Women Men Total Women Men Total
Manager 34 38 37 44 46 45 −9 −8 −8
Professional 32 35 33 40 41 41 −8 −7 −8
Technicians and others 32 37 34 37 43 40 −5 −6 −5
Total 32 36 34 40 43 42 −8 −7 −8
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Table 11.6 Factors affecting preference for substantial reduction of working
week (5 hours per week or more), by gender, logistic regression
Women Men
Exp(B) (sig.) Exp(B) (sig.)
Age (ref. 55–64)
25–34 0.343** 0.966
35–44 0.67 1.311
45–54 0.627 1.117
Living with a partner (ref. No) 1.144 1.225
Children (ref. No children) ***
Child 0–7 years 2.647*** 0.902
Child 8+ years 0.992 0.731
Work commitment (ref. Low) 0.975 0.811
Occupation (ref. Technicians and associate professionals 
and clerks) *
Manager 2.680** 1.538
Professional 2.101** 1.156**
Industry (ref. Public administration)
Manufacture 0.478 0.669
ICT 0.846 0.872
Finance 1.04 0.567
Education 0.909 1.898
Health, social services 0.684 1.981
Other industries 0.656 1.285
High time pressure (ref. Low) 1.151 1.246
Working time autonomy (ref. No) 0.716 1.072
Long working hours are desirable (ref. Normal working 
hours are desirable at the workplace) 1.345 1.1
Long working week (41+ hours) (ref. 1–40 hours) 6.019*** 8.265*** 
Problems in defining working time (ref. No problems) 1.245 1.301
Reasons for stretching working hours
The nature of work (ref. No) 0.912 0.704
Career orientation (ref. No) 1.151 0.941
Problems in work organization (ref. No) 1.348 1.795**
Constant 0.782 0.358*
Chi Square 165.859*** 203.522***
–2LL 789.714 817.81
N 746 777
Note: Sig.: <.05*, <.01**, <.000***. Dependent variable: preferred substantial reduction of working week (5+ hours
per week) (1=yes, 0=no.).
current working time. Among women, those working a long working week
(41 hours or more) were 6.0 times more likely to prefer a substantial reduction
of weekly hours, when compared to those working 1 to 40 hours per week.
The corresponding figure among males was even higher (8.3).
Among women, occupational status, children and age also mattered.
Female managers were 2.7 and professionals 2.1 times more likely to prefer a
substantial reduction of weekly hours when compared to technicians and
others. Among women, having young children (0 to 7 years old) accounted for
their willingness to reduce the working time, increasing the odds 2.6 times
when compared to respondents with no children (under the age of 18) at
home. In addition, among women, young age (25 to 34 years old) compared
to the oldest age group (55 to 64 years old), reduced willingness to cut
working hours. Furthermore, problems in work organization as a reason for
stretching working hours accounted for the willingness to reduce working
time, increasing the odds by 1.8 times among men, when compared to respon-
dents with no problems in work organization. 
11.4 DISCUSSION
The aim of the chapter was to discuss, in the context of knowledge workers
and especially managers, four interrelated aspects of working time: the extent
and antecedents of ambiguous, stretching and preferred working hours, and to
examine if there are significant gender differences.
Ambiguity of working time is a reality for many knowledge workers in
Finland: half of them had difficulties in defining their total working hours,
men more often compared to women. As expected, knowledge workers seem
to be more affected by the ambiguity of working time, at least compared to the
findings from the United States (Appelbaum and Golden, 2003), where the
proportion of wage and salary workers who cannot specify the typical end-
ing time of the workdays stood at 14 per cent in 2001. In the United States 
the proportion of workers working an “open-ended workday” has increased
markedly in just a few years; in 1997 it stood at only around 9 per cent. 
Occupational status was the best predictor of ambiguity of working
hours; in particular managers and professionals had a much higher probability
of having problems in defining working hours compared to technicians and
others. In addition, those in teaching or research had more problems in
defining work-hours compared to those working in public administration.
Furthermore, in a long working hours culture, working time autonomy and
high time pressure increased problems in defining working hours. Thus
blurring of working hours was produced by work-related factors (such as
content of work and time pressure) and organizational culture, but not
Managers and working time in Finland
309
individual-level factors, such as age or family situation. There was a slight
gender difference; women had slightly fewer problems than men in defining
their hours worked in paid employment. 
The ambiguity of working time is produced, to a great extent, by the nature
of the work (such as the independence of work tasks from the place of work).
Working at home might be interrupted by household or other private tasks, which
adds to the ambiguity of working time. Also, work tasks can penetrate into non-
work time; although no intention is made to work, a teacher might come up with
an idea for tomorrow’s class, and a manager solve a work-related problem. By its
very nature, knowledge work is often personal and endless. 
Another feature of the post-industrial working time regime is the erosion
of collectively agreed upon weekly (or annual) working time, as well as stretch-
ing working hours. While around half of the knowledge workers reported
working between 35 and 40 hours per week – the normal working time – many
did not. One out of three women and half of all men worked more than 
40 hours per week.
Among knowledge workers, managers in particular work a long working
week, which is a threat to decent working time. Occupational status predicted
long working hours: female managers were 3 times and male managers 2 times
more likely to work long hours compared to technicians. In addition, high
time pressure, a long working hours culture, working time autonomy and high
work commitment increased the likelihood of working long hours. On the
other hand, among women, having young children (0 to 7 years old) reduced
the likelihood of working long hours compared to those without children at
home. Therefore, long working hours are connected with both the work and
non-work situation. It can be assumed that the work-related factors promote,
and family-related factors inhibit, working long hours (see also Feldman,
2002). The Third European Survey on Working Conditions (2000) also
showed that working times vary considerably according to professional cat-
egory; managers’ work was characterized by both long working hours and very
intensive work (Boisard et al., 2002).
Overall, long hours seem to “come with the job” for managers, who
therefore are in danger of suffering from a decent working time deficit, 
namely that their working hours do not meet their needs and preferences.
Additionally, it holds an implicit gender equality issue; the more that managers
are forced to work long hours which do not meet their needs and preferences,
the more likely women – who often carry the main care responsibility in the
family – are to be excluded from managerial positions, reinforcing hierarchical
gender inequality (Rutherford, 2001). 
Besides structural factors behind long working hours, we were interested
in how employees themselves see the reasons for stretching working hours.
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The most common reason reported for stretching working hours was the
nature of the work (following problems in work organization and career
orientation). All these reasons were stressed slightly more often by men com-
pared to women. The nature of the work was best predicted by managerial
position; career orientation by young age; and problems in work organization
by high time pressure. In addition, a long working hours culture predicted 
all of these three reasons for stretching working hours. Thus the reasons for
stretching working hours were predicted by both work- and individual-level
factors and organizational culture. 
In the framework of decent working time, a crucial dimension is to what
extent preferred and actual working hours match each other. Therefore we
examined preferred working hours and their relation to actual hours. In
particular, we examined the extent and antecedents of those employees who
preferred a substantial reduction (5 hours or more) in their working hours.
Overall, 63 per cent of employees preferred a substantial reduction of weekly
working hours. As in the earlier studies, the most important factor was current
working time (e.g., Bielenski et al., 2002). Those employees working a long
week (41 hours or more) were 6 to 8 times more likely to prefer a substantial
reduction of weekly hours when compared to those working 1 to 40 hours 
per week. Among women, occupational status, children and age also mattered,
but not among men (see also Bielenski et al., 2002). In particular, women 
with managerial positions, young children and older age prefer a substantial
reduction in working hours. 
An interesting finding was also that the preference to reduce working
hours was linked to a specific reason for stretching working time. Those
reporting problems in work organization as a reason for stretching working
hours were more likely to want to reduce their working time, compared to
respondents with no problems in work organization. On the other hand, 
other reasons for stretching working hours, indicating more individual-based
willingness to work long hours – such as the nature of work and/or career
orientation – were not linked to a willingness to reduce working hours. 
The gender differences in the extent and antecedents of preferred hours
were mainly similar to earlier studies (Bielenski et al., 2002; Fagan, 2002).
Women preferred shorter hours and even a larger reduction in working hours
compared to men. In addition, among women the willingness to reduce their
hours was linked to both work-related (long working hours, managerial
position) and individual-level (age, children) factors, but among men it was
only work-related factors (long working hours). 
The results of this study are based on representative data among highly
educated Finns. However, there are some limitations. First, the data are
concentrated on highly educated knowledge workers, and therefore it is not
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possible to compare knowledge workers with other employees. In addition, on
the basis of cross-sectional data it is not possible to examine changes over time
or causal relationships. Furthermore, it is outside the scope of this study to
investigate in more detail the central question regarding the relation of work
and working time to place(s) of work and to the household. The expansion of
information and communications technology, and the nature of knowledge
work have not only changed working time issues, but changed the dependence
on the place of work as well. Working time issues are also affected by non-
work factors. Individuals do not live in isolation from their surrounding
community and institutions. One of the most important and closest
communities is the household (family). The composition and situation of 
the household have a role to play in the individual’s social and economic
behaviour, placing restrictions, making demands, and providing different
possibilities and benefits. 
All in all, the majority of knowledge workers and managers in Finland
report the realization of the new working time regime in their everyday life;
they often have problems in defining their total working hours; they often
work long hours; and their working time regularly stretches beyond the
“ordinary” (normative or collectively agreed) hours. The managerial position
was the most important predictor for reporting ambiguity of working time
and long working hours. Managerial work fuses positive and negative aspects
related to various dimensions of “decent working time”, enjoying in principle
high autonomy, but suffering from the possible adverse effects on health and
family created by long hours and stretching working time. A particular
problem for policy is that many managers, who work the longest hours and
have a strong preference for a reduction in their hours, often fall beyond the
“safety net” of working time regulations. Therefore special measures may be
needed for employees in managerial positions (see, e.g., Fagan, 2002).
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APPENDIX 11.1 SAMPLE ATTRITION ANALYSIS
For the sample attrition analysis characteristics of the participants were
compared to results from the 2001 annual labour force survey, collected by
Statistics Finland. A similar sample (n = 2651) was selected from the LFS
survey data with same criteria (age 25 to 64 years, finished tertiary education
ISCED level 5A and 6). The sample attrition analysis showed that in respect of
gender, age, family situation, children and occupational status our sample
represented well the LFS results. In our sample 49 per cent were women, in the
LFS sample 51 per cent. The largest age groups were 35 to 54 (63 per cent in
our sample, 59 per cent in the LFS sample). The mean age was 42 years both in
our sample and in the LFS sample. Both in our sample (82 per cent) and in the
LFS sample (80 per cent) most were living with a partner. Half of respondents
had children, both in our sample (49 per cent) and in the LFS sample (47 per
cent). Regarding occupation, the study participants represented quite well the
LFS sample. In our sample 18 per cent of the participants were managers and
68 per cent were professionals compared to 20 per cent and 68 per cent in the
LFS sample, respectively. The comparison regarding industrial classification
was not possible because of the different classification in our questionnaire
compared to LFS questionnaire. 
All in all, we may conclude that even though the response rate was not
very high (63 per cent), our sample was quite representative – at least in
relation to the background data we had available (i.e., gender, age, family
situation, children, and occupational status). 
Measures and methods
Ambiguity of working hours. To examine to what extent working hours are
unambiguous, participants were asked if they could express their total working
hours without ambiguity. The questionnaire is published in Finnish on the
internet (http://www.jyu.fi/yhtfil/tietotyo3.htm). (See Appendix 1 of the
questionnaire for detailed description of the measures and methods.)
Duration of working hours. The number of weekly working hours was asked
as follows: “How many hours per week do you normally put in to your main 
occupation, including the job-related work you do at home and overtime work?” 
Stretching working hours. The extent of stretching working hours was asked
as follows: “Do your work hours (including overtime) stretch beyond the agreed
or ordinary working hours?” Reasons for the stretching of working hours were
surveyed by presenting 14 factors and asking how important they were. 
Preferred working hours. The number of preferred weekly working hours
was asked as follows: “At this stage of your life, what would be the ideal
number of working hours per week?”
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Statistical analyses
In the empirical analysis we use – besides cross-tabulation and factor and
reliability analysis – logistic regression analysis separately for women and men.
Independent variables included individual- and job-level factors. 
Individual-level factors included age, family situation, children, and work
commitment. A sum variable (values 1 to 5) was formed to indicate commit-
ment to work, which was dichotomized for logistic regression analysis. 
Job-level factors included occupational status, industry, time pressure,
working time autonomy and working time culture. On the basis of occupational
title the respondents were classified in three occupational groups: managers,
professionals, and technicians and associate professionals. Industry was based 
on respondents’ own classification. Working time autonomy was measured 
based on influence over starting and finishing times of the workday; men (60 per
cent) more often than women (35 per cent) enjoyed working time autonomy.
Time pressure at work was investigated through four questions, which were
evaluated on a 5-point scale. A sum variable indicating time pressure at work 
was formed, and further dichotomized for the logistic analysis; 45 per cent of
respondents reported severe time pressure. 
Working time culture was measured by asking what was the most
prevalent working hour norm in the workplace. Half of the respondents (56 per
cent) said that normal working hours were desirable, 24 per cent reported no
reaction to longer working hours, and 21 per cent said that longer working
hours were desirable. The variable was dichotomized for the logistic analysis;
the latter two response alternatives indicate a long working time culture in
contrast to workplace culture favouring normal working hours. A long working
hours culture was more common among men (48 per cent) compared to
women (41 per cent). 
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12.1 INTRODUCTION: FLEXIBILIZATION
AND EROSION
For some years now, efforts have been under way to redraw the map of
working time regulation in Germany. New regulatory models are emerging
everywhere, and they have little in common with the principles that governed
the previous, long-established system. Flexibilization and decentralization are
the new watchwords encapsulating the principles driving the current changes.
Working times are becoming more flexible and individual establishments and
companies are becoming increasingly important as the locus of working time
regulation, at the expense of industry-level collective agreements (Schmidt and
Trinczek, 1999). In German literature, this process has been denoted by the
term “Verbetrieblichung”, which might best be rendered as “decentralization”
or “devolvement to establishment level”. The starting point for these changes
was the introduction of derogation clauses into industry-level collective
agreements specifying the periods of time within which variations in the
distribution and scheduling of working time had to be balanced out. These
derogation clauses created the conditions for decentralized negotiations on
new forms of working time regulation between works councils and company
or establishment management.
Increasing attention is now being paid to the risk that the delegation of
negotiating competences to parties at company or establishment level may lead
to an uncontrollable erosion of the collective bargaining system (König et al.,
1998). It is feared that the foundations of Germany’s dual system of industrial
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relations, with its delicate balance between actors at central and local levels,
trade unions and employers’ associations, on the one hand, and works councils
and companies on the other, could be completely destabilized (Hassel, 1999;
Bispinck and Schulten, 1998). The decentralization of regulation is seen as the
main driving force behind the process of erosion, because it is suspected that
regulations based on industry-level collective agreements are losing their power
to influence behaviour at the local level. From this point of view, the shift in the
levels of regulation has led to a continuous decline in the capacity of collectively
agreed upon norms to shape regulatory practices at the company or establish-
ment level.
I would like to contribute to this debate using three approaches. The 
first is that of a detailed empirical analysis. The fact is that little is known
about how new forms of working time regulation are actually operating at 
the company or establishment level. However clearly the trend towards
flexibilization has been identified in empirical terms (Herrmann et al., 1999;
Promberger et al., 2002), we still have very little information on how new
forms of working time regulation are manifesting themselves in the practical
organization of individual working time. It is by no means clear, therefore,
whether, and under what conditions, flexibilization and decentralization
inevitably lead to the erosion of regulation through collective agreements by
weakening the normative binding power of such arrangements.
The second approach is that of collective learning. The term “erosion”
denotes an unidirectional process that can hardly be said to be opening up new
prospects for the future structuring of working time regulation through
collective agreements. If this erosion becomes firmly established on a broad
front, there will be little left of the German system of industrial relations and
its collective forms of regulation. However, crises can also be the starting
point for new developments. From this perspective, new approaches to
regulation through collective agreement can also be seen as new attempts to
get the industrial relations system moving again. From this point of view, the
key issue for industrial relations is the direction in which these attempts 
are going. Are they pointing the way towards erosion or opening up new
prospects for working time regulation?
The third approach is individual participation in the negotiation of
“decent working time”. The new forms of working time regulation harbour
within themselves the seeds of a third level of industrial relations, in addition
to collective agreements and co-determination through works councils. This
level is individual employee participation, the formal foundations for which
are contained in the new working time regulations in the form of legitimate
claims. Consequently, the new collectively agreed upon working time reg-
ulations are always associated with the promise of a “decent working time”
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arrangement that will enable employees to assert their own individual working
time interests and requirements. Thus the extent to which this promise can be
realized, and whether it will give rise to new interactions between the various
levels of the system, will be a decisive factor in maintaining the normative
binding power of working time regulation, and for the future of the German
industrial relations system as a whole.
In examining these three approaches, I draw on the results of a research
project funded by the Hans Böckler Foundation. In the course of this project,
Steffen Lehndorff and I examined the practical effectiveness of new working
time regulations in firms and establishments. I carried out a total of five
intensive case studies in various companies in a number of different industries.
In each case, 15 to 33 interviews were conducted with experts and employees. 
12.2 WORKING TIME REGULATION AND CHANGES
IN PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
The regulation of working time by collective agreement does not take place in
a vacuum. On the one hand, it is embedded in the institutional characteristics
of the industrial relations system. It is the collective actors in this system, that
is, the bodies representing the interests of employees and employers (or
individual employers), who negotiate the agreements that govern working
time. In doing so, they are bound by the institutional framework of the
respective systems. On the other hand, however, working time regulation is
also directly linked to production systems in the workplace, because working
time is an important variable in the organization of production. 
In this section, therefore, we outline the general trends and inter-
connections between working time regulation, industrial relations and
production systems in Germany. This general context is crucial to any
assessment of the “knock-on” effects of the new forms of regulation. It will
become clear that the normative binding power of the new working time
regulations will stand or fall by their ability to make working time an
independent variable in the production system (and the collective actors’ 
power to enforce the new rules), and at the same time to offer employees new
scope for individual planning and participation in the process of establishing a
“decent working time”. 
The regulation of working time in Germany has traditionally been shaped
by the hierarchical interaction of two regulatory levels: industry-level collective
agreements, on the one hand, and workplace co-determination, on the other
(table 12.1). The outline of collective agreements on working time laid down
clear standards governing the duration, scheduling, and distribution of working
time that severely limited the scope of arrangements agreed at firm or
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establishment level. These standards were the 5-day work-week and 8-hour day,
creating a total weekly working time of 40 hours (later reduced in the metal and
engineering industry to 35 hours). Thus the only standards negotiated at the
local level concerned specific working time systems, such as shift systems for
production departments, but not separate regulatory systems governing the
scheduling, distribution or duration of working times.
Conversely, this meant that all deviations from the largely definitive
norms laid down in the outline agreements had formal status as exceptions.
These exceptions were also governed by collective agreements and associated
with additional costs in the form of premium payments. Thus there was a
differentiated system of premium payments for overtime, night work, and
Saturday and Sunday working. At the same time, in accordance with the
provisions of the Works Constitution Act (BetrVG, 1952), these exceptions
were subject to the approval of works councils. Thus flexibility in the form of
deviations from the normative standards was perfectly possible in practice, but
it was associated with additional costs and could also be forbidden by the
works councils.
Although they were the product of sometimes bitter political disputes,
these old forms of working time regulation fit so well with the functional
principles of the Fordist production system and its standardized products,
that a high degree of functional compatibility – in the sense of ex-post
functionality – can be said to have existed between them (Lipietz, 1985). Thus
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Table 12.1 The dual structure of the German industrial relations system
Regulatory level Legal basis Actors Agreements Objects of agreement
Free collective Collective Associations: Industry-level Wages and
bargaining Agreements Act: trade unions collective salaries
primacy of and agreements Working time
collective employers’ Wage systems
agreement over associations and principles
other arrangements of remuneration
Works Works Parties in the Company Implementation
constitution/ Constitution workplace: agreements of industry-
workplace Act: rights of co- works level collective
labour relations determination for councils and agreements 
works councils management and of employ-
ment and 
performance 
conditions in the 
workplace
Source: Author.
the strong working time norms constituted an important precondition for the
de-coupling of production from market fluctuations and uncertainties – which
for its part was an essential condition for the exploitation of economies of
scale by means of standardized products and processes. The standardization of
working time meant that it was no longer a factor in competition, and at the
same time created incentives for productivity gains, which were achieved
through intensive use of Taylorist rationalization strategies, standardization,
and by the reduction of the standard times allowed for each operation.
So it was no accident that the collapse of the Fordist production system
(cf. Boyer and Durant, 1997) gave rise to a crisis in the old system of working
time regulation. The old system was simply no longer compatible with the 
new production systems that have been emerging since the 1990s, and whose
fundamental characteristic is that they bring organizations into more direct
contact with the market. Nor is it any coincidence that the subsequent period
has seen the enforced flexibilization of working time (Hermann et al., 1999).
Firms have been striving to bring the production of goods and services as 
close as possible to the market. Perhaps the most incisive description of this
development is found in VolksWagen manager Peter Hartz’s metaphor of the
factory that “breathes” with the market (Hartz, 1996), an image that is now
firmly lodged in the cognitive processes of many German managers. 
Thus the emergence of new forms of working time regulation can be 
understood only against the background of the change in production systems. 
In the German debate, this change has been denoted by terms such as 
“marketization” (Moldaschl and Sauer, 2000), or the introduction of “market-
driven management systems” (Dörre, 2002). In my view, the second term is 
the more accurate one, since the organizational change that has taken place is 
characterized both by the harnessing of the market as a new instrument for coor-
dinating internal processes, and by an attempt to manage these processes centrally. 
Market-driven management systems operate on two levels, that of
strategic management (which is corporate governance), and that of the oper-
ational management of decentralized units (Haipeter, 2003). At the level of
corporate governance, the new element in market-driven management systems
is that strategic decision-making competences are invested to a greater extent
than previously in company management. As a consequence, greater emphasis
is placed on strategies geared towards the interests of the capital markets that
seek to maximize returns and increase the value of companies’ quoted shares
(Streeck and Höppner, 2003). This reference to capital markets helps
corporate management to justify internally the demands for increased returns
that individual operational units have to meet. This “financialization” of
corporate decision-making is probably widespread (Dore, 2000; Kädtler and
Sperling, 2001; Kädtler, 2003).
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The “financialization” of strategic decision-making at the central level
has its counterpart in the decentralization of operational decision-making
competences. Strategies formulated at the central level define the general
conditions in which operational units have to accommodate themselves as
they exercise the responsibilities devolved to them, whether for costs or
profits. In firms that have implemented operational decentralization (Faust et
al., 1994), it is left up to the decentralized units to decide how to manage 
with the budget allocated to them or how to meet the financial targets laid
down by central management. As far as the evolution of work organization is
concerned, the most significant consequence of market-driven management is
that employees themselves are directly confronted by the demands of the
market as an objective exigency. They have to make their own individual
contribution to the fulfilment of market-driven objectives in order to ensure
their unit’s survival, or to protect their jobs. This confrontation between
employees and the market is also denoted by the term “indirect management”
(Glißmann and Peters, 2001). 
It is the processing of market demands associated with indirect
management that gives such great impetus to demands for working time
flexibilization. It is only on this basis that there can be any spontaneous
response to demands emanating from the market and from customers, and
only on the basis that “breathing” processes are organizationally conceivable.
However, since they have to be adapted to the actual needs of companies or
individual establishments – or even individual groups of employees – flexible
regulations are decentralized regulations that operate at the company or
establishment level. That is why companies exerting pressure for working time
flexibilization in response to changes in the production system are always
associated with pressure for the decentralization of working time regulations
through collective agreements.
In a market-oriented production system, however, it is individual
employees who are most knowledgeable about market requirements. This 
is why working time flexibilization is closely associated not only with the
decentralization of collective working time regulations, but also with the
individualization of working time organization. This individualization, in turn,
can give rise to a certain degree of legitimate employee participation. The more
working time regulations are intended to give employees increased room for
manoeuvre in organizing their own work, the more they necessarily contain
participatory elements. In this sense, flexibility regulated through collective
agreements becomes an instrument for increasing employee autonomy in
matters of working time organization. At the same time, however, it can also
be associated with shifts in influence or importance between the various levels
of the industrial relations system. In particular, it may be the starting point for
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the emergence of a new regulatory level – one that is the locus for individual
participation (table 12.2).
However, problems are likely to arise at the interface between self-
organization and market-driven management, problems that could
fundamentally call into question the binding power of collective working time
regulations. Thus it is entirely conceivable, first, that their direct exposure to
the requirements of the market will make employees realize that in fact all
forms of collective working time regulation can be obstacles to fulfilment of
their own individual work goals. Working time would become a dependent
variable for employees as they seek to cope with their workloads. In this
situation, the collective norm would lose its binding power because it no
longer met the interests of the individual employees as they tried to organize
their own work.
This applies all the more since, second, the new pressure to increase
profits and reduce costs, which is linked to the “financialization” of strategic
decision-making, leads to a reduction in the resources available to the
operational units. The result is a personnel policy in the operational units
driven by the “bottom line”, the main effect of which is to reduce staffing
levels to a minimum. The more restrictively this policy is pursued, the more
increases in actual working times will be used as a means of dealing with
temporary increases in workloads. Thus, if indirect management creates
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Table 12.2 Flexible working time regulation and industrial relations
Regulatory level Legal basis Actors Agreements Objects of 
agreement
Free collective Collective Associations Collective Framework
bargaining Agreements Act agreements regulations
on working time on the duration,
scheduling and 
distribution of 
working time
Works councils’ Works Parties in the Company Flexible
rights of co- Constitution workplace agreements regulations
determination Act on working time
Employee Company Employee and Consultations Resolution of
participation agreements/ supervisor on working time individual
collective organization problems with
agreements on working time
working time organization
Source: Author.
incentives for increasing working times, these incentives become inherent
necessities when combined with a personnel policy which, in the wake of
“financialization”, is driven solely by the “bottom line”.
12.3 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW FORMS OF
WORKING TIME REGULATION – THE CASE 
STUDIES
Against this background, the key question is whether, in market-driven
management systems, collective regulations can still exert any normative
influence at all on the organization of working time at the local level. Thus it
seems reasonable to suppose that the main problem with the erosion of
regulation through collective agreement lies not so much in the shift of
regulatory levels itself, but rather in the fact that the shift is taking place within
a market-driven system. This is precisely the question I will be addressing in
what follows.
The most important instrument used in German companies that have
introduced flexible working time systems is the working time account. Such
accounts are technical tools for managing working times that deviate from
agreed-upon average working times – whether enshrined in individual or
collective agreements (Seifert, 2001). According to the latest surveys, it is
reasonable to assume that between 30 and 40 per cent of employees in
Germany now have working time accounts (Bauer et al., 2002; Seifert, 2001).
However, it should be noted, in assessing these figures, that working time
accounts can take very different forms, ranging from simple flexi-time systems
to those whose equalization periods are much more long-term or even
encompass the entire working life. The longer the equalization period within
which fluctuations in working times have to be balanced out, and the higher
the upper limit on the number of hours worked that can be accumulated on an
account, the greater the potential for flexibility that an account provides.
In the case studies, the results of which are presented in what follows, we
investigated systems of working time regulations that are part of the “avant-
garde” within the new forms of regulation in Germany.1 They belong to 
the avant-garde because they are designed to replace traditional regulatory
systems, and to open up room for manoeuvre and hence produce particularly
far-reaching forms of working time flexibility. They can be identified by three
general characteristics that they all share, and that distinguish them from the
typical working time account systems:
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1 “Components”, “Supplier”, “Software”, “IT Services”, and “Communicator” are all pseudonyms for the firms studied
and are used for purposes of protecting their confidentiality.
• the particularly widespread conversion of paid overtime into normal
working time: flexibility is no longer achieved through the use of
overtime, which is expensive and requires the approval of the works
council, but by varying normal working time. In this way, flexibility is
reinterpreted, becoming a formal rule rather than a formal exception;
• the use of different account systems: the new forms of regulation
combine certain types of accounts. These are generally flexi-time
accounts, on the one hand, and new long-term accounts, on the other.
Long-term accounts are those that allow for long equalization periods
and permit employees to take their time off in extended blocks (also
known as sabbaticals); 
• new procedural rules: first, opportunities are provided for employees to
take part in the negotiations with their supervisors and managers. The
regulations provide “handholds” or points of intervention (Lehndorff,
2003) for employees by giving them certain rights to which they can have
recourse should problems arise and establishing certain procedural norms
for decentralized negotiations between employees and managers. In this
way, the foundations have been laid for a new “arena” for decentralized
bargaining (Müller-Jentsch 1986). Second, points of intervention for co-
determination are stipulated. These “codetermination thresholds”
(Haipeter and Lehndorff, 2002; Lehndorff, 2003) bring works councils’
rights of co-determination into play when problems arise in the
decentralized negotiations between employees and supervisors. 
It is particularly interesting to investigate these pioneering cases because
they indicate where innovations are taking place in working place regulation,
and the directions new developments are going in. They are particularly suited
to detailed empirical analyses. At the same time, they are likely to give some
clues as to possible new means of regulation that might offer starting points
for exemplary learning. Table 12.3 presents details of the various regulatory
systems studied.
All the regulatory systems combine various types of accounts – such as
flexi-time and long-term accounts – and thereby provide management with
new and extended instruments for converting paid overtime into a more
flexible form of normal working time. The flexi-time accounts either have
short equalization periods or strictly defined and tightly drawn upper limits.
In most cases, the long-term accounts have no equalization periods or upper
limits, which is why they can also be described as lifelong working time
accounts. Employees can use these lifelong accounts in two ways. The
accumulated hours can either be withdrawn as an extended block of time off
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Table 12.3 Summary of working time account systems
Account types Equalization Upper limits Compensation options/
periods requirements
Components Working time WTA: none WTA: +105/–35 WTA: credits withdrawn in
account hours whole days or blocks of days
Long-term LTA: none LTA: +300 hours LTA: longer blocks
account as an average of all of time, early retirement
employees
Supplier Flexi-time FTA: 1 month FTA: +20 hours FTA: in hours or days
account
Long-term LTA: none LTA: none LTA: mandatory
account entitlement for further/ 
advanced training; 
transition to retirement; 
minimum withdrawal
3 months 
Software Flexi-time FTA: none FTA: +/−60 hours FTA: in hours or days
account
Long-term LTA: none LTA: up to age 45: LTA: block of free time;
account 1,800 hours, then part time on full pay,
unlimited early retirement
IT Services Flexi-time FTA: 1 month FTA: +/−50 hours FTA: in hours and days
account
Medium-term MTA: 5 years MTA: 550 hours; MTA: mandatory
account 135 hours worth entitlement for training;
of accruals each blocks of time off (fixed 
year entitlement to 6 weeks in
5 years); working time 
reduction through working 
time budgets
Long-term LTA: none LTA: none LTA: early retirement; lump
account sum payment for care 
services from age 45
Communicator Flexi-time FTA: 1 month FTA: +/−40 hours FTA: in hours and days
account
Long-term LTA: none LTA: none LTA: in days
account
Source: Own survey.
(i.e., a sabbatical) or they can be used to bring forward retirement or the
transition to part-time working for older employees – in other words, to
reduce working time over the course of the lifetime. In this latter option, 
long-term accounts function as retirement savings accounts (Haipeter and
Lehndorff, 2002).
The points at which new procedural norms and co-determination come
into play, and when employees themselves can begin to intervene, differ from
system to system. True, all of the agreements give employees rights of
participation, but in all cases employees are given the responsibility for
organizing their own working time within the limits laid down for the various
accounts. However, there are differences with regard to procedural norms. 
In this area, it is only the agreement at Communicator that has weak regu-
latory content. It stipulates no normative requirements at all for negotiations
between employees and management. The only normative element is that
management has the final decision regarding disputes. Otherwise, if the limits
laid down for the flexi-time account are exceeded, then the account in
question is simply capped, therefore, any excess working time, or rather any
entitlement to time off in lieu, is forfeited.
In contrast, the other regulatory systems we investigated lay down strong
procedural norms. At Components, for example, so-called “trigger limits”
have been set, which, once reached, set in motion negotiations between the
workforce and management. At Software and IT Services, working time
budgets have been introduced as a replacement for, or supplement to, paid
overtime. Such budgets have to be agreed upon as a matter of urgency between
the workforce and management when required, that is, when flexi-time
accounts are likely to be overloaded for a long period. The transfers of worked
hours to the long-term accounts must also be agreed upon at a decentralized
level. The same applies to the use of long-term accounts at Supplier. In
addition, at Software, employees are free to choose whether or not they should
join the working time account system at all. They have two options: they may
either withdraw altogether from the system and switch to a “fiduciary”
working time system (i.e., one which is based on trust, with working time not
being recorded at all); alternatively they may remain formally within the
account system, but be exempted from the obligation to negotiate (in this
case, they are assigned to a no-preference list).
The variable degrees of regulatory power are also reflected in the works
councils’ rights to co-determination. Thus at Communicator, the requirement
that the final decision should rest with management rules out co-determin-
ation. In essence, the works council has no real opportunity for intervention
unless it opts to go down the formal legal route. The situation is quite different
in the other four cases. At Components, the works council can be called in not
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only when disputes arise, but also when trigger limits are set and decisions are
taken on transfers to long-term accounts. At Software, the works council also
enjoys a right of co-determination in disputes. Moreover, it has veto power
with regard to the approval of working time budgets, and operates as an equal
partner on a working time committee that monitors the functioning of the
working time regulatory system. The regulatory system at IT Services also
calls on the works council when disputes arise and accords it full codeter-
mination rights, with regard to both the establishment of working time
budgets and the withdrawal of time credits. 
12.4 THE PRACTICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF 
WORKING TIME REGULATORY SYSTEMS
How effective are the working time regulatory systems in establishing norms?
Do they influence employees’ everyday behaviour in respect to working time?
And do they act as a counterbalance to the effects of the market-driven forms
of management outlined above? In the course of our investigation, I identified
a total of six problem areas that could adversely affect the practical effective-
ness of working time regulations, which play a decisive role in determining
their binding power.
12.4.1 The change in the function of flexi-time
It is flexi-time arrangements that constitute the actual success story of the 
new working time regulatory systems. It is the very flexibility of these
arrangements that employees are primarily exploiting in their day-to-day
behaviour. It should be remembered that today’s flexi-time systems bear little
resemblance to those of the 1980s. At that time, flexi-time was still used as a
measure designed to improve corporate culture; today, in the companies used
in the case study, it is regarded as a privileged instrument for dealing with the
operational demands of day-to-day business. The room for manoeuvre in 
the organization of flexi-time is no longer determined solely by individual
working time interests, but rather by a balance between those interests and
operational requirements. This change has also been fully internalized by
employees. This is not seen as generating potential conflict. Indeed, to the
contrary, flexi-time is appreciated for two reasons: because it makes it
possible, first, to adjust working time to business or operational requirements
and, second, to satisfy individual demands for flexibility.
And yet, under the cover of the high regard for flexi-time and its practical
effectiveness, a second shift in the function of flexi-time systems is currently
taking place as a consequence of market-driven forms of management. Indirect
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management has affected work organization, and customer demands and
general market pressures are giving rise to greater fluctuations in working time.
Furthermore, indirect forms of management have led employees to internalize
the concerns of their employers and customers, thereby making the company’s
economic problems, on the one hand, and its customers’ requirements, on the
other, their own problems. This forces them to adopt a completely new
approach to working time. Adhering to agreed-upon working times becomes a
secondary issue compared with the need to resolve the problems of both the
company and its customers. It is no coincidence that in all of our case studies
we found employees prepared to deliver a high degree of flexibility – sometimes
even beyond the limits of the working time arrangement.
Yet indirect management is only one side of the coin. At the same time,
organizations are being systematically starved of the human resources 
they need. The reason for this is the increased pressure to boost profits and
cut costs to which operational units are now subject as a result of the
“financialization” of corporate strategy. The result is a personnel policy driven
by the bottom line, with the main objectives being to operate with the lowest
possible staffing levels, and to deal with temporary increases in workloads by
extending working times. This makes it increasingly difficult for employees to
make use of their time credits. The extension of actual working times is
becoming an inherent necessity that individual employees find it virtually
impossible to avoid. For this reason, structural overtime is the “hidden
agenda” of indirect management (Lehndorf, 2003). 
12.4.2 The dominance of paid overtime
The route that most of the companies in our samples have taken in seeking to
manage structural overtime is the traditional one of paid overtime. At IT
Services, for example, this is the approach that is preferred in the working time
arrangement. For employees, an application for paid overtime is a self-evident
and perfectly valid alternative to the agreement of working time budgets. It is
even more than that, since the procedure for agreeing on a working time
budget is, in comparison, laborious and uncertain. To date, in any event, on
average only one in twenty employees has actually agreed a working time
budget. All the others applied for paid overtime. The volume of such
additional hours worked is up to 60 or 70 per month. The reason for this,
however, lies not only in the incentives contained in the working time
arrangement, but also in the working time policy adopted by the works
council. First, the works council has not exactly been keen to promote the 
new system of working time regulation. Indeed, many of the employees we
interviewed were unaware that working time budgets existed. Second, through
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its practice of approving overtime more or less without reservation, the works
council has played a major role in maintaining the dominance of paid overtime.
Thus the question of paid overtime, or time off in lieu, is decided
essentially by the working time policy of the various interested parties, and
principally that of the works council. This can be demonstrated by taking the
example of Supplier. Here, the working time regulations stipulate that half of
any increase in contractual working time is credited automatically to the long-
term account, which is then recompensed in the form of time off. This is a
policy decision in favour of compensatory time off that is enshrined in the
regulations. Moreover, the working time practices of the various parties are
consistent with the nature of the regulations. Management and the works
council have agreed to be more restrictive in the use of paid overtime.
Consequently, it is no longer available for use on the same scale. At the same
time, actual working times are becoming shorter because a part of the
increased contractual working time is recompensed with time off in lieu. One
important consequence of this policy is that in many areas of the organization
there is a concentration on what is absolutely essential. The demand for
efficiency and effectiveness is greater than ever.
However, all this takes place in the context of a personnel policy driven by
the bottom line. What will happen at Supplier if the volume of work begins to
increase more rapidly again is unclear. Will the pendulum swing back towards
increased use of overtime? Or will the restrictive overtime policy be maintained?
And will this then put pressure on staff recruitment? In this situation, the
consequences of market governance become a political problem, with which
those responsible for working time regulation will have to grapple sooner or later. 
12.4.3 The forfeiture of working time
Compared with the third problem area, the forfeiture of working time, paid
overtime seems to be a trivial problem. With paid overtime the works council
still has rights of co-determination (in theory at least), and retains an overview
of the volume of hours worked. This is no longer the case when the forfeiture
of working time becomes part of daily practice. In our sample, this is the case
only at Communicator, but it is clear from the literature that the phenomenon
is more widespread (Ahlers and Trautwein-Kalms, 2002; Glißmann and Peters,
2001; Moldaschl and Voß, 2002). 
At Communicator, it is a common practice for working time to be
neither recorded nor paid. Employees do not record the hours they work, or
do not do so truthfully. The reason for this is that, for most employees,
working time has become a parameter of only secondary importance. What is
really important for individual employees is to meet customer demands and to
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manage their own workloads. Working time is a lesser concern. In indirect
management, it is a dependent variable. Working time does not become really
important until the company regulations or working time legislation are
infringed. Individuals seeking to cope with the demands of their workloads
regard these norms as barriers. They try to surmount these barriers while at
the same time avoiding sanctions. It is for this reason that they do not
accurately record the hours they work. 
This practice is not only knowingly tolerated by management and
supervisors but also actively supported. True, most supervisors indicate that
they will not sign any time sheets that reveal infringements of the working
time norms. At the same time, however, they do accept time sheets from
which it is evident that the employees’ output could not have been produced
within the times recorded. In formal terms, all the proper procedures are
followed, but in reality the collective regulation of working time no longer has
any structuring effect on employees’ working time practices. Rather, those
practices are determined by the demands of a system of indirect management
implemented against the background of a restrictive personnel policy.
There are two reasons why, at Communicator and certainly elsewhere as
well, the forfeiture of working time is encouraged as a “solution” to the
problem of structural overtime. The first one lies in the working time
arrangement itself, which relies on automatic mechanisms without providing
any opportunities for employees or the works council to intervene. One of
these automatic mechanisms is the capping rule that applies to excess flexi-
time credits. Any such credits exceeding the limits stipulated for flexi-time
accounts are simply forfeited without compensation. What is more, there is no
mechanism for triggering negotiations. Neither the forfeiture of flexi-time
credits nor applications for overtime can be the object of dialogue or
negotiation, because the regulations do not provide for any procedures. Nor is
there any provision for the works council to intervene.
This weakness in the regulations points to the second problem, namely
the weakness of the works council, which is reflected in its working time
policy. The works council is caught in a predicament which might be described
as a dilemma of representation. The fact is that the works council is currently
the only actor that still has any interest in the practical effectiveness of
collective regulation. The company and its managers and supervisors are
relying on the development of indirect management, while for employees
working time regulation has become a disruptive factor. When the works
council intervenes to uphold working time regulations, it is pursuing a
collective interest that no longer seems to coincide with the interests of
individual employees. This creates a crisis of legitimacy for the works council,
further weakening its already precarious position in the workplace.
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The consequence of this dilemma is not only that working times lack
transparency and are unpaid, but also that they are extremely long. In the
interviews we conducted, employees frequently mentioned the health
problems caused by such long hours. Yet these problems are not seen as an
occasion to reconsider the practice. Rather, employees tend to take the view
that there is no alternative. The reason for this is that anxiety over job security
has been fuelled by the considerable number of jobs that have been cut in
recent years. Pressure emanating from the labour market has become a
significant driving force in the system of indirect management.
However, this practice of forfeiting working time threatens to become
a serious problem not only for individual employees but also for the develop-
ment of the organization as a whole. It is true that increasing working time
at no additional cost reduces wage costs in the short term; but in the longer
term it undermines the organization’s learning capacities. When working
time becomes a free resource, there is no longer any reason to use it
economically. Nor is there any incentive to conduct a debate on questions 
of efficiency or effectiveness. Individual abilities are not systematically
transformed into generalized and explicit knowledge (Brödner, 1997).
Improvements in productivity remain individualized and compartmentalized,
thereby preventing organizational learning processes from becoming firmly
established. 
12.4.4 The withdrawal of time credits from long-term accounts
Long-term accounts have not to date shown themselves to have any practical
effectiveness. The main cause of this is the withdrawal of time credits, which
is the so-called “Achilles heel” of such accounts. At the same time, this brings
us back to the problem of structural overtime as a product of market-driven
management systems.
The main criticism voiced by employees was that, in their view, the
withdrawal of time credits, at least in the form of sabbaticals, was simply
unfeasible. The reason cited was their experiences with a personnel policy
driven by the bottom line. The constraining environment in which they
operate means that the possibility of ever being able to make a withdrawal
from an account is little more than a remote prospect, likely to remain forever
out of reach. It is no accident that in none of the case study companies was 
a successful attempt to withdraw time credits from a long-term account for
the purpose of a sabbatical reported to us. Such withdrawals simply do not
happen. As a result, there are no positive examples around of narratives
developing within organizations about the opportunities that do exist and
which might serve to shape employees’ perceptions. Thus long-term accounts
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have not yet been through their “baptism of fire”, leaving employees’
expectations to become sceptical.
To date, therefore, the only realistic option for using long-term
accounts is their capacity as retirement savings accounts, enabling older
workers to either take early retirement or go part time. Both of these uses 
of long-term accounts are very much appreciated by employees, and the
opportunities are viewed much more positively. Nevertheless, these uses 
are obviously not sufficient to make long-term accounts more widely
attractive.
12.4.5 Individualized bargaining
A key element in the new forms of working time regulation is the creation of
an arena for decentralized bargaining on working time. Working time issues
are no longer treated as problems for the actors at the central level, for works
councils and for management at the establishment or company level. Rather,
they are decided on in negotiations between employees and their managers at
the local level. However, the problem here is that virtually no such
decentralized negotiations have hitherto taken place.
Our case studies reveal two main reasons for the practical ineffectiveness
of decentralized bargaining. The first is the persistence of old organizational
forms. The disruptive factor here is hierarchy, which results in working time
practices being shaped by management instructions rather than negotiations.
It is true that, in our sample, this problem situation predominated only at the
Components production plant. However, in light of the recent debate on the
“re-standardization of labour policy” (Schumann, 1998) or the “back-swing of
the labour policy pendulum” (Dörre, 2002), it may well be absolutely typical
of many plants in the manufacturing sector. 
The second reason is the successful introduction of market-driven forms
of management. Prime examples in our sample are Components and IT
Services, where market-driven management is the dominant organizational
element. It is clear from these examples that market-driven management is 
not dependent on the existence of participatory instruments and processes 
in order to function. On the contrary, the most favourable conditions for
rigorous implementation of market-led management, with its combination of
indirect control and a personnel policy driven by the bottom line, seem to
exist precisely where its effect is not compromised by rights of participation
and their corresponding processes. Conversely, the use of conciliation as a
coordinating mechanism may well restrict the effects of market-led
management. At the same time it may create decisive advantages for the long-
term development of an organization.
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Both can be illustrated by taking the example of Software. Here,
discussions on working time budgets and those on target setting are pre-
dominantly conciliatory in nature. They involve genuine negotiation, not just
top-down target setting. Employees are able to insert their concerns about
working time and job content into the decision-making process. As a con-
sequence, working time remains an independent parameter in the participants’
decision-making calculus. It is not reduced to a mere dependent variable.
Working time remains a scarce commodity. Moreover, and precisely for this
reason, working time and target-setting discussions increasingly function as a
locus for organizational learning. The very scarcity of working time gives rise
to questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of activities; as a result,
individual productivity improvements can also be stored in the organization’s
collective “memory”. 
12.4.6 The anchor role of co-determination
However, decentralized bargaining cannot become established unless it is
strongly supported by a works council exercising its rights of co-determination.
Working time regulation needs advocates at the company or establishment
level; these are primarily the works councils which, unlike employees, can 
draw on the Works Constitution Act, and have experience in disputes and
professionalized structures to rely on in their negotiations with management.
Software provides an impressive illustration of the interaction between 
co-determination and decentralized bargaining, an interaction that has a
decisive influence on the practical effectiveness of working time regulation and
at the same time strengthens the works council’s position. The works council’s
principal arena in the sphere of working time policy is the joint working time
committee. This committee functions as a monitoring and controlling body. 
It compiles data on time account balances, instances of capping, working 
time budgets, and employees who have voluntarily withdrawn from the
working time account system. At the same time, the committee intervenes as
arbitrator in individualized negotiations when requested to do so by employees.
However, the committee also acts proactively to monitor compliance with
working time regulations. Thus employees and managers are approached 
when flexi-time accounts are about to be capped and encouraged to consider
countermeasures. The committee also exercises its veto power when work-
ing time budgets accumulate in certain areas or among certain members of 
the workforce.
However, the real driving force on the committee is the works council. It
is the works council which, through its representatives on the committee,
constantly seeks to remind individual actors of the importance of working
Decent working time
336
time and working time regulation. It is also the works council that exercises its
veto power in problem situations. In this way, the works council has made the
practical effectiveness of working time regulation an issue within its own
policy. In doing so, however, it has clearly parted company with traditional
forms of representing interests. Works council members treat employees as
mature and responsible citizens of the company. Another factor is the
libertarian nature of the working time system. Employees are free to choose
whether or not they wish to take part in the working time account system.
This gives them the impression that it is not they who are being monitored by
the working time committee, but that they are simply complying with a
regulatory system that they are adhering to voluntarily, with the works council
helping employees to help themselves.
The veto power on working time budgets is an important instrument,
by means of which working time can be used to make the effects of market-
driven management on the organization a political issue. Such a veto
inevitably raises the question of how, and by whom, the volume of work is
to be managed. Simply posing this question is problematic for a personnel
policy driven by the bottom line. By making the practical effectiveness of
working time regulation a problem for its own policy, the works council has
at the same time committed itself to politicizing market-driven management
and keeping it in check. 
12.5 CONCLUSION
One unambiguous conclusion can be drawn from this analysis of the six
problem areas in working time regulation: such regulation cannot acquire
normative power unless the effects of market-driven governance are kept in
check. Only if this condition is met can working time regulation become
effective in practice, since it is only then that working time retains – or
acquires – the status of a dependent variable in the day-to-day operations of a
company or establishment. Indeed, one of the most significant consequences
of market-driven forms of management, with their combination of indirect
control and restrictive personnel policies, is that working time can be reduced
to a dependent variable in the decision-making calculus of the actors at the
local level. However, when working time is subordinated to other variables in
the decision-making process, working time regulations are unable to exert any
significant influence over workplace behaviour.
Against this background, strong regulatory norms are a necessary
condition for a system of working time regulation that is effective in
practice. This is shown by the example of Communicator. If both the works
council’s rights of co-determination and employees’ rights of participation
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are weak, working time norms, and with them the opportunities for works
councils and employees to exert any shaping influence, are a lost cause.
Working time regulation cannot function without strong procedural norms.
However, even a regulatory system with strong norms does not by itself keep
the effects of market-led governance in check. Without vigorous advocacy in
the workplace, working time regulations exist only on paper and can have no
practical application. 
However, the most important advocates of decentralized working 
time regulations are the works councils. Only they can make working time
regulations effective in practice. Two crucial preconditions have to be met if
they are to succeed in this task. The first is that the works council should
function as a stable countervailing power within the firm or establishment.
The case of Communicator shows what happens when this condition is not
met. There can be no agreement on the incorporation into the working time
regulations of points of intervention for individual employees or the works
council, nor is the works council capable of implementing any working time
policy at all. The second precondition is that the works council should also
pursue an active working time policy. It must make the practical effectiveness
of working time policy a problem for its own policy-making and keep working
time issues alive as policy issues within the organization.
However, such a policy depends crucially on a third precondition: the
interaction between co-determination and decentralized bargaining. However
hard the works council strives, working time regulation will not function
properly if it seeks to regulate everything from the top down. It must not only
tolerate the room for manoeuvre accorded employees in individualized
bargaining, but also, when necessary, defend them against management.
Employees must come onto the scene as new actors in industrial relations and
the works councils must accept this fact for what it is, and understand how to
make use of it. As the case of Software shows, if these conditions are met,
individualized bargaining can help to strengthen the works council’s position,
even though such bargaining is actually based on the delegation of the rights
of co-determination that it previously enjoyed. The collective representation
of interests can derive fresh strength from employee participation and
autonomy, provided that the relevant bodies try to make themselves the
defenders of individual employees’ rights in this area. There are opportunities
here for the development of a form of positive feedback based on the prospect
of “decent working time”. The demand for “decent working time” geared to
the interests and needs of individual employees can strengthen the ability of
interest representation bodies in the workplace and, hence, increase the
normative binding power of collectively agreed regulations that contain
formal starting points for a “decent working time”. 
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If these conditions are met, working time accounts can become not only
an instrument for implementing important aspects of “decent working time”,
but also, through the creation of a third bargaining level to supplement the
established levels of free collective bargaining and works councils’ rights of co-
determination, a new pillar of the industrial relations system as a whole.
However, this positive scenario should not deceive us into thinking that it is a
panacea for all problems. The new approaches to industrial relations have
many conditions attached to them. The most important one is probably the
strength of the works councils in the workplace bargaining system. In theory,
keeping market-led forms of management in check is an open political
process; in reality, however, this is only the case if the works council can act 
as a countervailing power. A weak works council can achieve little.
Trade unions also have a role to play here, both as parties to collective
bargaining and organizations that have interests in common with works
councils. Collective agreements are perhaps the most important instruments
for strengthening the representation of interests in the workplace. Thus trade
unions can, for example, deploy their negotiating power in local-level
collective bargaining in order to improve works councils’ bargaining position.
In this sense, collective agreements can act as “guide rails” (Lehndorff, 2003)
in the local organization of working time, providing crucial support for weak
works councils in particular.
In addition to their guiding role in the collective bargaining process,
however, trade unions must also become more active in the representation of
interests in the workplace. This applies in particular to their frequently invoked
function as advisers and service providers to works councils. Works councils
must become acquainted with the new responsibilities that the new working
time regulations place on them. In order to do this, they need trade union
expertise and assistance. However, if trade unions are to be able to provide this,
they need independent and consistent models of working time organization at
the local level. In particular, these models should be based on two main
principles: employee autonomy, and the independent role of working time as a
starting point for the “politicization” of market-led management.
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13.1 INTRODUCTION
The hypothesis that seems crucial to improving our understanding of the social
construction of employment in Japan runs as follows: there are in Japan three
levels of convention – defined here as “a form of agreement between
individuals”1 – the common denominator of which is the “social management
of age”, a notion we have borrowed from Nohara (1999). These three levels are:
pay conventions, family conventions and the convention on temporal
availability. These different levels do not operate independently of each other
and may in fact reflect a three-level analysis of the production and reproduction
system (Ribault, 2002). Our objective here is to examine what this hypothesis
could contribute to an analysis of the impact of the tertiarization of the
Japanese economy on time management. In other words, our main empirical
question is the following: is the increasing dominance of the service sector
leading to radical changes in the conventions on temporal availability that
currently prevail in Japanese society? What are the changes that might be
observed in the future in the way individuals manage their time in light of new
constraints – or indeed opportunities – that the service society brings with it?
More specifically, we will examine two areas of temporal availability:
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• Working time: is the tertiarization of economic activity and jobs leading
to a destructuring of working time? Who (employment status/gender) is
bearing the consequences of this destructuring? 
• Domestic time: is women’s employment, of which the expansion of the serv-
ice sector is assumed to be largely a corollary, leading to the increased
externalization of tasks that used to be carried out within the family? The
care of children and the elderly are particularly interesting cases in this regard.
Empirical observation of the changes taking place has to be combined
with an interpretation that seeks to assess the extent and scope of these
changes. As we shall see, the hypothesis that age plays a key role in the
definition of the societal conventions will provide us with a fairly pertinent
interpretative framework.
We will begin, therefore, by outlining this hypothesis. We will then
proceed to an empirically based presentation of the significant changes taking
place in temporal availability. Finally, we will attempt to interpret these
developments in light of our initial hypothesis.
13.2 AGE AS A KEY FACTOR IN SOCIETAL 
CONVENTIONS ON PAY, THE FAMILY AND 
TEMPORAL AVAILABILITY
As Nohara (1999, p. 43) has shown, the Japanese wage convention “reinforces
the homogeneity of the male wage-earning class by reducing the pay
differentials attributable to the diversity of occupational situations”, while at
the same time “considerably exacerbating pay discrimination against women”.
The “social management of age”, which lies at the heart of this wage con-
vention, operates through two mechanisms. The first is the construction of
skills through apprenticeship – any return on investment in qualifications or
skill is, a priori, seldom realized in the short term. The second is the lifetime
wage, which covers all basic consumption needs, including the reproduction
costs that often fall on individuals in a context in which the state makes little
provision in this regard.
Second, “the family convention in Japan is characterized by the relative
autonomy of the family space as a locus of reproduction and hence as a
producer of domestic services. This characteristic reinforces the gender
division of labour within the family, which is regarded as a private space”
(Nohara, 1999, p. 44). The state reinforces the autonomy of the family
through its non-interventionism (such as no or low levels of child benefit
allowances or student grants), and a tax system in which the household is the
basic unit. Thus the principle of the social management of age reinforces the
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gender division of status that is a fundamental element of the male bread-
winner model. We fully concur with this analysis, although we would wish 
to extend it.
Let us take the case of the impact – often assumed to be negative – of
increasing educational levels among young women on their marriage and
fertility rates. Shirahase (2000) shows that this idea cannot be verified in the
case of Japan. True, women are delaying the age at which they marry as they
remain in education longer. On the one hand, however, the period between
completion of education and marriage is in reality shorter than for women
who have not attended a university; on the other hand, the probability of a
female university graduate marrying is twice as high as that for a woman with
a lower level of education. In other words, while the age of marriage certainly
rises as the length of time spent in education increases, this delay does not
signify an upheaval in the timetable of marriage and of the other family
events that proceed from it. These findings support our hypothesis that
family events in Japan are closely synchronized with age – particularly for
women. This is less true in France, where the state influences family
strategies, or in the United States, where occupation and educational levels
seem to exert a strong influence on the timing of these events (Brinton,
1988). Since the timetable of family events in Japan is fairly compressed, the
role that age plays in that country is all the more important. Thus the
existence of a strict timetable based on age, and structured in a systematic
and hierarchical way, reduces the influence of socio-economic factors, such
as the level of education, occupation or social origin, and on whether or not
to marry, continue working, or to have children. It is thus this timetable’s
relative rigidity, which is a product of the high degree of synchronization
between family events and age, which makes women’s choices, and indeed
those of young people in general, conflicted.
Finally, the third level of convention, that of temporal availability, is
seldom mentioned since it is regarded as dependent on the other two and, 
as it were, implicit. Nevertheless, it seems to us that it plays an equally
fundamental role as the other two and, therefore, deserves to be made more
explicit. It is at this level that the linkage between working time and non-
working time is made. In Japan, it reflects the existence of a “time regime”2
whose geometry varies with age in particular. Whereas some authors
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(Devetter, 2001) have attempted to uncover the traces of the transition from
a Fordist to a post-Fordist working time regime in Europe, the working time
regime that has emerged in Japan since the 1980s is becoming highly diver-
sified and increasingly complex. It is diversified because it no longer privileges
(did it ever?) a single norm governing a worker’s temporal availability. There
are in fact a plurality of norms that apply at different stages in individuals’ life
cycles depending on their gender and age: young women or men, graduates or
otherwise, middle-aged women, middle-aged men, elderly women and elderly
men. Rather than the disintegration of the previous time norm, what we are
witnessing is in fact a segmentation of that norm (Gadrey et al., 1999). This
regime is complex, since it links a multitude of micro-regimes, the actors of
which do not necessarily share the same objectives – not even with regard to
time. What is striking is that, as with the wage and family conventions, it is age
that lies at the heart of this third level of convention. Here too, there is a rigid
timetable that governs temporal availability in accordance with age. This does
not mean that gender does not itself also play a decisive role in the
conventions on pay, the family, and temporal availability, but we hypothesize
here that gender conventions are themselves the result of the aforementioned
three levels of conventions in Japan.
Therefore, the social construction of employment (that of working and
non-working time and the linkage between them) takes place in Japan at 
the intersection of societal conventions on pay, the family and temporal
availability – with age as the factor bringing these three levels of conventions
into synchronicity with each other.
Synchronization with age does not mean that the conventions are set in
stone. There are certain indications that some degree of desynchronization is
taking place, which is worthy of examination, as is the way in which these
phenomena are reshaping the existing conventions. They include the growing
dissatisfaction among young part-timers with the mismatch between their
work schedules and their private lives (as well as the increase in mid-career
recruitment), which leads to a growing concern among young part-timers,
particularly women, to acquire “regular” employee status. However, if we wish
to analyse these social changes in a way that misrepresents them as little as
possible, then they must be assessed in light of the developments affecting the
extent to which the various phases of individuals’ wage trajectories, family
events and periods of availability for work are synchronized with age.
The wage and family conventions were the subject of a previous paper, in
which we analysed the duality of the Japanese wage-labour nexus (Ribault,
2000). Let us confine ourselves here, therefore, to an empirical investigation
of changes in temporal availability, before suggesting how these changes might
be interpreted.
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13.3 SOME EMPIRICAL DATA ON TEMPORAL 
AVAILABILITY IN JAPAN AND ITS EVOLUTION3
We will focus on changes relating to time in the work and domestic spheres.
13.3.1 Working time
Is working time being destructured as service activities and jobs come to
dominate the Japanese economy? If so, who is bearing the main brunt of this
destructuring? What is their employment status and gender?
Work schedules
The following analysis of labour mobilization is based on data covering
all economic activities. Our field surveys showed that in catering, for example,
rates of labour mobilization on atypical schedules were much greater than in
the economy as a whole. And in retailing, according to the Labour
Inspectorate in Saitama (an outer suburb of Tokyo), almost 40 per cent of
supermarkets schedule their employees to work very late into the night,
whereas only 70 per cent of stores had offered them the health checks required
by law.4 Nevertheless, the advent of the 24-hours-a-day, 7-day-a-week service
society is far from becoming a reality, and a large majority of the workforce
continue to work relatively “normal” schedules.5 Nevertheless, could develop-
ments specifically affecting certain populations be detected at the end of the 1990s?
And what is the link between these developments and economic tertiarization?
First, for the labour force as a whole, rates of deployment during normal
working hours were lower in 2001 than in 1996.6 Normal working hours are
defined as beginning around 8:00 to 12:00 and ending around 13:00 to 17:00.
This can certainly be explained in part by the trend towards shorter working
times. On the other hand, rates of deployment during the late time slots
between 18:00 and 23:00 were slightly higher, as they were for the night time
slots from midnight to 6:00. This trend is even more pronounced on Sundays.
Differentiation by gender shows that both men and women are affected
by this trend. This parallel evolution of male and female deployment rates can
certainly be linked to the tertiarization of economic activity, which requires
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working hours to be staggered in order to match staffing levels more closely
to the extended opening hours that are characteristic of the service sector, and
to reduce wage costs – particularly against a background of recession.
Who is involved in the increasing mobilization of the workforce during
atypical time slots? Full-timers (regular employees or “seishain”) are playing an
important role in this mobilization, particularly in the evenings. As far as part-
timers are concerned (the mainly female “pâto”7), they are being deployed less
frequently in the standard time slots; on the other hand, however, they are not
being deployed more in atypical slots. Their employment status is associated
with conventions on temporal availability that remain fairly stable over time,
with a particularly focused view on making paid work compatible with
domestic activities. In fact, it is the “arubaito”8 who are the main protagonists
in this increase in atypical schedules. Not only are they deployed in large
numbers during the evening time slots (18:00 to midnight) but also, unlike
regular employees, during the night time slots as well (1:00 to 6:00). Thus
there are two groups of employees, with very different employment statuses,
who are absorbing the cyclical and structural shocks: regular employees and
the arubaito.
Once again, can differentiation by gender help to refine the analysis? In fact,
it is female arubaito who are most heavily involved in the increased allocation
of this employment category to atypical time slots. This change can be
explained by the relaxation of the legislation regarding women’s work, by an
increasing desire among young women to become independent of their
parents and, above all, by the increasing pressure of unemployment on this
population – particularly the 15–24-year-old age group (Ribault, 2002).
We turn now to workforce mobilization at weekends.
Weekend work
There has certainly been a trend over the last 15 years towards a decline
in rates of working on Saturday and Sunday, which reflects the widespread
acceptance of the principle of two days off per week. Nevertheless, the various
age groups, occupations and employment statuses are not all affected in the
same way by weekend working.
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social status (frequently that of a “housewife who works”), may involve a “long-hours” part-time job.
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Employment status survey 2002). The hourly wage rate for arubaito is low, at between 800 and 1000 yen, about one-
third of the average hourly rate for “regular” employees irrespective of age. Arubaito receive virtually no bonus
payments and have virtually no entitlement to social protection.
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Thus, between 1996 and 2001, there were considerable disparities in the
evolution of deployment rates by day of the week. It is true that all age groups
(and both the men and the women in them) saw their deployment rates fall
during the “normal” working week (excluding weekends), but it was the age
groups at either end of the spectrum that were most affected: 15–24-year-olds,
on the one hand, and those over 80 years old, on the other (although this latter
group can be regarded as marginal!). There was also a fall in rates of Saturday
working in all age groups, most markedly among 15–19-year-olds. On the other
hand, the decline in rates of Sunday working among the 30 and over age groups
contrasts sharply with the increase in Sunday working among the 30 and under
group, and more particularly among those 24 and under. Rates of Sunday
working among the 15–19-year-old age group rose by 5 and 4 percentage 
points respectively for males and females; the corresponding figures for the 
20–24-year-old age group were 9 and 6 percentage points respectively.9 These
increases are very significant, since over the 5-year period in question they
represented a rise of between 10 and 30 per cent in Sunday working in these 
age groups.
An analysis of labour mobilization by occupation provides some
interesting additional information. On average, over the week as a whole, rates
of deployment differ little with occupation. Nevertheless, when a distinction is
made between the standard working week and Saturdays and Sundays, we find
with no surprise that such atypical work schedules are common in agriculture
and service occupations. Among the professional and technical categories, the
education professions have high rates of mobilization on Saturdays (70 per
cent) and Sundays (33 per cent). Similarly, weekend working is very frequent
in sales occupations, with 64 per cent working on Saturdays and 44 per cent on
Sundays. In the “other service occupations” category, deployment rates on
Saturdays are almost as high as those for the other days of the week, while the
share of those working Sundays, at 60 per cent, is the highest of any occu-
pational category. It is true, of course, that this category includes catering
workers and those employed in the leisure and entertainment industries.
Are there any differences in weekend working by gender and
employment status? It should be pointed out immediately that many Japanese
workers are scheduled to work at weekends, even though rates of deployment
are on the decline, as we have already seen. In 2001, more than half of regular
employees, part-time employees and arubaito worked on Saturdays, while
more than a quarter of regular employees, one-third of part-timers and almost
half of arubaito, worked on Sundays. In what ways can this simple observation
be qualified?
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First, it should be noted that, irrespective of employment status, men are
more likely than women to work on Saturdays and Sundays. Second, both
male and female part-timers and arubaito are more likely to work on Saturdays
than regular employees when weekly working time exceeds 35 hours. On the
other hand, when weekly working time is less than 35 hours, fewer male and
female part-timers work on Saturdays; this reflects the need of women at least,
to make work and domestic schedules compatible. The gap between the
scheduling of regular and atypical employees is even greater on Sundays,
particularly in the case of male arubaito. It should also be noted that this time,
it is the arubaito with shorter weekly working hours who are more likely to
work on Sundays than the others. This may reflect the fact that the jobs in
question are held by students whose temporal availability is constrained by
their school or college timetables, or it may be that these jobs are held by
workers waiting in the queue for higher-status jobs who do not really have any
choice when it comes to work schedules. 
13.3.2 Domestic time
Is there a tendency for domestic functions to be outsourced to professional
providers? It is undeniable that, on average, economically inactive married
women devote more time to domestic tasks, that is, housework, childcare and
elder care, and shopping, than those who are in paid employment. In 2001, the
inactive married women spent about 7 hours per day on such tasks, compared
with the 4 hours devoted to them by economically active married women.
However, this gap has existed at least since the 1970s.
Since the end of the 1980s, women have reduced the time they devote on
average to domestic tasks. However, the reduction is only slight: in 1986, they
spent 4 hours a day on average on such tasks, compared with 3 hours and 45
minutes in 2001, a reduction of just 15 minutes in 15 years. In relative terms, the
change seems even more minimal: on average, domestic tasks took up 16 per cent
of women’s time budgets in 2001, compared with 17 per cent 15 years previously.
Similarly, the gap between men and women in this regard is narrowing but still
remains very wide. In 2001, the average time men spent on domestic tasks was
just one-seventh of that spent by women (33 minutes per day); in 1986, men
devoted 19 minutes per day to such tasks, 13 times less than women. Thus
women’s labour force participation has not significantly changed either the
distribution of domestic tasks between men and women or the ways in which
these tasks are performed. It might reasonably have been expected, after all, 
that an increasing proportion of these tasks would have been entrusted to
organizations outside the household. It is true that the meagre level of service
provision in the Japanese welfare state scarcely increased at all during this period.
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In order to more thoroughly test the hypothesis that domestic tasks are
being outsourced, we will focus on elder care, which is one of the major
domestic activities likely to be outsourced to commercial or non-commercial
providers outside the household.
A complex relationship between work and care
Over the 10-year period for which we have comparable data (1991 to
2001), women’s labour force participation rate has stabilized at around 
50 per cent (which in fact constitutes a slight decline), while at the same time
there has been a reduction in the share of the total time (men and women
together) given over to care activities (from 78 per cent to 73 per cent). This
finding is not indicative of a strong trend towards the substitution of paid
work for domestic activity, which in turn is supposed to be generating a
significant market for services provided outside the household. The
alternative calculation we have carried out, based on the share of care tasks
in women’s daily schedules, produces the same results. The evolution of
women’s involvement in elder care (which rose from 2.6 to 3.3 per cent)
seems to be more consistent with a stagnating rate of labour force partici-
pation among women.
An analysis by age group sheds light on this surprising and complex
relationship between work and care over the period 1991 to 2001. The first
finding is that women in the 15–19 and 20–24-year-old age groups have reduced
their labour force participation rates, while at the same time considerably reducing
the share of their time devoted to care activities. On the one hand, this
phenomenon can certainly be explained in part by the increased length of time
spent in education, and, on the other hand, by the increasing delay in leaving
the parental home, the postponement of marriage, and the increase in healthy
life expectancy, which means that older family members do not need care until
later in their lives. Nevertheless, an increasing proportion of women in this age
group are involved in the care of elderly family members, even though that
involvement is on average less intensive. The second finding is that, at the other
end of the life cycle, the 60–64 and over-65-year-old age groups are going through
changes similar to those experienced by young women, although with some
differences and, obviously, for different reasons. Labour force participation rates
among women between the ages of 60 and 64 are declining slightly, as is the
proportion of their time spent on care tasks. At the same time, as is the case for
young women, increasing numbers of older women are involved in such tasks.
The major difference between these older women and those in the younger age
groups is that, for women between the ages of 60 and 64, the time spent on care
tasks fell only very slightly over the decade in question here (from 2 hours and
9 minutes per day in 1991 to 2 hours and 2 minutes in 2001). Women in this
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older age group remain among the most generous providers of care. We also
notice that labour force participation rates among women aged 65 and over
have also declined as has the share of their time spent on care tasks.
The third significant development is that labour force participation rates for
women in the 25–29 and 30–39-year-old age groups are rising, while at the same
time women in these age groups are devoting an increasing share of their time to
care tasks. Increasing numbers of women in these age groups are involved in
providing care with the average length of time they spend each day on such
work increasing. Between 1991 and 2001, it rose from 1 hour 15 minutes to 
1 hour 49 minutes for the 25–29-year-old age group, and from 1 hour 56
minutes to 2 hours 7 minutes among 30–39-year-olds. These are the age
groups most affected by the “double schedule”, whereby women are engaged
simultaneously, and in increasingly large numbers, in production, social and
reproduction activities. The fourth significant development concerns women in
the 40–49 and 50–59-year-old age groups. For these women, the substitution of
paid work for care tasks follows a more or less “normal” pattern, with labour
force participation rates rising and the share of their time devoted to caring for
others declining. Like women in the 20–24-year-old age group, increasing
numbers of them are involved in care activities but the average time they spend
on such tasks has declined considerably. For women between the ages of 40
and 49, it has declined from 2 hours 28 minutes in 1991 to 1 hour 34 minutes,
and for those between the ages of 50 and 59, it has declined from 2 hours 40
minutes to 2 hours 22 minutes. This period in women’s working lives seems
to be the one in which their children between the ages of 20 and 24 are most
actively engaged in care activities (see above), while at the same time
experiencing increased financial needs linked to their education. Furthermore,
in part as a result of the longer time spent in education, women in the 
25–29-year-old age group tended to increase significantly the share of their
time given over to care tasks throughout the decade. At the same time, such
an increasing number of them became involved in care activities that the
average time thus spent increased considerably. This suggests that the age at
which the younger members of a household take over responsibility for older
family members is changing. What we are observing here is undoubtedly a
strengthening of the intergenerational exchange between, on the one hand,
women with children who are devoting most of their time to paid work in
order to earn the second income required to fund their children’s expensive
education, and, on the other hand, their children who, in exchange for these
financial resources and the material protection afforded by the family,
undertake to commit themselves to a greater extent than usual to domestic
activities such as the care of elderly family members. In some cases, this
responsibility may become a reality at a somewhat later age than previously.
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Contrasting patterns of development in the time allocated to care
Between 1991 and 2001, the total amount of time women spent on care
activities increased slightly by (5 per cent), while that spent by men increased
substantially by 53 per cent. The amount of time spent on paid work increased
by a meagre 1 per cent for women and 2 per cent for men. However, women
still accounted for 79 per cent of the total time spent on care tasks in 2001,
compared with 84 per cent 10 years earlier; and for 36 per cent of the total time
spent on paid work, which is the same as in 1991.
The average time women spend looking after elderly members of their
households has declined in each age group, whereas men in the over-50 age
groups have seen rapid increases in the time spent on such activities. For
women, detailed examination of the populations concerned shows that when
the family member in need of care is under 65 years old, the average time
devoted to his or her care rises slightly over the period (particularly when the
person is cared for in the household, as opposed to an institution outside the
home), despite an overall trend towards a reduction in the average time given
over to care tasks. The same phenomenon can be observed among men. It is
true that the number of people involved in care activities is rising sharply in
the case of people aged 65 years and over, and declining steeply in the case of
those under 65.
The question of paid work
There was no significant change between 1991 and 2001 in the distribution
of female carers between those in paid work and those who are economically
inactive. Nevertheless, in the case of women looking after people under 65 years
old, 58 per cent were economically active in 1991 – compared with 52 per cent
in 2001. This would seem to suggest that, when they are in paid work, women
tend to reduce their involvement in the care of elderly household members
under 65 years of age, and to increase their contribution to the care of family
members over 65. This interpretation is confirmed, incidentally, by the
evolution of the total amount of time spent on care tasks by economically active
women between 1991 and 2001: it increased by 64 per cent for those looking
after a person over 65 years old, and fell by 50 per cent for those caring for a
person under 65. The changes in the corresponding figures for economically
inactive women were less dramatic but of the same order.
Care in the home and care outside the home
Care for people 65 years old and older. In 1991, 80 per cent of the time
economically active women devoted to care tasks was spent looking after
elderly relatives in the home (as opposed to the time spent in an institution
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outside the home). In 2001, on the other hand, this figure fell to 55 per cent.
The figures for economically inactive women were 74 per cent and 66 per cent
in 1991 and 2001, respectively. This means that in the course of the 1990s, there
was a shift in the location of women’s care work from the home to institutions
outside the home. This shift was particularly marked in the case of women in
paid work. However, does this mean that the time devoted to care tasks
decreases as the location where the care is provided changes? The answer is no.
Even though the increase between 1991 and 2001 in the amount of time spent
on care activities in institutions was significantly greater than that in the time
allocated to such tasks within the home, the growth was positive in both cases.
Care for people under 65 years old. In this category in 2001, there was a
relative balance between the amount of time devoted to care in the home 
and the time spent on care outside the home (49 per cent and 51 per cent
respectively). In 1991, the distribution was significantly less favourable to
home care (41 per cent of total time spent on care activities). This trend
towards a return to the home as the place where elder care is provided can be
observed among both economically active and economically inactive women,
as well as among both women and men.
Although some reservations have to be expressed as to the validity of the
statistics used, it can be hypothesized that this transition is probably linked 
to the effects of public policies intended to discourage elderly people from
remaining in institutions, particularly hospitals (a phenomenon known as
“social hospitalization”). Thus both the number of hospital stays and the
duration of those stays were reduced significantly during the decade in
question here. If this is so, why is the same phenomenon not observed in the
case of over-65-year-olds? One possible answer is that people in this age group
are being increasingly cared for partly in short-stay institutions (day centres,
respite care centres, etc.), which were being developed rapidly during the
1990s, in part through the impetus given by local authorities. These
institutions enable users to remain in their own homes (which may be either
shared with or close to their children), while giving them access to more
professional services when they need them. What is certain is that the total
time devoted to the care of older people under 65 years of age declined
considerably during the 1990s – particularly in the case of care provided
outside the home. Another interpretation of this development, which is not
incompatible with the previous one, is that rising labour force participation
rates among women (however slight the rise may be) have encouraged them
to reduce their share of the time devoted to the care of family members under
65 years of age, whose health is improving in any case, in order to be able to
give more time to older, more dependent family members. This would reflect
a shift in the distribution of temporal availability arising out of the constraints
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of labour market participation, on the one hand, and changes in the rate of
dependence by age, on the other.
The 2001 time budget survey sheds light on the question of whether care
behaviour changes with the use of external assistance. Almost 30 per cent of
men and 25 per cent of women who reported caring for a family member also
called on external assistance such as home help services. However, when these
caregivers call on this type of assistance to help with an elderly relative, no
reduction in the average time spent on care tasks can be observed. Indeed, the
opposite tends to happen: the more frequently external assistance is called on,
the longer the average time devoted to care tasks becomes. This phenomenon
can certainly be explained by the fact that an elderly person who needs at-home
help requires all the more additional care provided by a relative. In other words,
care provided by the family and that provided by professionals are not as
substitutable in practice as might be thought in theory. All this shows, once again,
how complex the relationship is between paid work and the time devoted to the
care of elderly family members, and indeed, domestic time in general.
How should we interpret the scale of these developments in the wider
context of social change and the forms it takes? In our attempt to find some
answers to this question, we now return to the central role that, we hypothesize,
age plays in the societal conventions on pay, the family and temporal availability.
13.4 THE THREE CONVENTIONS: STRUCTURAL 
OR MARGINAL CHANGES?
13.4.1 Limited individualization of life histories
Briefly, the three levels of convention we have identified reflect basic
characteristics of the productive and reproductive spheres of the Japanese
economy. More specifically, the pay conventions reflect the lifetime employ-
ment system and the accumulation of skills through apprenticeship; the family
conventions reflect the independence of the family from national or local
public bodies and the high level of interdependence between household
members (i.e. forms of solidarity inside rather than outside the family); the
conventions on temporal availability reflect a segmented and complex time
regime that helps to ensure the coherence of the pay and family conventions.
The timetables for the various phases of lifetime wage trajectories, family
events, and of periods of temporal availability are synchronized with age,
which means that individual life histories have only a minor influence on the
chronology. Thus it is not only social temporalities (i.e., social structures of
time including work, domestic life, leisure and solidarity) that are structured
differently or are the object of variable levels of commitment from individuals
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depending on their age, but also the age structure of individual life histories:
hence the timing of the various phases of lifetime wage trajectories, family
events and periods of temporal availability. In other words, the individual-
ization of life histories seems to be very restricted.
As a contrast, let us take the case of Sweden, whose economic and social
system is very different from that of Japan. In Sweden, family events and
periods of temporal availability have become decoupled from age through a
mechanism that has been described as the “complete individualization of
society” (Daune-Richard and Nyberg, 2003; Håkan and Bjørn, 2004). In other
words, beginning studies at a university, leaving the family home, marriage,
birth of the first child, graduation and obtaining a first job – all events that
punctuate the life cycle – no longer take place in accordance with a strict
timetable (if they ever did).10 Incidentally, this desynchronization, which is
not confined to Sweden, is a major factor in the emergence of new social risks
in countries that are not prepared for it (Taylor-Gooby, 2005). In the Japanese
reference system that governs social and family policy, the public authorities
are involved only in a very limited way in the autonomous space in which the
family produces domestic services (Nohara, 1999). Studies have shown that
the ideology of a strict separation between the domestic and public spheres is
particularly influential. It is men in the upper social classes who are the main
supporters of this ideology; irrespective of social milieu, women tend to
favour the use of professional services, whether in the provision of care for 
the elderly or for childcare (Yamato, 2000). There is no Japanese equivalent of
the “public childcare service” that exists in Sweden (Letablier, 2003). The
autonomy of the family reinforces the inequality of the gendered division of
domestic labour, which already gains considerable support from the
dominance of the male breadwinner model. Moreover, in the Japanese family,
children are not the focus of parental concern as autonomous individuals with
rights, as is the case in Sweden (although this does not prevent the ideology
that a mother’s care is essential for young children from being highly
influential).11 Thus a survey carried out in 2001 in the Tokyo region showed
that 60 per cent of women subscribe to the “myth of the 3-year-old child”,
according to which a child must be looked after by his or her mother until the
age of 3 (Japan Institute of Labour, 2003). Finally, the relationship between
family events and individual life histories is still largely structured around a
relatively rigid timetable (Brinton, 1988; Ribault, 2002). The persistence of a
high degree of synchronization between family events and age certainly helps
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to minimize the emergence of new social risks such as those that can be
observed in Western countries. Thus it is this synchronization of life events
(whether family- or work-related) with age that is the basis for the persistence
of the various forms of family solidarity that function as a safety net for family
members. This is why skills, educational level, occupation and social origin
have little impact on individual choices as to whether or not to marry, continue
working or have children.
What are the mechanisms – particularly the economic ones – that
underlie this relatively static situation, in which age continues to play a
dominant role in the structuring of individual timetables, despite the changes
that have been taking place at the various levels of societal conventions?
13.4.2 Conventions on availability and welfare and 
competency regimes
There are many studies that characterize Japan in terms of the predominant
position occupied by its skill formation system and its dualist consequences.
What can this perspective contribute to our exploration of the conventions on
temporal availability and their modes of change?
A firm-specific competency regime
The dominant competency regime in Japan is described as one that
privileges the construction and use of firm-specific competencies, as opposed
to one that privileges general competencies (Aoki, 1988; Koike 1994; Estévez-
Abe, 1999; Estévez-Abe et al., 2001). A guarantee of job security is necessary
in order to encourage both individual employees and their employers to invest
in competencies that can be exploited only by the firm in which they were
acquired. In this context, job security can be guaranteed by law or collective
agreements, as well as by non-legal mechanisms such as the transfer of
employees to subsidiaries.
A general competency regime is generally associated with a welfare
regime in which neither employment nor unemployment protection is highly
developed. This gives workers a strong incentive to protect themselves against
insecurity in the labour market by investing mainly in “transferable” (i.e.
general) skills. In contrast to this institutional pairing, where there is a high
level of protection against job insecurity and unemployment, workers may
find it more attractive to invest in competencies specific to a particular firm or
industry. Japan is located in an intermediate position between these two
extremes. Japanese companies offer a high level of protection for a core
segment of their workforces against the background of a societal system that
offers little protection against unemployment. This obviously encourages
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employees to take advantage of the career opportunities offered to them
internally by investing heavily in firm-specific competencies (Estévez-Abe et
al., 2001). Since there does not seem to have been any fundamental weakening
of the positive relationship between pay and age or seniority during the 1990s,
it can be said that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there is still a
high level of job protection in Japan (Sparks, 2004).
Thus the first major characteristic of the Japanese firm-specific
competency regime lies in the fact that it is based on a social protection regime
in which employees enjoy the status of breadwinner, which guarantees security not
so much of earnings as of employment, depending on size of firm. In this system,
employees of small and medium-sized firms are extremely vulnerable. Thus
from the welfare point of view, we are dealing with a strong breadwinner
regime whose fiscal and social protection arrangements alone bear witness 
to the obstacles it places in the way of the development of full-time work 
for women, and the way which it gives women’s employment a particular
dynamic. In fact, when structural changes occur in the productive system,
workers who are made redundant have to find a job in an emerging industry 
as quickly as possible, since they do not have access to high levels of
unemployment benefit over a long period of time. In reality, when male
breadwinners see their job security threatened or their earnings cut, their
wives generally seek employment in order to compensate for the loss of
household income. This mobilization of female labour takes place in a context
in which the costs of social protection are low because of the limited scope of
public programmes in this area. As a result, employers in sectors in which a
high share of the workforce has general competencies have a plentiful supply
of labour from which to recruit workers on terms and conditions that can
hardly be described as restrictive (Estévez-Abe et al., 1999).
A second major characteristic is that demographic constraints weigh all 
the more heavily on a competency regime of this kind, since age is one of the 
factors that helps to synchronize the various levels of convention on pay, family
and temporal availability. As Estévez-Abe (1999, p. 36) notes: “Japan is more
vulnerable in the long term to a shortage of young, male labour since it has to
try to keep the age of its workforce relatively low.” Incidentally, this is what
explains the more intensive use of female labour during periods when there is
a shortage of young workers, a general reduction in the labour supply or a
mismatch between supply and demand in the labour market. During the
1960s, demographic changes and the unprecedented increase in the time spent
in education resulted in a significant reduction in the supply of young male
graduates. As more and more graduates enter the labour market at a relatively
advanced age, so the average age of the labour force rises, which has an
inflationary effect on wage costs. Since Japan maintains a restrictive
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immigration policy, women have seen considerable employment opportunities
open up for them, including skilled jobs for those who have been able to access
the necessary training. Thus in an employment system in which skill
formation is stimulated and rewarded by seniority-based pay and lifetime
employment, a labour shortage poses an extreme set of problems for
companies. How, for example, can they keep the average age of the workforce
as low as possible in order to prevent labour costs from rocketing? The entry
of women into waged work during the 1980s and 1990s can also be explained
in part by the rise in the cost of male labour.
A firm-specific competency regime compatible with the
development of jobs requiring general competencies
In theory, the predominance of a firm-specific competency regime is an
obstacle to the development of jobs requiring more general competencies, and
in particular, therefore, to the development of a certain number of service jobs.
In reality, however, it is clear that what has characterized the evolution of
employment since the late 1970s in Japan is precisely the development of
services requiring general competencies.12 True, a number of field studies and
broader statistical surveys have shown that some service jobs in Japan, including
part-time jobs, fall more within the scope of a “quasi-internal market” than a
real general competency regime. There is plenty of evidence of particularly high
levels of seniority among this category of female workers. Nevertheless, in the
absence of any guarantee of pay levels sufficiently high to meet a family’s needs
– in other words, in light of the supplementary nature of the financial resources
generated by this type of job – they cannot really be regarded as part of a firm-
specific competency regime. Thus, as recent studies have confirmed, once the
variables such as seniority and educational level are controlled for, most of the
gender pay gap is due to the unequal value attached to age in determining pay
levels; this applies, incidentally, to both full-time and part-time jobs (Iwata,
2004). Furthermore, it is well known that the opportunities – when they exist
– for career development in this type of service job cannot be compared with
those on offer to male seishain. This confronts us with a first paradox: the
dominant competency regime in Japan, which is based on firm-specific
competencies, does not seem to be an obstacle to the development of jobs requiring
general competencies such as those found in service industries.
It is true that the Japanese welfare regime, which is characterized by a
relatively low level of unemployment protection and a relatively high level of
job protection (particularly for full-time male employees), encourages the
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development of jobs requiring general competencies in two ways. First, in the
strong male breadwinner model, as already mentioned above, any challenge to
the family wage constitutes a threat, which means that in a crisis (and any
resulting downward pressure on pay levels) women are drawn into the labour
market, taking jobs requiring general competencies in order to compensate for
any possible losses of income. Second, labour shortages or other tensions in
the labour market (whether quantitative or qualitative – the Japanese
employment system is particularly vulnerable to age factors) encourage
women to seek jobs requiring general competencies.
It is interesting to note – and this is the second paradox – that this
mobilization of female labour has been accompanied by the development of public
(or under public licence) childcare facilities. This is paradoxical, since the
“standard” theories of the welfare state suggest that a strong male breadwinner
model like that in Japan does not favour the development of an infrastructure for
the care of young children. However, Japan has been putting in place just such
facilities, most of them public or partly funded by the public authorities and
in no way inferior in either quantity or quality to those in European countries
(even though the Scandinavian countries are outstanding in this regard) or,
even more so, in North America.13 What may seem surprising is that a
shortage of labour with firm-specific competencies can encourage the
introduction of social policy measures that “normally” reflect a “women-
friendly” approach. It is true that the entry of large numbers of women into
the labour market all at once made it essential to put in place facilities for 
the care of young children; first so that those women not yet working could
contemplate entering the labour market, and second, so that those already in
work could be trained and maintain continuity of employment after the birth
of their child(ren). 
Societal conventions and their stability
The expansion of jobs requiring general competencies, which tends to
encourage women to enter the labour market, should have a negative impact
on the system for protecting male workers with firm-specific competencies. 
In fact, the cost associated with providing such protection increases as the
employment system moves from a regime in which firm-specific competencies
predominate, towards one in which general competencies prevail. In other
words, an increase in the transferability of the principal competencies
deployed and most highly rewarded brings increasingly burdensome economic
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constraints to bear on the initial model and begins to call in question the
breadwinner status of specialized workers (which in turn stimulates women’s
employment). It is then up to political leaders and policy-makers to decide
whether or not to attempt to modify such economic developments by putting
in place protective measures such as those introduced in the social democracies
of Northern Europe. In these societies, the welfare state itself has become the
employer of a relatively unskilled labour force (also offering qualified jobs at
the same time), and has taken it upon itself to put in place social protection
measures designed, on the one hand, to maintain the economic and social
stratum of workers with firm-specific competencies and, on the other, to
promote gender equality in a way that is compatible with the maintenance of
that stratum. What is the situation in Japan?
Although the specific characteristics of the Japanese competency and
welfare regimes, taken together, tend to favour the development of jobs for
women with general competencies, particularly in personal and business
services, these types of jobs are not institutionally dominant, despite the 
fact that they predominate numerically. Our hypothesis – which does not
exclude the influence of political factors further upstream – is that one of the
explanations for this lies in the persistence of age as an important factor in the
societal conventions on pay, the family and temporal availability.
In a system in which the timing of the various phases in individual wage
trajectories, family events and periods of availability is governed principally by
age, the most appropriate mode of skill formation and accumulation is one that
privileges firm-specific competencies, since it is this mode that offers the most
efficient and effective means of establishing a balance (in both quantitative and
qualitative terms) between the supply of and demand for labour (depending on
the temporal availability offered and required). Thus the gradual transition
from a firm-specific to a general competency regime can lead to significant
changes in the evolution of societal conventions, particularly those on temporal
availability (see Gadrey et al., Chapter 10 in this volume).
As far as the family conventions are concerned, these changes give rise to
doubts about the durability of the strong breadwinner model. After all, any
challenge to the dominance of the firm-specific competency regime is not
unconnected with the entry of women in large numbers into waged work
(particularly on a part-time basis), and hence with the transition from a strong
to a weak breadwinner model (one full-time and one part-time wage earner),
along the lines of the model that became established in the Netherlands during
the 1980s.
As far as the conventions on temporal availability are concerned,
significant changes may occur when age is no longer the main vector
structuring the timing of availability. On the one hand, atypical work
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schedules are no longer preserved for male workers or for certain age groups.
On the other hand, the distribution of domestic tasks is likely to become more
equal, since individuals’ availability for domestic tasks will depend less on
gender than on the residual availability that paid work brings with it. Now if
women work more and their schedules are less standardized, it is very likely
that they will rethink their commitment to domestic tasks. Finally, some of
these tasks, particularly the care of children and of the elderly, could well be
increasingly outsourced. In none of the following areas have we observed any
significant change in Japan:
• atypical work schedules are increasing among young workers (arubaito,
particularly women) and among “regular” male workers; however, pâto
jobs remain the preserve of middle-aged women seeking to work hours
that are compatible with their responsibility for domestic tasks;
• the distribution of domestic tasks by gender has not changed
significantly over time;
• the stability of the shares of their total time budget that both men (a
quarter of their available time) and women (about 10 per cent) spend on
paid work is evidence of the limited nature of the changes taking place;
• households are being slow to externalize certain domestic tasks, despite
the mechanisms put in place by government; furthermore, we have
already seen, in the case of elder care, that the externalization of tasks can
be accompanied by a simultaneous increase in the overall amount of time
devoted to the care of elder members of the household.
This forces us to conclude that the transition to a general competency
regime has not yet occurred and that the absence of any fundamental challenge
to the central role that age plays within the currently prevailing firm-specific
competency regime bears eloquent testimony to this fact.
13.5 CONCLUSION
The conventions on temporal availability provide the linkage between those
on pay and the family, which is why they are worth investigating, since they
are the means of adjustment between two spheres: production and repro-
duction. By placing age at the heart of its societal conventions on pay, the
family and temporal availability, the Japanese economic and social system puts
a curb on the marketization of the productive and reproductive spheres, while
at the same perpetuating a certain number of inequalities (particularly those
relating to gender). To adopt the terminology of specialists in the welfare
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state, this arrangement guarantees a high level of “decommodification”. This
decommodification reflects the extent to which the power of market forces
over individuals’ lives is reduced by the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
It is generally measured by the earnings replacement rate of welfare benefits.
In Japan, however, it is rather job security (the effect of which might be
measured by seniority, for example) that is the most reliable yardstick. The
weakness of the transfer effects of domestic time to the market sphere, as
observed in the case of elder care, for example, shows how firmly rooted this
decommodification is.
If a society that places age at the heart of its conventions on wages, the
family and time may suffer from the major disadvantage of subjecting the
socio-economic system to the uncertainties of demographic change (see, for
example, the effect of an ageing population on inflationary wage costs), it also
has the advantage – age, unlike gender, being a transitional state – of being able
to adapt itself to changes in that variable without making structural changes to
the system as a whole. As far as wages are concerned, the ages at which seishain
join a company, retire or reach the end of their careers with that company can
be postponed or brought forward, and employers can make up (certainly
within limits) for the costs of such changes by demanding greater flexibility
from part of their workforce. As far as the family is concerned, the average age
of leaving the parental home, of first marriage, and of having the first child, can
also be postponed without fundamentally altering the sequencing of the
various phases of the life course. Finally, as far as the temporal dimension 
is concerned, the combination of rapid demographic change and rising female
labour market participation rates should, logically, lead to a widespread
increase in atypical schedules and periods of work, including the increasing
externalization of some of the work of caring for children and elderly family
members, as well as a redistribution of domestic tasks and time between the
sexes. To date, however, such phenomena remain very limited. Work schedules
are becoming more flexible, but this requirement for increased flexibility still
mainly concerns workers at an age that is compatible with the temporal
availability expected of them in the reproduction sphere. On the domestic
side, not only is the division of labour still very unequal by gender and age, but
as the example of elder care shows, the entry of women into the labour market,
far from fostering the emergence of market services, has merely delayed the
age at which such care begins to be provided, with caregivers and the cared-for
ageing together.
In theory, the dual protection afforded to male employees as the holders
of firm-specific competencies and as breadwinners could be under threat from
a dual shift, first, towards a more individualistic and less family-based welfare
state, and second, towards a more general, less specific competency regime.
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Will tertiarization, through the economic specificities it brings to bear
depending on the economic and social systems in which it unfolds, unleash an
irreversible wave of job creation in which the competencies in greatest demand
will be largely general in nature?
However, let us return to our initial question, which is whether the
tertiarization of the Japanese economy is leading to a radical desyn-
chronization between the societal conventions on wages, the family and
temporal availability, on the one hand, and age, on the other. In theory, this
should be the case, since tertiarization is associated, as we have seen, with an
increase in jobs requiring general competencies – particularly in a context in
which state support for new social services is strictly limited. As Estévez-Abe
(1999) mentions, there is usually a higher level of gender equality in a general
competency regime, or at least this type of regime is more neutral with regard
to gender than a specific competency regime; furthermore, the family model
associated with such a regime is often of the weak breadwinner type (one full-
time and one part-time provider) rather than the strong breadwinner type
(one full-time provider). In principle, therefore, the transition from a regime
dominated by firm-specific competencies to one dominated by general
competencies constitutes a shock to the productive system that requires a
structural adjustment in the reproductive sphere. From the point of view of
wage conventions, careers and pay are no longer evolving mainly in line with
age; as far as the family conventions are concerned, the timing of family events
may be disrupted, with births occurring before marriages, and women gaining
greater financial autonomy as a result of growing recognition of their com-
petencies and qualifications. Finally, as far as the conventions on temporal
availability are concerned, a new distribution of domestic tasks is leading to
structural changes in women’s availability for work and making it possible to
reshape the wage convention, with age no longer being the driving force of
individual wage trajectories. Availability for work and non-work activities is
less rigid and less predetermined by age.
For all that, the conventions on family and temporal availability in Japan
do not seem to be undergoing any spectacular changes. The time that women
have “freed up” is being channelled towards jobs in market personal services
that are both poorly paid and offer little in the way of social protection. These
jobs are in part a response to a labour supply that is constrained by the still
considerable burden of domestic tasks for which women are responsible and
are also part of the dominant family structure, that of the male breadwinner.
Social protection is provided by family solidarity, by the main breadwinner’s
employer and, to a very limited extent, by the state. If changes to these
conventions can take place without challenging the synchronization with age
that lies at its heart, such changes can be regarded as marginal.
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We can also conclude from these results that the most significant dimen-
sions of “decent working time”, namely, “working time arrangements should be
healthy, family-friendly, promote gender equality and facilitate workers’ choice
and influence over their hours of work”,14 are not particularly advanced in
contemporary Japan.
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14.1 INTRODUCTION
Many studies dealing with working time have demonstrated both the convergence
of trends within the EU and the continuity of specific national features (Anxo
et al., 1998; Daune-Richard, 1996; Freyssinet, 1999; Lallement, 2000). The con-
clusions reached, however, depend on the level of the comparison. On the 
one hand, drawing on statistical indicators or transformations of institutional
regulation accentuates the convergences, while on the other hand, privileging
comprehensive qualitative investigations emphasizes the singular aspects of the
national contexts. Only multi-level, comparative approaches – which are still rare
– offer the possibility of going beyond such a dichotomy (Michon, 2003).1 This
is the paradigm adopted here to study relationships between the formalized,
represented and experienced dimensions of working time with regard to two
occupational groups – female hospital nurses and bank managerial staff – in the
countries of Belgium, France and Spain.2
After defining the sociological perspective and methodological
approaches of this study (section 14.2), we provide certain background
information about the three national contexts with regard to labour market
participation, employment, unemployment, and working time by gender and
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age group; and (section 14.3) the formalized regulation of working time. We
then present the main findings concerning the three levels of working time in
the three countries; first for nurses (section 14.4) and then for bank managerial
staff (section 14.5). The conclusion emphasizes the distance separating the two
groups in all three cases, and suggests how the approach can shed light on trade
unions’ difficulties in keeping in check the growing power of neo-liberalism’s
policies of flexibilization, fragmentation and the imposed individualization of
temporal availability. 
14.2 A MULTI-LEVEL APPROACH
Our approach is distinguished by the importance given to the level of
“experienced time”, in its relationships to “formalized time” and “represented
time” (box 14.1); by a conception of work times which encompasses both the
time on the job and the time in the working life; by the attention paid to differ-
entiations among wage earners, notably with regard to gender; and by the
examination of societal diversity. 
The notion of experienced time, according to Grossin (1996), is taken here
to mean qualitative time, that of each person’s overall temporal experience, within
which working time – even in the narrow sense of the time of the provision of
labour – constitutes a pivotal component among employed persons, but one
which is always part of the larger complexity of mixed social times. Work times
are not limited to the time of labour provision: they involve the time of the job
(the time stipulated in the work contract) and the time of working life. A
comprehensive approach to reviewing the dynamics of working time standards
in France has convinced us that, with the decline of the Fordist norm, we are
dealing not with one single standard of flexibility on the rise, but two. The first,
“heteronomous”, is not controlled by wage earners, is not well recognized in terms
of wages and status, and has little relevance for researchers. Most notably, it is
found in the world of unskilled service employees.3 The second, “autonomous”,
is the exact opposite of the first; that is, it is exemplified by certain managerial
posts and intellectual or artistic professions (Bouffartigue and Bouteiller, 2003a).
In principle, female hospital nurses occupy a middle position between these 
two patterns as they are subject to time constraints linked to the continuity 
of treatment, but enjoy a protective wage status relative to women without
qualifications; the bank managers are closer to the autonomous pattern. 
This temporal experience emerges from a series of social contexts, where
formalized working time (regulated by explicit rules) is one of the essential
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Box 14.1 Methodology
Each of the three levels of temporal representation was subject to specific forms of
investigation.
Formalized time, or the formal standard of the regulation of working time, was studied
on the basis of an analytical grid distinguishing four levels of regulation (national law;
national agreements; sector-based collective agreements; and company, plant, and
hospital agreements and rules), three dimensions of time worked (provision of labour,
work contract and working life) and three registers within the provision of labour
(duration, distribution and predictability). 
The time represented by collective bargaining participants was investigated on the
basis of documentary sources (leaflets and lists of demands) and interviews carried
out at the national level of the sectors or companies studied, as well as at the local
level of the establishments and departments. Sources used in this study were kept
confidential to protect the anonymity of the participating firms and employees;
therefore, pseudonyms are used in lieu of the names of participating institutions. The
nurses worked at the following institutions: in France, Vital, a public hospital in the
provinces (2,000 employees); in Belgium, Erasme, a university hospital (3,000
employees); and in Spain, Clinico, also a university hospital (5,600 employees). The
managerial staff of the commercial banks worked at the following: in France, the CGP
was chosen (40,000 employees, 35 per cent managerial); in Belgium, Fortis (25,000
employees, 50 per cent managers); and in Spain, Banco (32,000 employees, 70 per
cent in the “technician” category).
The study on experienced time was conducted through biographical interviews
carried out on the basis of a common grid. In France, these were conducted with
about 15 employees from each occupational group (female nurses from two medical
units, cardiology and diabetology–nephrology; bank managers from a group of CGP
branches with 500 employees, 30 per cent of them being managers mainly devoted
to sales and  marketing). In Belgium, nine female nurses working in medicine
(endocrinology–diabetology and neurological rehabilitation) and ten managers from
Fortis (half back office, half front office) were interviewed. In Spain, six interviews were
carried out with female nurses from the cardiology unit. The experienced time of the
bank managers was analysed on the basis of materials produced by two discussion
groups (one male, the other female) and four interviews with “technicians” from Banco
(three front office, one back office). 
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components. The configuration of relations between the levels and actors of
this regulation varies from one country to another, with the actors conveying
representations of time, notably in collective bargaining, which itself 
functions largely on the basis of formalized working time (Thoemmes and de
Terssac, 1997).
Differentiations among wage earners are clearly increasing. The central
role of gender justifies the comparison of the two groups, which are at once
sharply gender based. “Femininity” is at the foundation of the socio-historical
construction of the nursing profession, while “masculinity” is at the origin 
of the managerial category (subsequently, this gender identification is being
modified). The forms of temporal availability are also highly differentiated.
The growing domination of productive and market times over “human times”
is imposing itself on a body of wage earners who are unequally equipped to
resist it or organize it positively. Here, women are in a relatively unfavourable
position. The necessity for continuous medical treatment confronts largely
female nurses with socially abnormal schedules imposed as an occupational
norm, while bank managers, largely male, have only recently been subject to
the pressure for results (which has now become a career criterion along with
temporal availability). In each of these cases we ask to what extent, and in what
ways, is temporal availability socially recognized, controlled, and legitimized
by those concerned?
Comparing the ways in which work times are constructed in specific
national contexts implies articulating them with other social times within
societal constructions. Therefore, here we must take into account the respective
roles of the family, women, and the state, in the sphere of reproduction. The
“national forms of employment” (Groupe emploi exclusion, 1998; Barbier and
Lindley, 2002) are themselves embedded in wage–society and welfare state
models (Esping-Andersen, 1999), which determine “gender conventions”
(Letablier and Lurol, 2000). Such an approach thus runs into the
methodological problem of “comparing the incomparable” (Maurice, 1989). 
14.3 THREE NATIONAL CONTEXTS
14.3.1 Statistical overview
The difference in labour market participation rates by gender is greatest in
Spain (27.8 per cent), lowest in France (12.8 per cent), and more pronounced
among women between the ages of 55 and 64, two-thirds of whom are
economically inactive in Spain and Belgium. Older men are also unlikely to
have paid employment in Belgium. In France, nearly half the women in this
age group are economically active. In Spain, the absence of paid employment
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among women from 25 to 54 years old is still much more common (one-third,
compared to one-quarter in France and Belgium).
The activity rate by age and gender also shows the degree to which, in
France, and even more so in Belgium, labour market participation is concentrated
among prime-age individuals. Nearly half the male members of the labour force
over 54 years old are no longer actively working in Belgium. Unemployment rates
are at similar levels. The Spanish rate comes closer to the other two but is higher,
as is the percentage of precarious jobs, which affect nearly one-third of the active
population, with men affected almost as often as women. This configuration is
reversed for the rate of part-time employment. Part-time status is still rare in
Spain for the population as a whole (8 per cent), although it is starting to affect
women significantly (18 per cent), but it exceeds the European average for Belgian
women (37.7 per cent, compared to 33.5 per cent). In France, the part-time rate
remains slightly under the European average (29.7 per cent).
Taken as a whole, these figures lead to the classic hypothesis of a certain
substitutability between the two forms of employment, which serves as a tool
of flexibility and a means of sharing available work. 
The weekly work-hours (“customary” and “actual”) of people working
full time differ less from one country to another. Spain is the only country
where the “customary” full-time work-week exceeds 40 hours. The number of
part-time hours is highest in France, where it exceeds the European average,
and is lowest in Spain. The situation in France suggests the generalized
influence of a French-style employment standard, that is, an unlimited-term
and full-time contract throughout the entire labour force, including those
groups most recently employed (women in part-time employment). When we
combine the frequency and length of part-time work, the cases vary from
country to country. In Spain, we find part-time work which is still infrequent
and with a limited number of weekly hours; in France, rather frequent part-
time work with a long work-week; and in Belgium, part-time work that is even
more frequent and lasting, indeed, almost as long as in France. The use of this
atypical form of employment in Europe follows distinct models, which reveal
“differentiated societal logics” (Lallement, 2000). 
The data on schedules show that habitual night work remains marginal in
all three countries. Belgium stands out for the frequency of shift work (in
alternating teams), and Spain for weekend work in which one-third of the
labour force works on Saturday and 15 per cent on Sunday.
From this initial overview, we may note that France and Belgium are
similar in terms of most of the indicators, while Spain is set apart by the low
rate of female labour market participation (outside of the young age groups,
which indicates a recent upsurge in the entry of women into the world of wage
earners) and the frequency of weekend work.
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14.3.2 Formalized regulation of working time
The changes in industrial relations that have taken place in the three countries
over the past 20 years are similar, but they exist within different structures
(box 14.2). In France, the state plays a central role in the regulation of labour
and employment, even if the industrial sectors have played an important role
at certain critical historical moments (Fidenson and Reynaud, 2004). Once
again, it was through legislation (the so-called “Aubry” laws) that the legal
working week was reduced to 35 hours for companies with more than 20
employees and the civil service. But we may speak of “negotiated law” to the
extent that it stimulated a renewal of collective bargaining around working
time at sector and company levels. The rate of unionization is also low in
France, especially in the private sector, and the numerous trade unions are
divided, notably with regard to the issue of working time. In Belgium and
Spain, the state and the rule of law have less weight and sectoral collective
agreements play a more active role, along with the infra-national levels,
including the Flanders–Wallonia division in Belgium, and the role of the
provinces and autonomous communities in Spain. The trade unions are 
much less fragmented and divided in these two countries, each of which has
two main federations: in Belgium, the “Fédération Générale du Travail de la
Belgique” (FGTB), “Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens” (CSC), and 
the smaller “Centrale Générale des Syndicats Libéraux de Belgique” (CGSLB);
in Spain, the “Confederacion Sindicál de Comisiones Obreras” (CC.OO) 
and the “Unión general de Trabajadores” (UGT), along with a few nationalist
unions. The rate of unionization is higher than in France (50 per cent in
Belgium, 15–20 per cent in Spain). But it is at the company and establish-
ment levels that collective bargaining and unilateral employer-driven
regulation is on the rise. Common to all three countries is the same trend 
of “reversing the working-time problematique of the past 25 years”
(Freyssinet, 1999).
14.4 FEMALE HOSPITAL NURSES
In all three countries, the nursing occupation is distinguished by the frequency
of irregular hours, and more broadly, difficult working conditions. In a
context where the continuous increase in healthcare needs comes up against
the limitation of public health expenditures, treatments are more technical and
more often subject to protocols, and the lengths of hospital stays are shorter
with patients hospitalized more often suffering from multiple pathologies.
Despite the profession remaining highly feminized, it has nonetheless
departed from the stereotype of the nurse as a young single woman. Most
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Box 14.2 Formalized regulation of working time: Main provisions
In France, education is compulsory until the age of 16, but in practice schooling
continues much longer. While the legal retirement age of 60 years (with the exception
of specific occupations) was not lowered by recent pension system reforms, the
length of the required contribution period (37.5 years until 1996) was extended (42
years in 2010), first in the private sector and then in the public sector. Alongside the
unlimited-term work contract, “atypical forms of employment” (notably the fixed-term
contract (FTC), “temping”, part-time work, and subsidized jobs) have been on the rise
for the past 20 years. The category that has received the most encouragement is
female part-time employment, in one of two contrasting forms: one involving a
protected job (in which part-time is usually chosen and often associated with parental
leave), and the other a non-protected job (in which part-time is more often imposed).
The rationale underlying working time was “reversed” in the 1980s, thanks to a
number of factors including an element of redistribution of the fruits of growth, and
the collective reduction of working time (RWT), which became one of the possible
components of a labour–management trade-off involving greater flexibility of times
worked and sharing of available work. Depending on the period, emphasis has been
placed on one term of this trade-off or the other. The determined intervention of public
authorities in recent years enforcing the Aubry laws in organizations, and the reduction
of working time (known in France as the ARTT – aménagement et reduction du temps
de travail – or simply the “35 hours”), should not mask the broader margins of freedom
given to negotiators, or the extended possibilities of flexible organization of work hours
(annualization, wage adjustment, and wage packages for managers based on days
worked). As a result, the differences in the situations among different sectors,
companies and categories of employees have become even more pronounced.
In Belgium, education is compulsory until the age of 18, with the possibility of part-
time schooling from age 16 on. The legal retirement age is 65 years for men (full career
of 45 contribution years), and 63 for women (who will be aligned with men by 2009).
The system of “pre-pensions” (early retirement with unemployment benefits) at age
58, and even as early as age 53, remains in force. As in France, FTCs, “temping”, and
subsidized jobs constitute the main precarious forms of employment and come under
comparable legislation. Possibilities for parental leave are slightly greater in Belgium
(full or part-time leave until the child is 4 years old), as are the possibilities for full or
part-time career breaks for personal reasons (“time credits”). Notwithstanding
resistance at the branch level of regulation, public authorities have closely supervised
wage negotiations and directly encouraged policies regarding working time. They
have done this following two main rationales: the sharing of available work (through 
/cont’d
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Box 14.2 (/cont’d)
the massive use, until recently, of “pre-pensions” and the encouragement of part-time
work) and negotiated flexibility. Even if unions were unable to obtain the 35-hour
week, certain sectors and companies have come closer to it, generally at the price of
concessions in the area of flexibility in the arrangement of working hours (with the
spread of the reference period to an annual scale). This is the case for the banking
sector, where the average yearly working week is fixed at 35 hours, and also in the
healthcare sector for wage-earners over 45 years old (with a sliding scale of 36 hours
at age 45; 34 hours at age 50; 32 hours after age 55).
In Spain, compulsory school attendance ends at age 16. The legal retirement age is
65 years for men and women alike, with just 35 contribution years necessary for a full
pension. But pre-retirement and early retirement plans have led to a drop in the real
retirement age. The rate of labour market participation among men between 60 and
64 years old went from 67 per cent in 1980 to 43 per cent in 2000. As elsewhere,
measures have been taken to encourage the labour market activity of older workers.
Fixed-term contracts (FTCs) have been easy to use, and have been used frequently
since the 1980s, with the result that they now represent nearly one-third of total
employment. This situation has, in turn, led to a high level of labour turnover and a
large proportion of unemployed workers receiving little or no compensation. Despite
recent measures to encourage it, part-time employment has shown little increase in
Spain. Since 1999, Spanish legislation, like that in other countries, has followed
European directives on the “reconciliation of work and family life” by introducing rights
to leave for the care of children or other family members.1 A series of legislative
modifications over the past 20 years has tended to weaken the normative framework
of the law in favour of collective bargaining at the sectoral and company levels, which
has also allowed for greater flexibility. If the “workers’ statute” of 1980 included initial
provisions promoting flexibility, it still maintained strict controls and subordinated those
provisions to the existence of collective agreements. This limited the number of
working hours per day (9) and per week (43), and also limited overtime by imposing
an extremely high premium (more than 75 per cent above the normal wage). But the
1994 reform of this statute was designed to disrupt the institutional framework by
raising the ceiling on the number of daily and weekly hours. This was done in the spirit
of the annualization of working time, and also by modifying the hierarchy of norms so
as to accord considerably more latitude to collective bargaining at the sectoral and
company levels. As in Belgium, trade union activity in Spain in favour of the 35-hour
week has had effects on the contractual and actual duration of working time; but
these are uneven and often associated with trade-offs in the area of greater flexibility. 
Note: 1European integration has helped to harmonize these forms of time regulation.
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female nurses live with a partner and continue working within their profession
despite old and new occupational hardships.4
The ageing of female nurses seems more pronounced in France (table
14.1), but the phenomenon does not have a simple explanation. It may reflect
different rhythms of increasing the number of nurses and thus of recruitments
(in Spain, the development of the public health system is more recent), or
inequalities in the number of departures before the legal retirement age (in
Belgium, these are encouraged thanks to recent agreements). In all three
countries, single women have become a small minority of all nurses.5 Part-time
status has spread, especially in France (where it concerns one-third of the
profession), and in Belgium. And in all three cases, we can observe a
diminution of irregular schedules over the course of the career. 
Certain specific country features in the regulation of the occupation are
likely to have an effect on employment and working conditions. Belgium 
has two certification levels, “certified” (baccalauréat level) and “graduates”
(baccalauréat + 3 years of study). The latter, who are more numerous and
better paid, nonetheless provide the same patient care, from the most
technical procedures to “nursing” per se.6 The public authorities’ discourse
on the nursing “shortage” is more pervasive than in France. As for female
The challenge of temporal availability: France, Belgium and Spain
377
4 For the French case, cf. Le Lan and Baubeau (2004): the constraints of pace and deadlines showed significant
aggravation between 1998 and 2003. 
5 In France and Spain alike, only one female nurse out of five in the 35 to 44 age group lives alone. 
6 This distinction does not coincide with the French distinction between nurses’ aides and nurses: Belgium has a
separate category of “nursing auxiliaries” or “health auxiliaries”, but they are few in number and hold no 
specific diploma.
Table 14.1 Percentage of women, age of female nurses in France and
Spain, age of nurses (male and female) in two French and two
Belgian hospitals
Female nurses Nursing staff (including nurses’ aides)
France Spain Vital Hospital (Fr.) Erasme Hospital (Belg.)
Age 25 and under 3.0 4.4 4.0 7.2
Ages 25–34 25.4 23.5 30.0 27.3
Ages 35–44 29.9 39.3 33.0 45.1
Ages 45–54 29.1 27.1 28.3 18.0
Age 54 and over 12.5 5.9 4.6 2.4
Women as percentage of total 87.0 86.0 88.0 87.0
Sources: Female nurses – France: DREES, 2003. Spain: EFT, 2001. Nursing staff include both males and females:
Administrations of hospitals studied. While the four columns are not strictly comparable, since nearly 90 per cent of
nursing staff are female, some very rough comparisons are possible. 
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nurses in Spain, training flows are less strictly controlled by the public
authorities, which may explain why they face greater unemployment.7
14.4.1 France
Formalized time comes under the L’Aménagement et la Réduction du Temps de
Travail (ARTT) agreement concluded at the end of 2001 between the Ministry
of Health and certain unions, in the context of the new Aubry laws. This type of
working time introduced a double wage scale (annual and weekly), a definition
of “actual working time” and rules for maximum hours worked and rest periods.
The “35 hours” (due to become 32 hours for night work) are conceived as a yearly
average with variable modalities depending on the specific rules. This agreement
does not eliminate pre-existing differences between hospitals and personnel
categories.8 At Vital Hospital, it has led to longer hours for the night shift, which
in turn benefits from a greater number of reduction of working time (RWT) days
than the day shifts. The dominant feeling among the nurses is that working
conditions have declined and that the RWT is more limited than was previously
hoped. In case of absences in the care units (since there is practically no recourse
to temping and the supply posts have few staff members), the main form of
regulation consists of calling nurses to work on their days off. 
The represented time of the social partners reflects sharp divergences. The
Nursing Care Department at Vital Hospital calls for greater flexibility in the
management of working time, and sees the notions of “chosen time” and “part
time” as closely related. The unions are divided over this notion. The main
union among those signing the agreement, the Confédération Française
Démocratique du Travail (CFDT), which is not represented locally, approves
the national agreement, but at the same time disapproves of the minimal 
role left for local bargaining. Meanwhile, the unions which did not sign,
Confédération Générale de Travail (CGT) and Force Ouvrière (FO), re-
presented at the local level, stress the limited effectiveness of the reduction of
working time given the insufficient number of jobs created, as well as the
dangers of greater flexibility of working time.9 
The investigation of experienced time confirms the critical role of time
issues in the nurses’ lives. Their competence as “jugglers” – a term used by
several of them – is a central aspect of their professional abilities. Nurses
nonetheless work minor miracles every day in order to withstand their
7 In 1997, 16 per cent of Spanish nurses (male and female) underwent at least one period of unemployment, including
4 per cent who were unemployed during the entire year.
8 These disparities were revealed in 1999 by the Roche mission preceding the ARTT in the civil service.
9 Since the new personnel supposed to compensate for the RWT were insufficient, the public health sector was the first
to “relax” the 35 hours, in early 2003, with a special exemption from the maximum limit on overtime hours. 
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accumulated time constraints, both at work and outside of it (especially in the
coordination of the two space-times). These daily acrobatic feats, which relate
to the majority of interviewees (that is, those with children), become
extremely dangerous when they are prolonged or when the partner also works
atypical or irregular hours, and/or when there is no extended family to help
with the care of young children.
In fact, these temporal competencies are largely invisible, with little or no
statutory recognition. They are constructed socially, on three temporal levels:
• The process of socialization and work socialization, in which the attitude
towards the profession is most often positive and often already explicitly
anchored in the maternal model, that is, in the sense of a plan for self-
fulfilment through an activity in the service of children and/or others.
Here, the preservation of a strong interest in the work nourishes and
sustains time-management abilities, especially since atypical hours,
although considered “socially abnormal”, are at the same time seen by
these nurses as “professionally normal”. 
• The modalities of personal appropriation of the hours proposed, which is, in
particular, the possibilities for mutual aid and arrangements through
scheduling within the care units between colleagues or with the head
nurse, as well as the possibilities for switching to part-time status once
they have children. 
• The hopes for better schedules in the course of working life, that is, hopes
which are made credible by career possibilities.
The nurses are critical with regard to the way the reduction of working time is
applied.10 Being badly represented by the trade unions is less on the scale of major
demands. The fact that female experience of time is badly reflected in the
dominant union approach probably also plays a role, as certain women leaders in
the CFDT and CGT health-workers’ federations recognize. The nurses still have
the feeling, moreover, of not really being “represented as female nurses”, which
reflects the objective distance between the socio-occupational and gender
composition of the union teams, and female nurses as a group. But it also reflects
the distance between certain of their aspirations concerning time and the
traditional union viewpoint. This gap is expressed in two ways: first, there is the
nurses’  attachment to time arrangements on the fringes or outside of regulations.
These arrangements are based on a social exchange in which longer and/or more
intensive daily schedules (10 or even 12 hours comprising the “swing” shift from
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10 An extensive survey carried out at the same period (2002, i.e. at the beginning of the application of the ARTT in the
hospitals) arrives at a similar conclusion (Tonneau, 2003).
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the “night” team to the “morning” team, with a rest period under the legal
minimum) are accepted and sometimes even requested in order to benefit from
longer days off or vacations. Second, there is the shift to part-time status. While
this is an extremely important issue in the experience of these female nurses, it
was practically absent from public debate at the hospital when the RWH (reduced
working hours) was introduced.
14.4.2 Belgium
Formalized working time, as demonstrated by a recent agreement covering the
health-care sector, attempts to compensate for the insufficient attractiveness
of nursing jobs. Provisions have thus been introduced for the gradual
reduction of work hours from the age of 45 on. Other measures are aimed at
harmonizing and upgrading remunerations, stabilizing personnel, increasing
training flows, developing bridges between the two certification levels,
establishing a better definition of tasks, and improving work schedules.
Nurses benefit from “pregnancy leave” which is remunerated from the begin-
ning of their pregnancy at 80 per cent of their wages. In the hospital studied,
the regulations seem to be better respected than elsewhere. It has become
common practice to have every other weekend or public holiday off, and to
have three weeks of paid vacation during July and August rather than two for
family reasons. Nearly two-thirds of the nurses over 45 have chosen to adopt
the voluntary RWT, while the remaining third have opted for maintaining the
length of their working time. Among the tools that permit administrators of
the care units to deal with workload fluctuations and absences is recourse to
temping, which plays a key role (there are some 100 temporary nurses working
at Erasme Hospital). These may be beginners who are learning about the
different situations involved in the practice of their profession, or experienced
nurses who have deliberately chosen this form of employment. Their
favourable situation in the labour market – as attested by the fact that they are
remunerated for their seniority – leaves them a certain degree of choice among
institutions, units and schedules. They are seen as having a more detached
relationship to their work than the “permanent” nurses. Part-time status also
plays a large role (half of the nurses at this hospital are part time) in so far as
part-timers can be asked to increase their working time as the need arises
without exceeding the limits on work hours.
With regard to represented time, employers in the sector would like to 
see greater flexibility in working time, such as extending the daily hourly 
limit from 11 to 12 hours, the replacement of the quarterly reference period
by the annual system, greater possibilities for converting overtime into
compensatory days off, and easier utilization of fragmented work periods.
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Conversely, the unions would like to see more control of exemptions and
better compensation, in time and wages, for exceeding the limit on work
hours. At Erasme Hospital, where the rate of union membership is 35–40 per
cent, the unions are vigilant about the application of rules on working time,
including a 50-hour maximum allowed per week, breaks at a minimum of every
11 hours, and recognition of the (frequent) extra hours in the late evening as
“night work”. The nurses sometimes criticize this attitude because it can
reduce possibilities for their own work arrangements within the units. As a
result, the unions adopt a more pragmatic attitude in practice. But at the same
time, they criticize the excessive use of temping and the inadequate number of
personnel. The question of working hours in the nurses’ real career paths – the
switch to part-time status and/or regular daytime schedules – does not seem
to be a subject of discussion or action, any more than in the French case.
On the level of experienced time, work rhythms, and the way the nurses
adjust to them, resemble the situations observed in the French hospital, but with
a few slight differences. The morning shift begins working later at Erasme (7 a.m.
rather than 6 a.m.), but the large size of the metropolitan area means a longer
commuting time and having to get up almost as early. The night shift works one
hour more. The advantage of having every other weekend off was introduced
earlier. The changing of the shifts lasts slightly longer. And the hours of nurses
on fixed shifts vary less because of a more sophisticated system for mobilizing
replacements.11 Otherwise, the rotation between morning and evening hours for
the day shift, like that of the night shift, is quite similar, as is day-to-day work
organization. The nurses show the same abilities for coordinating and planning
personal and family time and, within the units, the same kinds of time
arrangements. On the other hand, the hospital administration seems more willing
to take into account differences in temporal availability in relation to family
situations. In spite of the great number of arrangements, however, tensions
associated with the double availability required – for an ever more demanding job
and for the family – also remain quite sharp.
14.4.3 Spain
The formalized regulation of the health-care occupations is undergoing pro-
found changes in the wake of the decentralization of authority over health-
care management from the state to the autonomous communities, which got
under way in 2001. The ongoing collective bargaining deals with training,
professionalization, and working conditions and hours. As elsewhere, the general
context is one of pressure on health-care expenditures, the search for shorter
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waiting periods before hospitalization, more flexibility in the conditions of
recourse to outside personnel, and greater managerial autonomy for the indi-
vidual institutions, including the management of work hours. In practice, the
regulation of working time already seems to take place largely at that level. 
Formalized working time comes under the general civil service rules, that
is, overtime is not remunerated but compensated with days off. The average
annual work week is 37.5 hours, and in addition to 22 vacation days, agents are
entitled to 6 personal days each year. The draft law on the status of health-care
personnel provides for a maximum work-week of 48 hours on a 6-month basis;
the definition of night work as that carried out between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m.; 
and a minimum break of 12 hours between two periods of service. A specific
agreement covers the health-care personnel of the autonomous regional
communities, which allows for a notable exemption for health reasons from
stand-by duty and rotations for personnel over 55 years old. At Clinico
Hospital, the argument of the “unit’s needs” is increasingly used to call upon
replacements because the possibility of recourse to a back-up team has been
eliminated and personnel resources must now be found within the care units
themselves. In the cardiology unit studied, there was also an increase in
“internal” management of scheduling through sporadic arrangements between
the head nurse and the other nurses.
At the level of represented time, the profession has a high degree of
collective organization, mainly on the occupational model. Thirty-seven per
cent of the female nurses, for example, belong to trade unions and only 8 per
cent to the CC.OO and UGT unions. Beyond the objective of the 35-hour
week, union action is focused on closer control of work hours and better
monetary compensation for “abnormal” hours (Sundays, nights, etc.), in the
face of a decrease in the additional remuneration specific to night work.
In Spain, nurses typically have a “double career” determined by pro-
fessional and family considerations. The beginner’s alternating daytime
schedule gives way to night work with the birth of children. Since this
schedule is better paid, it also helps in the purchase of a home. As the children
grow up, the nurses seek a fixed daytime schedule, with work in a community
clinic, which is often seen as the ideal position at the end of their careers.
Comments made in a nurses’ discussion group (similarly as in one-to-one
interviews) show that the possibilities for individual scheduling arrangements
in line with their family situations are important; indeed, this is what
determines most of their informal exchanges of hours. As in the other two
countries, nurses in Spain suffer above all from the lack of weekend availability
for family life and the unforeseeable nature of their working time. This lack of
availability itself is perceived as more severe than the quantitative shortage. In
addition, these nurses feel (as is common in the other two countries as well)
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that their workload is increasing. They also expressed the opinion that their
position in the labour market is declining because of the surplus of nurses
relative to the number of jobs available, and that as a result, they face reduced
margins for negotiating where and under what conditions, notably temporal,
they will work within their profession.
14.4.4 Comparative remarks
It is at once necessary and difficult to take into account all the facets of the
working situation of such an occupation in order to grasp the potential national
features of its experienced times. Certain aspects of the Belgian nurses’
formalized time appear less favourable than in France (such as a lower training
level for some of them or longer normal and maximum weekly hours), but
others are more favourable, including the reduction of working hours for those
approaching retirement and “pregnancy leave”. By contrast, the conditions of
Spanish nurses appear less favourable. In both cases, however, the position of
the occupational group in the labour market seems to play an important role.
In Belgium, it is the scarcity of nurses that has forced employers to modify end-
of-career working time. And this situation is even more the case where
practised, experienced times are concerned. The way, for example, that female
nurses in France, and even more so in Belgium, have massively seized upon
part-time status to regain a certain control of their time has to do with the
“scarcity” of labour (Baret, 2002). And in all three countries, phenomena of
individual organization of schedules (whether sporadically or throughout the
life cycle) may be largely invisible in labour–management agreements, but have
a customary existence nonetheless with regard to extremely localized power
relations within establishments, care units and territories.
14.5 BANK MANAGERS
The banking sector in all three countries shows convergent economic and
social dynamics, with deregulation and disintermediation (i.e., reduction in the
use of intermediaries between producers and consumers) going along with the
entry of the major banks into a more competitive world. In certain cases, as in
France, this development has been associated with a privatization process. The
sector’s shift from administered to market regulation has resulted in radical
changes, which are more or less pronounced from one country or company to
another. Everywhere, however, feminization, higher training levels and an
increase in managerial staff – as well as ageing tied to the decline in overall
numbers – characterize banking personnel. France shows the greatest degree
of feminization and the clearest ageing of the labour force, while these two
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trends are the least marked in Spain, and Belgium occupies a middle position
(table 14.2). The proportion of “managerial staff ”, however, must be con-
sidered with a great deal of caution, given the specific sense of this notion in
each case.12 This “category” has little institutional and symbolic coherence in
Belgium (De Troyer and Martinez, 2002), and even less in Spain, where (and
this is the case with banking) it often becomes dispersed within a larger group
of “technicians” (Prieto, 2002). 
14.5.1 France
Formalized time is determined through ARTT negotiations, which are
themselves embedded in larger issues (bringing the sectoral collective
agreement back into play). All the unions ultimately signed the latter,
notwithstanding the conflicts involved in the course of negotiations. The
negotiation of the “35 hours” at the sectoral level was marked by even greater
conflict, with sharper inter-union divisions over this issue than over the
collective agreement as a whole (Dressen, 2003). At the bank selected for 
this study (the “CGP”),  the CFDT is the most influential union at sectoral 
and company level, while this union has more moderate positions than its
federation. Indeed, the CGP is one of the rare major banks where the union
signed the agreement. The climate of that negotiation and the subsequent
application of the “35 hours” suffered less than elsewhere. 
In terms of represented times, however, we find the classic divergences
between unions and management. The latter seeks to limit job creation, make
working time more flexible and moderate wage increases, while the former seek
to increase hiring, obtain the maximum number of RWT days chosen by the
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12 Cf. Bouffartigue (2002) on the specifically French notion of cadre, a term which encompasses “professionals” or
“experts” as well as “managers”. In English, it is often translated as “professional and managerial staff ”.
Table 14.2 Percentage of women and managers, age of bank managers
France Spain Belgium
(AFB, 2002) (AEB, 1997) (ABB, 1997)
% women/total personnel 55.0 27.0 47.0
% managers/total personnel 30.0 60.0 (“technicians”) 40.0
Age 30 and under 16.2 16.4 19.5
Ages 30–39 20.8 29.3 26.4
Ages 40–49 30.5 36.8 29.5
Ages 49 and over 32.0 17.6 24.6
CH 13-CH 15 (p.343-416)  27/4/06  8:47 AM  Page 384
employees, and protect wages. At CGP, the question of the measurement and
the reduction of managers’ working time in “wage packages based on days
worked” (forfaits en jours) seems to have been the subject of specific
compromises and controversies which concerned, on the one hand, the
possibility offered to some of the managers to opt voluntarily for this modality
and, on the other, an amendment to the agreement extending the list of
managerial posts involved, against the CFDT’s position. But for the SNB
(CFE–CGC), the main trade union organization among managers (which
signed this amendment), CGP management’s determination to offer managers
a form of RWT clearly differentiated them from non-managers, and met the
desires of a significant part of the managers constituting the union’s electorate.
To understand the experienced time of the managers in the CGP sales and
marketing network studied requires taking into account two contrasting social
profiles. The older managers, nearly all of who were men, were recruited with
low diploma levels and came from modest social backgrounds and local
geographical origins. They started out in support posts, became managers in the
course of their careers, and remained close to the union movements. The young
managers, half of whom were women, all had higher-education diplomas and
came from diverse social and geographical backgrounds. Since they had begun
their careers as managers, they were removed from union culture. Although we
cannot really speak of a “generation gap”, certain tensions existed between the
two categories. In both groups, time constraints were much less severe than
among the nurses, and the distance between their experienced time and the time
represented by the unions seems smaller. The “35 hours” were better accepted
than at the hospital. The slight difference between the managers’ actual
experience and the union’s benchmarks had to do with the breakdown, and thus
the reduction, of working time. Certain recent graduates even found the
formula of a wage package in days more flexible (because it does not imply the
“constraint” of taking an RWT day off each month), and more adapted to the
organization of their work and lives.
Nonetheless, the reasons behind the low level of time constraints are
considerably different for the two generations. Among the older, male man-
agers, career stakes were a thing of the past, and their domestic situations
made them more disposed towards a professional investment which was
ultimately rather limited (with relatively regular, predictable work schedules),
and combined with personal activities. Among the young generation, career
stakes were crucial. Optimistic about their career prospects, they were
concerned with investing themselves in their work and proving themselves,
especially since they were conscious of the heightened competition resulting
from greater pressure over profits. Would they have to accept a geographic
change in order to pursue their individual careers, or would they opt for
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maintaining a certain quality of family life, in which the career of their partner
often counted as much as their own? Ultimately, the evolution of work
pressures and the way tensions between strategies of professional fulfilment
and the division of domestic tasks are handled within the “two-career” couples
of this new generation will determine the extent of the emerging changes in
CGP managers’ experienced time. 
14.5.2 Belgium
Banking is one of the sectors in which a significant proportion of managers are
distinguished between their functions and those of other employees in the job
classifications. They are thus placed between “managerial/trustworthy staff ”
(personnel de direction/de confiance), who are 4 per cent of total banking
personnel and not covered by regulations on working time, and support staff.
The definition of this “managerial/trustworthy staff ” constitutes a major 
issue in union–management conflicts. Branch managers are generally placed in
this category. 
The formalized time of the collective agreement notes the union demand 
for a 35-hour week without trade-offs in terms of flexibility (the annual guideline
of 1,621 hours goes along with weekly and monthly limits which are still quite
strict) and wages. It is true that the decrease in working hours has not led to the
creation of jobs; that a number of banks were already close to the new guide-
lines; and that its effectiveness is not guaranteed for managers and “managerial
/trustworthy staff ”. The most contested points, such as the definition of
“trustworthy staff ” and the increased numbers of branches open on Saturdays,
have been consigned to moratoria or work groups. The possibilities for pre-
pensions at age 58 have been maintained. For the rest, the company remains a
major locus for collective bargaining. At Fortis Bank, the work-week is 36 hours
long but employees benefit from 12.5 “extra-legal” holidays and managers from
15.5. Apart from the tiny fraction of “managerial/ trustworthy staff ”, managers
are in principle subject to the same working time regime as other employees, 
with a combination of daily and monthly scales. Only “managerial/trustworthy
staff ” have their remuneration indexed to earnings in any significant way, which
reflects the trade union’s vigilance and influence. This factor is essential for
understanding the different attitudes of bank managers with regard to working
time in the three countries. These compromises over working time are very recent
and could prove unstable, especially since the company itself is the result of a
recent merger, whereby the system of time regulation carried over was the one
most favourable to the personnel.
The represented time of human resources development (HRD) has three
objectives: broadening the notion of “trustworthy staff ” who are not covered
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by working time regulations; increasing real work-hours; and revoking
compromises deemed too “generous” in the areas of variable hours and extra-
legal holidays. The FGTB and CSC unions present a united front at the
bargaining table but exhibit differences in the area of working time. The FGTB
believes that applying the system of time accounting and recovery of extra
hours to all managers will encourage a time-clock mentality. The CSC,
meanwhile, is distrustful of an overly rigid approach, has reservations about
the demand for extending badges to branch personnel, and feels that the
increase of recovery days disorganizes work. The union presence is much
stronger in the “back office” than in the sales and marketing network, where
the personnel are more dispersed and subject to greater mobility as well as
greater pressure over earnings coming from the branch managers.
“The advantage of the bank is that you can pursue your career and still
have a family life.” This statement from a young female manager working in
the Fortis sales and marketing network shows that such a representation of
social mobility remains possible among the new generation of bank managers
and that experienced time is inseparable from career issues. It also indicates, as
in the French case, the distance separating these managers from female nurses
in terms of time constraints. Compared with available data on managers’ real
work hours, it shows that position in the chain of command and gender are the
determining variables in the relationship to working time. For example, the
practices of middle managers are closer to those of office employees than
those of top managers, and women, regardless of their category, are more
likely to measure their presence at work, as well as to have less daily overtime
and to work part time. Overall, expecting to advance in the company ranks, or
in the internal labour market more generally, means not counting the number
of hours worked. The application of the rules comes up against the weight of
tacit agreements on what a manager is, and on the form of commitment to the
work and company that are associated with the job. As in France, above all it
is the feminization of the managerial staff that is calling into question a model
presented as universal when it is in fact gendered in the masculine. Unlike
female nurses, whose domestic constraints are legitimated and integrated into
the management of their working time, the managers’ temporal availability
eclipses their domestic situation. 
14.5.3 Spain
Formalized time depends mainly on the private bank’s national collective
agreement. This agreement makes it easier to stop working before the legal
retirement age and indeed, among the three countries studied, Spain is the 
one with the lowest percentage of wage earners over 50 years of age. The
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provisions concerning work hours also represent an advance over the
legislation in force, but their effectiveness is uncertain given the low number
of collective agreements at company and establishment levels. Working days
are traditionally continuous in the sales and marketing network (8 a.m.–
3 p.m.) and discontinuous in the back office (i.e., administrative functions).
Saturday work in the bank branches is either excluded or limited during the
period from October to May. 
The time represented by the two main unions, CC.OO and UGT (which
have 60 per cent of the representatives’ mandates), is aimed at reducing the
length of the work-week and work-year, eliminating Saturday work,
lengthening holidays, and broadening rights to leaves for family or personal
reasons. Union representatives denounce the considerable distance between
the formal and actual norms of working time, whereby contractual work-
hours are frequently exceeded under the impact of a model of temporal
availability in one of two forms. In the back office, the workload is increasing
in the context of organizational changes and greater competition over pro-
motions. In the branch, there is also pressure over sales figures through the
indexing of remunerations to earnings. The excessive lengthening of the work-
day has become a major issue of contention, along with the denunciation of its
negative effects on employment and free time. In Spain, the category of bank
employees which comes closest to French and Belgian notions of managerial
staff is that of “technicians”, although this term is broader.13 Union repre-
sentatives divide them into three groups: recent graduates recruited on
precarious terms waiting for a stable position and thus subject to a high level
of professional demands; those over 45, who have no prospects for promotion
and are waiting to stop working; and those in the 30–45 age group, who have
to deal with the tension between the risk of an early levelling off of their
careers and the demand for intense involvement in their work and the
company. These same representatives indicate that they are taking into
account changes arising from the rapid feminization of the personnel. This has
led them to develop a critique aimed at both the formal homogeneity of
collective agreement provisions and their ineffectiveness because of the
individualized nature of managers’ practices in the area of working time.
Between the extremes of excessive rigidity and total deregulation, they
proposed a schedule which would vary according to the personal needs of the
wage earners, but which would come under specific rules. This representation
of time, as expressed by union activists, seems much closer to experienced time
than what the official demands suggest. 
13 A distinction is made between “fully dedicated managers”, who are younger and have more diplomas, and others who
have the manager title but neither the responsibilities nor the wage level of the first group.
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Experienced time as it emerges from two discussion groups of mid-career
bank managers (men and women, ages 30–45) reflects several divisions
depending on the work situation (in the sales and marketing network or 
the central departments), gender and life-cycle stage. The branch managers
denounce the “tyranny of the ratio”, where daily extra hours are tied above all
to pressure over objectives in a context of limited personnel. In the back
office, what counts most is the importance of temporal availability as a
promotion criterion. In both cases, the criteria for determining objectives 
and promotion are opaque and outside the control of the unions, despite their
repeated demands. But gender constitutes the main division. Female managers,
regardless of their family situation, are quite exacting in their double roles as
professionals and women, with the latter always linked to motherhood. Since
their own mothers generally remained outside the labour force, they have
inherited a conception of motherhood entailing a great amount of availability
for the children. The “reconciliation” of these two activities thus seems
impossible for them. But far from resigning themselves to this situation,
resorting to simple personal arrangements or counting on their partners to
take over domestic tasks, they expect the company to create more room for
family life, through shorter work-hours, part- or full-time parental leaves and
so on. As for the men, while the chauvinist model still dominates, some accept
a far more measured relationship to their work and considerable involvement
in family life.
But this trade-off between mid-career bank managers and their employers,
that is, greater temporal availability at the price of a status-enhancing career, is
starting to be perturbed by a series of factors, including the improvement of their
position in the labour market and a feeling of imbalance between 
their contributions and their compensation. The result, in a number of cases, is
the decision to resign. The “exit” wins out over the “voice” (Hirschman, 1995).
As for the experienced time of this group of managers, who are objectively and
subjectively at the end of their careers from about 45 years on, there is nothing
in common with the preceding groups, a distinctive feature which is not the case
with represented and formalized time alike. 
14.5.4 Comparative remarks
The situation of middle-aged managers in the Spanish bank, and especially that
of the women, shows the same trends found in the other two countries. Here,
the employer’s adoption of management methods privileging profit-sharing
appears to meet with less collective and/or union resistance than in Belgium 
and even in France. This phenomenon assumes even more specific features
because the entry of Spanish women into the labour market is still quite recent;
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seemingly “prisoners” of a very strict vision of their role as mothers, they are
faced with a choice which is more radical than elsewhere: extensive professional
availability based on the male model or withdrawal into the family sphere. 
14.6 CONCLUSION
For each of the two groups studied, the prevailing trend would seem to be the
converging dynamics of work time in all three countries. The social logics that
construct these occupations and distinguish them from each other (notably
the logic of gender) seem to be stronger than the social logics rooted in
societal differences and similarities.
But the latter exist nonetheless, which means that the outlines of the two
occupational groups cannot be compared with any degree of precision in
isolation from an entire group of intertwined social relations. A Belgian nurse
is not a French or Spanish nurse. Her certification levels are different, as is her
place in the division of labour within the hospital. She does more nursing per se
because she cannot rely on the same number of auxiliary nurses. Similarly,
Belgian bank managers are not French bank managers. Their status is more
recent and more fragile in institutional terms, while their social identity is less
clear. And what can we say about the vast group of “technicians” in the Spanish
bank? The limited amount of part-time employment in Spain is reflected
among female nurses, whereas in France and even more so in Belgium, part-
time work is a key element in their mode of regulating the responsibilities they
“juggle”. Bank managers in Spain face considerably more pressure over
temporal availability, with the realities of their experienced time far removed
from formalized work time. In addition, pressure over sales figures is now
combined with a recent surge in female activity, leading these two trends to
come up against the symbolic resistance of the traditional housewife model.14
If female managers emancipate themselves from such a model, it appears likely
to occur at the price of extremely high existential tensions.
Our investigation nonetheless confirms the general trend towards a
decrease in the average length of working time, associated with an increase in
its intensity, flexibility and diversity, phenomena which are themselves rooted
in the spread of company regulations and the decline of legal safeguards. In all
three countries, neo-liberal policies have now gained the upper hand over
union-initiated advances in the area of the collective reduction of working
time, advances which have most often been emptied of their meaning in a
context of unequal social dialogue.
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Even if the two groups share a strong subjective involvement in their
work, the distance separating the nurses from the bank managers is reflected
by very different forms of temporal availability, as well as the concomitant
blurring of boundaries between work and life outside of work. The availability
of the first group is at once less controlled by its members and less well
recognized in statutory terms. This distance stems above all from the gender-
based identity of both groups, with female roles underlying the first and male
roles the second. It is also related to differences in the forms of subordination
to their respective economic and social temporalities: that is, the imperative of
continuous treatment imposes schedules outside of social norms on nurses,
who are also faced with the unpredictability of their schedules, which is not
the case for bank managers. To some extent, the nurses sometimes succeed in
drawing on the legitimacy of their domestic responsibilities to limit their
temporal availability at work, notably through informal arrangements within
the care units. This is not (or not yet) the case for female bank managers. But
the fact remains that the role of gender in the constitution of these occu-
pations and in their situation of time management issues is not eternal. If the
masculinization of nursing is still very limited, the feminization of bank
managers is occurring rapidly. And it is potentially the main resource for
questioning the model of extensive temporal (and geographic) availability in
this occupational group for all three countries.
Beyond differences in the strength of the trade unions, experienced time in
these two groups, and the unions’ represented time converge with slight
differences.15 This represented time goes back to complex processes of the
collective representation of time, including the unions’ representations of
workers’ temporal problems and expectations. But our investigation does not
provide sufficiently precise data on this issue. If we limit ourselves to the explicit
formulation of union demands related to working time, this seems much more
dependent on the state of formalized time, which it seeks to influence in relation
to a realistic evaluation of the balance of power with employers. In all three cases,
union representatives may find themselves in an awkward position relative to
nurses’ or bank managers’ expectations if they opt for a strict application of
regulations or propose new rules too directly inspired by the “Taylorist” vision
of the evaluation and control of time. In all three countries, men are over-
represented in the union leadership of hospital workers, and the same is true for
older men with few diplomas among the leadership of the banking unions. This
disproportional representation may explain part of the distance in question. 
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In the French case, a complementary interpretation has also been
advanced regarding the difficulty of maintaining the prospect of “collective
guarantees of a possibility of individual choice” (Leuthold and Lichtenberger,
1981), notably in the area of work times. This is true especially when action in
favour of collective and/or union control of objectives and workload is both
crucial and difficult everywhere. On the first issue, certain rights already exist
and are largely used by female nurses; moreover, this is the case with the right
to part-time status or the possibility of opting for RWT after age 45 in
Belgium. But these rights remain limited and are not without disadvantages in
the context of limited personnel: imposed multiskilling, less scheduling of
hours, and the reduction of pensions. Other personal arrangements of work-
hours during the course of a career are practised in all three countries, such as
fewer alternating shifts and more fixed daytime hours. Personnel management
in the hospitals takes temporal aspirations into account to a certain extent. But
this does not involve universal, collective rights. Would such practices seem to
point the way towards union action more in tune with experienced times?
It is important to stress the fruitfulness of linking the various temporal
levels on which the social experiences of professional times are based. “Job
time” sheds light on “working time”. This occurs, for example, when tempor-
ary Belgian nurses (who occupy a strong position in this segment of the labour
market) manage to choose their working hours – unlike some of those 
who have stable jobs, or when young Spanish bank managers starting out with
fixed-term contracts are immediately subject to heavy demands for temporal
availability. “Professional lifetime” also sheds light on “working time”. In both
groups, activity is particularly coming to an end before the legal retirement
age, which reflects the issues of workload and work intensity (professional or,
for women, professional and domestic) throughout working life. How will the
patterns of mobilization for work evolve if professional life comes to last
considerably longer? Or how can the possibility of workers’ individual choice
and collective control over working time – that fifth dimension of “decent
working time” – be expanded without spacing these possibilities over the
whole of working life?16 This is just one illustration of the fact that all the
dimensions of “decent working time” are at once interdependent and
inseparable from work that is “sustainable” in terms of its responsibilities and
remuneration level alike.
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15.1 INTRODUCTION
In the last few decades, part-time work, temporary jobs and work schedules
have expanded throughout most industrialized countries (Boisard et al., 2003,
p. 1; Presser, 2003, p. 2; Zeytinoglu, 1999, p. ix). The majority of new jobs
created since the 1980s in Canada are part-time and temporary employment
contracts (Tabi and Langlois, 2003, p. 13; Vosko et al., 2003, p. 20; Zeytinoglu,
2002, p. 15). This trend is evident in all sectors of the economy, including the
public sector (Ilcan et al., 2003, p. 636). With the political, economic and
technical changes of the last few decades, as well as the socio-cultural changes
in work, personal and family lives, there is a move toward a 24-hour, 7-day
work society in Canada. The traditional 5-day schedule of 7–8 hours of work
per day starting somewhere between 6 a.m. and 9 a.m. and ending between 3
p.m. and 6 p.m. is no longer applicable to many workers. Working time is
encroaching on social and personal time for many workers, and it is now not
unusual to be regularly employed at weekends. 
The ILO report, Working time and workers’ needs and preferences in
industrialized countries: Finding the balance (see also Messenger, Conclusion 
in this volume) shows that Canada’s experience with working time issues is
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similar to that of other industrialized countries. Of the five dimensions of
decent working time discussed by Messenger, we will focus here on the
healthy working time dimension (though the gender equality through working
time and family-friendly working time dimensions are also closely related).
The healthy working time dimension focuses on enhancing workers’ well-
being by addressing the health and safety implications of working excessively
long hours, night work, and various types of shift work schedules (Messenger,
this volume). We will then extend this focus to weekend work in Canada.
Weekend work is an unsocial schedule that can be disruptive to personal life as
it affects leisure time, such as pursuing personal interests, spending time with
family, and socializing with friends, neighbours and the local community. 
The underlying theme of this chapter is that healthy working time is an
important component of workers’ health. As a starting point, we will use the
World Health Organization’s definition of health as “a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or
infirmity” (Zeytinoglu et al., 1999, p. 23). Meaningful employment, econ-
omic stability, and healthy and supportive work and social environments are 
all recognized as being of central importance to the health of individuals
(Hamilton and Bhatti, 1996, p. 3). Social life is also an important component
of an individual’s health and well-being (Zeytinoglu et al., 1999, p. 23).
This chapter focuses on workers whose regular work-week includes
Saturdays, Sundays and sometimes both days (hereafter referred to as workers
regularly employed at weekends). The purpose of this chapter is to examine
the determinants of regular weekend work in Canada. We use Statistics
Canada’s 1999 Workplace and Employee Survey (WES). The WES data are
collected from employers and their employees, and contain a large number of
identifying variables for weekend work and its determinants not usually
available in other data sets in Canada. Using these data will also allow us to
generalize about the general population of Canada.
The topic of regular weekend work can be examined from employers’,
consumers’ and workers’ perspectives, since each category is a key player in
the weekend work issue. In this chapter, however, the analysis will be from the
individual workers’ perspective, since we believe that it is the workers who are
most disadvantaged by the weekend work issue. In weekend work, employers
and consumers are the main beneficiaries. Employers keep their businesses
open at weekends earning profits and/or using their capital more efficiently 
by not keeping it idle, while consumers get extended hours of service. The
workers, therefore, are the main source of labour who provide the services and
produce the goods in order to supply the demands of employers and
consumers at the weekend. Weekend workers are employed at a time when
most other people, including their family and friends, are resting or socializing.
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Moreover, they often lose out on socializing within their communities, as
many community activities take place during this customarily restful time. We
point out, too, that workers are also consumers, and although they might not
want to work at weekends, many do demand service at this time. 
15.2 THE CONTEXT, THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
AND FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH WEEKEND
WORK
Starting with the Industrial Revolution, and later in the 1930s, a certain life-
style was created for workers in Canada, thanks to strong unionization in
mass-production manufacturing and related industries. Workers had two days
per week as a rest period, and most wives did not work outside the home since
a single-earner income in the family was sufficient in providing a middle-class
lifestyle (Forrest, 1996, n.p.; 1998, p. 83). In the last three decades global
restructuring of economies, major innovations in the information technology
sector, increased growth of the service sector, and changes in social values and
family structures (including many women entering the labour force and
remaining there) have led to substantial changes in the hours worked and
demanded in Canada (Zeytinoglu and Muteshi, 2000, p. 108). For example, in
1991, 11 per cent of the workforce worked regularly on Saturdays or Sundays
(Winters, 1994, p. 45). This percentage increased to 18.5 per cent in 1999 (see
table 15.3). Studies from the European Union (Boisard et al., 2003, p. 24) and
the United States (Presser, 2003, p. 8) show similar trends.
In terms of the theoretical background, weekend work can be explained
by both the dual labour market theory (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, p. 2) and
core–periphery conceptualization (Atkinson, 1987, p. 93; Osterman, 1992, p.
280). The literature suggests that people who work during the traditional
work-week are full-time “core” workers in jobs with primary labour market
characteristics. These are the workers in good quality jobs with good pay and
benefits, as well as access to training, promotion possibilities within the
company and relative job security. These core jobs are surrounded by a variety
of peripheral work arrangements (Zeytinoglu, 1999, p. 52; 2002, p. 18.). Of
those peripheral work arrangements, we will focus only on part-time work,
temporary work and seasonal work. 
In this chapter, we argue that these peripheral work arrangements are one
of the important factors contributing to the increase in weekend work. It 
is the availability of labour in a variety of work arrangements that allows
employers to create weekend jobs. There seems to be an abundance of indi-
viduals working, voluntarily or involuntarily, in a variety of non-standard jobs
and work schedules, including regular weekend work. 
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Part-time and temporary jobs are particularly conducive to weekend
work. Recent figures show that 62 per cent of Canadian workers are employed
on a full-time basis, 9 per cent in both regular part-time and temporary 
full-time employment respectively, 6 per cent in temporary part-time employ-
ment, with the other 14 per cent being self-employed (Kapsalis and Tourigny,
2004, p. 6). Focusing on hours worked, a Statistics Canada study (Kapsalis and
Tourigny, 2004, p. 7) showed that temporary full-time workers worked fewer
hours than temporary part-time workers, and both groups worked fewer
hours than regular full-time workers. In particular, temporary employment
accounts for almost one-fifth of overall growth in paid employment between
1997 and 2003 (Galarneau, 2005, p. 6).
The idea of core–periphery conceptualization, usually relegated solely 
to the periphery of part-time and temporary workers who work in unsocial
work schedules of evenings and split shifts, should, as this chapter argues,
include weekends as well. Part-time and temporary workers employed in the
“periphery” of their organizations work in secondary labour market conditions
(Beechy and Perkins, 1987, p. 142; Zeytinoglu, 1999, p. 49; Zeytinoglu and
Cooke, 2004, p. 20). Thus we expect to find those in part-time and/or tem-
porary jobs to be more likely to be regular weekend workers. 
Seasonal workers in the secondary labour market, therefore, are accordingly
placed in the periphery of their workplaces. These workers are hired for only a
fixed period of time, such as only in summers or during holiday seasons. Seasonal
workers often work extended hours or consecutive days (Osberg et al., 1995, 
p. 3) during less desirable working hours. We expect to find in our study that there
are significant numbers of seasonal workers employed regularly at weekends. 
It is well known that unionization tends to protect workers from
undesirable working conditions (Akyeampong, 2002, p. 5; Marshall, 2003, 
p. 12). There is also ample research showing the benefits of unionization for
workers (Fang and Verma, 2002, p. 18). Unions were at the forefront of the
legislated two-day-per-week rest period. Though many non-standard workers
are not covered by collective agreements (Gunderson and Hyatt, 2001, p. 103),
and even if covered, endure inferior conditions to regular full-time workers
(Zeytinoglu, 1991, p. 408), we presume that in unionized environments there
will be protection against weekend work. Perhaps those working at weekends
will be non-union workers, who are often part-time, temporary or seasonal
workers. Thus we expect to find that unionized workers will be less likely
regularly to work at weekends.
Non-standard work is typically found in the service sector, while the
manufacturing sector generally uses full-time workers on an overtime or shift
basis, or contracts out the work (Zeytinoglu and Muteshi, 2000, p. 100). 
It is mostly the workers in retail trade who tend to work at weekends 
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(WES Compendium, 2001, p. 33; Zeytinoglu et al., 2003, p. 32). We expect to
find in our study that workers in the service sector will be more likely regularly
to work at weekends.
Well-educated, white-collar professionals generally have “standard” 
work hours during the usual Monday through Friday work-week, though 
they might work longer hours during the workday. They may also choose to 
work at weekends, due to the occupational culture of long hours, corporate 
culture and management strategies (Romaine and Zeytinoglu, 1999, p. 264).
Nonetheless, they tend to consider themselves as sometimes, but not
regularly, weekend workers. They are generally employed in good-quality jobs
with core labour market characteristics. Thus we expect to find that these
white-collar managerial and professional workers will not be working regularly
at weekends. That is, we expect that workers in low-level white-collar jobs or
blue-collar jobs will be more likely to work regularly at weekends.
There is mounting empirical evidence demonstrating that non-standard
work has come to represent a particularly female option where work is being
contracted in a gender-differentiated way (Zeytinoglu and Muteshi, 2000, 
p. 102). The literature suggests that many of the workers employed at weekends
are disadvantaged populations of the society, including women, parents with
dependent children (Cranford et al., 2003, p. 459), and ethnic minorities who
are, in Canada, mostly recent immigrants (Chard et al., 2000, p. 191; Zeytinoglu
and Muteshi, 2000, p. 110). It is likely that workers in weekend jobs will be
drawn from these populations in the labour force. Thus we expect to find that
women, recent immigrants, many of whom are ethnic minorities, and parents
with dependent children are more likely regularly to work at weekends.
To better demonstrate this hypothesis, the following model represents
our analysis and the factors associated with weekend work. The model shows
the relationships between possible different factors involving weekend work
such as the workplace, industry, and a number of individual characteristics that
are associated with it. These relationships are presented in figure 15.1.
15.3 METHODOLOGY
Data from the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES), which is a new data
set of Statistics Canada, is based on a survey of employers (workplaces) and
workers employed by those workplaces. The analysis presented here is based
on the responses provided by workers, which are then merged with some of
the workplace characteristics obtained from the workplace data. Details of the
data are provided in box 15.1.
In this chapter, we focus on whether the worker’s regular work-week
includes Saturdays and/or Sundays. This is the dependent variable in our
Who is working at weekends in Canada?
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multivariate analysis. Variables that can affect regular weekend work are
grouped into four categories: job characteristics, workplace characteristics,
industry sector and individual (i.e. human capital and personal) characteristics.
While most variables come from the employee data, the size of the workplace,
workplace part-time and temporary worker rate, and industry variables are
from the merged employer data set. These variables and how they are coded
are explained in table 15.1. 
In analysing the data we begin with the frequency distributions and
descriptive statistics. Following that, we will proceed to a multivariate analysis
in order to isolate the relationships between weekend work and several potential
factors associated with it. The following analysis uses weighted microdata
accessed at the McMaster Research Data Centre. 
Although we are interested in a range of variables that may be associated
with regular weekend work, we are particularly interested in assessing the
relationships between part-time, temporary and seasonal work status, and
regular weekend work. We examine the associations between the dependent
variable of regular weekend work and the key variables of whether a worker is
in a part-time, temporary or seasonal job, and whether the worker is covered
by a collective agreement. In addition, the interaction variables of the
following associations are used in the analysis: part-time and temporary work,
part-time work and work covered by a collective agreement; and temporary
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Figure 15.1 Job, workplace and individual factors that affect regular
weekend work
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work and work covered by a collective agreement are included as part of the
key set of variables. We also include a number of other variables to control for
their effects on the regular weekend work variable. Thus other workplace,
industry and individual characteristics variables are included. For each analysis,
we record the odds ratio, coefficient and significance level of each variable as
well as the overall (pseudo) R2 (i.e. how much of the variance is explained). 
It should be noted that Statistics Canada strongly recommends the use of
bootstrapping2 in statistical analysis using the WES data set due to its complex
survey design. All presented significance levels are bootstrapped results, using
Statistics Canada’s recommended set of 100 bootstrapped weights for this data
set via the Stata function developed and discussed by Pierard et al. (2004, 
p. 20). One effect of using such a large data set and a bootstrapping procedure
is that results may indicate strong statistical significance even when
substantive significance is unclear. Therefore we will discuss particular variable
results only when statistical significance is found and the magnitude of the
Who is working at weekends in Canada?
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Box 15.1 Data source and explanations
Data
Statistics Canada’s Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 1999 employee microdata
linked to workplace (i.e. employer) microdata are used. WES surveys firms in all
industries, with the exception of agriculture, fishing, fur trapping and public
administration. WES covers all firms regardless of size, and examines a range of
workplace issues. The 1999 WES has data on 24,597 employees from 6,351
workplaces, with a response rate of 83 per cent and 94 per cent respectively. Data were
collected first from the employers, followed by surveying selected employees from each
workplace. For larger workplaces, up to 12 employees were randomly chosen. For very
small organizations – with four or fewer employees – all employees were selected. (For
more on sampling and sample design, see WES Compendium, 2001.)
Limitations of the data
The WES data probably under-represent individuals with part-time and/or temporary
employment contracts because only employees of the workplaces are eligible for
sampling under the WES methodology. Thus, for example, workers employed by the
temporary help services (agency workers) can be included only if that agency is captured
as a separate workplace. If, however, these workers are on temporary assignment in
another workplace, they are not surveyed since they are not employees of that employer.
2“Bootstrapping” is generally used as a method of testing the reliability of a data set.
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Table 15.1 Description of variables
Variable name Question/explanation, coding
Dependent variable
Regular weekend work Does your usual workweek include Saturdays and/or 
Sundays? 1 = Yes, 0 = No
Key variables of interest
Job characteristics
Part-time work Not counting overtime, how many paid hours on average 
[usually] do you work per week at this job? 
1 = Part-time, working 29.9 hours or less per week 
0 = Full-time, working 30 hours or more
Temporary work Which of the following describes your terms of 
employment in this job? 
1 = Temporary work, i.e. casual or on-call work where hours
of work vary substantially from one week to next, called in 
whenever work is needed, or term employment ending at a 
specified date 
0 = Regular work arrangement with no contractual or 
anticipated termination date
Seasonal work Which of the following describes your terms of 
employment in this job?
1 = Seasonal work, 0 = Not seasonal
Covered by a collective In current job, are you a member of a union or covered by a 
agreement collective bargaining agreement? 
1 = Yes, 0 = No
Interaction variables
Part-time and temporary Work part-time and temporary? 
work 1 =Yes, 0 = No
Part-time and covered by Part-time worker covered by a collective agreement? 
a collective agreement 1 = Yes, 0 = No
Temporary and covered by Temporary worker covered by a collective agreement?
a collective agreement 1 = Yes, 0 = No
Other associated variables
Workplace characteristics
Workplace size Total employment at [the workplace] in the last pay period 
of March 1999, number of workers
Log of workplace size Transformation to reduce skewness in the data
Workplace part-time Total number of part-time employees in the workplace in
worker rate the last pay period divided by total employment at the 
workplace in the last pay period of March 1999 
(% part-time)
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Variable name Question/explanation, coding
Workplace temporary Total number of temporary (i.e. non-permanent) 
worker rate employees receiving a T4 slip at the workplace in the last 
pay period divided by total employment at the workplace 
in the last pay period of March 1999 (% temporary)
Industry characteristics
Primary industries 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Manufacturing and related 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise (reference group)
Service sector 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Individual characteristics
Human capital characteristics
Highest education attained:
Less than high school 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Completed high school 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Some post-secondary 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
(including degree/certificate
diploma but excluding 
university degree) 
University degree or 
higher 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise (reference group)
Occupation: 
Manager 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Professional 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Lower white-collar 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Blue-collar 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise (reference group)
Full-time work experience Number of years
Full-time work experience Number of years squared
squared
Personal characteristics
Gender 1 = Female, 0 = Male
Marital status:
Married/common law 
partner 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise (reference group)
Other marital status 
(single, separated, 
divorced, widowed) 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Dependent children 1 = Yes, 0 = No
Immigrant status: 
Immigrant 1 = Yes (not Canadian-born), 0 = No (Canadian-born)
Recent immigrant 1 = Yes (immigrated in/after 1990), 0 = No
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significance is sufficient to suggest noteworthy associations. We will do this by
looking at the odds ratio, which, if below 0.9 or above 1.1, will give us a crude
indication of substantive significance.
15.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WORKERS
Our study indicates that about 19 per cent of workers in Canada regularly work
at weekends. As presented in table 15.2, roughly 15 per cent of our sample is
involved in part-time work arrangements, while the shares of those in temporary
or seasonal jobs are 5 per cent and 2 per cent respectively. Among a weighted
sample of 10.8 million, those in part-time, temporary and seasonal arrangements
represented 1.6 million, 0.5 million and 0.3 million workers, respectively. 
About 28 per cent of the workers in this survey were either unionized or
covered by a collective agreement, but only a small percentage of part-time
and temporary workers were covered by a collective agreement. The average
worker was in a workplace of over 400 employees, while the percentages of
part-time and temporary employees per workplace were 28 per cent and 12 per
cent, respectively. Almost two-thirds of surveyed workers were in the service
sector, with one-third in manufacturing and related industries, leaving only a
very small proportion in primary industries. Of the total workers in this
survey, over 70 per cent had some post-secondary education, college degree,
diploma or university degree. Close to two-thirds were in blue-collar
occupations and about one-fifth were in lower-level white-collar occupations,
with the remainder being managers and professionals. The average full-time
work experience was 16 years. Slightly more than half the respondents in the
survey were female, more than two-thirds were married or in common-law
relationships, and slightly less than half had dependent children. Most
respondents were Canadian-born, while 18 per cent were immigrants, of
whom only about 3.5 per cent had immigrated during or after 1990. 
15.5 PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS IN REGULAR 
WEEKEND WORK
As a starting point, descriptive statistics were reviewed to discover which
worker sub-groups were more likely to be employed at weekends. Among all
surveyed workers, 18.5 per cent regularly work at weekends. On a weighted
basis, that equates to just under 2 million among the sample of 10.8 million
workers. In comparison to the earlier cited estimate of 11 per cent in 1991, this
study confirmed that weekend work in Canada was not confined to an
unlucky few. Moreover, as the following statistics show, all segments of the
labour force were affected. 
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Table 15.2 Characteristics of workers
Variable label Mean Standard Percentages 
deviation
Regular weekend work (% workers) 18.5
Part-time work 15.2
Temporary work 4.8
Seasonal work 2.4
Covered by a collective agreement 27.9
Part-time and temporary work 2.5
Part-time and covered by a collective agreement 4.4
Temporary and covered by a collective agreement 2.1
Workplace size 412.16 1 144.49
Workplace size – logarithmic form 1.79 0.86
Workplace part-time worker rate 0.28 0.29
Workplace temporary worker rate 0.12 0.22
Industry:
Primary sector 1.7
Manufacturing and related sector 33.6
Service sector 64.7
Highest education attained:
Less than high school 10.7
Completed high school 17.5
Some post-secondary 52.4
University degree or higher 19.5
Occupation:
Manager 15.1
Professional 16.2
Lower white-collar 22.4
Blue-collar 46.4
Full-time work experience 16.17 10.71
Full-time work experience squared 376.14 421.58
Gender (percentage female) 52.1
Marital status:
Married/common-law 69.1
Other marital status 30.9
Has dependent children 47.2
Immigrant status:
Immigrant 17.5
Recent immigrant 3.5
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As shown in figures 15.2 and 15.3, the differences among job status
categories were dramatic: 49 per cent of part-time workers and 37 per cent of
temporary workers regularly work at weekends. That compares to only 13 per
cent of standard (i.e. neither temporary nor part-time) workers who regularly
work at weekends. Since part-time and temporary workers may have lower
tenure inside organizations and therefore may be assigned to less desirable
(leftover) work schedules, we looked at only those with less than 30 months
of tenure with their current employer. Surprisingly, among this group of
recently hired employees, only 25 per cent worked at weekends (versus 16 per
cent among those with higher organizational tenure). While the percentage
working weekends among those recently hired was higher than the average for
all workers, it was much lower than the percentages for the part-time and
temporary groups. (Since this effect size is smaller than expected, we instead
included the role of full-time work experience in our multivariate analysis.)
Seasonal workers frequently exhibited a similar work characteristic, with 38
per cent regularly working weekends.
Interestingly, there is little difference between those covered by a
collective agreement and those who are not, with the proportions of workers
regularly working weekends among these categories being 20 per cent and 18
per cent, respectively. On the other hand, there were major differences
between occupational groups, with 26 per cent of lower-level white-collar
employees working at weekends, versus about 17 per cent among blue-collar
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workers, and only about 14 per cent among workers in managerial jobs.
Similarly, there were meaningful differences between the genders, with 16 per
cent of males regularly working weekends versus 21 per cent among females,
as shown in figure 15.4.
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These distributions show that those who regularly worked weekend
unsocial hours were likely to be employed in part-time, temporary, seasonal
jobs and/or possibly covered by collective agreements. Moreover, they were
also more likely to be female and/or in lower-level white-collar jobs. 
15.6 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS RESULTS
Now, we turn to the multivariate results shown in table 15.3. As expected,
workers in part-time and/or seasonal jobs were significantly more likely to
work at weekends. On the other hand, workers in temporary jobs were only
somewhat more likely to work weekends when controlling for the effect of
other factors. Unexpectedly, workers covered by a collective agreement were
more likely to work at weekends. Since we were controlling for the impact of
industry, occupation, gender and other factors, these were not related factors
for workers covered by collective agreements to work regularly at weekends.
The interaction of part-time status with other variables yields unusual results
as well. Workers in part-time employment covered by collective agreements
were much more likely to work at weekends, but those who were part-time
and temporary were much less likely to do so (when controlling for those two
pairs of categories separately). 
Our research of the past two decades on part-time and temporary employ-
ment suggests some explanations for these findings (see, e.g., Zeytinoglu, 1999,
p. xix; 2002, p. 16). Since the early 1980s there has been a steady change in
unionized workplaces. First part-time work increased in unionized workplaces,
then casual work also began to increase. Unions were initially reluctant to
represent these workers, but as time passed and their numbers continued to
increase in the workplaces they represented, unions began negotiating for these
workers. They principally negotiated for full-time and part-time workers who
were in more or less regular and continuous employment. Unions also nego-
tiated for temporary workers, although these negotiated wages, benefits and
employment conditions were generally lower than those that full-time and part-
time workers received. For example, unions were able to provide more predictable
schedules for their members by negotiating with the employer to post schedules
a few days before the assigned shift, enabling workers to plan ahead better for
events in their own lives. Before such collective agreements the employer 
would have simply called the worker the day before the workday, necessitating
unplanned availability on the part of the worker. If the worker refused the
unplanned work schedule a few times, the employer would simply no longer call,
which would lead to the worker losing their job. 
In another example, in some collective agreements unions were able to
negotiate longer shifts (that were at least 5 hours long) for part-time workers
Decent working time
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Table 15.3 Determinants of regular weekend work in Canada (logistic
regressions)
Odds Regression Standard Significance
ratio coefficient error
Key variables of interest
Part-time work 2.721 0.998 0.179 ***
Temporary work 2.024 0.705 0.361 *
Seasonal work 1.898 0.641 0.257 **
Covered by a collective agreement 1.299 0.262 0.132 **
Part-time and temporary work 0.491 −0.712 0.420 *
Part-time and covered by a collective 
agreement 1.774 0.573 0.263 **
Temporary and covered by a collective 
agreement 1.020 0.019 0.311
Other associated variables
Workplace size (log form) 0.861 −0.149 0.053 ***
Workplace part-time worker rate 5.244 1.657 0.180 ***
Workplace temporary worker rate 0.620 −0.479 0.214 **
Industry: Primary sector 1.638 0.493 0.264 *
Industry: Manufacturing and related (ref.)
Industry: Service sector 2.514 0.922 0.106 ***
Education: less than high school 1.810 0.593 0.253 **
Education: completed high school 1.886 0.634 0.213 ***
Education: some post-secondary 1.636 0.492 0.202 **
Education: university degree or higher  (ref.)
Occupation: manager 0.843 −0.171 0.206
Occupation: professional 0.498 −0.697 0.161 ***
Occupation: lower white-collar 0.962 −0.039 0.107
Occupation: blue-collar (ref.)
Full-time work experience 0.952 −0.050 0.013 ***
Full-time work experience squared 1.001 0.001 0.000 *
Gender (1 = female) 0.656 −0.422 0.098 ***
Marital status: married/common-law (ref.)
Marital status: single/divorced/widowed 1.392 0.331 0.117 ***
(Has) dependent child(ren) 0.930 −0.073 0.123
Immigrant 1.157 0.146 0.162
Recent immigrant 0.840 −0.174 0.240
Constant −2.469 0.300 ***
Number of observations prior to weighting 23,209
Wald chi-square 717.160 
Probability > chi-square 0.000
Pseudo R-square 0.193
Log pseudo-likelihood (9,001)
Note: Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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by stipulating that these shifts be at the weekends or in the evenings. Before
these negotiated longer shifts, employers assigned workers 2- or 3-hour shifts
during times when there was greater demand for their services. These workers
would end up spending so much time commuting to and from work that they
would have spent an hour’s earnings on travel. Under these conditions, part-
time and temporary workers covered by collective agreements agreed to work
at weekends or evening shifts, but it was stipulated that they must be allowed
to work a minimum 5-hour shift. Although some workers were not always
satisfied with the time or day of the designated shifts, at least it was worth the
time and effort to get to work. In fact, our recent research shows that many
of these workers are showing symptoms of stress and reduced job satisfaction
due to the unfavourable working conditions in part-time and/or temporary
jobs (Zeytinoglu et al., 2003, p. 29). 
Concluding this issue, it is important to note that part-time and
temporary workers are less likely to work in weekend jobs, precisely because
employers are able to fill those weekend shifts with part-time workers
regularly scheduled for weekends (of the unionized type that was discussed
previously). Temporary workers are offered employment at weekends only if
these regular workers do not show up for work. 
Continuing with our presentation of the multivariate analysis results (in
table 15.3), employees in larger workplaces (determined by the number of
workers) or with a higher proportion of temporary employees are less likely
to work at weekends. However, those workplaces with higher proportions of
part-time employees are more likely to have weekend work accomplished than
others. In fact, the results suggest that part-time job status and the workplace
part-time worker rate are among the most indicative signals of regular
weekend work. 
In terms of the industry relative to manufacturing workers, those in the
primary and especially service sectors are also more likely to work regularly at
weekends. Therefore, as expected, and similar to the European Union expe-
rience (Boisard et al., 2003, p. 29) and the United States experience (Presser,
2003, p. 8), regular weekend work seems to be more common in the service
sector than elsewhere.
Human capital characteristics are also important. Higher levels of edu-
cation, which indicated a greater investment in human capital, help workers to
avoid regular weekend work. In comparison, workers without university
degrees are more likely than workers with higher levels of education  to work
regularly at weekends. The level of education is also closely related to the level
of occupational group a worker belongs to. Our results show that, except for
professionals, there are no substantive differences in the level of regular
weekend work between occupational groups when controlling for other
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factors. To be more precise, professionals are significantly less likely to
regularly work weekends, but managers and lower-level white-collar and blue-
collar workers all have essentially the same likelihood of regular weekend
work. The fact that managers are regularly working at weekends is an
unexpected result of the study, although blue-collar and lower white-collar
workers working at the weekend are in the expected parameters of the study.
Managers who regularly work at weekends are increasing in Canada. If
workplaces are open at weekends, there will often be managers in them. Some
of those managers may even be hired regularly to work at weekends. For the
time being, professionals appear to be immune to regular weekend work. It is
possible that they may be working at some weekends at home on work-related
business, such as preparing reports or reading work-related publications, but
they are not regularly assigned to do this work at weekends. The study also
illuminated the fact that full-time work experience has essentially no effect on
the likelihood of working weekends regularly. 
In terms of personal characteristics, after controlling for other factors,
being male is associated with a higher likelihood of regular weekend work than
being female, which is unexpected based on the earlier descriptive statistics.
Consequently, the reason why more females (than males) work weekends is
due in large part to being overrepresented in jobs, occupations, or other
industries in which regular weekend work is prevalent, rather than due to
gender per se. In other words, in terms of overall numbers, more female
workers regularly work at weekends than male workers because more females
work in part-time jobs; in lower-level white-collar clerical, sales and personal
services occupations; and in the service sector. Women’s customary weekend
employment does not occur because employers create these regular weekend
jobs specifically for women. In other words, these are not what some people
call the “mom’s shift part-time work” that exists in the United Kingdom or in
Germany (the former West Germany). The jobs were not created with women
in mind, to accommodate women’s hours of work with children’s schooling
hours, for instance, but because there is consumer demand for services at
weekends and employers want to keep their workplaces open and working for
reasons of competitiveness. 
The fact that more women than men are regularly working at weekends
suggests that there is discrimination against females due to the patriarchal
societal system that operates in Canada and most other countries. As the
theory of patriarchy discusses (Walby, 1990, p. 19), society separates women
and men according to their gender, giving specific roles to each and expecting
different work roles and caregiving responsibilities from each based on their
gender. In households, it is usually the women who perform the domestic
work, including caring for children and working adults. In addition, women
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want to, and need to work in paid jobs. Since men are generally employed full
time, and women take care of the household chores and caregiving respon-
sibilities in the home, they end up working at times of the week that are left
over after family responsibilities have been performed. Since weekend or
evening hours are the times that employers seek to fill, times that also
correspond with the male partner in the family being home to oversee any
household or caregiving activities, women end up applying for and working
during those weekend hours. We should, however, keep in mind that these are
not the work-hours and schedules that women voluntarily choose, but are the
hours and schedules that the patriarchal society, family unit, and social system
dictate are suitable for women; thus these hours are involuntarily chosen
hours for women workers. As Messenger (in this volume) discusses, these are
tightly constrained choices for women, particularly where childcare services
are limited or impractical.
In terms of marital status, our results show that in comparison to married
workers, those who are single are more likely to be engaged in regular weekend
work. Those who have fewer family commitments and, possibly, students who
are in school during the weekdays are regularly working at weekends. 
Finally, contrary to our expectations, there are no significant differences
between Canadian-born workers and immigrants in terms of weekend work. In
addition, there are no differences between Canadian-born, pre-1990 immigrants,
and recent immigrants in terms of weekend work. All are equally likely regularly
to work at weekends. Other research shows that recent immigrants in Canada
are largely in overall poor-quality jobs. Being a recent immigrant is a significant
factor in earning lower wages (Thompson, 2002, p. 21) and benefits (Zeytinoglu
and Cooke, 2005, p. 54) than the Canadian-born and immigrants who came to
Canada before 1999. Overall, this suggests that although recent immigrants work
in jobs with lower pay and fewer benefits, when it comes to regular weekend work
there are no differences, suggesting that new immigrants are not discriminated
against in the weekend work aspect of their jobs.
15.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In the last few decades there have been major changes in working time in
Canada. Canadians are experiencing an extension of working hours to
evenings and weekends, as well as moving towards a 24-hour, 7-day work
society. As our study indicated, since 1991, the last time a study of weekend
work was conducted in Canada using Statistics Canada data, there has been an
increase in the percentage of workers regularly working at weekends from 
11 per cent to 18.5 per cent. The object of this study was to examine the
determinants of weekend work in Canada. 
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There is strong evidence in our data that workers in part-time, temporary
and/or seasonal jobs are more likely to work regularly at weekends. Workers
covered by collective agreements, particularly those in part-time jobs covered
by such agreements, are more likely, on average, to work regularly at week-
ends. Workers in workplaces with a high percentage of part-time workers and
those employed in the service sector are also more likely regularly to work at
weekends. An overall analysis of these findings suggests a certain scenario for
regular weekend workers. Many of them work in part-time and seasonal jobs,
with some others in temporary jobs. These workers are employed in work-
places where the employer relies largely on part-time workers, and they are
predominantly in the service sector. Our accumulated research on this topic
suggests that part-time workers are predominantly covered by collective
agreements. To a lesser degree, temporary and seasonal workers are working at
weekends in return for some security in the number of hours the employer
assigns them, including some continuity and regularity in work schedules,
which includes longer shifts (of 5 hours or more), making it financially feasible
for them to commute to work. We argue that these are the underlying reasons
for part-time, temporary and seasonal workers, particularly the part-time
workers covered by collective agreements regularly to work at weekends. 
We also found that those with higher education, including professionals,
are less likely regularly to work weekends, which shows the value of invest-
ment in education and the importance of the professional occupation from a
worker perspective. 
On the other hand, although a higher percentage of females than males
regularly work at weekends, that difference changes course when controlling
for workplace, industry, and individual worker characteristics. The difference
between the descriptive statistics and multivariate results allows us to infer that
female workers are more likely regularly to work at weekends due to other
factors, such as being overrepresented in part-time, temporary and seasonal
jobs, rather than due to gender or occupation per se. In other words, employers
are creating regular weekend jobs that are part-time, temporary, and seasonal,
and filling them with available workers. Employers are creating these regular
weekend jobs because there is consumer demand for services at weekends, and
because they want to keep their workplaces open and operational for com-
petitiveness reasons. More women than men regularly working at weekends
suggests that this is discrimination against females due to the patriarchal societal
system. In our society, femininity and masculinity are constructed differently,
placing women and men at different jobs in workplaces and in different roles in
society. As a result of this, women spend more hours performing household
tasks and caregiving work, and fewer hours in paid work (at times when their
spouse can assume the responsibility for these housekeeping tasks). Since men
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tend to work in full-time jobs in a standard schedule of weekdays, women opt
– for lack of other options – regularly to work at weekends.
Interestingly, we also found less variation regarding the level of weekend
work between Canadian-born workers and immigrant workers, and pre-1990
immigrants and recent immigrants. This suggests that regular weekend work has
penetrated into the working life of all workers. It is not only new immigrants, or
immigrants in general, who are undertaking these undesirable hours of work.
Canadian-born workers are enduring a similarly unsocial schedule. 
Regular weekend work is an unsocial schedule that can be disruptive to
personal life, affecting leisure time activities such as pursuing personal
interests, being with the family, and socializing with friends, neighbours and
the local community. Weekend work can also be unhealthy, as we showed in
another study – a detrimental factor contributing to increased stress, with the
resultant physical and mental health problems for workers and consequently
their workplaces (Zeytinoglu et al., 2003, p. 49, Messenger in this volume).
Similar concerns are being raised for working time schedules and their
correlations with workers’ health in Europe (Boisard et al., 2003, p. 44). It was
noted that meaningful employment, economic stability, healthy work
environments, and supportive social environments are important, but also 
that an active social life outside the workplace is a vital component of an
individual’s health and well-being (Zeytinoglu et al., 1999, p. 23). Overall, the
increasing percentage of regular weekend workers in Canada, and factors
associated with this trend, reveal unhealthy working time schedules for
workers, suggesting that many workers may have challenges in balancing
regular weekend work with social and personal time.
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PART V
CONCLUSION

This concluding chapter aims to synthesize some of the most important
findings from the selected papers from the Ninth International Symposium on
Working Time that are included in this volume and, in particular, to apply these
findings to the task of further developing and refining the five dimensions of
the proposed policy framework for moving towards “decent working time”.
16.1 BACKGROUND
As mentioned at the beginning of this book, a recent ILO publication1 has
analysed the gaps between the working hours that individuals need or would
prefer and the actual hours that they are required to work (Messenger (ed.),
2004). This report found that there are several different types of “gaps” between
workers’ actual and preferred hours of work that are particularly common. These
include the following situations: those workers who are working “excessively”
long hours and would prefer to work substantially fewer hours; those workers
who are working part-time – and especially those in “marginal” part-time jobs of
less than 20 hours per week – who would prefer to work more hours; and finally,
those workers whose primary concern was not the number of hours they are
working, but rather the arrangement of those hours, such as working at night, at
weekends, and on irregular or rotating shift schedules.
From the perspective of decent work,2 the “gaps” which exist between
people’s aspirations regarding their work and their current work situations can
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1 Jon C. Messenger (ed.) 2004. Working time and workers’ preferences in industrialized countries: Finding the balance
(London and New York, Routledge).
2 A brief discussion of the ILO’s concept of decent work is included in this volume. For a more in-depth treatment of
the subject, see International Labour Office (ILO). 1999. Decent work, Report of the Director-General to the
International Labour Conference, 87th Session (Geneva). 
be viewed as “decent work deficits”. The ILO defines a “decent work deficit”
as “a gap between the world that we work in and the hopes that people have
for a better life” (ILO, 2001, p. 8). Thus, the “gaps” that have been identified
between workers’ actual and preferred hours of work can be considered as one
type of “decent work deficit”. By adopting this approach, we can establish a
basis from which to consider how the goal of decent work can be advanced in
the arena of working time – that is, towards “decent working time”.
Based upon both the existing international labour standards in the area of
working time and recent research on working time trends and developments
focusing on industrialized countries,3 the ILO’s Conditions of Work and
Employment Programme has proposed five significant dimensions of “decent
working time”, as indicated in the Foreword. These five dimensions are as
follows: working time arrangements should promote health and safety; be
“family-friendly”; promote gender equality; advance the productivity of enter-
prises; and facilitate worker choice and influence over their hours of work.
Advancing each of these five dimensions requires a broad range of policies, which
may be articulated at the national, sectoral and/or enterprise levels. Of course,
the precise mix of policies that need to be pursued will vary substantially across
countries (and perhaps even across states or regions within the same country),
depending upon the socio-economic realities extant in each country.
16.2 HEALTHY WORKING TIME
The first of the five dimensions of “decent working time” is healthy working time.
The need for working time to be both healthy and safe is a traditional concern –
one that dates back to the very first international labour standard, the Hours of
Work (Industry) Convention in 1919. Long working hours and “unsocial” work-
ing hours, particularly night work, are neither preferred by workers nor healthy
for them. Moreover, one must keep in mind that the effects of long hours and
“unsocial” working hours (e.g., night work) are not limited to individual work-
ers, but also affect their families and society at large (Spurgeon, 2003).
The principle that underlies this dimension of “decent working time” is
that hours of work which are unhealthy should not be a means of improving
firms’ profitability, a principle referred to in the international standards on
working time, most significantly the Hours of Work (Industry) Convention,
1919 (No. 1) and the Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention,
1930 (No. 30). This principle is also a primary objective of the European
Union (EU) Directive on Working Time (93/104/EC).
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3 A similar research effort focusing on developing countries and countries in transition is now nearing completion, and
the results of this project will be published in an ILO report on Working time around the world (working title) in 2007.
Nevertheless, as Golden (2004; see also Chapter 8 in this volume) points
out, both employers and individual workers may not properly consider the
potential negative effects on health and safety in determining working hours,
which may result in the overutilization of labour or “overwork”. Golden
(2004, p. 6) defines overwork as the point “when the length of work hours
begins to adversely affect the health and safety of individuals, families,
organizations and the public, even if workers themselves voluntarily work the
excess hours”. He emphasizes that these negative externalities with regard to
health and safety – that is, the “spillover costs of overwork”, justify the need
for some type of regulation to provide a “countervailing force” to restrain
excessively long hours (ibid., p. 16). Golden emphasizes that the need for such
regulation holds not only in those cases in which the long hours are
involuntary, but even when the long hours are worked “voluntarily”,4 in order
to protect the safety and health of both the workers involved and the general
public. A similar justification can be applied to protective measures concerning
night work and other forms of “unsocial” hours as well.
Appropriate public policies to protect workers against excessively long
and “unsocial” working hours are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for achieving the goal of healthy working time. Both Campbell (2004) and
Golden (Chapter 8 in this volume) point to the relatively weak regulatory and
institutional frameworks regarding working time which exist in Australia and
the United States, respectively, as being important factors in the increasing
incidence of long or “extended” hours in those countries (see also Lee, 2004).
Noting that the move towards longer hours is the dominant trend for full-time
employees in Australia, Campbell (2004) stresses the importance of unpaid
overtime, particularly among managers and different categories of salaried
professionals, and a lack of paid annual leave due to an increasing casualization
of the Australian labour force. Clearly, these factors relate directly to the
regulatory framework in Australia, which excludes most professionals and
managers from overtime pay requirements that might help limit the recourse
to extended hours, and excludes “casual workers”5 from employee entitle-
ments such as that for a minimum amount of paid annual leave. Similarly,
Golden notes that the only regulatory restraints on long working hours in the
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4 Golden also notes that there is a tendency for workers to adjust their working time preferences in line with their
current hours, so in such cases workers may actually be internalizing “preferences” for long hours based on the
requirements of their jobs.
5 The category of “casual workers” in Australia is quite broad. “There is no standard number of working hours that
defines a casual worker . . . the main difference between a permanent and a casual worker is the notion that a permanent
employee has an ongoing contract of employment of unspecified duration while a casual employee has not. The
characteristics of casual employment that flow from this notion are:
• Limited entitlements to benefits generally associated with continuity of employment such as annual and sick leave, and 
• No entitlement to prior notification of retrenchment (no security of employment) and only a limited case for
compensation or reinstatement”. (Kryger, 2000)
United States are the overtime premium imposed under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), as well as weekly and daily limitations on hours of
work that apply only to truck drivers. However, there is no general limitation
on maximum hours of work in the United States, and a broad range of
managerial, professional, and technical occupations are exempt from the over-
time pay requirements of the FLSA under regulations which are established by
the United States Department of Labor.6
Nonetheless, establishing a sound national framework for regulating
working time is not, in and of itself, sufficient to make healthy working time a
reality. Strong economic pressures or incentives towards long or “extended”
hours can reduce the effectiveness of any regulatory framework. For example,
it appears that the traditional link between low pay and long hours continues
to exist in many developing countries, as overtime payments provide an
important source of additional income for some low-wage workers. This is
particularly true for workers with low educational levels, especially in develop-
ing countries such as Brazil and China (Saboia, 2002; Zeng et al., 2005). Paid
overtime, while increasing the earnings of these workers, can, however, become
institutionalized, often as a cost-saving strategy for firms when compared with
the increased fixed costs of hiring additional workers. When this occurs,
workers may gradually come to accept long hours of work – in some cases, they
may even come to be “dependent” on the additional income generated by
overtime working – adjusting their working hour preferences towards their
current hours (as suggested by Golden in this volume) and becoming unwilling
or (economically) unable to reduce their working hours. In this case, perhaps
the most effective policy for encouraging reduced working hours is a minimum
wage set at a level sufficient to allow workers to earn a “decent” income during
the standard or “normal” work-week.
In addition, it is becoming more and more obvious that, at least in the
industrialized world, those workers with the highest levels of remuneration,
such as managers and professionals, exhibit the longest working hours. As
Nätti et al. report in Chapter 11 of this volume, in Finland long working hours
were best predicted by occupational status, with managers and professionals
being substantially more likely to work long hours compared with other
occupational categories. According to their study, “[a]mbiguity of working
time is a reality for many knowledge workers in Finland: half of them had
difficulties in defining their working hours, men more often compared to
women” (p. 309). The most common reason that they found for such
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6 See Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales, and Computer
Personnel; Final Rule. US Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division,
Federal Register 69: 22122, 23 April 2004.
“ambiguous” and “stretching” working hours among managers and profes-
sionals was the “nature of the work” (p. 311). In other cases, however, it may
be that corporate culture and management strategies, as well as intense
competition among colleagues, induce workers to work long hours. For
example, Haipeter (Chapter 12 in this volume), working with Lehndorff on a
series of case studies of German firms with innovative working time systems
(see, e.g., Lehndorff, 2002), emphasizes the “‘financialization’ of corporate
decision-making”, which focuses on increasing shareholder value (and often
results in cutting staff levels to an absolute minimum), combined with the use
of “market-driven management systems” which require employees to achieve
market-based objectives (e.g., specific performance targets) within a frame-
work that allows individuals extensive discretion in organizing their work 
(pp. 323–5). This combination of high performance targets and heavy work-
loads, plus extensive autonomy in organizing work, including individual
working time, often results in hours of work that extend “as necessary” to
achieve established performance targets or business objectives. There are now,
therefore, increasing concerns about the effects of excessively long hours on
the health and safety of managerial and professional staff.
Combating the pressures for long and “stretching” working hours among
managers and professionals is not an easy task. Despite the effects of such long
hours on the health, safety and personal lives of these workers, it is often
difficult to address unhealthy working time among managers and pro-
fessionals, and in fact most national working hour regulations exclude many
workers in these occupations from their provisions. Extending regulations on
working hours, such as those for overtime pay and maximum hour limits,
would be an important step towards reducing the long hours among these
workers. In France, for example, the working hour laws have been extended to
cover most cadres (a category that includes both managerial and professional
staff), by limiting the total number of days that they work (via extended paid
holidays) rather than limiting total hours worked as for other employees
(Incomes Data Service, 2002). In some circumstances it may also be feasible to
incorporate at least some of these types of workers into workplace collective
agreements, but new mechanisms of regulation that centre on the amount of
hours worked may also be necessary. 
16.3 “FAMILY-FRIENDLY” WORKING TIME
A second important dimension of “decent working time” is providing workers
with family responsibilities engaged in paid employment with the time that they
need to handle those responsibilities – in line with the principle established in the
ILO’s Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 156). Such
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responsibilities include caring for family members (children, elderly relatives,
etc.) and performing other necessary household tasks (cooking, cleaning,
shopping, etc.) “Family-friendly” working time allows individuals sufficient time
to meet these essential domestic obligations, and therefore benefits not only
workers, but also society as a whole. In particular, “family-friendly” working time
measures7 are designed to help meet the needs of parents – both men and women
– to have sufficient time to care for their families, particularly (although certainly
not exclusively) on a daily basis, a reality that is often forgotten in so-called “post-
Fordist” working time arrangements that often function by averaging hours over
a period of weeks, months, or even an entire year.
According to studies of life-cycle working time (Boulin and Hoffman,
1999; Anxo et al., Chapter 4 in this volume), working time patterns and
workers’ preferences regarding their hours of work are highly influenced by
variations across the life cycle of individual workers – variations that have
become more dramatic as individuals’ biographies have become more diverse.
Such studies argue that the allocation of an individual’s time among paid 
work, domestic tasks, care, leisure and other activities is highly sensitive to
household composition (e.g. the number and age of household members) and
also their current phase in the life course. Indeed, in some countries, such as
Japan, the entire social system is based on an individual’s age – that is, their
particular stage of life. In Japan, this life-cycle-based structure includes not
only paid employment (which is based on seniority), but there is also “a high
degree of synchronization between family events and age” (Ribault, Chapter
13, p. 347 in this volume).
Family responsibilities and the precise nature of those responsibilities –
e.g. the presence of children and their age(s) – exert a strong influence on
households’ time allocation and gender division of labour (see e.g. Anxo,
2004). However, these impacts vary substantially across countries and societal
contexts, such that the ability to combine family commitments and work
exhibits a large variation among countries. For example, Ribault (Chapter 13
in this volume) points to an interesting phenomenon of “intergenerational
exchange”, in which Japanese women aged 50–59 substantially increase their
participation in the paid labour force in order to provide extra household
revenues to finance their children’s (often very expensive) tertiary education;
in return, their children, who are typically between 20 and 24 years old at that
time, take on the primary responsibility for household tasks, such as providing
elder care. While this may be an extreme example, it nonetheless provides an
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7 The entire range of “family-friendly” measures can include a variety of different policies and practices, including not
only those relating to hours of work, but also a number of other measures such as maternity protection and affordable,
accessible and high-quality childcare services.
illustration of just how complex the relationships between time use and
household composition can be.
Some of these family responsibilities are already outsourced, at least in
part (e.g. childcare facilities, schools and market-based services for domestic
tasks). Nevertheless, not all such activities can reasonably be outsourced; thus
a significant portion of these activities remains the responsibility of the family
or household. Both “inflexible” working hours and limited childcare and other
family-related support tend to reinforce the traditional “male breadwinner–
female homemaker” division of labour within households and create
difficulties in combining paid work and family duties.
However, successfully blending work with family responsibilities is also
about when people are available, and the energy that they have available to
devote to family activities (Fagan, 2004). “Non-standard” working hours in
the evenings, at nights and at weekends, as well as unpredictable variations in
working hours based on fluctuating market demands, tend to increase the
likelihood that workers will report work–family conflicts (see Fagan, 2004;
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions, 2001). Of course, the inconveniences involved with working
“non-standard” hours are not equally shared by all groups of workers: for
example, Zeytinoglu and Cooke (Chapter 15 in this volume) demonstrate that
in Canada, those workers in part-time, temporary and seasonal jobs are more
likely to work at weekends than full-time, permanent employees.
The possibility of using working time arrangements to facilitate the
combination of work and family commitments may be achieved by different
but complementary means. These “family-friendly” working time measures
include a variety of policy options, ranging from a collective reduction in full-
time hours to an individual right to reduce (or adapt) working time for family
reasons, such as has been recently introduced in the United Kingdom. In
general, short working hours – that is, part-time work – appears to be a widely
employed strategy for balancing paid employment with family responsibilities.
For example, Bouffartigue and Bouteiller (Chapter 14 in this volume) find that
part-time work is the “linchpin” of personal strategies for juggling paid work
and family responsibilities among hospital nurses in Belgium and France.
However, there are two main problems with this reliance on part-time
work as a strategy for work–family reconciliation. The first problem is that
part-time jobs are, on average, of lesser quality than comparable full-time jobs.
This is the case in many countries, not only in terms of hourly wages, but also
with regard to non-wage benefits such as pensions (and health insurance in the
United States), social insurance coverage, training opportunities and career
development (see e.g., Polivka et al., 2000; Fagan and O’Reilly, 1998). In
addition, “substantial” part-time hours (20–34 hours per week) are much more
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popular than “marginal” part-time hours of less than 20 hours per week (see,
e.g., Fagan, 2004). In fact, it appears that many full-timers would prefer to
switch to part-time work but for the workplace obstacles and career penalties
that are currently associated with part-time work. The second problem is that
part-time workers are overwhelmingly female,8 meaning that part-time work is
gender-segregated in nearly all of the countries in which it exists (see the
discussion in the next section).
These findings point to the importance of improving the quality of
available part-time positions as a means of achieving “family-friendly”
working time. This in turn suggests the need to “normalize” part-time work
vis-à-vis the full-time standard that exists in each country. As noted in the
chapter by Yerkes and Visser (Chapter 9 in this volume), such a process of
“normalization” has already occurred in the Netherlands and is in now in
process in Germany and the United Kingdom as well. Equal treatment
regulations in employment, non-wage benefits and social protection systems
help to improve the conditions of part-time work, and at the same time make
a substantial contribution towards promoting gender equality, a subject to
which we turn in the next section (McCann, 2004).
Certain types of “flexible” working time arrangements can also
contribute to work–family reconciliation, particularly those flexi-time
programmes and “time-banking” schemes that permit workers to accumulate
extra hours and then use them to take full or partial days of paid time off at a
later date. If properly structured, such schemes can also allow workers to vary
their hours of work based on their individual family situations. Finally,
offering workers the possibility of “telecommuting” to their jobs by working
from home can also provide them with the ability to blend work and family
responsibilities on a daily basis, although care must be taken that this does not
lead to excessive hours due to the inevitable blurring of the boundaries
between paid work and personal life.
Maternity, paternity, parental and similar care-related leave can also
advance “family-friendly” working time by providing longer-term working
time adjustments for family responsibilities (and physical recovery for
mothers in the case of maternity leave). For example, Sweden offers one model
for using blocks of paid leave, including sabbaticals, to help individuals to
better organize their working time over the life cycle. And although few
countries have family leave entitlements as generous as those in Sweden,
statutory entitlements to maternity, paternity and parental leave have been
increased in almost all OECD countries in recent years (OECD, 2001).
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8 In industrialized countries, women hold nearly three-quarters of all part-time positions (OECD, 2004, p. 311), and
part-time work is increasingly used in developing countries as well (e.g., Taylor, 2004).
A final point regarding work–family reconciliation measures is that take-up
of working time adjustments or extended leave is often low – particularly for men
– and so there is a substantial gap between policy and practice. Employees may
feel that they can’t afford to take advantage of such opportunities, perhaps
because their line manager is unwilling to agree to these arrangements, or because
they may perceive that it will jeopardize their future promotion potential 
and/or even their job security. In particular, take-up rates for these measures are
systematically much lower for men than for women, and long weekly working
hours are largely (though certainly not exclusively) a male phenomenon. All of
these factors suggest that in general men have insufficient time for family life.
This phenomenon and the resulting gender inequality in the sharing of family
responsibilities that it spawns are addressed in the next section.
16.4 GENDER EQUALITY THROUGH WORKING TIME
The third dimension of “decent working time” involves using working time as
a tool for promoting gender equality. Equality of opportunity and treatment
between women and men in the world of work is a principle established in a
number of international labour standards, most notably the Discrimination
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111). This ILO
Convention enshrines the elimination of discrimination regarding employment
and occupation as a fundamental principle – one that remains at the core of the
ILO Decent Work Agenda today (ILO, 2000a). This means that the overall
objective of advancing gender equality also needs to be applied in the area of
working time – and integrated into the full range of working time policies – 
in order to ensure that policies designed to advance other “decent work”
objectives do not inadvertently have a negative impact on gender equality.
An important principle in this respect is to distinguish between working
time measures that are “family-friendly” per se and those that are both “family-
friendly” and can simultaneously promote gender equality as well. For example,
measures such as part-time work or parental leave provide parents with the
opportunity to spend more time caring for their children or older relatives.
However, if mothers are the only ones who make use of such leave, then, while
these policies may indeed help promote work–family balance, they may
simultaneously reinforce gender inequality by relegating women to marginal
forms of labour market participation – rather than paving the way for a true
equality in paid employment. To promote gender equality, working time
policies must, first, enable women to be on an equal footing with men in
employment (e.g., position levels, career advancement, etc.), and second,
enable “both partners [to] combine paid work, family responsibilities, and
lifelong learning . . .” (emphasis added), as suggested by Bosch in his
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proposed model for a new, more flexible standard employment relationship
(Bosch, 2004, p. 1; Bosch, Chapter 2 in this volume). Realizing such a model
will obviously require a more equal division of domestic tasks between men
and women, including care responsibilities – which can be promoted via
working time policies that encourage men to adjust their working hours at
different stages of the life course, such as when they have young children.
From this discussion, it is clear that the gender equality dimension of the
decent working time policy framework has two important implications for
working time policies. First, working time policies should promote gender
equality in employment through gender-neutral measures. Second, it is
important to ensure that policies that advance other dimensions of decent
working time do not negatively impact on gender equality.
As discussed in the ILO’s recent book on working time in the industrialized
countries, a coordinated combination or “portfolio” of policies is required to
promote gender equality because the efficacy of one particular instrument is
usually contingent upon other measures (Messenger, ed., 2004). First, policies are
needed to close the “gender gap” in the number of hours of paid employment for
men compared with those hours worked by women. This objective can be
achieved both by limiting excessively long hours among full-time workers and
encouraging longer hours for part-timers. Changing the “long-hours culture”
that is often associated with the self-determined working time patterns of many
managers and so-called “new economy” professionals is a particularly thorny
problem, as these individuals are largely exempt from working time regulations.
The long hours in such positions act as an (often invisible) barrier to the
advancement of women who have family responsibilities, and hence reinforce the
“glass ceiling” that already exists in these occupations.
Second, with regard to the question of part-time work, the key issues are
twofold. First, it is essential that the quality of part-time work be improved if
it is to be made compatible with the objective of promoting gender equality
(Fagan, 2004; OECD, 2001; Fagan and O’Reilly, 1998). As mentioned earlier
in this chapter, one particularly important mechanism for improving the quality
of part-time work – and thus helping to promote gender equality, since (as
noted above) the vast majority of part-time workers are women – is the use of
equal treatment regulations in employment, non-wage benefits and social
protection systems, which will help to improve the employment conditions of
part-time workers. Promoting the equal treatment of part-time and full-time
workers is a principle that was established in the ILO’s Part-Time Work
Convention, 1994 (No. 175), and has been extended to the laws of a number
of countries, as well as to the European Union as a whole through the 1997 EU
Part-time Work Directive (97/81/EC) (McCann, 2004). The equal treatment
approach is clearly an essential step towards improving the quality of part-time
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work. Ultimately, this means embarking on a process whose objective is to
make part-time positions equivalent to those of full-time ones in terms of their
pay, benefits and career development opportunities. Such a process – sometimes
referred to as the “normalization” of part-time work – is discussed at length in
the chapter by Yerkes and Visser presented in this volume (Chapter 9).
The occupational profile of part-time positions is also important. Policies
designed to promote equal treatment between part-timers and full-timers
require “comparable” full-time positions with which comparisons regarding
the equal treatment of part-time workers can be made. If part-time workers are
concentrated in a narrow range of occupations, there may be few if any
comparable positions. To address this situation, policies are needed to help
“desegregate” part-time work, such as making part-time positions available in
a wider range of jobs and incentivizing employers to structure part-time
positions around “substantial” rather than “marginal” part-time hours (which
are typically defined as less than 20 hours per week) by, for example, removing
provisions in social security regulations that favour the creation of “marginal”
hours jobs (McCann, 2004). With a wider range of part-time positions plus
more substantial part-time hours, the underemployment (including earnings
losses) associated with part-time work is reduced, as are the career advance-
ment penalties; as a result, part-time workers become more fully integrated
alongside full-timers in the workplace and the labour market as a whole (Fagan
and O’Reilly, 1998). According to Yerkes and Visser (Chapter 9 in this
volume), such a broad profile of part-time positions already existed in the
Netherlands by the end of the 1990s.
Beyond the question of part-time work, promoting gender equality
involves overcoming the “no-win” dilemma of work–family reconciliation
measures: that is, policies designed to facilitate women’s integration into the
labour market may simultaneously reinforce gender inequality in the domestic
division of labour and thus inadvertently undermine gender equity in employ-
ment (Moss and Deven, 1999). In particular, managerial resistance and the
negative attitudes of colleagues can create obstacles to men’s use of recon-
ciliation measures. To help overcome such obstacles, a broad range of policies
(and not just working time policies) are needed to promote the involvement
of fathers in domestic tasks and care activities. One possible approach would
be to provide fathers with the right to take extended leave for family reasons
or reduce their working hours when they have young children – rights that are
already available to mothers in many industrialized countries. In addition,
enterprise-level policies designed to reduce organizational resistance to men
adapting their working hours based on family needs would also have positive
“knock-on” effects for female colleagues by “normalizing” a broad range of
working time arrangements.
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16.5 PRODUCTIVE WORKING TIME
Obviously, it makes no sense to talk about decent working time without
considering its effects on the productivity of enterprises. In that sense,
“decent working time” is also productive working time, in that more and more
enterprises are recognizing that promoting a healthy “work–life balance” for
their employees isn’t just the “right thing” to do, but that such an approach
can also serve as an effective competitiveness strategy. Enterprise policies and
practices that seek to promote “decent working time” can benefit businesses
in a number of different ways, as will be discussed below.
Before considering the range of positive effects that have been shown
from various aspects of “decent working time” policies and practices, however,
a few words of caution are in order. First, there is a fundamental normative
question: whether or not economic impact is the most appropriate perspective
from which to evaluate public policies, such as those embodied in international
labour standards (whether on working time or other subjects), or whether one
should focus primarily on their efficacy in promoting social welfare. How one
answers this question will depend in large part on whether one places greater
importance on economic efficiency or on social justice. Second, as emphasized
by Rubery et al. (Chapter 5 in this volume), the human resource management
practices associated with “post-Fordist” forms of work organization – such as
the “self-regulated” working time of many managerial and professional staff
and the “fragmented” time systems (e.g., very short part-time hours) often
used, for example, in the retail industry – lead to flexible working hours that
have the potential for a “double-edged impact”; that is, the end result can be
either positive or negative depending upon how the working time arrangement
is implemented. Thus, as with other employment practices, there is the
potential for both a “high road” and a “low road” to achieving working time
flexibility – and, as we shall see, taking the “high road” generally requires a
proactive approach.
Having said that, there are nonetheless substantial business benefits
that can be reaped from “decent working time” policies and practices. 
First, there is longstanding evidence that points to a link between reductions
in working hours and increased hourly productivity, including the ILO’s 
own research (see White, 1987 for a review of the relevant literature). Such
productivity gains result not only from physiological factors such as reduced
fatigue (as in the case of workers who are working long hours on a regular
basis), but also from an improvement in employee attitudes and morale. 
The largest potential productivity gains can be expected from reductions 
in “excessive” hours of work – i.e., more than 48 hours per week – 
which also helps to advance the other dimensions of decent working time as
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well.9 There is substantial empirical evidence that reductions in “excessively”
long hours of work – typically linked with changes in work organization,
methods of production and similar factors – have resulted in substantial
productivity gains over the years (see, e.g., Bosch and Lehndorf, 2001; White,
1987).10 Also, since long hours of work are positively related to absenteeism
and staff turnover, reducing such long hours can also provide firms with
benefits in terms of reduced absenteeism and lower staff turnover (see e.g.,
Barmby et al., 2002).
A number of enterprise studies also show the business benefits of
adopting company policies that promote various aspects of decent working
time, such as working time arrangements that allow workers to adjust their
work schedules in response to their individual circumstances. For example,
one major study in the United States found that flexi-time and tele-
commuting had positive effects on productivity (Boston College Center for
Work and Family, 2000). Flexible working time arrangements such as flexi-
time and compressed work-weeks have also shown positive effects on
employee attitudes and morale (see, e.g., Hogarth et al., 2001; Gottlieb et al.,
1998). These improvements in employee attitudes and morale can, in turn,
translate into a better “bottom line” – as demonstrated by a recent study that
shows a statistically valid, positive relationship between employees’ emotions
regarding their work and firms’ financial performance (Towers Perrin and
Gang & Gang, 2003). A review of the literature on the effects of flexible
working time arrangements (Avery and Zabel, 2001) also found benefits to
firms from such arrangements due to decreased tardiness and absenteeism, 
as well as improved recruitment and retention of employees, particularly
when labour markets are tight. Finally, some studies indicate that perhaps 
the most important factor is not the working time arrangement per se, 
but rather workers’ ability to choose their arrangement – often referred to as
“time sovereignty” – that shows the strongest impact on employees’ job
performance, and hence on firms’ productivity (Gottlieb et al., 1998). 
Thus there appears to be substantial evidence regarding at least the 
potential benefits of “decent working time” arrangements for enhancing
enterprise productivity.
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9 The ILO is in the process of developing “decent work” indicators, which include as one indicator the proportion of
the workforce with “excessive hours of work”, defined as having usual hours of work of over 48 hours per week in the
main job. This 48-hour threshold is in line with the ILO Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 1) and the
ILO Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1930 (No. 30), both of which establish 48 hours as the
maximum for weekly hours under normal circumstances.
10 It should be noted that the productivity gains connected with reductions in working time tend to decrease as the
length of working time decreases. More recent empirical studies of the productivity effects of reductions in working
time have focused on the reduction of hours of work from a lower baseline level (i.e., 40 hours per week or less), and
these studies generally show weak or no effects of working time reductions in countries in which hours of work are
already relatively short (see, e.g., Anxo and Bigsten, 1989).
This is not to say, however, that these business benefits will automatically
result from simply deploying working time arrangements that are consistent with
“decent working time”. Realizing these benefits requires firms to implement
innovative arrangements that consciously seek ways of combining business
efficiency with increased worker influence over their working hours. Such an
approach is demonstrated in the chapter by Haipeter (Chapter 12 in this volume),
in which we see a number of different German firms experimenting with
innovative forms of working time arrangements, including flexi-time and various
forms of “working time accounts” (i.e., “time banking” schemes that allow
workers to accumulate “credits” in working hours for later use) that attempt to
make just such a combination. Not surprisingly, Haipeter finds both successes
and failures among his company case studies. For example, those flexi-time
arrangements that actively seek to balance the interests of workers with firms’
operational requirements are a particular “success story” that emerges from these
case studies. On the other hand, Haipeter also finds that long-term working time
accounts – designed to enable employees to take time off in extended blocks 
(i.e. “sabbaticals”) – have not lived up to their promise, primarily because of
practical difficulties with scheduling the withdrawal of large blocks of time credits
from these accounts (in the form of sabbaticals) in an intensely competitive
environment in which staffing levels are tight.
Ultimately, as Bosch (Chapter 2 in this volume) emphasizes, “Any
attempt to combine business efficiency with increased time sovereignty for
employees inevitably raises the question of work organization” (p. 59). Bosch
goes on to cite Lehndorff ’s work on innovative forms of work organization
(see e.g., Lehndorff, 2001), which, he says, “show[s] that such a synthesis can
be made to work successfully” (p. 59). In the ILO’s recent book on working
time in industrialized countries, Messenger (2004), in his analysis of working
time at the enterprise level, reaches a similar conclusion, but emphasizes that
making such a synthesis work in practice requires firms to make a conscious
attempt to align business objectives and strategies with workers’ needs 
and preferences in ways that are mutually reinforcing. This point is aptly
demonstrated by the experience of the lessons learned from enterprise case
studies in France, in the context of the Aubry laws mandating a 35-hour
average work week (Charpentier et al., Chapter 7 in this volume). Three of
the four companies in this study lacked “‘an associated project for change’,
which could have harmoniously combined the various components of decent
working time . . .”; not surprisingly, therefore, all three of these companies
reported negative effects from the move to the 35-hour work-week (e.g.,
lower productivity, increased absenteeism), while the one company (Banque)
that had adopted a proactive strategy for managing this change seems to have
fared much better (p. 193).
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16.6 CHOICE AND INFLUENCE REGARDING 
WORKING TIME 
Increasing demands for temporal availability at all hours of the day and during all
7 days of the week, as discussed in the chapter by Gadrey et al. (Chapter 10 in this
volume), can be considered to be a type of “competence” sought by employers.
These authors present evidence demonstrating that such temporal availability is
particularly important when hiring employees who possess low levels of formal
qualifications. According to Gadrey et al., such requirements for extensive 
temporal availability – at all times of the day, on all days of the week, at very short
notice, for interrupted or irregular work periods, etc. – are among the most
unfavourable of working conditions because of the substantial disruptions they
create in individuals’ lives. For example, they cite the “paradoxical” perception of
part-time workers in cafeterias or fast-food restaurants, who, despite working short
hours, feel that they are giving their entire lives to their work because they must
be available for work at any time and on very short notice (p. 281). While these
are perhaps extreme cases, they nonetheless serve to highlight the importance 
of workers’ ability to choose, or at least influence, their working hours for 
achieving decent working time. This is the fifth and final dimension of “decent
working time”: choice and influence regarding working time.
The concept of “decent work deficits” discussed at the beginning of this
chapter – with its notion of “gaps” between people’s aspirations regarding their
work and their current work situation – implies that increasing workers’ ability
to choose, or at least influence, the length of their working hours and their
work schedules can help to advance “decent working time”. Increasing workers’
choice and influence regarding their working hours is – as discussed in the
ILO’s recent book on the subject – a matter of considering workers’ subjective
needs and preferences, with all of the technical difficulties that this approach
entails, rather than making the assumption that actual working time
arrangements reflect workers’ preferences regarding their hours of work. This
notion is taken one step further in the concept of “working time capability”
developed by Lee and McCann in Chapter 3 of this volume. Building on the
work of Sen (1999) they outline a concept of working time capability with a set
of real options from which workers are able to make genuine choices, and then
develop a model which focuses on the importance of considering the available,
feasible alternatives when choices about working time are made. Expanding this
kind of choice means expanding the range of opportunities for workers to
structure their work and personal activities, such that their working hours can
more closely approximate their individual situations.
This objective can be advanced in two related ways. First, the number 
of working time options available to employees can be increased, such that
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workers can choose from a “menu” of alternatives. Second, workers can be
permitted to exercise a direct ongoing influence over the length and
arrangement of their working hours. This latter approach (often referred to as
an “individual influence” approach) recognizes that “decent working time”
should help to promote the outcomes that individual workers prefer.
Policy measures to advance worker choice and influence regarding
working time can be adopted at the national, sectoral and enterprise levels. For
example, national legislation has been introduced in a number of European
countries that can enhance worker influence by allowing collective agreements
to implement or modify working time standards (EIRO Online, 1998). Laws
have also been enacted in a few countries, such as the Netherlands, Germany
and the United Kingdom, which provide individual workers with a right to
request changes in their working hours. Although the specific provisions of
these laws vary11 – and both the working time regulatory frameworks and
socio-economic circumstances in these three countries are quite different –
such “right to request” legislation has the potential to advance workers’ ability
to influence their working hours, as well as to address the existing dichotomy
between full-time and part-time work. In fact, this “right to request” approach
favours a notion of the “modulation” of working hours, by promoting
smoother transitions between different working time arrangements (McCann,
2004; Anxo et al., Chapter 4 in this volume).
At the enterprise level, flexi-time schemes and “time banking” accounts
that allow workers to build up time “credits” for later use are tools that have
the potential to offer workers a substantial amount of influence over their
working hours. As noted above, such schemes can combine business
efficiency with increased worker influence over their working hours, for
example by creating working time accounts that fuse time banking with
aspects of hours averaging over multi-week periods. Indeed, any firm-level
practice that provides workers with a choice among alternative work
schedules or facilitates worker influence over scheduling would be of some
benefit to individual workers and can be encouraged through a range of
government incentives.
Mechanisms such as a “right to request” changes in working hours laws
and time banking accounts do not always work as intended, however. For
example, Fouarge and Baaijens (Chapter 6 in this volume) investigate Dutch
workers’ preferences regarding their working hours in the context of the
pioneering legislation in the Netherlands regarding the right to request
working time changes (including changes in both the number of hours worked
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11 For example, the British provision, which is included in the Employment Rights Act 1996, applies only to parents
with children under the age of 6 or disabled children under the age of 18.
and their scheduling). Their early findings12 – with the Dutch “right to
request” legislation in place for just two years at the time of the study –
showed that, despite the law, changes in working hours are still often
associated with job mobility; this finding indicates that certain “rigidities” in
how enterprises structure working hours persist. Likewise, Haipeter (Chapter
12 in this volume) discusses flexi-time and other types of working time
accounts, and identifies some problems with their use. In particular (as noted
above), he finds problems with the withdrawal of time credits in long-term
time accounts (e.g., for sabbaticals), often leading to the forfeiture of working
time, and concludes that “(l)ong-term accounts have not shown themselves to
be of any practical effectiveness. The main cause of this is the withdrawal of
time credits, which is the so-called ‘Achilles’ heel’ of such accounts” (p.334).
One must also be cautious about a tendency to assume that providing
workers with greater choice and influence over their hours of work necessarily
means a complete individualization of decisions regarding working hours, or that
this approach can be effective entirely at the individual level. As highlighted by
Lee and McCann (Chapter 3 in this volume), a strong degree of social support
is essential in increasing workers’ “working time capability” – that is, the range
of realistic working time options from which they can choose. Such support can
be provided at various levels through methods including laws that strengthen
trade unions such as those on independence, recognition and the right to strike.
Finally, it is important to consider how broader social objectives can be
realized in conjunction with the facilitation of individual choice. The synchro-
nization of working hours and social times, such as those times traditionally
dedicated to community and family activities, becomes increasingly difficult in
a context of individualized hours. Building on the work of Supiot (2001),
Rubery et al. (Chapter 5 in this volume) emphasize that certain types of “post-
Fordist” human resource management practices:
call into question collective aspects of the organization of work and life by
challenging “the community time patterns that have governed life on and off the
job” . . . Results-based employment relationships blur the boundaries between
work and free time while fragmented time relationships often explicitly facilitate
the scheduling of work in parts of the day or week that would previously have been
considered “community time” (pp.126–7).
Thus working time policies also need to explicitly address these concerns
wherever possible. For example, such policies need to consider the opening hours
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12 This study uses data from the OSA Labour Supply Panel through the year 2002, which is only two years after the
Adjustment of Working Hours Act in the Netherlands came into effect (in July 2000). Therefore it was probably too
early for any significant impacts of the law to have materialized.
of public and private services, including changing these hours when necessary to
accommodate changing lifestyles, in order to promote an improved quality of life.
The “times of the city” (tempo della città) initiative in Italy provides a good 
illustration of how this concern regarding the synchronization of working hours
and social times might be addressed (see, e.g., Boulin and Mückenberger, 1999).
16.7 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As we have seen, the five dimensions of “decent working time” provide a broad
policy framework by which the goal of decent work can be advanced in the
arena of working time. These five dimensions should be considered as a set of
guiding principles that point in a direction that leads towards “decent working
time” – at whatever stage a country may be in its process of development. As
principles, the five dimensions of “decent working time” will of necessity vary
substantially in their implementation (i.e., the specific mix of policies used to
advance decent working time) from one country to another, according to
variations in national, regional and perhaps even local circumstances. 
It should also be emphasized that these five dimensions of “decent
working time” cannot – and are not designed to – provide a comparative
analytical framework for an empirical definition of “decent working time” on
an international basis. That is not to say, however, that such a comparative
analytical framework could not be developed; it is simply that this was not the
original purpose of the concept of “decent working time”. In fact, Boulin et al.
(Chapter 1 in this volume) suggest one possible approach that might be used
as a starting point for developing such an analytical framework. However, a
word of caution appears to be in order here: given the well-known difficulties
of making even the simplest international comparisons, developing such a
framework – which would amount to an international empirical definition of
“decent working time” – would seem to be a Herculean task.
Nonetheless, the five dimensions of “decent working time” do provide an
overall structure for future research in the field of working time – in fact, each
of these five dimensions constitutes an important theme for future research on
working time. For example, the ILO has already published a volume (Spurgeon,
2003) focusing on the first dimension of decent working time, healthy working
time, which provides a meta-analysis of the current state of knowledge
regarding the effects of working time (both hours of work and working time
arrangements such as shift work, night work and irregular hours) on both
safety and health. Similarly, the recent work by Lee and McCann in developing
the concept of “working time capability” (which is presented in Chapter 3 of
this volume) helps to advance our understanding of the fifth dimension of
decent working time, choice and influence regarding working time.
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In its future programme of research on working time, the ILO will bring
to fruition its current research project on working time in developing countries
and countries in transition with the publication of a report on Working time
around the world (working title) in 2007. The topic of working time is one that,
while it has been heavily researched in industrialized countries, is unfortunately
often neglected or even forgotten in many developing countries. As this report
will show, it is essential to avoid making broad generalizations regarding hours
of work and working time arrangements across the developing world, as even
the limited evidence that is available shows that there are dramatic differences
in both the regulation of working time and actual working hours and working
time arrangements across different regions of the world, such as among Asia,
Africa and Latin America (see, e.g., Zeng et al., 2005; Ndiaye, forthcoming;
Saboia, 2002). This report will conclude with a set of policy suggestions
designed to apply the “decent working time” policy framework, which was
developed based on research on working time in industrialized countries, to 
the substantially different circumstances that exist across the developing and
transition countries.
In terms of specific research topics relating to various aspects of the five
dimensions of “decent working time”, the following issues appear to be of
particular importance. First, from the perspective of healthy working time, it
remains essential to focus on the traditional question of excessive working
hours – but this time in newly emerging economies such as China and India.
Second, it will be crucial to further explore the obvious trade-offs between the
dimensions of “family-friendly” working time and gender equality through
working time, such as in the area of part-time work – seeking policies that can
simultaneously promote work–family reconciliation and gender equality. It will
also be important to expand the knowledge base regarding how various types
of flexible working time arrangements, such as compressed work weeks and
“time banking” accounts, can be structured to promote increased enterprise
productivity (the dimension of productive working time), without detracting
from workers’ health and safety (the dimension of healthy working time),
including flexible forms of work organization such as teleworking.13 Finally,
working time research efforts should be aimed at exploring the fifth dimension
of decent working time, choice and influence regarding working time, along
the lines suggested by Lee and McCann – that is, by expanding workers’
“working time capability”, including how this relates to the question of
working time and older workers in the context of “active ageing” policies.
Conclusion
437
13 While technically not a working time arrangement, the increasing importance of teleworking within the context of
“self-managed” working time, especially among managerial and professional staff, and its profound implications – e.g.,
in terms of blurring the boundary between paid work and personal life and its tendency to promote “stretching
working hours” (see, e.g., Nätti et al., Chapter 11 in this volume) – makes it an important topic for future research.
In addition, as discussed at the beginning of this book, the ILO has been
considering the implications of the recent General Survey Report (ILO, 2005)
on two of the most important international labour standards on working time,
the Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 1) and the Hours of Work
(Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1930 (No. 30), which concluded that the
revision of these instruments is warranted.14 A discussion of this report at the
International Labour Conference in June 2005 and a subsequent discussion by
the ILO Governing Body in November 2005 concluded with the suggestion to
conduct a Tripartite Meeting of Experts on Working Time. In determining how
to proceed, the available research on the various working time topics discussed
in this volume will be crucial in informing both the decision of the ILO’s
Governing Body regarding the appropriate course of action to take with respect
to these standards, as well as any potential future discussion of working time 
at a Meeting of Experts or at the International Labour Conference – the body
which ultimately makes the decisions on the adoption and revision of inter-
national labour standards.
While it is hoped that all of these efforts will assist in advancing “decent
working time”, ultimately, however, any movement in this direction will depend
on the relative value that both institutions and individual citizens place upon
their quality of life compared with their material wealth. The economic
imperatives driving societies towards the “24-7 model” of operating hours and
greater diversification in working hours for individual workers appear unlikely
to diminish, and may well continue to intensify. The question then becomes
one of individual and societal values: what working hours do people want? And
what are they willing to accept to get them, e.g., lower earnings? Even in a
country such as the United States – where material incentives are strong and
very long working hours are commonplace – a significant portion of workers
are now saying that they would like to reduce their hours, even if that means
some reduction in income (Jacobs and Gerson, 2004; Golden, Chapter 8 in this
volume). Perhaps not surprisingly, in the last few years a citizen movement
dedicated to fighting “time poverty” and promoting a more “balanced life” has
sprung up in that country.15 Thus, as a greater focus on quality-of-life issues
emerges among individuals and in institutions across the industrialized world,
we might well expect to see an increased call for policies and approaches that
offer the promise of moving towards “decent working time”.
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14 This report was prepared by the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations.
15 Take Back Your Time is a “grass-roots” citizen movement whose stated objective is to fight “time poverty” in the
United States. For more information about this organization, see www.simpleliving.net/timeday.
References
Anxo, D. 2004. “Working time in industrialized countries: A household perspective”, in 
J. Messenger (ed.), 2004.
—; Bigsten, A. 1989. “Working hours and productivity in Swedish manufacturing”, in
Scandanavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 613–19.
Avery, C.; Zabel, D. 2001. The flexible workplace: A sourcebook of information and research
(Westport, Connecticut, Quorum Books).
Barmby, T.; Ercolani, M.; Treble, J. 2002. “Sickness absence: An international comparison”,
in The Economic Journal, June, Vol. 112, pp. F315–F331.
Bosch, G. 2004. “Working hours and the standard employment relationship”, paper
presented at the Ninth Conference of the International Symposium on Working Time,
Paris, 26–28 February.
—; Lehndorff, S. 2001. “Working-time reduction and employment: experiences in Europe and
economic policy recommendations”, in Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, 
pp. 209–43.
Boston College Center for Work and Family. 2000. Measuring the impact of workplace
flexibility: Findings from the national work/life measurement project (Boston,
Massachusetts, Boston College Center for Work and Family, Wallace E. Carroll School
of Management). http://www.bc.edu/centers/cwf/research/highlights/meta-elements/
pdf/flexexec-summ.pdf.
Boulin, J.-Y.; Hoffman, R. 1999. “The conceptualisation of working time over the whole life
cycle”, in J.-Y. Boulin and R. Hoffman (eds.): New paths in working time policy (Brussels,
European Trade Union Institute).
—; Mückenberger, U. 1999. Times in the city and quality of life, BEST European Studies on
Times (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities).
Campbell, I. 2004. “Employer pressures and overtime: Exploring the causes of extended
working hours in Australia”, paper presented at the Ninth Conference of the
International Symposium on Working Time, Paris, 26–28 February.
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 2001.
European Union Survey on Working Conditions [acceding and candidate countries]
(Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Community).
European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) Online. 1998. Flexibility in working time in
Europe (Dublin, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions). http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2001/11/study/TN0111143S.html.
Fagan, C. 2004. “Gender and working time in industrialized countries”, in J.C. Messenger
(ed.), 2004.
Conclusion
439
—; O’Reilly, J. (eds.) 1998. Part-time prospects: An international comparison of part-time work
in Europe, North America, and the Pacific Rim (London and New York, Routledge).
Golden, L. 2004. “Overemployment in the US: Which workers are willing to reduce their
work hours and income?”, paper presented at the Ninth Conference of the International
Symposium on Working Time, Paris, 26–28 February.
Gottlieb, B.; Kelloway, E.K.; Barham, E. 1998. Flexible work arrangements: Managing the
work-family boundary (Chichester, UK, Wiley).
Hogarth, T., et al. 2001. Work-life balance 2000: Results from the baseline study (Norwich,
United Kingdom, Department for Education and Employment).
Incomes Data Service (IDS). 2002. “France: Managers’ hours and the European Social
Charter”, in Employment Europe, March, Vol. 483, p. 5.
International Labour Office (ILO). 1999. Decent work, Report of the Director-General to
the International Labour Conference, 87th Session, Geneva. 
—. 2000a. Decent work for women: An ILO proposal to accelerate the implementation of the
Beijing Platform for Action (Geneva, ILO).
—. 2000b. Your voice at work: Global report under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, International Labour Conference, 88th Session,
Geneva.
—. 2001. Reducing the decent work deficit, Report of the Director-General to the International
Labour Conference, 89th Session, Geneva.
—. 2005. Hours of work: From fixed to flexible? General Survey of the reports concerning the Hours
of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 1) and the Hours of Work (Commerce and
Offices) Convention, 1930 (No. 30), Report III (Part 1B), International Labour
Conference, 93rd Session, Geneva.
Jacobs, J.A.; Gerson, K. 2004. The time divide: Work, family, and gender inequality
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press).
Kryger, T. (Australian Bureau of Statistics). 2000. “Casual employment: Research note 2,
1999–2000” (Canberra, Australia, Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library).
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/1999-2000/2000rn02.html.
Lee, S. 2004. “Working-hour gaps: trends and issues”, in J.C. Messenger (ed.), 2004.
Lehndorff, S. 2001. Weniger ist mehr: Arbeitszeitverkürzung als Gesellschaftpolitik (Hamburg,
VSA-Verlag).
—. 2002. “The governance of service work – changes in work organization and new challenges
for service-sector trade unions”, in Transfer, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 415–434.
Decent working time
440
McCann, D. 2004. “Regulating working time needs and preferences” in J.C. Messenger
(ed.), 2004.
Messenger, J.C. (ed.) 2004. Working time and workers’ preferences in industrialized countries:
Finding the balance (London and New York, Routledge).
—. 2004. “Working time at the enterprise level. Business objectives, firms’ practices, and
workers’ preferences”, in J.C. Messenger (ed.), 2004.
Moss, P.; Deven, F. (eds.). 1999. Parental leave: Progress or pitfalls? (Brussels, CVBG-
Centrum voor Bevolkings-en Gezinstudie).
Ndiaye, A. Forthcoming. Étude sur le temps de travail et l’organisation du travail: Cas du
Sénégal, Conditions of Work and Employment Programme Series (Geneva, ILO).
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2001. “Work and
family life: How do they balance out?”, in OECD Employment Outlook 2001 (Paris,
OECD).
—. 2004. OECD Employment Outlook 2004 (Paris, OECD).
Polivka, A.; Cohany, S; Hipple, S. 2000. “Definition, composition, and economic
consequences of the non-standard workforce”, in F. Carré et al. (eds.): Nonstandard
work: The nature and challenges of changing employment arrangements (Champaign,
Illinois, Industrial Relations Research Association).
Saboia, J. 2002. “Survey report: Working week and organization of labour in Brazil”, ILO
Conditions of Work and Employment Programme, unpublished report.
Sen, A. 1999. Development as freedom (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Spurgeon, Anne. 2003. Working time: Its impacts on safety and health (Seoul, ILO and Korea
Occupational Safety and Health Research Institute).
Supiot, A. 2001. Beyond employment: Changes in work and the future of labour law in Europe
(Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Taylor, O. 2004. “Working time and work organization in Jamaica”, ILO Conditions of Work
and Employment Programme, unpublished report.
Towers Perrin and Gang & Gang. 2003. Working today: Exploring employees’ emotional
connections to their jobs (New York, Towers Perrin).
White, M. 1987. Working hours: Assessing the potential for reduction (Geneva, ILO).
Zeng, X.; Liang, L.; Idris, S.U. 2005. Working time in transition: The dual task of
standardization and flexibilization in China, Conditions of Work and Employment
Programme Series No. 11 (Geneva, ILO).
Conclusion
441

absenteeism  117, 130, 432
Adjustment of Working Hours Act (2000),
Netherlands  5, 82, 155, 159–60, 170
dissatisfied workers  168
gender differences  171, 244
probit model  163–4
results  174
age factors
arubaito 350–1
bank managers  385–6
birth of first child  245
decommodification  8, 46
labour market  30–1
minimum age at employment  22
part-time work  81, 348
social management  345, 346–7
wage conventions  365
women workers  240, 309
workers, white-collar  269
working hours  296, 306
working time capabilities  71, 72
agrarian societies  22–3
agricultural sector  23
airport example  133
Altonji, J.G.  161
Anglo-Saxon model  42, 57
anti-discrimination measures  21–2, 157, 159
Antila, Y.  291
Anttila, T.  7
Anxo, D.  4, 19, 70, 78, 79–80, 83
Aristotle  97n2
ARTT (aménagement et reduction du temps de
travail): see 35-hour week
arubaito part-time workers  350–1, 352, 364
assembly-line work  14, 33, 195
Aubry Laws, I and II  183, 184, 190, 374, 376
decent working time  5–6, 197
delegitimization  203
job creation  191–2
negotiations  187, 198
reduction of working time  181–2, 206–7
see also France, 35-hour week
Auer, P.  48, 50
Australia  1
casual workers  421n5
decent work league table  25
Industrial Relations Act  80
overtime  80, 421
Reasonable Hours  230
working hours, long  19, 76, 291
Austria  32–3, 47, 81, 161
autonomy
workers  197–8, 293, 339
working time  299, 301, 303, 306, 314, 370
443
INDEX
Note: Page numbers in italics denote figures, tables or boxes
Decent working time
444
Baaijens, C.  5, 6, 161, 434–5
bank managers  8
age factors  385–6
Belgium  384, 386–7
dual wage households  386
experienced time  371
family commitments  386, 387, 389, 390
feminization  383–4, 387
fixed-term contracts  392
France  383–6
masculinity  372
national differences  369–70, 389–90
resignations  389
Spain  384, 387–9
women  388–9, 391
working time autonomy  370
banking deregulation  383–4
Becker, G.  167
Belgium
bank managers  8, 384, 386–7
education  375–6
experienced time  371
fixed-term contracts  47
health care sector  380–1
labour market  372–3
nurses  8, 377, 380–1
pre-pensions system  375–6
reduction of working time  392
trade unions  374, 381, 387
unemployment  373
women workers  47, 373
working hours  373
working time, formalized  375–6
Berg, P.  253
Bielenski, H.  295
birth rates: see fertility rates
Bisault, L.  268
Blair government, UK  237, 253–4
blue-collar workers  279–80, 399, 404
see also manual labour; occupational grading
Blyton, P.  47–8
Böheim, R.  161
Boisard, P.  33
bootstrapping technique  401, 405
Bosch, G.  2, 3–4, 17, 43, 62n4, 427–8, 432
Bouffartigue, P.  8, 425
Boulin, J.-Y.  3, 4, 436
Bouteiller, J.  8, 425
Braverman, H.  123
Brazil  422
Briefs, G.  44
Browne, J.  78
Burawoy, M.  77
Burnod, G.  268
burn-out  117n11
call centres  53, 140, 186, 190–1, 196, 201
Campbell, I.  19, 421
Canada
part-time work  395, 398
public sector  395
temporary employment  395, 398
weekend work  8–9, 395, 396–7, 412–14, 425
working time reductions  16
capabilities theory  4, 67–78, 79
car manufacturing  14, 186, 193–4
career breaks  31, 59, 62, 100, 112
career development  16, 191, 311, 355
caregiving  355, 357, 413–14, 424
see also homecare workers
Carnoy, M.  59
Castells, M.  41, 43, 47, 57
casual workers  421n5
see also temporary employment
catering sector  276, 281, 282
Cazes, S.  48, 50
CBI (Confederation of British Industry)  255
Central Planning Bureau, Netherlands  244–5
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
(CNRS)  2
CFDT: see Confédération Française
Démocratique du Travail
CGT: see Confédération Générale de Travail
Chardon, O.  268
Charpentier, P.  5–6
charwoman’s epitaph  65, 69
Chenu, A.  268
child bearing  98, 160, 245
see also fertility rates
child benefit allowances  346
child rearing years
flexible working time  56
life course  109, 230, 428
paying for education  424
SER  62
time spent on  99, 226
UK  81
women workers  94, 242, 309, 310
working hours, long  301, 303
childcare
gender equality  69
Germany  247–8
Japan  358, 362
mothers  144–5
Netherlands  243
parents sharing  86, 143
public provision  46, 52, 60, 107, 252
Sweden  358
UK  256
women workers  56, 346, 352, 362
childlessness  98
China  422, 437
citizens’ rights, universal  110, 120
Clarke, L.  44
clerical workers  7
CNAM (Conservatoire National des Arts et
Métiers)  2
CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique)  2
co-determination, works councils  329–30,
336–7, 338
collective agreements
companies  254–5
decent working time  23, 320–1, 338
domiciliary service organizations  282
national differences  110
Netherlands  243
shift work  408, 410
skill levels  268
weekend work  406, 408
working time  28–9, 321–2
collective bargaining  21
companies  190
decent work  23
decentralized  187
Germany  249
negotiating conditions  319–20
nurses  381–2
time represented  371
UK  128, 130
working time  182
commitment  138, 144, 220–1, 295
Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations, ILO
438n14
companies
collective agreement  254–5
collective bargaining  190
competency  359–61
contract work  110
time policies  113–14, 119
see also corporate governance
competitiveness  95
Conditions of Work and Employment
Programme, ILO  95, 420
Confédération Française Démocratique du
Travail (CFDT)  378, 379, 385
Confédération Générale de Travail (CGT)  378,
379, 385
Confederation of British Industry (CBI)  255
Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers
(CNAM)  2
consumption  219–20, 397
contract work  45, 110
fixed-term  47, 249, 376, 392
flexibility  15
precarious  270
short-term  120
temporary  107–8
time/wages  292
contracting out  134, 142
conversion factors  68, 71, 295
Cooke, G.  8–9, 425
core–periphery conceptualization  397, 398
corporate governance
financialization  323–6, 331, 423
market-driven  323–4, 337–8
Current Population Survey (CPS)  210, 217,
218, 223, 229
DARES study  33
Deakin, S.  68, 85
decent work  21–5
conflicts  185
distribution  222–3
ILO  42–3
league table  25
part-time work  244, 251
time  25–8
Index
445
Decent Work Agenda, ILO  427
decent work deficits  3, 21, 420, 433
decent working time  13–14, 27–8, 201–2, 203
Aubry Laws  5–6, 197
collective agreements  23, 320–1, 338
contingent nature  197–8
developing countries  20
dimensions of  v–vi, 25–8, 95–6, 155–6, 283,
297, 396, 419, 436
family-friendly working time  423–4
France  5–6, 199, 283–5
gender equality  vi, 26, 427–9, 437
health issues  95, 420–3
ISWT  1, 2
Japan  367
legislation  4
life course  120
managers  7, 293, 311–12
Messenger  vi, 25–6, 266, 278, 283, 396
norms  430
policy framework  viii, 228–30, 436–8
post-industrial  290
preferred/actual hours  173–4, 295–6, 311
productive  430–2
staff cohesion  204–5
sustainability  392
wages  203–4
white-collar workers  284–5
workers’ choice  209, 229–30
working time accounts system  339
working time reduction  181–2
work–life balance  20
decentralization  66, 187, 319, 320
decommodification
age/gender  8, 46
full-time work  51
internal/external  45
labour market  44
security/flexibility  54
welfare state  365
demand factors  124, 162, 171, 216–17, 332–3
Denmark
full-time working hours  48, 240
job rotation  118
part-time work  47–8, 235–6, 246
sabbaticals  117
unemployment  117n10
women workers  257
working hours  17, 49, 161
Department of Labor, US  228, 422
Department of Transportation, US  228
deprivation  74, 76–7
deregulation  54, 290, 383–4
Destival, V.  268
developed countries: see industrialized countries
developing countries  20, 28, 422
Devetter, F.-X.  266, 347n2, 348
disabled persons  68n1, 94, 253–4
discrimination: see anti-discrimination measures
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
Convention, 1958 (No. 111), ILO  427
dismissal procedures  50–1
divorce  98, 257
doctors  134–5
domestic time  346, 352–7
domestic work
gender difference  69, 71, 352, 364, 411–12
outsourcing  353, 364, 425
time spent on  99, 352
see also caregiving; child rearing years
domiciliary service organizations  282
downshifting  34
downsizing  137, 142, 220
Drago, R.  70
Droit individuel à la formation 31
dual labour market theory  397
dual wage households  59, 102, 141, 386
earnings: see wages
Eastman, W.  77
economic factors  58, 67–8, 175
see also demand factors
education
Belgium  375–6
costs  424
institutions  101–2
leave for  59, 117n12
and part-time work  53
Spain  376
time spent in  19, 347, 353
education levels
EU  54
knowledge workers  298, 311–12
labour market entry  53, 97
Decent working time
446
wages  422
women workers  252
working hours reduction  165
education sector  168, 306
EIRO  246
elderly, care of  281, 346, 352, 353–7, 424
see also caregiving
employee rights: see workers’ rights
employees: see workers
employers  189, 254
employers’ associations  320
employment  26, 95, 191–2
access to  21, 24, 46
continuous  124, 220
disabled people  94
information society  3–4
institutions  97
job tenure  48, 50
labour market  26
legislation  249
lifetime  357
minimum age  22
minimum standards  53–4
motherhood  235, 252, 256
national differences  103–6
precarious  120
productivity  19
public expenditure  23
social construction approach  3, 345, 348
technologies  42, 99
total  15, 17, 18
see also job entries; work; working hours
Employment Act (2002), UK  253
Employment Options for the Future Survey  71,
295–6
employment relations
changes/regulation  135
ICTs  51, 62
part-/full-time  47–8
reconfigurations  4–5
results-based  vii
time organization  123–4, 128–35, 136
UK  4–5, 123, 144–5
working time  127
see also standard employment relationship
(SER)
employment tribunals  132–3
entitlements  30–1, 110, 235, 243–4, 279–80, 425–6
see also welfare state; workers’ rights
Erlinghagen, M.  50
Esping-Andersen, G.  44, 365
Estévez-Abe, M.  360, 366
ethnic minorities  251–2
see also immigrant workers
Eurobarometer  53
European Commission  17, 47, 270, 273–4
see also European Union Working Time
Directive
European Court of Justice  29
European Employment Strategy  3, 31, 95,
99–101, 114, 120, 236
European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions  2, 31, 33,
36, 109–10, 425
European Labour Force Survey  49, 53, 54, 55,
254
European Trade Union Institute  2
European Union
convergence of trends  369
fixed-term contracts  47
flexibility in working life  100–1
parental leave  117, 118
part-time work  16, 47, 158
Part-time Work Directive  428
SER  47–51
social partners  128
weekend work  397, 410
women workers  239
working hours  30, 161, 241
Working Time Directive  28, 29, 36, 134, 420
working time per person employed  16
working time policies  28–31
European Work and Employment Research
Centre  128
European Working Conditions Survey, Third
291, 292, 310
Eurostat  75n7
Euwals, R.  161
Factories Act (1844), UK  v
Fagan, C.  4, 75, 79, 296
Fair Labor Standards Act, US  216, 228–9, 230,
422
family  97, 98, 359
family commitments
Index
447
bank managers  386, 387, 389, 390
caregiving  357
gender differences  424, 427
motherhood  171
nurses  381, 382–3, 425
women workers  115, 296
work–life balance  16, 26, 47, 236, 248, 249,
250–1, 253, 254, 255, 284, 425, 426–7,
429, 437
see also work, paid/unpaid
family conventions  345, 346–7, 348, 363, 365
family wage  44, 47, 59
see also male breadwinner model
family-friendly working time
decent working time  423–4
France  278
government policies  25, 425
leave  426
life course  95
UK  31, 253–4, 425
fast-food industry  276–7, 281
fathers  95, 253
female homemaker role: see gender differences;
work–life balance
femininity  372, 413–14
fertility rates  34, 52, 107–8, 141, 245, 347
financialization  323–6, 331, 423
Finding the balance: Working time and workers’
needs and preferences in industrialized
countries, ILO  395–6, 419
Finland  292
gender segregated labour market  298
knowledge workers  309
managers  7
overtime  80, 290–1
sample attrition analysis  313
shift work  291
Sunday work  291
working hours  161, 290–1, 422–3
preferred  297–309
Finnish Labour Force Survey  292
flexibility
contracts  15
decommodification  54
EU  100–1
individuals  35–6
internal  52
negotiated  115, 244
part-time work  175
product markets  51–2
productivity  32, 35–6
SER  57–62
service sector  278
temporal availability  271
time organization  131–2
work schedules  365
working hours  vi, 4, 19, 85, 230
working time  5, 7, 20, 28, 29, 47, 52, 56,
59–60, 431
flexibilization  319, 320, 324–5
Flexible Working Regulations, UK  253–4
flexicurity  37
flexi-time  326, 327, 431, 434
extended  19
forfeiture  333
Germany  432
market-driven  330–1
personal control  14–15
work–family  426
Force Ouvrière  378
forced labour  22
Ford, Henry  65, 66
Fordism  66, 69, 125–6, 322, 323
Fouarge, D.  5, 6, 434–5
Fourastié, J.  100
France
Aubry Laws, I and II  5–6, 181–2, 183, 184,
374, 376
bank managers  8, 383–6
clerical workers  7
decent work league table  25
decent working time  5–6, 199, 283–5
Droit individuel à la formation 31
education  375
educational leave  117n12
employment rates  104
experienced time  371
family policies  347
family-friendly  278
full-time/part-time working hours  240
labour code  126
labour market participation by gender  372–3
modified breadwinner model  107
nurses  8, 377, 378–80
occupational grading  267
Decent working time
448
parental leave  111
part-time work  16, 27
reduction of working time  376, 378, 384–5
service sector  7, 283–5
skill levels  265–7
temporal availability  280
35-hour week  5–6, 30, 182–4, 193–8, 205–7,
374, 376, 378, 384, 385, 423, 432
time organization  392
trade unions  187, 189, 374, 378–9, 385
unemployment  373
weekly working time  104
white-/blue-collar jobs  265–7
women workers  47, 373
working conditions  265–7, 273–7
working hours  373
extended  30
preferences  296
reduced  17
working time accounts system  31, 112
working time reduction  181–2
working time regulations  278, 370, 375
free time  211, 214
see also leisure time
freedom of association  21
Friedmann, G.  274
Frost, R.  291, 292
full-time work
decommodification  51
Denmark  48, 240
working hours preferences  296
working hours reduced  167–8
see also weekend work; working hours;
working time
Gadrey, N.  7, 275, 280, 345n1, 433
gender differences
Adjustment of Working Hours Act  171, 244
domestic work  69, 71, 352, 364, 411–12
employment security  365–6
family commitments  424, 427
Finnish labour market  298
Japan  364–5
labour market  102–9
labour supply, increasing  171
late night working  349–50
managers  167, 310
non-standard work  399
overemployment  226
time use  99
wages  370, 372
weekend work  352, 404, 407–8, 411
working hours
changes  174
long  34, 144, 294, 301, 302, 303, 304, 314,
428
preferred/actual  307
reduction  163–4, 165–6, 167–8
working time  278
gender equality
childcare  69
decent working time  vi, 26, 427–9, 437
domestic work  69, 71
opportunity  95
Sweden  102
working hours, long  34
gender factors
decommodification  8, 46
discrimination  34
educational levels  53, 54
labour divisions  99, 108–9
labour market  102–9, 372–3
leave  119
part-time work  8, 47, 52, 159, 236, 245–6, 426
promotion  77, 428
social inequalities  vii, 2
working hours  49, 71, 291, 309
working time culture  295–6
work–life balance  3
Gender Role Modules, ISSP  237
General Social Survey, US  211
General Survey Report, ILO  438
Germany
annual average working hours per person  247
childcare  247–8
collective bargaining  249
corporate governance  323
decent work league table  25
east/west differences  247–8, 256
employers’ associations  320
employment laws  249
flexible working time  7
full-time working hours  48
full-time/part-time working hours  240, 242
Index
449
Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete
Arbeitsverträge 82
government policy  248–50
industrial relations  319–20, 322
labour markets  61
life course  101
male breadwinner state  247–8
Ministry for Family, Seniors, Women and
Youth  249
parental leave  111
part-time work  6, 27, 31, 52, 54, 56, 235, 236,
237, 245, 246–51, 256–7
Part-time Work and Fixed-term Contracts Act
82, 159, 174–5
reunification  246
social partners  249, 250–1
students in employment  53, 240
trade unions  7, 250, 320, 339
women workers  47, 50, 238, 240, 242
working hours  49, 161
changes  17, 30, 238
long  19
working time accounts system  31, 112, 326,
327–30
working time regulation  319–20, 321–2,
326–30, 330–7
Works Constitution Act  322, 336
works councils  7, 320, 322, 329–30, 333,
336–9
Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete
Arbeitsverträge: see Part-time Work and
Fixed-term Contracts Act (2001),
Germany
Ghai, D.  22–3, 24–5
glass ceiling concept  428
Golden, L.  6, 35, 85, 421–2
Gollac, M.  266, 275–6
Goux, D.  268
government policy
family-friendly working time  25, 425
France  347
Germany  248–50
UK  253–4
working hours  181–2
graduates  360–1
Greece  16
Grimshaw, D.  4
Haipeter, T.  7, 321, 423, 432, 435
Hakim, C.  74–5
Hartz, P.  323
Harvard Business Review 113, 114
Harvey, M.  44
Hayek, F. von  66
health care sector  168, 228, 380–1
health issues  294
decent working time  95, 420–3
WHO definition  396
workers  95, 266
working hours  29, 76
working time flexibility  32–3
Heinz, W.R.  94, 98, 101
Heldrich Centre, Work Trends survey  211n3
Heyes, J.  130
Hörning, K.  96, 98
holiday allowance  157
home working  48, 310, 426
homecare workers  132–3, 140, 143, 281, 282
see also caregiving
hotel sector  276, 281
Hours of Service Regulations, US Department
of Transportation  228
Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices)
Convention,1930 (No. 30), ILO  vi, 420,
431n9, 438
Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919
(No. 1), ILO  v, vi, 420, 431n9, 438
Household Panel Survey, UK  161
household work: see domestic work
human capital  59, 410–11
human resource practice  125–6, 386–7, 430, 435
hygiene conditions  276–7
Iceland  32
ICTs: see information and communications
technologies
ILO: see International Labour Organization
immigrant workers  404, 412, 414
immigration policy  360–1
inactivity, paid on the job  125–6, 139–40, 141
income  21, 23, 94, 97, 138–9, 219–20
see also time/income; wages
income insurance fund  121
income transfers  120
India  437
individual preferences
Decent working time
450
decent working time  173–4
individual choice laws  87
social changes  97
working hours  5, 295–6
changes  168, 169–70
long  221–2
reduced  218, 220
working time  198, 290
individualization
bargaining  335–6
life histories  357–9
Sweden  358
temporal availability  370
working hours  66
working time regulation  98
industrial relations  1, 187, 319–20, 322, 324–5,
339
Industrial Relations Act (1996), Australia  80
industrialized countries
flexibility of working time  20
labour reorganization  14–15
life course  13
new Stakes and Policies  3
part-time work  395
working time policies  1, 13, 28–31
work–life balance  65
information and communications technologies
(ICTs)  41, 51, 57, 62, 293–4, 297
information society  3–4, 41–3
INSEE Labour Survey  272
Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en
Socio-économie (IRIS)  2
I’Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales
(IRES)–France (Noisy-le-Grand)  2
institutions
decent work  22–3
education  101–2
employment  97
life course  101
social  101
and social norms  73–4, 85
time/income  117
work–life balance  109
International Labour Conference  vii, 21, 438
International Labour Organization (ILO)
Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations
438n14
Conditions of Work and Employment
Programme  95, 420
decent work  21–5, 42–3
Decent Work Agenda  427
decent working deficits  21, 420
decent working time  v–vi, 155–6
Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) Convention  427
Finding the balance 395–6, 419
General Survey report  vi, 438
health/working time  436
Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices)
Convention  vi, 420, 431n9, 438
Hours of Work (Industry) Convention  v, vi,
420, 431n9, 438
ISWT research  2
Night Work Convention  80
Part-Time Work Convention  428
Part-Time Work Recommendation  81
Tripartite Meeting of Experts on Working
Time  vi–vii, 438
Workers with Family Responsibilities
Convention  423–4
Working time around the world 437
International Labour Review 24n4
International Social Survey Programme
working time preferences  296
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
237, 296
International Symposium on Working Time
(ISWT)  vii–viii, 1, 2, 3, 419
Ireland  25, 47, 48, 50
IRES (I’Institut de Recherches Économiques et
Sociales)–France (Noisy-le-Grand)  2
IRIS (Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en
Socio-économie)  2
ISSP (International Social Survey Programme)
237, 296
ISWT: see International Symposium on Working
Time
Italy  16, 34, 107–8, 240, 242, 436
Jany-Catrice, F.  7
Japan
childcare  358, 362
decent work league table  25
decent working time  367
education  347
family conventions  346–7, 348, 363, 365
Index
451
fertility rates  347
gender inequalities  364–5
job protection  360, 361–2
job security  359, 360
Labour Inspectorate  349
labour shortage  360–1
life-cycle  424
lifetime employment  357
male breadwinner model  360, 362, 363, 366
service-sector  8, 361–2
small and medium-sized enterprises  360
social construction approach  345
social conventions  362–4
social protection  366–7
temporal availability conventions  349–57,
363–4
unemployment  359–60
wage conventions  348, 365, 366
welfare state  352, 361–2, 363
women workers  361, 424
working hours, long  19, 32, 291
working time regime  1, 348
work–life balance  8
job creation  15, 16, 191–2, 265
job protection  360, 361–2
job quality  5, 273–4, 285
job rotation  118, 121
job security  vii, 21, 95, 142, 295, 359, 360,
365–6
job status
long  294
weekend work  406
women workers  309
working hours  226–8, 292, 299, 309
long  294, 301, 303
see also occupational grading
job tenure  48, 50
job time/working time  392
Karston, L.  128
Keynes, J.M.  65, 76
knowledge, specialist  61
knowledge transfers  58, 62
knowledge workers  41–3, 145, 292–4, 298,
309–12
knowledge-based society  30–1, 37, 265
Kodz, J.  294, 295
Kohl, H.  248
Korea, Republic of  32
Krüger, H.  96, 108
Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire pour la Sociologie
Économique (LISE)  2
labour divisions
see also caregiving; female homemaker model
labour divisions, gendered  99, 108–9, 425
labour force
feminization  102, 114, 247, 383–4, 387
Japan  360–1
mobilization  350, 351
reserves  271
shortages  14, 360–1, 383
subdivisions  48
unemployment  218–19
see also labour supply
labour legislation  82–3, 85, 86–7
labour market
age factors  30–1
Anglo-Saxon model  42
capability approach  68
decommodification  44
deregulation  54, 56
dual labour market  397
employment  26
exit  111
gender factors  102–9, 298, 372–3
internal/external  61
Netherlands  156–60
secondary  398
segmentation  77
social factors  73
social institutions  101
transitional  100
welfare state  109
women workers  16, 19, 30–1, 46, 47, 52, 115,
236, 238, 240, 242, 353–4
working conditions  273–4
labour policy  v, 335
labour supply
constrained  219
dynamic model  217, 219–22
economic factors  175
increasing  171, 172–3
overemployment  217–22
reduced  166–70
Decent working time
452
labour–leisure models  216–17
Lallement, M.  3, 5–6
Landers, R.  77
lay offs  126, 295
leave
family-friendly  426
gender factors  119
long-term  34–5
maternity/paternity  253
parental  36–7, 59, 81, 95, 111, 117, 118, 245
return to work  119
social welfare  36–7
training  19, 117, 194
Lee, S.  4, 19, 295, 433, 435, 436, 437
Lefresne, F.  5–6
legislation
decent working time  4
employment  249
labour  82–3, 85, 86–7
workers’ rights  86
working hours  vi, 80
changes  433–4
Lehndorff, S.  321, 423, 432
Lehto, A.N.  291
leisure time  65, 66, 99
Leopold, J.  128
life course  4, 93–4
child rearing  109, 230, 428
decent working time  120
destandardization  31
dynamics of  96–101
European Employment Strategy  99–101
family  97
family-friendly  95
industrialized countries  13
institutions  101
national differences  98, 101–9
OECD  100n3
sustainable career options  120
time organization  98–9, 115–19
time/income allocation  100
working time  31, 95–6
work–life balance  120
life expectancy  98, 99, 353
lifelong learnng  2, 60, 100, 112
lifetime wage  346, 358
LISE (Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire pour la
Sociologie Économique)  2
Loos-Baroin, J.  5–6
Loundes, J.  76
McCann, D.  4, 295, 433, 435, 436, 437
Maddison, A.  14, 15, 16
making out  77
male breadwinner model  425
changes  102, 107
cross-country comparisons  6, 236
Germany  46, 247–8, 256
Japan  347, 360, 362, 363, 366
Netherlands  242
SER  47
management
analysis  195–7
indirect  324, 325–6, 331
market-driven  330–1, 335, 423
managers
decent working time  7, 293, 311–12
Finland  7
gender differences  167, 310
masculinity  372
overemployment  227
stress  196
unpaid overtime  137
wages  138–9
weekend work  411
working hours  422–3
long  294–5, 304, 305, 306
standard  399
working time  291–2
Manchester University  128
manual labour  167–8, 292
see also blue-collar workers
marketization  323, 330–1
marriage, age at  347
marriage rates  98, 347
Marsden, D.  124
Martinez-Granado, M.  161
Maruani, M.  26, 270, 272, 284
masculinity  372, 413–14
maternal part-time work model  108
maternity leave  253
MATISSE  2
Mediterranean exit or full-time model  107–8
Index
453
men
fathers  95
life expectancy  99
long-term leave  34–5
paternity leave  253
working hours, long  32, 34, 60
see also male breadwinner model
Merlié, D.  33
Messenger, J.C.  9
decent working time  vi, 25, 26, 266, 278, 283,
396
Finding the balance 395–6, 419
part-time work  284
women workers  412
working time eneterprise level  432
Mexico  32
Michon, F.  3, 27
mini-jobs  248, 249–50
Minimum Wage Act (1983),  New Zealand  83–4
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment,
Netherlands  174
Mintzberg, H.  292
Moen, P.  294
motherhood
childcare  144–5
employment  235, 252, 256
family duties  171
leave for  253
paid/unpaid work  243
part-time work  108, 157, 242, 251–2
working hours  107
see also pregnancy leave
Murdoch, R.  133
national differences
bank managers  369–70, 389–90
employment rates  103–6
globalization  13
life course  98, 101–9
nurses  369–70, 377–8, 390
part-time work  27, 235
social solidarity  23
women workers  373
working hours  373
working time  27, 110–11, 372
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, US  161
National Study of the Changing Work Force,
US  214
Nätti, J.  7, 422–3
negotiations  188, 189–90, 191–2, 319–20
neo-liberal model  51, 370
Netherlands  16, 17
anti-discrimination measures  157, 159
Central Planning Bureau  244–5
childcare  243
citizens’ rights  120
collective agreement  243
entitlements  30–1
labour legislation  86–7
labour market  156–60
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
174
one-and-one-half earner model  6, 235, 237
parental leave  245
part-time work  235–8, 242–5, 429
preferences  5
voluntary  75
women  6, 27, 47, 52, 147, 157, 256–7
selection equation  177
service sector  157, 242
Socio-Economic Panel  161
stress  94, 237
students in employment  240
trade unions  243
wage legislation  243
welfare state  244–5
work refusal  80
working hours
annual average  155
changes  165, 176–7, 238, 434–5
extended  30
full-/part-time  240, 242
preferences  164–6
working time accounts system  31, 112
working time reduction  35, 36, 162
see also Adjustment of Working Hours Act
New Stakes and Policies, industrialized
countries  3
New Zealand  32, 83–4
newspapers  133
Nicole, C.  272
night work  78–9, 80, 185, 419
Night Work Convention, 1990 (No. 171), 
ILO  80
Decent working time
454
no paid work option  71, 73
Nohara, H.  345, 346
Nolan, P.  44, 45
Nordic universal breadwinner model  102
Norway  62n4, 81, 101, 161
nurses  134–5, 276n5
and bank managers  8
Belgium  377, 380–1
collective bargaining  381–2
experienced time  371
family commitments  381, 382–3, 425
femininity  372
France  377, 378–80
national differences  369–70, 377–8, 390
reduction of working time  380
shift work  379–80, 381
Spain  377, 381–3
temporal availability  391
time constraints  370, 378–9
trade unions  381
work schedules  379–80
working conditions  374, 377
working hours  374, 377
obligation  135, 137–9
occupational grading  267, 349–52, 406–7, 422–3
see also job status
OECD  17, 18
life course  100n3
national differences  19, 20
service sector  273
women workers  239, 240
workers’ freedom of choice  35
working hours  32, 241
work–life balance  33–4, 36, 37
oil crises  15
one-and-one-half earner model  6, 235, 237
open-ended workdays  309
opt-out provision  28–9, 237
O’Rand, A.M.  108
O’Reilly, J.  19
organizational sphere  128–9, 198, 294–5
Orloff, A.S.  46
OSA Labour Supply Panel  161, 162, 164, 166,
173–4, 435n12
outsourcing  353, 364, 425
overemployment
cyclical  216–17, 218
demographic factors  223, 226
estimates  212–13, 217
gender differences  226
by industry  225–6, 227–8
labour supply  217–22
macroeconomic level  216–17
managers  227
measurements  210–15
microeconomic level  215–16
by occupation  224, 227–8
part-time work  227
shift work  227
UK  6, 211n2
US  6, 209, 210
wages  223
women workers  226
overtime
Australia  80, 421
contractual working hours  162
created opportunities  130
Finland  290–1
income lost  204
labour demand  216–17
mandatory  214
paid  331–2, 422
refusal rights  80–1
structural  331
unpaid  137, 421
unplanned  141
working time flexibility  327
works councils  332
overwork  421
Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, US  161, 211
Paoli, P.  33
parents
childcare sharing  86, 143
leave
EU  117, 118
Netherlands  245
SER  59
Sweden  36–7, 81, 95, 111
lone  98, 143
working hours reduced  253–4
part-time work  18
age factors  81, 348
Index
455
arubaito 350–1, 352, 364
Austria  81
Canada  395, 398
decent work  244, 251
Denmark  47–8, 235–6, 246
and education  53
entitlements  110, 425–6
EU  16, 47, 158
European Employment Strategy  236
feminized  242
flexibility  175
France  16, 27
gender  8, 47, 52, 159, 236, 245–6, 426
Germany  6, 27, 31, 52, 54, 56, 235, 236, 245,
246–51, 256–7
industrialized countries  395
involuntary  109–10, 235, 266
labour law  82–3
marginalized  237, 249–50, 252, 257, 419, 426,
429
Messenger  284
motherhood  108, 157, 242, 251–2
national differences  27, 235
Netherlands  5, 6, 16, 17, 30–1, 52, 156–7,
235–8, 242–5, 256–7, 429
normalized  235, 243, 244, 251, 257, 426, 429
overemployment  227
pâto 350, 364
reversible  116
short-hours  vii, 35, 243
Spain  16, 81
Sweden  47
trade unions  408
UK  17, 236, 237, 245–6, 256–7
unemployment  244, 248
voluntary  74–5
weekend work  408, 410
women  6, 8, 156–7, 235–6, 361–2, 428
workers, white-collar  269
workers’ rights  235, 236, 243–4
working hour deficits  76
working hours
reduced  109–10, 167–8
short  35
Part-time Work and Fixed-term Contracts Act
(2001), Germany  82, 159, 174–5
Part-Time Work Convention, 1994 (No. 175),
ILO  428
Part-time Work Directive, EU  428
Part-Time Work Recommendation, 1994 (No.
182), ILO  81
paternity leave  253
pâto part-time workers  350, 364
patriarchy theory  411–12
Paxson, C.H.  161
pay conventions: see wages
pensions  243, 425
Pernod-Lemattre, M.  7
Pezet, A.  195
Pfau-Effinger, B.  248
Pierard, E.  401
Polyani, K.  44
Portugal  47
post office staff  140
post-Fordism  125–6, 348, 430, 435
post-industrial societies  95–6, 290
poverty  76
preference theory (Hakim)  74–5
pregnancy leave  80, 81, 380, 383
pre-pensions system  375–6
presenteeism  220, 295
print unions  133
private sector working hours  217–18
product market flexibility  51–2
production  51–2, 66, 345
productivity
competitiveness  95
decent working time  430–2
efficiency  15, 185, 192
employment  19
flexibility  32
full/fragmented  126
improvements  334
increases  46
working hours, long  284–5, 430–1
working time  25, 200, 431n10
professionals
ICTs  293–4, 297
standard work-hours  399
unpaid overtime  137
weekend work  411
working time  392
profitability  295
promotion  77, 138, 144, 428
Decent working time
456
protection for workers  28, 29, 45, 46–7, 50–1,
58, 78–9
public sector  142, 242, 306, 395
qualifications  61–2
see also education levels
Reasonable Hours, Australia  230
Rebitzer, J.  73
recommodification  53, 56–7
recruitment problems  145
reduction of working time (RWT)  160–1, 181–2
Aubry Laws, I and II  206–7
background history  14–20
Belgium  392
compensation  204–5
France  190, 191–2, 194, 196, 376, 378, 384–5
free choice  203
nurses  380
productivity  200
Rehn, G.  15, 100
Reich, R.  293
reproduction  52, 345
resignations  389
results-based employment relationships  vii, 127,
131, 135, 137–9, 141
retail sector  280
retendering process  142
retirement age  19, 111, 329
retirement savings accounts  329
Reynaud, E.  284
Ribault, T.  8, 424
Robien law  190
Roper-ASW survey  211n3
Rubery, J.  4, 430, 435
Rutherford, S.  295
sabbaticals  112, 117, 327, 329, 334, 435
sample attrition analysis  313
Scandinavia  25, 31, 36–7, 236
see also individual countries
Schippers, J.J.  161
Schmidt, M.  85–6
Schroeder, G.  248
seasonal workers  398, 413
sectoral differences  23, 275–6
Seifert, H.  114
self-employment  33, 48
self-monitoring  196
Le Séminaire International sur le Temps de
Travail (SITT)  vii
Sen, A.  4, 67, 74, 75n8, 78, 79, 433
service sector
flexibility  278
France  7, 283–5
Japan  8, 361–2
job quality  273
mini-jobs  249–50
Netherlands  157, 242
non-standard work  398–9
temporal availability  345
temporary employment  270
UK  255
unskilled white-collar workers  268–70
weekend work  410, 413
working hours  1
shift work  186, 215–16
collective agreement  408, 410
Finland  291
nurses  379–80, 381
overemployment  227
rotating  186, 419
split shifts  281
swing shift  379–80
weekend work  413
Shirahase, S.  347
shopping duties  352
SITT (Le Séminaire International sur le Temps
de Travail)  vii
skill levels
accumulation of  357
collective agreement  268
France  265–7
sectoral differences  275
training  268
US  268
wages  272
small and medium-sized enterprises  2, 28, 119,
186, 360
social cohesion  118–19
social construction approach  3, 345, 348
social conventions  362–4
social conversion factors  68, 74, 77–8
social dialogue  22, 390
social inequalities  vii, 2, 34, 58
Index
457
social interventions  66–7, 78
social justice  118
social management  345, 346–7
social norms  73–4, 85, 97
social partners  128, 249, 250–1, 254–6, 257, 378
social protection  21, 24, 45, 60, 116–18, 360,
366–7
social rights  68, 78, 85
social security  60, 117
Spain
bank managers  384, 387–9
decent work league table  25
education  376
employment rates  105
experienced time  371
fertility rates  34, 107–8
fixed-term contracts  47
full-time/part-time working hours  242
labour market participation by gender  372–3
nurses  377, 381–3
nursing/bank managerial staff  8
part-time work  16, 81
temporary work  54, 107–8
trade unions  374, 388
unemployment  373
weekly working time  105
women workers  373
working hours  373
working time  376
work–life balance  376
Spurgeon, A.  436
staff cohesion  204–5
staff vacancies  137–8
standard employment relationship (SER)  41–3
change  51–7
employers’ benefit  124
European Union  47–51
flexibility  57–62
function  43–7, 59
protection for workers  46–7
Scandinavian model  62
trade unions  124
Statistics Canada
bootstrapping technique  401, 405
weekend work  412
WES  396–7, 399–400, 401, 402–3
Statistics Finland  297–8, 313
Statistics Netherlands  160–1
stress  32–3, 94, 196, 237, 253, 414
student grants  346
students in employment  53, 240, 352, 412
subcontracting  134, 145, 193–4
Sunday work  84, 279, 291, 351
supermarket workers  349
Supiot, A.  435
employment relations  123, 125
EU Directive  36
French labour code  126
leisure time  65
schedules  37
time allocation  66, 98, 100, 119
work/employment  26–7
working time law  84
Sutela, H.  291
Sweden
childcare  358
employment rates  103
fathers  95
full-time/part-time working hours  240
gender equality  102
income transfers  120
job rotation  118
leave  426
parental leave  36–7, 81, 95, 111
part-time work  47
sabbaticals  117n11
working hours
extended  30
preferences  296
working time
options  115–16
reductions  16
weekly  103
Sweet, S.  294
Take Back Your Time  438n16
Taylor, L.  73
Taylor, M.  161
Taylorism  33, 56, 58, 274, 323, 391
technological change  42, 99
telecommuting  426
teleworking  437n13
temporal availability
bank managers  391
Decent working time
458
as competence  433
flexibility  271
forms of  279–83
France  280
individualization  370
Japan  349–57, 363–4
nurses  391
potential  281
remuneration  285
service sector  345
workers, white-collar unskilled  274, 277,
278–85
temporary employment
call centres  140
Canada  395, 398
service sector  270
Spain  54
trade unions  408
weekend work  410, 413
temporary work agencies  145
Tétard, F.  292
time
child rearing  99, 226
client company  196–7
compressed  200
control  203
decent work  25–8
experienced  370, 371, 372, 381, 383, 385,
388–9, 391
formalized  370, 371, 372, 378, 380, 382, 383,
384, 386, 387–8, 391
fragmented  vii, 125, 126, 131, 139–41, 143,
144–5, 292
income  94, 97
incompressible  200–1
lost  204
qualitative  370, 371, 372
represented  370, 371, 372, 378, 380–1, 384–5,
386–7, 391
social utility of  100
training  194
unpaid  282–3
unproductive  126
wages  292
time banking schemes  426, 432, 434, 437
time budget survey  357
see also working time budgets
time off  279–80, 332
time organization
community-based  127
company level agreements  113–14
domestic sphere  128–9
employment relations  128–35, 136
flexibility  131–2
France  392
gender inequalities  99
internal employment contract  124–5
life course  98–9, 115–19
organizational sphere  128–9
social cohesion  118–19
Taylorism  391
workers’ control  185
time poverty  438, 438n16
time pressures  94, 292, 294, 306
time sovereignty  431
time/income  100, 117, 138–9, 211, 214–15
Trade Union Conference, UK  31
Trade Union Congress, UK  255
trade unions
Belgium  374, 381, 387
call centres  190–1
decline in power  50, 133–4
France  187, 189, 374, 378–9, 385
freedom of action  21, 187
Germany  7, 250, 320, 339
Netherlands  243
nurses  381
part-time work  408
print  133
SER  124
Spain  374, 388
temporary employment  408
UK  31, 254, 255
working conditions  398
working time changes  132
training
commitment  138
entitlements  31
leave  19, 117, 194
SER  44
skill levels  268
vocational  61, 62
and work  53
Tripartite Meeting of Experts on Working Time
vi–vii, 438
Index
459
Turkey  32
Turnbull, P.  47–8
turnover rates  59–60, 143
underemployment  6
unemployment
Belgium  373
career breaks  31
decreases  235
Denmark  117n10
France  373
Japan  359–60
job creation  15
labour force withdrawal  218–19
mass  19
part-time work  244, 248
Spain  373
young people  242, 350
United Kingdom  75
Blair government  237, 253–4
case studies  146–9
child rearing years  81
childcare  256
collective bargaining  128, 130
dismissals  50
dual-income households  141
Employment Act  253
employment rates  106
employment relations  4–5, 123, 144–5
Factories Act  v
family-friendly working time  31, 253–4, 425
fertility rates  141
fixed-term contracts  47
flexibility  56, 230
Flexible Working Regulations  253–4
government policy  253–4
Household Panel Survey  161
life course  101
organizational/employment relations sphere
128
overemployment  6, 211n2
part-time work  6, 17, 27, 235, 236, 237,
245–6, 251–6, 256–7
recommodification  53
service sector  255
stress  253
students in employment  240
Trade Union Conference  31
Trade Union Congress  255
trade unions  254
unpaid overtime  137
weekly working time  106
women workers  47, 238, 240, 242
working hours  49
changes  238
extremes  255–6
full/part  48, 240, 242
long  19, 32, 48, 76
preferences  296
reduction  129
wages  214
working time
changes  129
reductions  16
standards  130, 131–2
Working Time Regulations  83–4
United States of America
decent work league table  25
Department of Labor  228, 422
Department of Transportation  228
dismissals  50
employment relationships  56–7
Fair Labor Standards Act  216, 228–9, 230,
422
flexible working hours  85
GSS  211, 217
job tenure  48, 50
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth  161
National Study of the Changing Work Force
214
open-ended workdays  309
overemployment  6, 209, 210
overtime  80
Panel Study of Income Dynamics  161, 211
skill levels  268
time poverty  438n16
weekend work  397, 410
working hours
extended  30
long  19, 76, 291
per capita  19
preferences  209
working time reductions  16
Université de Paris I  2
Université de Paris IX  2
unsocial hours  143, 414, 421
Decent working time
460
Väisänen, M.  7
Van Echtelt, P.  32
Visser, J.  6, 426, 429
vocational training  61, 62
Volkoff, S.  266, 275–6
voluntary work  282–3
wage conventions  348, 365, 366
wages
decent working time  203–4
developing countries  422
educational levels  422
and effort  131, 134
employment conditions  270–3
gender differences  370, 372
graduates  360–1
guaranteed  124
job creation  265
legislation  243
lifetime  346, 358
managers  138–9
minimum  157, 243, 253, 422
overemployment  223
real hourly  218n8
skill levels  272–3
working hours  76, 214
see also time/income
Ward, K.  4
weekend work
background factors  397–9
Canada  8–9, 395, 396–7, 412–14, 425
Canadian/immigrant workers  404, 412, 414
categories  400
collective agreement  406, 408
EU  373
gender difference  352, 404, 407–8, 411
human capital  410–11
Japan  350–2
job status  406
marital status  404
occupational groups  406–7
part-time work  408, 410
regular  404, 406–8, 409, 411, 414
seasonal workers  413
service sector  410, 413
shift work  413
stress  414
students in employment  412
temporary employment  410, 413
workers  404, 405, 406, 407
see also Sunday work
weekly working time  103–6
welfare regime  359–60, 361–2, 363
welfare state  36–7
corporatist  44, 46
decommodification  365
gender factors  46
Japan  352, 361–2, 363
labour market  109
neo-liberal  44, 51
Netherlands  244–5
SER  45–6
social-democratic  44
supra-enterprise  44–5
WES: see Workplace and Employee Survey
Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur: see Adjustment of
Working Hours Act (2000), Netherlands
Wilkinson, F.  85
women workers
age factors  240, 309
bank managers  388–9, 391
Belgium  47, 373
careers  355
child rearing  94, 242, 309, 310
child-bearing  98, 160, 245
childcare  46, 52, 94, 252, 346, 362
Denmark  257
education levels  252
elderly, care of  355–7
employment patterns  74
ethnic minorities  251–2
European Union  239
family  34, 115, 296
France  47, 373
Germany  50
Japan  361, 424
job status/age  309
labour market  14, 16, 19, 30–1, 46, 47, 52,
115, 236, 238, 240, 242, 353–4
managers  310–11
married  157
Messenger  412
national differences  373
night work  185
overemployment  226
Index
461
part-time work  6, 8, 156–7, 235–6, 361–2, 428
preferences  247–8, 252–3
patriarchy theory  411–12
pregnancy  80
Scandinavia  236
social protection  60
white-collar  269
working time capability  87
see also caregiving; gender entries;
motherhood; work, paid/unpaid
Wooden, M.  76
work
culture  137
and employment  26, 191–2
fragmentation  281
intensification  77, 125, 126, 201–2, 205–6,
277, 438
nature of  304, 305, 306, 310, 311
non-standard  398–9
paid/unpaid  34, 47, 52, 73–4, 99, 219, 243,
282–3, 289, 354, 411–12, 413–14, 424–5
see also decent work
work refusal  80, 83, 84
work schedules  349–50
control over  36–7, 60, 66, 285
fixed hour  211
flexibility  365
inconvenient  143
nurses  379–80
predictability  279–80, 281–2
Work Trends survey, Heldrich Centre  211n3
work–life balance  vii, 2, 3, 25, 145
commitment  144
decent working time  20
EU policies  28, 29, 30–1
family  16, 26, 47, 236, 248, 249, 250–1, 253,
254, 255, 284, 425, 426–7, 429, 437
industrialization  65
institutions  109
Japan  8
life course  120
OECD  33–4, 36, 37
productivity  430–2
Spain  376
time poverty  438
working conditions  185
working hours, long  33–4
workers
autonomy  197–8, 293, 339
consumption  397
control over schedules  36
decent working time  209, 229–30
dissatisfied  168
freedom of choice  35
health issues  95, 266
independence  36
individual-choice rights  87
and managers  195–7
preferences  77
representation  24, 187–92
seasonal  398, 413
skill levels  41, 52, 272–3, 274, 284–5
technological change  42
time organization  185
unskilled  265–8, 277, 278–85
wages  272–3
weekend work  404, 405, 406, 407
see also women workers
workers, white-collar  265–7, 399, 404
age factors  269
graduates  269
part-time work  269
service sector  268–70
temporal availability  274
unskilled  267–77, 284–5
working conditions  267–77
workers’ rights  21–2, 24
individual choice  87
labour law  85
legislation  86
part-time work  235, 236, 243–4
refusal  80–1
Workers with Family Responsibilities
Convention, 1981 (No. 156), ILO
423–4
working conditions  14, 21
France  265–7, 273–7
improvements  14
labour market  273–4
nurses  374, 377
sectoral differences  275–6
trade unions  398
wages  270–3
workers, white-collar, unskilled  267–77
work–life balance  185
Decent working time
462
working hour deficits  76
working hour gaps  71
working hours  48, 300, 310
actual/preferred  vi, 229, 419–20, 421n4, 424,
433–4
adjustment  156
age factors  72, 296, 306
annualized  100–1, 128–9, 130, 183, 194, 207,
247, 271, 376
arrangement of  419
Belgium  373
blurred  298–9
compressed  138
decentralization  66
diversification  66
European Labour Force Survey  254
extremes  255–6
Finland  290–1, 422–3
flexibility  vi, 4, 19, 85, 230
France  373
full-time/part-time  17, 240, 241, 242
gender factors  49, 71, 174, 291, 307, 309
health  29
individualization  66
job status  226–8, 292, 299, 309
legislation  vi, 80, 433–4
managers  422–3
minimum requirements  215
motherhood  107
national differences  373
nurses  374, 377
occupational grading  422–3
overlapping  186
part-time  109–10, 167–8
per capita  19, 35
as performance indicator  77
preferences  159–60, 164–6, 168, 169–70, 209,
221–2, 295–6, 297, 306–9
private sector  217–18
rotating  186
self-employment  33
service sector  1
social hours  436
standard/non-standard  126, 131–2, 399, 425
state intervention  181–2
unsocial  279, 284
wage levels  76, 214
workplace culture  299, 306
working hours, long  49, 55
Australia  19, 76, 291
child rearing  301, 303
Denmark  17, 48, 49, 161
gender differences  34, 144, 294, 301, 302, 303,
304, 314, 428
health  76, 421
Japan  19, 32, 291
job status  294, 301, 303
managers  294–5, 304, 305, 306
motivation  303–6, 310–11
presenteeism  220, 295
productivity  284–5, 430–1
SER  48
work, nature of  304, 305, 306
working hours reduction
demand side  162
education levels  165
France  181–2, 296
gender differences  163–8, 309
individual preferences  218, 220
Norway  81
parents  253–4
UK legislation  129
see also reduction of working time (RWT)
working time  v, 1, 3, 15, 289, 346
autonomy  299, 301, 303, 306, 314, 370
capabilities  67–70, 87, 433, 435, 436, 437
CBI  255
changes  135–41
collective agreement  321–2
collective bargaining  182
compliance  129, 141–3, 144
compressed  431
culture  295–6, 306, 314
densification  32–3
developing countries  28
employment relationship  127
and family  26, 141–2
flexibility  5, 7, 20, 28, 29, 32–3, 47, 52, 56,
59–60, 327, 431
forfeiture  332–4
formalized  370, 372, 374, 375–6
individual preferences  198, 290, 433–4
job time  392
knowledge workers  292–4, 309–12
life course  31, 95–6
Index
463
life-cycle  392, 424
managers  291–2
national differences  27, 110–11, 372
options  110–13, 115–16
per person employed  16, 17
policies  13, 17, 19, 28–34, 35
post-industrial  289–90
preferences  69, 70–8, 82–3, 296
productivity  25, 431n10
reconceptualization  66
reconfiguration  8–9
regulation  66, 93, 98, 278, 319–22, 326–38,
370, 375, 430
SER  46
service sector  349–52
situational perspective  200–1
standardization  323
stress  32–3
variable  183
see also decent working time; reduction of
working time (RWT)
working time accounts system
annualized  19
changes  13–14
decent working time  339
Germany  7, 31, 326, 327–30, 432
regulations  112
take-up rate  35
time credit withdrawal  334–5
Working time around the world, ILO  437
working time budgets  329, 331, 336
Working Time Directive, EU  28, 29, 36, 134,
420
Working Time Regulations (1998), UK  83–4
workloads  200, 201, 332–3, 383
Workplace and Employee Survey (WES),
Statistics Canada  396–7, 399–400, 401,
402–3
workplace culture  77, 85, 299, 306
Workplace Employee Relations Survey  137
Works Constitution Act, Germany  322, 336
works councils  7, 320, 322
co-determination  329–30, 336–7, 338
crisis of legitimacy  333
industrial relations  339
overtime  332
World Health Organization  396
Yerkes, M.  6, 426, 429
Ylöstalo, P.  291
youth unemployment  242, 350
Zeytinoglu, I.  8–9, 396, 425
Decent working time
464
